Thursday 30 September 2021

Photo: Wuxi Snapshot, by Haoyuan Kevin Xia



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Photo: Wuxi Snapshot, by Haoyuan Kevin Xia



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New Editorial Guidelines Leash RTHK to National Security Law

New guidelines by Hong Kong’s public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) issued to its staff on Wednesday codify its editorial stance to support the National Security Law. The guidelines are the latest development in the razing of Hong Kong’s media landscape and the mutation of RTHK from investigative watchdog to neutered lapdog. Jeffie Lam and Denise Tsang from the South China Morning Post reported on the document’s warning to RTHK staff:

RTHK issued a detailed set of guidelines on Wednesday requiring staff to uphold “the constitutional order” of the city and China’s sovereignty, following allegations of “biased” news coverage stemming from the anti-government protests of 2019 that have sparked wars of words with officials and cancellations or revamps of several programmes.

The 105-page, wide-ranging document gave prominence to the national security law that Beijing imposed on the city last year, reminding RTHK producers and journalists to “implement” the directions given by the government in safeguarding security. They were also urged to be cautious in contacts with foreign governments and bodies as well as political or “illegal” organisations.

Failure to comply with the new set of guidelines would lead to disciplinary action, the broadcaster’s management warned, without spelling out what that meant. [Source]

Echoing similar wording in recent government guidelines on film censorship and charities, RTHK’s guidelines also used the more expansive phrase “contrary to the interests of national security,” in addition to merely “endangering national security,” when delineating what would constitute a violation.

In ordering RTHK staff to adhere to “the interests of national security” and China’s “national interests,” the guidelines imply that reporting should adopt the Chinese state’s interpretation of sensitive topics. As one staff member told Reuters, “I’m not sure that I will be able to produce any more programmes that aren’t directly in line with the government’s stance.” For example, citizens who challenge the state are now to be portrayed not as opposition protesters but as criminals. RTHK’s own coverage of the guidelines summarized this shrinking room for editorial neutrality: 

It says while public interest is the basis of RTHK’s work, the station should also take into consideration national interest, which is “an essential part of public interest”.

It says the station must identify itself with national interests in programmes on mainland affairs and Taiwan.

There are updated guidelines on reporting crime. Staff members are told to never portray criminals as victims and make sure criminal acts are not sympathised, justified or glamorised, adding that RTHK’s programmes must not instigate the public to participate in acts against the law.

They are told to be cautious when reporting or producing programmes involving people who are suspected of breaching the national security law. [Source]

Another alarming change to editorial protocol is the document’s mandatory referrals section, indicating when staff must seek permission from higher-level managers for permission to report on certain topics. Much of what was once the purview of individual staff members must now be approved by management:

5.28 The following matters must be referred to PPO (e.g. Chief Assignment Editor) or above or discussed in advance at editorial or senior staff meetings:

(a) broadcasting any interviews with criminals and people sought by police
(b) any proposal to grant anonymity to anyone trying to evade the law;
(c) payment to criminals or former criminals;
(d) broadcasting any surreptitious recording originally made for note-taking purposes;
(e) disclosing details of kidnapping or serious crimes which have been obtained surreptitiously or unofficially;
(f) requests from outside parties to see or obtain untransmitted recorded material; and
(g) commissioning of opinion polls on any political issue. [Source]

Even in the week leading up to the guidelines’ release, RTHK’s editorial position underwent subtle changes that foreshadowed the broadcaster’s future under the new guidelines. On Monday, RTHK published an article with positive coverage of a white paper released by China’s State Council Information Office. The article was copied almost word-for-word from a Xinhua article, without proper attribution; RTHK normally gives attribution when publishing articles from AFP. In addition, as the Hong Kong Free Press reported, “Three recent stories relating to the Tiananmen Massacre, and the commemorative groups and activities in Hong Kong, failed to mention there was a bloody crackdown. Rather, one of them referred to simply the ‘ending’ of the 1989 protests.”

In May, CDT published a timeline chronicling “two months of turmoil” at RTHK. The turmoil continued right up until the ominous developments of this week. In June, several RTHK radio and television programs were suddenly axed. At the beginning of August, RTHK wiped clean its Twitter account, which had become known for its often sardonic tone on developments in the city. The account started afresh with replies disabled.

Days later, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that the broadcaster would air more content from mainland state media in order to “nurture a stronger sense of patriotism.” This deepened fears that, as Hong Kong Journalists Association Chairperson Ronson Chan put it, “RTHK will become state media as soon as possible.” Chan questioned, though, whether “this will be effective propaganda for the Beijing authorities or just a means of HKSAR government to show their loyalty to Beijing. I think it’s the latter one.”

Also in August, regulators upheld a complaint against RTHK for implying that Taiwan is a country in a news report that referred to “1,800 polling stations nationwide.” The Communications Authority ruled: “It is a fact that Taiwan is not a country and hence the use of the term nationwide in the remark is inaccurate.” On July 20, RTHK staff received a memo introducing new rules on references to Taiwan, ominously bringing the organization’s policies into line with longstanding rules for mainland media. RTHK itself reported:

RTHK staff have been banned from using “inappropriate” terms such as “Taiwan’s president” or “Taiwan government” in all radio, television and online output, to comply with the one-China principle.

In a circular disseminated to all staff on Tuesday afternoon, management said as Hong Kong’s public service broadcaster as well as a government department, RTHK must strictly abide by the principle and exercise a “high degree of caution” in the use of terminology in relation to Taiwan. 

