Tuesday 31 May 2022

Bachelet’s “Failed” Xinjiang Visit Draws Widespread Condemnation and Calls For Her To Resign

On Saturday, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet concluded her highly anticipated visit to Xinjiang. It had been hoped that Bachelet’s visit might provide some form of accountability for the millions of Uyghurs subject to Beijing’s campaign of repression, even in spite of the constraints imposed by the Chinese government. What began in controversy—with framing of her visit as an opportunity for dialogue rather than an investigation into human rights abuses—ultimately ended in widespread criticism from governments and activists alike, who viewed her performance as little more than fodder for state propaganda. Many Uyghur groups called for Bachelet’s resignation and questioned whether the UN remains a capable vehicle for achieving justice for crimes against their humanity. 

At the end of her visit, Bachelet hosted a 45-minute online press conference, during which she gave a prepared statement and fielded several questions from Chinese and international media outlets. She adopted Beijing’s framing of the human rights issues in Xinjiang as counterrorism measures, and described the mass-internment camps using the CCP’s misleading term of “vocational education and training centers” (VETCs). Bachelet declared that “The government assured me that the VETC system has been dismantled,” but admitted that she was “unable to assess the full scale of the VETCs.” She also did not discuss any of the revelations in the Xinjiang Police Files that were released during her visit. Stuart Lau from Politico reported on other significant shortcomings of Bachelet’s visit:

Bachelet admitted that the only prison she visited in Xinjiang was not one in which Uyghurs convicted of terrorism or political crimes are held. Those are the charges most commonly meted out by the Chinese authorities to anyone in the region who spoke up against the country’s high-handed approach to their communities.

She also didn’t see any operating internment camp — as Chinese officials told her all the so-called “vocational training centers” have closed down.

[…] While Bachelet said she asked Beijing officials to “rethink” certain policies, she was also complacent about what she said she managed to achieve during the trip.

“Of course, being part of a bubble because of the COVID-19 restrictions, we could meet some people and not everyone,” Bachelet said. “But with the people we were able to speak to, it was in an unsupervised manner.” She made no mention of what human rights groups say is a pervasive use of surveillance technologies by the Xinjiang government. [Source]

Many observers lambasted Bachelet for appearing to read prepared remarks when answering a question from Chinese state media, and for spending more time answering their questions about human rights abuses in the U.S. than those in China: 

The goal of Bachelet’s muted approach may have been to save sharper critiques for conversations behind closed doors and to “pave the way for more regular, meaningful interactions in the future.” But as Human Rights Watch director Kenneth Roth stated, “Such quiet backroom conversation is just what Beijing wants—no public reporting, no pressure to end its intense repression of Uyghurs and others.” Raphael Viana David, Acting Asia Programme Manager for the International Service for Human Rights, argued that Bachelet’s silence only emboldens Beijing, tarnishes the UN’s credibility, and fails to improve the human rights situation in China:

Bachelet fell short even of the work done by the UN’s very own independent experts and committees in documenting both the scope and the gravity of rights violations across the country.

[…] Unlike the 2000s, Xi Jinping’s China is not one where limited space exists for dialogue on human rights. As NGOs, our experience working on China tells us that closed-door dialogue does not work: speaking out is not a matter only of principle, it is the only leverage for human rights change in China we have. Regrettably, the High Commissioner does not appear to be interested.

[…] This was not only a test for her, but for the credibility of the UN’s human rights office, and she failed. Her visit will have a lasting impact on the prospects for an impartial, multilateral response to China’s human rights crisis. This will only bolster Beijing’s entrenched sense of impunity. [Source]

Indeed, Chinese diplomats and state media jumped on the occasion to instrumentalize Bachelet’s cooperative approach. Zha Liyou, consul general at the Chinese consulate in Kolkata, wrote that Bachelet’s visit “[n]ot only vindicated, but justified” China’s human rights model. As Bloomberg reported, many human rights activists and researchers believed Bachelet’s handling of her visit whitewashed the human rights abuses that she was entrusted to combat: 

“There are now calls to either abandon the UN Human Rights Commission, or to have her step down immediately,” said the US-based researcher [Adrian Zenz]. “I think the Uyghurs are feeling profoundly betrayed.”

[…] Sophie Richardson, the China director at Human Rights Watch, told Bloomberg TV on Monday that Bachelet’s trip had “achieved exactly what the Chinese government wanted — a near-total lack of criticism of its human rights record.”

“Perhaps worst of all, the fixes that the high commissioner proposed are precisely the ones that have been tried in the past and failed and effectively enable the Chinese government to commit even worse human rights,” she added.

William Nee, research and advocacy coordinator at Chinese Human Rights Defenders, said Bachelet’s remarks were too “weak to match the gravity of the situation.” 

“To a large extent, this is the sort of whitewashing that the human rights community was afraid would happen when the news of her visit was announced,” he wrote in an email to Bloomberg News. [Source]

At Axios, Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian reported that many activists felt betrayed and called on Bachelet to resign: 

“If the one institution that was supposed to stand by us ended up aiding the Chinese government’s own narrative, what more could we do to change the victims’ lives?” said Rayhan Asat, a human rights lawyer and Yale law fellow whose brother is detained in Xinjiang, calling this the “ultimate betrayal.”

The institution of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is now “badly compromised,” said Frederick John Packer, a professor of law at the University of Ottawa who served on the drafting committee secretariat at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, where the plan to establish the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights was created. Packer said he was “still in shock” at how the visit had turned out.

“The world cannot afford this,” he said. “She must resign along with those who advised this awful course.”

[…] “Bachelet neglects the duties of her office, her mandate to the world to stand up for human rights, and the UN’s founding principles,” [D.C.-based advocacy group Campaign for Uyghurs] said in a statement. [Source]

Even esteemed Chinese law professor and founder of the U.S.-Asia Law Institute Jerome Cohen, rarely a vocal presence online, tweeted a scathing critique of Bachelet and called on her to resign: 

Some activists wondered whether Bachelet, who was once herself subject to arbitrary detention and torture, might have handled the visit differently in her youth:

Several Western governments shared similarly critical assessments. Putting it bluntly, Germany’s Federal Foreign Office stated that Bachelet’s visit to Xinjiang “failed.” Commenting on the government’s remarks, German newspaper Die Ziet wrote that Bachelet did not do justice to the suffering of the Uyghurs. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed concern that “the conditions Beijing authorities imposed on the visit did not enable a complete and independent assessment of the human rights environment,” and he was troubled “that no insight was provided into the whereabouts of hundreds of missing Uyghurs and conditions for over a million individuals in detention.” Finbarr Bermingham reported for the South China Morning Post that the EU also expressed “regret” about Bachelet’s visit: 

“While taking note of the non-investigative nature of the visit, we regret that the high commissioner’s access to independent civil society organisations, human rights defenders and detention centres was limited, and that this did not allow her to assess the full scale of political re-education camps in Xinjiang,” Massrali said.

[…] [After] watching Saturday’s press conference – held virtually due to Covid-19 restrictions – European diplomats remain unconvinced of the wisdom of her visit.

[…] Another [diplomat] pointed out that Bachelet had spoken at length about US gun violence when asked by Chinese state media, while giving only “curt” remarks to international media’s questions about human rights conditions in China.

It was suggested that Bachelet had erred in asking Xinjiang authorities to review their own policies, which was akin to “asking the wolf to take care of the sheep”. [Source]

Bachelet’s failed visit raises questions about the integrity of the UN and its ability to achieve justice for the Uyghurs, considering that the Chinese government appears to have neutered the world’s most authoritative human rights actor during the most high-profile visit to assess the largest mass internment of an ethnic-religious minority since the Holocaust. The wave of widespread criticism over Bachelet’s unusually tame remarks shows that “even the UN cannot convince the world of its impartiality,” as Vincent Ni wrote in The Guardian. (In related blows to the UN’s integrity over the past week, China was elected to the World Health Organization’s Executive Board, and North Korea took over as the chair of the UN Disarmament Forum.) In an op-ed for The Washington Post, Josh Rogin described “How the U.N. became a tool of China’s genocide denial propaganda”:

“Nothing that we’ve seen from the high commissioner’s trip to China dispels our worry that this will be used as a massive propaganda victory for the Chinese government,” [Human Rights Watch U.N. director Louis] Charbonneau told me in an interview. “Bachelet needs to work to put an end to, and not enable, the perception that the U.N. is letting China get away with massive abuses at no cost.”

[…] Bachelet’s trip was not just a missed opportunity to speak truth about China’s atrocities. She has undermined her credibility and the overall credibility of the U.N. system on human rights. Beijing has compromised yet another part of the U.N. system, said Christopher Walker, vice president at the National Endowment for Democracy.

[…] Leaders in Beijing are now surely more confident than ever they can commit mass atrocities without fearing significant costs imposed by the international community. When the history books are written about the world’s failure to stop the Uyghur genocide, Bachelet’s trip will go down as one of many shameful episodes. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/05/bachelets-failed-xinjiang-visit-draws-widespread-condemnation-and-calls-for-her-to-resign/
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Minitrue: Keep Firm Grip on Messaging Over Shanghai COVID Relaxation

The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. The name of the issuing body has been omitted to protect the source.