[…] FTU lawmaker Luk Chung-hung had last week enquired about RTHK’s previous use of “president” to refer to the island’s leader in a written question to Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development Edward Yau in Legco, suggesting that the broadcaster may have breached the one-China principle in doing so.

[…] In 2020, Yau had said an RTHK programme had breached the one-China principle when a former reporter asked a World Health Organisation official if the body would consider admitting Taiwan as a member.

However, the Communications Authority later ruled that complaints about the programme were unsubstantiated. It also found last month that a separate complaint over RTHK’s use of the word ‘president’ to refer to Tsai Ing-wen was unsubstantiated. [Source]

RTHK also covered the new rules in Chinese, although with somewhat less elaboration. HKFP published an excerpt from the RTHK memo:

  1. As RTHK is Hong Kong’s public service broadcaster as well as a government department, it must strictly abide by the above guiding principles and exercise a high level of caution in relation to Taiwan in all its radio, television and new media services. Inappropriate nomenclature such as “country” / “Republic of China” / “R.O.C” / “中华民国” / “国立” / “行政院” must not be used when referring to Taiwan. Under no circumstances should Taiwan be referred to as a sovereign state or perceived as one.
  2. Since Taiwan is part of China, the most senior leader of Taiwan should be referred to as “台湾地区/当局领导人” but not as so-called “台湾总统”. Appropriate nomenclature should be used when referring to the so-called “Central” level of administration in Taiwan. For example, “台湾政府 / Taiwan Government” should be avoided and “台湾当局 / Taiwan authorities” should be used instead. “行政院” should be more appropriately addressed as “台湾行政机关”, “台湾地区行政管理机关” or other expressions that comply with the one-China principle and fit the status of Taiwan as part of China. [Source]

These new guidelines closely mirror a broader set of terms restricted from Xinhua news reports, which was first published in 2008 and translated by CDT in 2011. The full list details restrictions related to commercial and medical endorsements, references to celebrities and officials, slang, derogatory terms for disabilities, privacy and other issues in legal cases, ethnicity and religion, international relations, Hong Kong, Macau, Xinjiang, and territorial claims:

Prohibited terms concerning our territory, sovereignty, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau

A. Hong Kong and Macau are China’s Special Administrative Regions. Taiwan is one of China’s provinces. In any written word, on any map or chart, careful attention must be paid to not refer to it as a “country.” This is especially the case when many countries or regions are listed consecutively. Extreme attention must be given to slipping any semblance of the words “country or region” here.

B. When it is impossible to avoid referring to Taiwan’s political system and other organizations, quotations should be used. For example, Taiwan’s “Legislative Yuan,” “Executive Yuan,” “Control Yuan,” “Elections Committee,” “Executive Yuan’s Comptroller,” and so on. The appearance of “Central Government,” “National,” “Chinese Taipei,” in written word is prohibited, but in unavoidable instances, add quotations, such as in Taiwan’s “Central Bank,” and so on. Taiwan’s “Legislative Yuan Chief,” “Legislative Committee members,” and so on, must all be in quotation marks. Taiwan’s “Qinghua University” and “Imperial Palace Museum” must be in quotations. The use of “Republic of China President (Vice-President)” and other titles for Taiwanese officials are strictly forbidden, even with the use of quotation marks.

C. For the so-called laws administered by Taiwan, these should be called the “regulations concerning the region of Taiwan.” For Taiwanese legal affairs, never use “official validation,” “judiciary assistance,” “extradition,” or any other international legal terms.

D. The two shores of the Taiwan Straits and Hong Kong cannot be referred to as “two shores, three regions.”

E. Do not say “tourists from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan come to China for travel.” Instead say “tourists from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan come to the mainland (or inland) for travel.”

F. “Taiwan” and “the fatherland/ the mainland” are corresponding concepts. “Hong Kong and Macau” and “inland” are corresponding concepts. Do not confuse them.

G. Do not reference Taiwan, Hong Kong or Macau together with a reference to China. For example, “China-Hong Kong,” “China-Taiwan” or “China-Macau.” Use “Inland and Hong Kong,” “mainland and Taiwan,” or “Beijing-Hong Kong,” “Shanghai-Hong Kong,” “Fujian-Taiwan,” and so on.

H. “The independence of Taiwan” or “Taiwanese independence” must be used with quotation marks.

I. Some of Taiwan’s societal organizations such as “China Taoist Culture Alliance,” “China Promotional Committee for Cross-Straits Marriage,” and others using “China,” must be used with quotation marks.

J. Taiwan cannot be called Formosa. If it must be used in a quotation, quotation makes must be used. [Source]

One quirk of the shifting ground beneath Hong Kong reporters’ feet has been RTHK’s own coverage of the constricting space for itself and other media in the city. In August, for example, it reported “China On The Dot” host Johnny Lau’s suspicions that the current affairs program’s cancelation was connected to the “not healthy” atmosphere for media and culture in Hong Kong. Previously, it had reported comments by recently sacked radio presenter Allan Au, who said that RTHK “has been using all its administrate [sic] power to do whatever it wants, to remove people and voices it doesn’t like,” and “acting against the spirit of public service broadcasting.” The report added: “The RTHK Programme Staff Union said it was extremely worried that impartial and critical voices are disappearing from the airwaves.” 