At 18:00 this evening, [city government account] Shanghai Announces revealed forthcoming changes on entry and exit for residential districts, public transit operation, private vehicle usage etc from June 1. All media, please promptly republish to widely inform city residents. In reports, take care to keep a firm grip on messaging; titles and content must be precise, to avoid ambiguity or misreadings. Use methods like promoted comments to vigorously roll out online guidance and secure the understanding, cooperation, and support of the city masses. Specific requirements are as follows:

1. Do not use the phrase “ending the lockdown.” Unlike Wuhan, Shanghai never declared a lockdown, so there is no “ending the lockdown.” All parts of Shanghai underwent static management-style suppression and suspensions, but the city’s core functions kept operating throughout this period. Emphasize that related measures were temporary, conditional, and limited. The resumption on June 1 will also be conditional: it is by no means the case that every person in every district across the whole city will be able to freely head out at once, nor that this is a uniform relaxation. Reports should not play up “comprehensive relaxation” or “comprehensive [return to] normality” …. (May 30, 2022) [Chinese]

This apparently incomplete directive comes as Shanghai authorities announce an end to two months of heavy restrictions as “the epidemic situation in our city has been effectively controlled and the situation continues to improve.” The easing follows similar relaxation of Beijing’s more limited controls late last week. Despite the success of Shanghai’s restrictions in containing the outbreak, their sometimes draconian and arbitrary implementation sparked public frustration and suspicion that absolute, unyielding prioritization of COVID control had more to do with politics than public health. Fencing installed to help enforce the controls is already being removed, though many milder restrictions on activities and businesses will remain in place.

The directive’s mention of “static management” offers a glimpse of the sometimes bewildering proliferation of jargon, slogans, and euphemism spawned amid this wave of controls. CDT last week translated a compilation of these terms, from “Dynamic Clearance” to “Temporarily Distance Oneself from Stressors,” that had been deleted from WeChat for unspecified policy violations. Another of the lockdown’s linguistic contributions is the phrase “we’re the last generation,” a Shanghai resident’s instantly iconic retort to a police officer’s warning that non-compliance with COVID control rules would haunt his future descendants. This exchange was captured in one of many similar videos that circulated amid the lockdown. Audio from several of these was compiled in a wildly viral and quickly censored video titled “Voices of April,” which was translated by CDT and targeted by a previously published directive.

Shanghai’s size and economic and cultural prominence ensured that its restrictions drew widespread attention, but many other cities across and China have faced similar conditions. A pair of CDT translations in mid-May described long lockdowns in China’s border towns. Another set in April highlighted the plight of Chinese truck drivers forced to navigate a shifting and unpredictable mosaic of disparate local rules while working to ease supply shortages across the country.

真Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/05/minitrue-keep-firm-grip-on-messaging-over-shanghai-covid-relaxation/
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Friday 27 May 2022

Photo: Canola fields, Motorbike Trip Tibet, by Matt Ming

A lone rider stands next to two motorcycles parked alongside a road, gazing out over a stunning green-and-yellow patchwork of canola fields, and beyond that, a stream meandering through deep green foothills.

Canola fields, Motorbike Trip Tibet, by Matt Ming (CC BY 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/05/photo-canola-fields-motorbike-trip-tibet-by-matt-ming/
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Heartbreak, Disinformation, and New Punitive Measures in the Wake of Xinjiang Police Files Release

With the release of the Xinjiang Police Files on Tuesday, the world has seen what Xinjiang’s “re-education” camps look like from inside official Chinese government databases: mugshots of thousands of faces, spreadsheets filled with personal data on detainees, and training guidelines  for guards, including “shoot to kill” directives in the event of a detainee escape. The photos and files have elicited a range of empathetic emotions from Uyghur communities in exile, Chinese netizens, and foreign governments, and an increased resolve for accountability. For the Chinese government, however, the release of the files has provided another opportunity to deny the evidence and distort the narrative about human rights violations in Xinjiang. 

For Uyghurs, the files were a vivid reminder of the injustice their community has suffered from the CCP’s policies in Xinjiang. But not everyone was eager to look. “Everyone is going through those pictures thinking is there a family member, is there a neighbour or someone that they studied with or somebody they may know that are in the pictures that are being released,” said Ramila Chanisheff, president of the Australian Uyghur Tangritagh Women’s Association. Erin Handley from Australian national broadcaster ABC described the trauma many Uyghurs experienced as they looked through the photographs: 

“I couldn’t stop my tears,” said [Rayhangul Abliz, who searched for her parents, residents of a neighboring area].

“All of them look like my dad or my brothers, every [pair of] eyes looks like [they are] asking me … ‘Please help me’.”

[…] Ramila Chanisheff described the “devastation” many felt when looking at long sentences handed down for “absurd” reasons.

“It was extremely painful to read the report and see the thousands of innocent faces on the screen,” she said.

“We have relatives over there. So [we’ve been] scouring through the pictures.

“You can hear the anxiety and the stress and sadness in their voices.”

[…] Fatimah Abdulghafur, whose father was detained in Xinjiang in 2017 and died the following year, said looking at the photos was “retraumatising”. [Source]

Writer and linguist Abduweli Ayup and other Uyghurs identified some of their friends and family members among the new photographs:

In a powerful Twitter thread, Babur Ilchi summarized the mixed reactions many Uyghurs had to the photographs:

On Weibo, Chinese netizens shared feelings of heartbreak, powerlessness, and even complicity after reading through the Xinjiang Police Files. CDT editors have compiled and translated some of their Weibo comments, with the names of the commenters anonymized to protect their identities: 

Iha****say：Seeing this made me so very sad. They did nothing wrong, but were deprived of their freedom and all the possibilities of life, and then that was covered up and buried. Why was this done to them?

DE****S：A feeling of powerlessness.

hus****hu：That first photo—once you’ve seen it, you’ll never be able to forget it.

sinc*****icui：Looking into her eyes, I felt as if I’d been pulled into the abyss …

sinc*****icui：After seeing those photos and reading those files, I opened up my Weibo and WeChat and wanted to vomit. I feel like none of us is innocent, and I am guilty, too. [Chinese]

Many Uyghurs worked to capitalize on the global spotlight to push for greater accountability. Two days after the leak of the Xinjiang Police Files, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) began its “Uyghur Summit” in Munich, bringing together over 200 activists, experts, and policymakers to discuss international advocacy strategies and the responsibility to protect. “Condemnation and empty statements cannot stop genocide,” WUC president Dolkun Isa said, adding, “There is no excuse anymore for governments, countries and international organizations to look the other way.” Mentioning the Xinjiang Police Files at the Oslo Freedom Forum, Jewher Ilham, daughter of detained Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, stated: “Today, what we need is action. Together, we may actually have what it takes to free my family and friends who are locked up, who are trapped in this endless life of captivity.” 

In a significant move following the release of the Xinjiang Police Files, German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz issued Germany’s first top-level denunciation of the human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Economy Minister Robert Habeck said Germany would change its China policy to give greater priority to human rights and to cut dependencies, stating: “Our China policy must change. Appeasement for economic interests is no strategy.” Michael Roth, Chairman of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that these changes would apply to German companies in Xinjiang, for whom “consequences must be drawn.” Members of the European Parliament have also been vocal following the release of the files. Reinhard Bütikofer called on EU member states to impose additional human-rights-related sanctions on China, and Raphaël Glucksmann called on the UN Human Rights office to end its “complicity” with Beijing by publishing its report on Xinjiang.

The new tone was echoed in the European press. An editorial by Germany’s Der Spiegel read, “In the wake of the Xinjiang Police Files torture revelations, policymakers must ask themselves: What crimes are we accepting for our prosperity?” An editorial by France’s Le Monde launched an “appeal to reason,” noting that the Xinjiang Police Files “remind us that we must keep our eyes wide open to the reality of China’s repression of ethnic minorities.” Spain’s El País also concluded that the files “prove China’s repression against the Uyghurs.”

One domain where governments have been putting rhetoric into action is in the regulation of supply chains tainted by forced labor from Xinjiang. Much of the discussion has revolved around Xinjiang cotton, but as a recent report from C4ADS noted, the problem extends to at least eight other goods produced in disproportionately high volumes in Xinjiang that are part of global supply chains. In response to the Xinjiang Police Files, Franziska Brantner, state secretary of the German Ministry of Economy, said the European Commission “will present [a] law on banning products from forced labour,” adding that it “will be important to work on it rapidly.” In the U.S., the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) will soon come into force on June 21, unleashing a regulatory revolution funded by millions of dollars of enforcement capacity. Alexandra Stevenson and Sapna Maheshwari of The New York Times reported how the increased visibility of human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the looming UFLPA are reversing the tide of American business expansion in China: 

Cotton from Xinjiang is widely used in the global garment industry. As of last fall, 16 percent of cotton clothes on store shelves in the United States had fiber from Xinjiang, according to a survey by Oritain, a company that does forensic testing to determine the origin of raw materials. But regulation soon to go into effect in the United States will allow customs officers to seize shipments of any goods that are made in Xinjiang unless companies can prove their supply chains are not tainted with forced labor.