Also in August, RTHK covered the release of the Hong Kong Journalists Association’s annual report, which described the past year as “the worst ever for press freedom in the territory.” The HKJA report painted RTHK’s situation in bleak terms: “The past year saw RTHK being devastated by a ‘supertyphoon.’ As this report went to the press, the storm is not yet over. [… T]heir plight reflects the big picture of increased curbs on the media in times of big change in Hong Kong.”

While RTHK dismantles itself from the inside, some of its journalists have found ways to survive on the outside. Former RTHK journalists have migrated to smaller, independent news outlets created amid the hostile climate of the national security law. In the Columbia Journalism Review, Rachel Cheung profiled three of these outlets and their link to RTHK journalists: 

Across the city, Citizen News, a digital newsroom founded by a group of veteran journalists in 2017, has become, in the words of its reporters, “a refugee camp.” Some of the city’s sharpest journalists quietly joined the outlet for its editorial independence, while hiding their bylines to avoid unwanted attention. Citizen News has taken on journalists from Apple Daily and the neutered public broadcaster RTHK, and the entire China desk from a TV network, i-Cable. This summer, it hired twenty-four interns, almost doubling its headcount, and launched a fundraising campaign to support the expense. [Source]

Samuel Wade contributed to this post.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/09/new-editorial-guidelines-leash-rthk-to-national-security-law/
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Wednesday 29 September 2021

UN Human Rights Council Report Cites Intimidation, Reprisals against Chinese Activists Who Cooperate with the UN

A September 17 advance report from the UN Human Rights Council notes that the Chinese government has engaged in intimidation and reprisals against activists who have cooperated with the United Nations on human rights issues related to China. The section on China, which appears on page ten of the report, cited numerous specific instances of intimidation and retaliation:  

China

  1. Multiple UN actors addressed allegations of intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders and civil society organizations that cooperated, or were perceived as cooperating, with the UN, in particular their arbitrary detention including in “residential surveillance at a designated location.”  Names and further details on some cases are withheld for fear of further reprisals.  
  2. Some representatives of civil society in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region declined to engage further with or have their cases raised by OHCHR and UN human rights mechanisms due to a fear that they would be in contravention of the June 2020 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong (see CHN 17/2020 ). 
  3. The human rights defender network Civil Human Rights Front was placed under police investigation for having, inter alia, sent a joint letter on 10 December 2020 to the High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Its convenor, Mr. Figo Hu-Wun Chan, received a formal request from police on the purposes of the letter.
  4. It was reported to OHCHR that Mr. Shen Youlian, human rights defender in Guizhou province, was administratively detained for ten days following his online posting of an open letter to the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
  5. It was reported to OHCHR that human rights defender Ms. Li Qiaochu was detained, allegedly as a reprisal for meeting online with two experts from the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (see CHN 4/2021).
  6. Annex II contains developments in the situations of Ms. Li Yuhan, Mr. Liu Zhengqing, Ms. Xu Yan, Ms. Chen Jianfang, Ms. Wang Yu, Mr. Qin Yongmin, Ms. Zhao Suli, Mr. Mi Chongbiao, Ms. Li Kezhen, Ms. Li Wenzu, Ms. Wang Qiaoling, Mr. Li Heping, and Mr. Jiang Tianyong. [Source] 

During the forty-eighth session of the UN Human Rights Council, which runs from September 13 to October 1, 2021, the Chinese delegation has made numerous attempts to distract from the report—including hosting no fewer than four “invitation-only” side events that either point the finger at other nations’ track records on indigenous people’s rights, or seek to deflect criticism aimed at China. 

Another recent report notes China’s attempts to thwart NGO applications to the United Nations. As CDT has reported in the past, this is but one of many long-running Chinese interference tactics at the UN. Rana Siu Inboden, senior fellow with the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas-Austin, described some of the methods used, in an excerpt published in Foreign Policy:

China is the most active country in stalling NGO applications at the United Nations, even if the organizations engage in the most innocuous and uncontroversial activities. China is not content to control civil society within its own borders. Given the role of NGOs in advancing human rights globally and drawing attention to China’s human rights crimes, Beijing is working hard to shrink the space for these groups internationally.

[…] Current U.N. Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations rules allow states to pose any question, even mundane and repetitive ones, to defer an NGO’s application until the committee’s next biannual meeting. […] Several repressive states have used this method to continually delay some applications for years. An analysis of committee meeting summaries and reports from 2016 through 2019 revealed China was the most frequent member state to pose questions to delay and block civil society applicants. It did so 340 times, outpacing South Africa (337 times), India (283 times), Cuba (220 times), and Russia (172 times).

[…] Other countries—especially authoritarian powers—often join Beijing in stalling NGO applications, and their actions often appear to be coordinated. According to my own research, the Like Minded-Group of Developing Countries, an informal coalition of an estimated 51 (mostly autocratic) regimes, is responsible for 94 percent of NGO-application deferrals. [Source]

One of the individuals named in the Human Rights Council report, Ms. Li Qiaochu, has been in detention since March 2021, most likely in retaliation for meeting online with two experts from the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. A longtime advocate for labor rights, civil rights and women’s rights, she is also the partner of veteran activist Xu Zhiyong; her willingness to speak out about torture he suffered while in detention has caused her to be surveilled, harassed and detained. She is reportedly suffering from depression and auditory hallucinations while in detention, and her requests for bail pending trial have been repeatedly denied. A number of human rights organizations have called for her release:

There has been news in the case of Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi, two of the activists and legal scholars behind the New Citizens’ Movement. The two, who are currently being held in a centre in Linshu county in Shandong province, have spent over 20 months in detention on charges of “subversion of state power.” Mimi Lau of the South China Morning Post reported the details of the recent indictment against them:

According to the indictment issued by the municipal procuratorate in Linyi city in Shandong early August, Xu is charged with subverting state power for leading a “citizens’ movement” together with fellow activist Ding Jiaxi.