The new rule, called the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and the inability of companies to determine what is happening in their supply chains are unraveling decades of the clothing industry’s expansion in China.

“That era is drawing to a close because of the gravity of the forced-labor crisis and the broader human-rights crisis in the Uyghur region,” said Scott Nova, executive director of the Worker Rights Consortium, a steering committee member of the Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region. “The increasing authoritarianism of the Chinese government across the board is creating a situation where business as usual isn’t feasible anymore.” [Source]

Predictably, the Chinese government received the release of the Xinjiang Police Files with scorn. At a press briefing on Tuesday, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin called it “the latest example of the anti-China forces’ smearing of Xinjiang,” adding, “the lies and rumors they spread cannot deceive the world.” China has consistently claimed that the recurring evidence of abuses in Xinjiang is false. When UN Human Rights Chief Michelle Bachelet arrived in China earlier this week, Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed his hope that her visit would “clarify misinformation.” Meanwhile, the CCP has engaged in a global propaganda campaign to assert its own narrative regarding Xinjiang. A new report released Friday by The Brookings Institution and the Alliance for Securing Democracy demonstrates how Beijing continues to exploit search-engine results to shape views on Xinjiang and COVID-19. Covering the report for The Wall Street Journal, Karen Hao described how terms such as “Xinjiang” and “Adrian Zenz” (the academic behind the release of the Xinjiang Police Files) yielded a significant number of sources drawn from Chinese state media:

Searches for “Xinjiang” returned content from Chinese state outlets in the top results on YouTube almost daily over the duration of the study, which covered 120 days from November to February, as well as close to 90% of the time on either Google’s or Bing’s news sites.

The searched content that came up from state-controlled providers typically denied widespread media and scholarly reports of human-rights abuses in the region, casting them as part of a coordinated attempt by Western governments to smear China.

[…] On Thursday, shortly after the release of the trove, a U.S.-based search for “Adrian Zenz” turned up one Chinese state media result on the first page of Google and four of the top 10 videos on YouTube, attacking the scholar’s credentials and accusing him of lying.

[…] Chinese state media outlets were able to break through to top results regularly on web search, which prioritizes measures of a source’s quality, for more targeted terms like “Xinjiang terrorism” or Mr. Zenz’s name, reflecting Beijing’s creation of a robust information network, according to Joan Donovan, research director of Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy. [Source]

With translation by Cindy Carter.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/05/heartbreak-disinformation-and-new-punitive-measures-in-the-wake-of-xinjiang-police-files-release/
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Translation: The Little Dictionary of Shanghai’s Fight Against the Pandemic

The coronavirus pandemic has introduced a rash of new vocabulary into everyday life across the globe, but perhaps nowhere more so than in China, where the battle for “COVID zero” has spawned an epidemic of slogans. Political rallying cries and abstruse formulations are endemic to the Chinese Communist Party, which often communicates in a style nearly impenetrable to uninformed observers. The pandemic seems to have exacerbated the CCP’s predilection. Terms such as “spatial-temporal proximity,” “Baymax,” and “social clearance” are regularly employed by the media and used in daily life. But it seems that simply compiling the Party’s slogans is a sensitive endeavor. WeChat censors recently deleted a post titled “The Little Dictionary of Shanghai’s Fight Against the Pandemic 4.0” for violating the platform’s rules. The censored dictionary, a compilation of terms introduced or adapted during the Shanghai lockdown, is both a valuable archive of the outbreak of slogans and a unique form of protest art.

Organized into eight sections—each given a dry title such as “A Numbers Game” or “Vivid Metaphors,” and concluding with the section  “Incoherence”—the little dictionary is a masterclass in how language can be rendered meaningless. Arranged in such an expansive list, the slogans become both abstraction and absurdity. One entire section consists of phrases echoing an official formula, originally applied to tax and fee collection, which has since become infamous in the form of the leaked instruction to ‘round up everyone who should be rounded up‘ in Xinjiang. CDT has translated the now-censored little dictionary and will give choice slogans full expositions on our China Digital Space wiki: 