The two are accused of recruiting a network of people to produce an “illegal” documentary, set up websites and publish subversive articles, and of organising “secret meetings” to subvert the state.

The indictment, which has been circulating online, says Xu used the messaging app Telegram to network and exchange ideas and used Zoom “to organise regular ‘non-violent’ colour-revolution training for members of the ‘citizens’ movement’ with the objective of subverting state power”.

Other “illegal activities” listed in the indictment included secret meetings in Yantai in Shandong and Xiamen in Fujian in 2018 and 2019 respectively.

In the 2019 Xiamen meeting, Xu and Ding are accused of preparing an action plan for their “citizens’ movement”, including a fundraising drive and a drive to spread their colour revolution ideas at the grass-roots level. [Source]

China Change has published a detailed case history, putting the charges in context and providing  an explanation of why the indictments against Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi were only made public recently:

Now, after more than a year and half in detention, six months of which were spent in RSDL, a lengthy “investigation” and repeated “supplementary investigations,” Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi were indicted on August 5, 2021. Though their lawyers were notified of the indictment at the time but didn’t receive a copy of indictments until early September. Without legal grounds to do so, the court arbitrarily forced the lawyers to sign a confidentiality agreement barring them from sharing hard copies of the Indictment with family members or making them public.

Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi were indicted separately as two cases, though by law they should be of the same case. [Source]

Lastly, it appears that #MeToo activist and journalist Huang Xueqin and labor activist Wang Jianbing, who have been missing since they disappeared in Guangzhou on September 19, are under suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” and are being held in RSDL by police in Guangzhou. On September 28, Reporters without Borders (RSF) posted an update and called for their immediate release:

Chinese independent journalist Huang Xueqin (Sophia Huang), famous for her involvement in the #MeToo movement in China, was arrested on 19th September, 2021 in the southern city of Guangzhou under suspicion of ‘inciting subversion of state power’. Huang, who was preparing to leave China to study in the United Kingdom, is believed to be held under “Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location” (RSDL), a term that refers to solitary confinement in the regime’s “black prisons”, in which the prisoners are often tortured.

“Huang Xueqin is a prominent journalist who was only serving the Chinese public interest by investigating social issues, and it is outrageous to suspect her of subversion”, insists Reporters Without Borders (RSF) East-Asia bureau head, Cédric Alviani, who calls for Huang’s “immediate release alongside all other journalists and press freedom defenders detained in China.” [Source]

 



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/09/un-human-rights-council-report-cites-intimidation-reprisals-against-chinese-activists-who-cooperate-with-the-un/
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Tuesday 28 September 2021

Chinese Government Seized and Sold Assets of Xinjiang Detainees

A report published by the advocacy group Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) on Friday reveals that Chinese authorities have seized and sold off millions of dollars worth of assets held by Uyghurs imprisoned in Xinjiang. The newly revealed auctions add to the secrecy and lack of due process for the more than a million Uyghurs who have been detained in internment camps. They also point to the CCP’s targeting of Uyghur business leaders, who once served as a link between the government and local Uyghur populations, but who now stand in the way of the CCP’s campaign of ethnic assimilation. Eva Xiao and Jonathan Cheng from the Wall Street Journal, which corroborated UHRP’s findings, described how asset seizures by Chinese authorities coincided with the government crackdown on ethnic minorities: 

Since 2019, Xinjiang courts have put at least 150 assets—ranging from home appliances to real estate and company shares—belonging to at least 21 people and valued at a total $84.8 million up for auction on e-commerce sites.

[…] The Uyghur group [UHRP] said it recorded seizures that were clearly linked to court cases involving charges related to terrorism and extremism. It also included cases of people identified by Chinese state media as extremists, or whose families reported they had been accused of such activities.

[…] A Wall Street Journal analysis of corporate records of companies in Hotan city—home to several prominent Uyghur real-estate developers—indicates that orders by municipal authorities to freeze Uyghur entrepreneurs’ assets increased sharply in 2018, about a year after Xinjiang authorities began interning local Muslim minorities en masse.

In 2017, one Uyghur business owner had company shares frozen following orders from a local court. The next year, the number jumped to 22, accounting for more than half of all individuals and firms who had shares frozen due to criminal or civil cases in Hotan city since 2013. [Source]

The policing of normal activities has criminalized innocuous behaviors and expressions of faith, and yet little public information is available regarding the alleged criminals or their crimes in the court documents attached to the auctions. In one relatively transparent case studied by the report, a court document listed three individuals over 75 years old as having helped “terrorist activities.” The UHRP report demonstrated the scope and secrecy of the government’s campaign against the Uyghurs: 

This report presents twelve cases of imprisoned Uyghurs whose property has been auctioned on the judicial auction platform of Taobao. Five of these cases involve Uyghur businesspeople whose arrests have been reported in publicly available sources. The other seven cases are of Uyghurs whose arrests on politicized charges have not been previously reported. Given the scale of the arrests and mass detention taking place in East Turkistan, this dataset likely represents only a fraction of the property dispossession occurring in the government crackdown on Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in the region, which began in earnest in 2016.

[…] These judicial auctions represent further evidence of the scope of the crackdown on Uyghur society, as well as the speed and lack of due process with which the campaign is taking place. The Chinese government has not disclosed any details of the cases appearing in this report, and in most cases has not revealed the arrest of the individuals involved. These cases demonstrate the secrecy with which the government is trying and imprisoning people in the Uyghur Region. [Source]

Uyghur business leaders were once a bridge between the local government and Uyghur community. Many helped reduce ethnic tensions by providing jobs to Uyghurs, especially those who struggled to find work in state- or Han-owned firms. In a separate article in the Wall Street Journal, Eva Xiao documented the important role of Uyghur business leaders in community life:

Like other wealthy Uyghurs in Atush, Mr. Eli donated money to less affluent members of the community and pooled his money with others to fund the construction of a mosque, [his wife] added.

In addition to direct donations, which were sometimes a form of Islamic almsgiving, the city’s well-off raised money through lamb auctions and sporting events to cover wedding or school fees for those who couldn’t afford them. Many became patrons of Uyghur cultural projects, including calligraphy competitions and art exhibitions.

[…] “Without Uyghur businessmen, Uyghur society is paralyzed,” said Abduweli Ayup, a Uyghur activist based in Norway, who founded Uyghur Hjelp. Cut off from their charity, he said, poor families, bankrupt business owners and other Uyghurs in need are now totally dependent on the Chinese Communist Party for support. [Source]

The report examined cases of asset seizures that were auctioned off on Taobao, owned by Chinese tech giant Alibaba. While UHRP notes that these cases involving Taobao are likely only a fraction of the total number of cases in which Uyghur assets were seized, the participation of one of China’s largest tech companies may raise more concerns for international investors and oversight bodies. Previously, Alibaba’s cloud computing business presented facial recognition software that its clients could use to detect Uyghurs. Chinese companies have already been heavily criticized for their role in the forced labor and mass incarceration of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, which put them on blacklists by the U.S. government. 

In addition to Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang are also subject to arbitrary property seizures by the Chinese government. Thousands of ethnic Kazakhs, including some that are citizens of Kazakhstan, have been detained in Xinjiang. Guldana Salimjan wrote in Lausan about how the forceful dispossession of ethnic Kazakh land, originally propelled by ecotourism, accelerated in order to sustain the internment camps:

In 2017, the Chinese government deemed Kazakhstan one of the “26 sensitive countries”—Muslim-majority countries perceived to be “harboring religious extremism”. Many Chinese Kazakhs in Xinjiang who used to freely travel to Kazakhstan can no longer do so, because their passports have been confiscated by the local police. Many Kazakhstan nationals are detained in camps as well, and their families in Kazakhstan dare not to travel to China and visit them. Chinese authorities view Chinese Kazakhs who have visited Kazakhstan as a threat, as they may publicize the situation in Xinjiang to the international community and undermine China-Kazakhstan relations. The state’s expanded repressive capacity provided authorities more leverage to coerce Kazakhs and Uyghurs to forfeit their land and assets with the threat of sending them to “study in the camps.”

According to the testimonies collected by the Xinjiang Victim Database, Chinese Kazakhs who have travelled to Kazakhstan, have family in Kazakhstan, or have Kazakhstsan citizenship or a green card, have been intimidated by Xinjiang’s local governments into giving up their land. These cases show that the processes that prevented Nurbaqyt from protesting the theft of his land have been accelerated by the internment camp system. Now it was no longer isolated incidents of large-scale theft; instead, any Kazakh citizen deemed untrustworthy appeared to be subject to land seizures and detention in the emergent internment camp system. The camp system has allowed this process to proliferate at a grassroots level. [Source]

On Sunday, China’s State Council Information Office released another white paper on Xinjiang, titled “Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data.” The paper touted Xinjiang’s population increase over the last sixty years, criticizing Western reports of genocide and overlooking the population decline over the past few years due to aggressive assimilation policies. Western scholars were not impressed: 

There is precedent of governments seizing assets from persecuted minorities using the justification of criminality. Perhaps the most infamous is the Nazi’s seizure of about $20 billion worth of Jewish assets during the Holocaust. Another prominent example is the U.S. government’s seizure of two to five billion dollars worth of property during the internment of Japanese Americans. Even today, the U.S. government is legally allowed to seize individual assets that it alleges are involved in a crime, a practice which civil rights groups argue must be reformed to prevent government abuse.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/09/chinese-government-seized-and-sold-assets-of-xinjiang-detainees/
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Minitrue: Welcome Home, Meng Wanzhou; Water Down Coverage of Deal With U.S. Justice Department

The following censorship instructions, issued to the media by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. The name of the issuing body has been omitted to protect the source.

Notice: please display the following slogan on the Ping An International Financial Center, Kingkey Finance Tower, Di Wang Tower, China Resources Tower, One Shenzhen Bay, and Hon Kwok City Center: “Welcome Home, Meng Wanzhou!” Requirements: suspend display of other publicity/promotional content, and use warm colors onscreen, such as white characters on a red backdrop. (September 25, 2021) [Chinese]

If reporting on circumstances related to the deferred prosecution agreement reached between Meng Wanzhou and the U.S. Department of Justice, do so objectively, accurately, and in strict accordance with authoritative information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Give the matter generally low-key and watered-down treatment; do not extrapolate, interpret, or comment without prior arrangement; and do not cite information from foreign sources. Please pay attention to confidentiality, and strictly control the scope of information. (September 25, 2021) [Chinese]

The above directives coordinate celebration and coverage of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou’s return to China last Friday, following nearly three years entangled in extradition proceedings in Canada. Meng, also the daughter of Huawei’s founder, was sought for prosecution in the U.S. over charges involving fraud and sanctions violation, but the extradition request was dropped in a deferred prosecution agreement after Meng admitted wrongdoing, while stopping short of a guilty plea.