Phase 1 一些新概念
Phase 1: New Concepts

动态清零  dòngtài qīnglíng
 Dynamic Clearance

社会面清零  shèhuìmiàn qīnglíng
 Societal Clearance

社会面基本清零 shèhuìmiàn jīběn qīnglíng
 Basic Societal Clearance

社会面动态清零 shèhuìmiàn dòngtài qīnglíng
 Dynamic Societal Clearance

硬隔离 yìng gélí
 Hard Quarantine

软分隔 ruǎn fēngé
 Soft Barricades

静默期 jìngmò qī
 Silent Period

微网格 wēi wǎnggé
 Micro Grid

网格长 wǎnggé zhǎng
 Grid Manager

静态管理 jìngtài guǎnlǐ
 Static Management

强化兜底 qiánghuà dōudǐ
 Strengthen Baseline Guarantees

流调判密 liúdiào pànmì
 Identify Close Contacts Through Contact Tracing

点式复工 diǎnshì fùgōng
 Point-to-Point Return-to-Work

有序解封 yǒuxù jiěfēng
 Orderly End to Lockdown

重新赋码 chóngxīn fùmǎ
 Renew Quality-Control Codes

底线思维 dǐxiàn sīwéi
 “Worst-Case-Scenario” Thinking

极限思维 jíxiàn sīwéi
 “By-Any-Means-Necessary” Thinking 

压茬推进 yāchá tuījìn (Origin is Shaanxi dialect: “niāchá tuījìn”)
 No-Stone-Unturned Advance

提级管理 tíjí guǎnlǐ
 Enhanced Management 

数字哨兵 shùzì shàobīng
 Digital Sentry 

无疫之区 wúyì zhī qū
 Pandemic-free Zone

网格化管理 wǎnggéhuà guǎnlǐ
 Grid Management 

防疫零动态 fángyì líng dòngtài
 Pandemic Stasis

无差别消毒 wúchābié xiāodú
 Indiscriminate Disinfecting 

安全屋技术 ānquánwū jìshù
 Safehouse Technology

沉默少数群体 chénmò shǎoshù qúntǐ
 Silent Minority 

流动中的风险 liúdòngzhōng de fēngxiǎn
 Ambulatory Risk

严格静态管理人员 yángé jìngtài guǎnlǐ rényuán
 Strict Static Management Personnel 

社会面流动人员 shèhuìmiàn liúdòng rényuán
 Socially-ambulatory Personnel

小区自我静默期 xiǎoqū zìwǒ jìngmòqī
 Self-imposed Neighborhood Quiet Period

综合社会成本最低 zōnghé shèhuì chéngběn zuìdī
 Lowest Comprehensive Cost to Society

Phase 2  应X尽X  系列
Phase 2: The Must-Should Series

应收尽收 yīng shōu jìn shōu
 Round up everyone who should be rounded up.

应转尽转 yīng zhuǎn jìn zhuǎn
 Transfer everyone who should be transferred. 

应隔尽隔 yīng gé jìn gé
 Quarantine everyone who should be quarantined. 

应免尽免 yīng miǎn jìn miǎn
 Relieve all rents that can be relieved. 

应检尽检 yīng jiǎn jìn jiǎn
 Test everyone who should be tested. 

应治尽治 yīng zhì jìn zhì
 Treat everyone who should be treated. 

应接尽接 yīng jiē jìn jiē
 Vaccinate all those who should be vaccinated. 

应筛尽筛 yīng shāi jìn shāi
 Screen all those who should be screened. 

应开尽开 yīng kāi jìn kāi
 Open all businesses that should be opened. 

应考尽考 yīng kǎo jìn kǎo
 Allow all who must take standardized tests to take them. 

应续尽续 yīng xù jìn xù
 Refinance all loans that should be refinanced. 

应扫尽扫 yīng sǎo jìn sǎo
 Scan all health codes that should be scanned. 

应验尽验 yīng yàn jìn yàn
 Check all health codes that should be checked.

应贴尽贴 yīng tiē jìn tiē
 Post all contact-tracing QR codes that should be posted. 

应领尽领 yīng lǐng jìn lǐng
 Apply for all contact-tracing QR codes that should be applied for. 

Phase 3  一些数字游戏
Phase 3: A Numbers Game

四应四尽 sì yīng sì jìn
 The Four Must-Shoulds

六保一防 liù bǎo yì fáng
 The Six Protects and One Prevent

一戴四查 yí dài sì chá
 The One Wear and Four Checks

一日三检 yí rì sān jiǎn
 The Three Daily Checks

三消一静 sān xiāo yí jìng
 The Three Disinfects and One Waiting Period

三个并重 sān gè bìngzhòng
 The Three Equally Importants

一地一策 yí dì yí cè
 One Region, One Policy

一点一策 yì diǎn yí cè
 One Location, One Policy

一事一协调 yí shì yì xiétiáo
 One Issue, One Coordination

一事一对策 yí shì yí duìcè
 One Issue, One Solution

一小区一分析 yì xiǎoqū yì fēnxī
 One Neighborhood, One Analysis

一小区一处方 yì xiǎoqū yì chǔfāng
 One Neighborhood, One Prescription 

一行业一指引 yì hángyè yì zhǐyǐn
 One Industry, One Guide

一点多组、多点一组 yì diǎn duō zǔ,  duō diǎn yì zǔ
 One Location, Multiple Groups; Multiple Locations, One Group 

以点带链、以链带面 yǐ diǎn dài liàn, yǐ liàn dài miàn
 Have Industry Leaders Carry the Supply Chain; Have the Supply Chain Carry Everything Else. 

一天一户、一人一次 yì tiān yí hù 、 yì rén yí cì
 One Day, One Household; One Person, One Time

“1+1+1″管理 “yī jiā yī jiā yī” guǎnlǐ
 “1+1+1” Management 

“4+7+12”联动机制 “sì jiā qī jiā shí’èr” liándòng jīzhì
 “4+7+12” Coordinated System

“2+2” 抗原核酸检测 “èr jiā èr” kàngyuán hésuān jiǎncè
 “2+2” Antigen and Nucleic Acid Tests

“四早”要求 “sì zǎo” yāoqiú
 The “Four Early’s” Requirement 

“四集中”原则 “sì jízhōng” yuánzé
 The “Four Centralizations” Principle

“绿蓝黄红”4色风险 “lǜ lán huáng hóng” sìsè fēngxiǎn
 “Green, Blue, Yellow, Red” Four Colors of Risk

15分钟检测服务圈 shíwǔ fēnzhōng jiǎncè fúwùquān
 15-minute Testing Service Circles

三辆车  三道口  三圈判定 sān liàng chē, sān dào kǒu, sān quān pàndìng
 The Three Cars, Three Entrances, Three Circles Determination 

三区分级差异化防控 sān qū fēnjí chàyìhuà fángkòng
 Three-level Zones Targeted Prevention 

一朵云一根线一个面一条边 yì duǒ yún, yì gēn xiàn, yí gè miàn, yì tiáo biān
 One Cloud, One Line, One Facet, One Side

Phase 4  一些排比对仗
Phase 4: Antithetical Parallels

日清日结 rì qīng rì jié
 OEC: Overall; Everyone, Everything, Every Day; Control and Clear

日产日清 rì chǎn rì qīng
 Dispose of Medical Waste the Day It Is Produced 

追阳转阳 zhuī yáng zhuǎn yáng
 Follow Up on Positive Tests, Transfer Positive Patients

双阳双控 shuāng yáng shuāng kòng
 The Two Positives and Two Controls

双联双进 shuāng lián shuāng jìn
 The Two Connections and Two Advancements

群防群治 qún fáng qún zhì
 Mass Surveillance, Mass Governance

即采、即走、即追 jí cǎi, jí zǒu, jí zhuī
 Test, Ship, Trace

扫街、扫楼、扫村 sǎo jiē, sǎo lóu, sǎo cūn
 Scour the Streets, Scour the High-rises, Scour the Villages

抓早、抓小、抓基础 zhuā zǎo, zhuā xiǎo, zhuā jīchǔ
 Seize Early, Seize Small, Seize the Base

快封、快筛、快消、快解 kuài fēng, kuài shāi, kuài xiāo, kuài jiě
 Lock Down Quickly, Test Quickly, Disinfect Quickly, Lift Lockdown Quickly

采、送、检、报、核 cǎi, sòng, jiǎn, bào, hé
 Sample, Send, Test, Report, Confirm

从严从紧、从细从实 cóng yán cóng jǐn, cóng xì cóng shí
 Urgency and Rigor, Detail and Efficacy

有序放开、有限流动 yǒuxù fàngkāi, yǒuxiàn liúdòng
 Open Up in an Orderly Manner, with Limited Movement 

有效管控、分类管理 yǒuxiào guǎnkòng, fēnlèi guǎnlǐ
 Effective Control, Discrete Management 

动态调整、动态公布 dòngtài tiáozhěng, dòngtài gōngbù
 Dynamic Adjustments, Dynamic Announcements

连点成片、连片成面 lián diǎn chéng piàn, lián piàn chéng miàn
 String Points into Sectors, Connect Sectors to the Whole

有限人员、有限区域、有限活动 yǒuxiàn rényuán, yǒuxiàn qūyù, yǒuxiàn huódòng
 Limited Personnel, Limited Areas, Limited Activities