Almost immediately, Canadians Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig also returned from detention in China, appearing to vindicate longstanding suspicion that they had been held to apply pressure on Canada for Meng’s release. Chinese authorities have said that they were granted medical parole, and that the timing was coincidental. Spavor was sentenced to 11 years in prison for espionage last month, while Kovrig was awaiting sentence on similar charges. Subsequently, a travel ban was also lifted on American siblings Victor and Cynthia Liu, who had been prevented from leaving China for more than three years.

Meng’s homecoming became the focus of nationwide celebrations. Before being escorted to quarantine—which The Economist’s Simon Rabinovitch noted would be “the strictest confinement she has faced over the past 1,000-plus days”—Meng gave an effusive speech at the airport, thanking the Chinese leadership for securing her release. Victor Mair posted a lightly edited Google Translation of her comments at Language Log, commenting that “the text is not worthy of the labor that would be required to make a sensible, polished translation into English. Indeed, leaving the translation somewhat fractured gives a fair idea of the shoddy, maudlin quality of the original.”

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, our motherland is moving towards prosperity. Without a strong motherland, there would be no freedom as I have today. […] Thank you, my dear motherland, and the party and government. It is the brilliant Chinese red that ignites the fire of faith in my heart, illuminates the darkest moments of my life, and leads me on the long journey home. [Source]

State media enthusiastically struck up a similar refrain. South China Morning Post’s Zhou Xin and Yujie Xue reported on the official framing of Meng’s return, and on the celebrations that erupted as “the live broadcast of her arrival was watched by nearly 100 million viewers at its peak.”

Xinhua confirmed on Saturday morning that her return was a result of “unremitting efforts of the Chinese government”. People’s Daily, mouthpiece of the ruling Communist Party, said in an editorial Meng’s release was “a major victory of the Chinese people” and showed “no power can stop China’s advancing steps”.

Throughout the day, internet users were busy tracking her flight CCA552, chartered by the central government, as it made its way across the Arctic Ocean, many describing her as the country’s heroine.

At the arrival hall in Shenzhen Baoan International Airport, thousands of people had gathered to welcome her home. Some held banners, flowers and Chinese national flags. Others wore red masks with the national flag printed on them.

Banners displayed the message “Welcome home Ms Meng Wanzhou” while chants of “Meng Wanzhou, you’re a heroine. We love you” could also be heard. Airport security staff were on hand to keep order. [Source]

(See more from and about Wuheqilin via CDT.)

The story occupied nine of the top ten spots on Weibo’s list of trending hashtags. At Hong Kong Free Press, Selena Cheng described the tone of online commentary, noting some dissent from the dominant tone of pride and celebration:

“Remember, the reason Ms. Meng can return is not because the US and Canada were kind, it’s because our motherland is strong!” one Weibo user wrote in response to the broadcaster’s article.

[…] However there were also commentators who were critical that China rolled out the welcome mat for a tech executive they sarcastically dubbed “Huawei’s eldest princess.”

“Since when was she detained? She lived well in her own house,” one wrote.

“A strong China can rescue the so-called princess, but couldn’t care less about supplying electricity to 90 million citizens in the north-eastern provinces,” said another, referring to a widespread power outage on Sunday and subsequent restrictions placed on the use of electricity in the region. [Source]

Cheng noted that, by contrast, the two Michaels’ return home was “treated with relative silence in the Chinese media.” At The Washington Post, Lily Kuo highlighted some online discontent over the apparent trade:

“The discussion online is that Meng was innocent, but the facts of Kovrig and Spavor’s crimes are irrefutable. The U.S. side releasing Meng was justified, but was China forced into this compromise?” one user wrote on Weibo, China’s Twitter-like platform.

[… C]omments asking for more details on their release were quickly scrubbed from discussion forums. “There is no basis for China’s release of the Michaels. This is not justice in the least,” read one post that has since been deleted. “People keep saying Meng’s case is a great victory for China … but it’s been three years and we had to trade two Canadian spies,” another user wrote on Weibo.

Liu Xiaoyuan, a rights lawyer, wrote in a WeChat post viewed more than 100,000 times before it was taken down that China ought to explain the release of the Canadians. “Now that the two whose cases were ‘iron clad’ have been released, shouldn’t a legal explanation be given?” Liu wrote. [Source]

The brazenness of the timing grated elsewhere as well, as the Toronto Star’s Ben Cohen reported:

“What’s bizarre about it is that their conditions for release match Meng’s exactly, almost word for word,” said Stephanie Carvin, associate professor of international relations at Carleton University.

[…] “It’s blatantly obvious either Beijing didn’t anticipate the extent to which the entire international community would recognize this as a hostage swap or they’re just very comfortable issuing very thin denials,” said Carvin. “It feels like international gaslighting.”

[…] “You always have to assume the primary audience for this material is domestic,” she said. “If you recall, during Meng’s trial they had fake protestors show up holding up signs saying, ‘Free Meng.’ That was for the Chinese audience. Everyone in the West saw through that in about six seconds.”[Source]

Foreign Policy’s James Palmer commented that “Many China analysts, myself included, believed there would be a delay of weeks or months between Meng’s release and the return of the Canadians, to give Beijing plausible deniability. The absence of that shows how little China cares about its reputation. It would rather emphasize its power.”