Phase 5  一些重要行动
Phase 5: Important Campaigns

大冲洗 dà chōngxǐ
 The Great Rinse

大清消 dà qīngxiāo
 The Great Disinfection

大总攻 dà zǒnggōng
 The Great General Offensive

捞干扑灭 lāogān pūmiè
 Dredge Up, Stamp Out

逢阳快转 féng yáng kuài zhuǎn
 Transfer Every Positive Case Quickly

拔点清面 bá diǎn qīng miàn
 Clear the Whole from the Roots

挂图作战 guàtú zuòzhàn
 Battle According to the Blueprint

清源行动 qīng yuán xíngdòng
 Operation Purify-the-Source

敲门关爱行动 qiāomén guān’ài xíngdòng
 Knock with Love Campaign

腾换扩容行动 téng huàn kuò róng xíngdòng
 Make Room, Change Purpose, Expand Campaign 

中医药干预行动 zhōngyīyào gānyù xíngdòng
 Traditional Chinese Medicine Intervention Campaign

拔点攻坚行动 bádiǎn gōngjiān xíngdòng
 The Struggle at the Roots Campaign

大上海保卫战 dà shànghǎi bǎowèizhàn
 The Great Battle to Defend Shanghai

九大攻坚行动 jiǔ dà gōngjiān xíngdòng
 The Nine Great Struggles Campaign

十大清零攻坚行动 shí dà qīnglíng gōngjiān xíngdòng
 The Ten Great Struggles to Achieve Zero Campaign

Phase 6  一些生动比喻
 Phase 6: Vivid Metaphors

“加减乘除”解决民生需求 “ jiā jiǎn chéng chú” jiějué mínshēng xūqiú
 “Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division” to Meet Livelihood Needs

治未病 zhì wèibìng
 Treat Preventatively

全国一盘棋 quánguó yì pán qí
 The Whole Country Is One Chessboard

拧紧“水龙头” níngjǐn “shuǐlóngtóu”
 Nip Cases in the Bud

拔钉子 bá dīngzi
 Pull Nails

摸清疫情“底数” mōqīng yìqíng “dǐshù”
 Ascertain Pandemic “Base Numbers” 

积极挖潜扩大“增量” jījí wāqián kuòdà “zēngliàng”
 Actively Tap into Potential to Expand Supplies

优化管理盘活“存量” yōuhuà guǎnlǐ pánhuó “cúnliàng”
 Optimize Management to Better Utilize Existing Resources

“较劲爬坡”关键时刻 “jiàojìn pápō” guānjiàn shíkè
 A Critical Juncture in Our “Summit Push”

打通“大动脉” dǎtōng “dà dòngmài”
 Open “Major Arteries”

畅通“微循环” chàngtōng “wēi xúnhuán”
 Connect “Micro-Loops”

Phase 7  一些作战口号
 Phase 7: Battle Slogans

层层压实 céngcéng yāshí
 Instill Responsibility Through the Command Chain

包保责任 bāobǎo zérèn
 Duty to Protect

守土有责 shǒutǔ yǒuzé
 Take Responsibility for Your Jurisdiction

全力以复 quánlì yǐfù (Official sources put “复”, a pun on 全力以赴 quánlì yǐfù, in quotation marks.)
 Go All Out to Resume Production 

发现一起 扑灭一起 fāxiàn yì qǐ pūmiè yì qǐ
 Find One Case, Stamp Out One Case

清零一块 巩固一块 qīnglíng yí kuài, gǒnggù yí kuài
 Get One Section to Zero, Hold One Section to Zero

过“紧日子” guò “jǐn rìzi”
 Endure “Times of Austerity”

信心比金子更重要 xìnxīn bǐ jīnzi gèng zhòngyào
 Confidence Is Worth More Than Gold

Phase 8  一些语无伦次
Phase 8: Incoherence

关门不歇业 guānmén bù xiēyè
 Doors Stay Shut, Businesses Stay Open

解封不解防  jiěfēng bù jiěfáng
 End Lockdown, Don’t Let Your Guard Down

时空伴随者 shíkōng bànsuízhě
 Spatial-temporal Companions 

层层传导压力 céngcéng chuándǎo yālì
 Exert Pressure Through the Command System

控制摄取信息量 kòngzhì shèqǔ xìnxīliàng
 Control Information Ingestion

暂时离开应激源 zànshí líkāi yìngjīyuán
 Temporarily Distance Oneself from Stressors

Alex Yu contributed to this post.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/05/translation-the-little-dictionary-of-shanghais-fight-against-the-pandemic/
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