As the second directive highlights, Chinese authorities were keen to downplay or dismiss the admission of wrongdoing that had secured Meng’s return. The Financial Times reported that related searches had been blocked on Weibo, quoting “a person familiar with the situation” as explaining that “We need to portray this as a complete success for China.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted in a statement that “Facts have long proved that this is a political persecution against a Chinese citizen with the aim to oppress China’s high-tech companies,” and that “the ‘fraud’ accusations against Ms. Meng are nothing but fabrication.” A statement from the U.S. Department of Justice, though, pointed out that the case against Huawei remains underway, and suggested that Meng’s statements had bolstered it:

“In entering into the deferred prosecution agreement, Meng has taken responsibility for her principal role in perpetrating a scheme to defraud a global financial institution,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Nicole Boeckmann for the Eastern District of New York. “Her admissions in the statement of facts confirm that, while acting as the Chief Financial Officer for Huawei, Meng made multiple material misrepresentations to a senior executive of a financial institution regarding Huawei’s business operations in Iran in an effort to preserve Huawei’s banking relationship with the financial institution. The truth about Huawei’s business in Iran, which Meng concealed, would have been important to the financial institution’s decision to continue its banking relationship with Huawei. Meng’s admissions confirm the crux of the government’s allegations in the prosecution of this financial fraud — that Meng and her fellow Huawei employees engaged in a concerted effort to deceive global financial institutions, the U.S. government and the public about Huawei’s activities in Iran.”

[…] “Financial institutions are our first line of defense in maintaining the safety and security of the U.S. financial system,” said Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite Jr. of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “That is why the law requires that companies who avail themselves of the U.S. financial system provide financial institutions with truthful information about their business operations. Meng Wanzhou, CFO of Huawei Technologies, admitted today that she failed to tell the truth about Huawei’s operations in Iran, and as a result the financial institution continued to do business with Huawei in violation of U.S. law. Our prosecution team continues to prepare for trial against Huawei, and we look forward to proving our case against the company in court.” [Source]

Several accounts have described the behind-the-scenes developments that had helped break the three-year deadlock. A team from the Wall Street Journal wrote that, rather than the “unremitting efforts of the Chinese government” credited by state media, the decisive shift had come from Meng herself. Although her final admission fell short of the guilty plea the U.S. Department of Justice had earlier pushed for, the WSJ account suggested that the department had made little concession by comparison:

Around May, the talks gained momentum after Ms. Meng hired a new lawyer, William Taylor, who was introduced to the prosecution team as someone who had been brought on specifically to see if he could reach a resolution.

Justice Department officials offered the same bottom line as they had before; that Ms. Meng admit to what they said she did. They also made clear they were willing to resolve Ms. Meng’s case separately from that against the company.

[…] The talks reached a breakthrough on Sunday, Sept. 19, when Mr. Taylor conveyed for the first time that Ms. Meng was willing to admit to wrongdoing, and sent a draft of what she was prepared to acknowledge. That draft served as the basis for the statement of facts attached to her deferred prosecution agreement on Friday.

[…] Prosecutors have their own motives for wanting to strike a deal, Justice Department officials said. They calculated that Ms. Meng could continue appeals related to her extradition that could prolong that fight for several years. Under Canadian law, government officials also could ultimately decide to end the process.

If Ms. Meng had been convicted by a U.S. jury or pleaded guilty, the officials said, prosecutors would have ended up with essentially the same statement of facts she agreed to. Some defendants who faced similar wire and bank fraud charges have also faced little prison time, and Justice Department officials said prosecutors felt the deal was 85% of what they could have ultimately hoped for if she arrived in Brooklyn. [Source]

This rationale might lend credence to various parties’ claims that no prisoner exchange agreement lay behind the unexpectedly rapid sequence of events—claims which have met widespread skepticism. White House press secretary Jen Psaki said on Monday that although President Biden had raised the Michaels’ cases on a call with Xi earlier this month, and that Xi had also raised Meng’s, “no negotiation” had occurred, and the Justice Department had acted independently. Citing “three sources with direct knowledge of the talks with China, Huawei and Ms. Meng’s lawyers,” The Globe and Mail’s Robert Fife reported that Biden had insisted that the extradition case against Meng could not be dropped unless the Michaels were released at the same time, while Xi demanded that the Michaels could only be freed if Meng did not have to admit guilt.

Canada’s ambassador to the U.S. Kirsten Hillman endorsed Psaki’s claim on CTV on Sunday, stating that as Meng’s case approached its resolution, Beijing simply decided “that it was no longer in its interest to continue holding [Kovrig and Spavor], and so they started the process in talking to our officials in Beijing about making arrangements to have the Michaels leave.” She further insisted “that Canada didn’t ever back down from our commitment to international law. We never succumbed to the pressure that, unfortunately, the two Michaels were the victims of.”

The Economist summed up the lingering questions over how last weekend’s resolution had been achieved, echoing the Wall Street Journal’s suggestion that Meng was the one who appeared to have given ground.

Much remains unclear about the terms of the exchange—in particular how much was said explicitly by representatives of the three countries in negotiations and how much was only winked at. From the outset both American and Canadian officials have been bedevilled by the problem of not wanting to appear to negotiate for the release of hostages. Some China hawks in America and Canada will accuse President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of rewarding China’s tactics, and of going soft by agreeing to let Ms Meng go free. The resolution comes just days after Mr Trudeau narrowly secured victory in parliamentary elections. He had rejected entreaties to order Ms Meng released much earlier, on the reasoning that to subvert the judicial process would show China how easily it could gain leverage over Canada. As for America, Donald Trump’s Justice Department had entered similar negotiations with Ms Meng in 2020, and the published terms of the agreed plea—most crucially, that she must admit wrongdoing—appear much the same as what prosecutors were believed to be offering under Mr Trump late last year.

[…] But the Communist Party’s bullying has come at a diplomatic and strategic cost. In February, Canada led a coalition of nearly 60 countries in denouncing arbitrary state detentions of citizens—an obvious shot at China, though it was not explicitly named in the joint declaration. It was another example of countries coalescing around various concerns about China’s behaviour in recent years under Mr Xi. The recent AUKUS security agreement between Australia, Britain and America is the latest, most dramatic example. Governments around the world are becoming much more wary of China. The taking of the two Michaels—and the eventual confirmation that they were indeed hostages to be exchanged— will be viewed in history as one of the reasons why. [Source]

Whether or not the Michaels’ detentions ultimately brought about Meng’s release, fears that China would be encouraged to adopt similar tactics in the future have dominated analysis of the case’s implications. CNN’s Stephen Collinson described the outcome as “a troubling sign of a new era of superpower confrontation,” while at The New York Times, Chris Buckley and Katie Benner also reported concern over future hostage diplomacy:

The exchange resolves one of the festering disputes that have brought tensions between Washington and Beijing to their worst point in decades. But it will likely do little to resolve deeper issues including human rights, a sweeping clampdown in Hong Kong, cyberespionage, China’s threats to use force against Taiwan, and fears in Beijing that the United States will never accept China’s rise.

The swiftness of the apparent deal also stands as a warning to leaders in other countries that the Chinese government can be boldly transactional with foreign nationals, said Donald C. Clarke, a law professor specializing in China at George Washington University Law School.

“They’re not even making a pretense of a pretense that this was anything but a straight hostage situation,” he said of the two Canadians, who stood trial on spying charges. Mr. Spavor was sentenced last month to 11 years in prison, and Mr. Kovrig was waiting for a verdict in his case after trial in March.

“In a sense, China has strengthened its bargaining position in future negotiations like this,” Professor Clarke said. “They’re saying, if you give them what they want, they will deliver as agreed.”

[…] To say that the apparent swap signals a thaw in relations would be premature at best, experts said. [Source]

The Wall Street Journal’s James T. Areddy and Andrew Restuccia similarly reported “no sign of a thaw over major disputes, such as China’s claims involving Taiwan or the South China Sea, that some fear risk putting the countries on a path toward military conflict.” At the same time, they cited the resolution of Meng’s and the Michaels’ cases as the latest in a series of “actions suggesting a willingness on both sides to grab at green shoots” in areas such as climate cooperation, trade, and student visas.

In the Biden administration’s view, most of Beijing’s actions have been incremental and reflect pressures it faces rather than a fresh spirit of cooperation, according to the person familiar with the administration’s internal discussions on China. The relationship is hugely complex and for every positive development, there are many more thorny issues that have yet to be resolved, the person said.

[…] Some watchers still said the breakthrough may signal cooler heads prevailing. “The immediate release of the Michaels gives me greater hope that this is merely the first step in joint efforts to get better relations back on a somewhat smoother, at least less dangerous, track,” said Jerome Cohen, a New York lawyer who has worked on several high-profile legal cases involving the two countries. [Source]

In a 2019 interview with Time Magazine, Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei described the company’s situation in the crossfire of Sino-U.S. rivalry as “like a small tomato stuck between the two countries.” Canada may now have some relief from a similar predicament. As Reuters’ Denny Thomas reported, Ottawa faces decisions on a number of fronts including Huawei’s inclusion in 5G deployment, cooperation between Canadian and Chinese universities, and its broader stance toward China: an approach that Foreign Minister Marc Garneau, insisting that “our eyes are wide open,” has characterized as “coexist, compete, cooperate, and challenge.” And tensions over the Meng affair remain inflamed, as illustrated by a “heated” exchange at the U.N. General Assembly on Monday, reported by CNN’s Richard Roth, Caitlin Hu, and Ben Westcott:

"Canada observed the rule of law, and two Canadian citizens paid a heavy price for this commitment … We continue to oppose the way these two fine people were treated," [Garneau] said.

[…] Later in the evening, a representative from China’s delegation to the UN General Assembly exercised the country’s right of reply, accusing the United States and Canada of keeping Meng under house arrest arbitrarily and without "legal reasons."

[…] “We hope that Canada can face up to the facts squarely, correct their mistakes and draw lessons from what happened so that they do not make further mistakes," Liu warned.

Canada responded, with a delegation representative saying Meng had been treated with judicial independence and rule of law, and noting "she spoke outside the Vancouver courthouse to thank the court."

The Canadian citizens who were held in China "did not benefit from a similar degree of transparency, respect, due process or judicial independence," the Canadian representative said.

"And we will continue to speak out against arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations, thank you."

Liu responded one more time, saying "We cannot accept what he said."

"Facts cannot be denied, and laws cannot be affronted. We believe that history will have a final judgment," he added. [Source]

真Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/09/minitrue-welcome-home-meng-wanzhou-water-down-coverage-of-deal-with-u-s-justice-department/
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