Friday, 19 August 2022

Translation: Quarantine Diary. “All I Had Was One Question: What Exactly Are The Rules?”

In this post from WeChat public account 兽楼处, a man gives a first-person account of his family’s experience in quarantine following a potential COVID exposure at a shopping mall in Beijing. In addition to describing the food, surroundings, and daily rhythms of a quarantine center, the article also touches on confusion about quarantine rules, inconsistent enforcement, and the time-honored bureaucratic practice of passing the buck. The piece features such now-familiar terms as “Health Kit,” “red code,” and “spatial-temporal proximity,” as well as the ubiquitous dabai (“Big Whites,” white-suited pandemic personnel), harried hotline workers, and Beijingers caught up in a Kafkaesque web of conflicting regulations and information.

In the middle of the night, my phone started buzzing on my bedside table. I answered, blearily. It was an unfamiliar number, starting with 198-. On the other end was a man who rapidly read off my name and ID number.

“Is that you?” he asked. I mumbled yes without thinking about it. “This is ___ from Tongzhou District,” he said. “You were at the We-Life Shopping Center on June 10, correct? And you’re still living in the ___ residential compound in Tongzhou?”

I moved away from Tongzhou years ago, I said, but yes, I’d taken my daughter to We-Life for a meal and a movie on the third floor.

The man said there had been a confirmed case [of COVID-19] at the We-Life branch of the Nanjing Impressions restaurant. “Have you done a nucleic acid test in the last two days?” He asked. “How many vaccinations have you had? Where are you currently residing? Are you currently feeling anything out of the ordinary?”

That woke me up a bit. I told him my current address in Chaoyang district, and that I had received three vaccinations, and that I’d taken four nucleic acid tests over the past five days, with the most recent one at 7:00 p.m. the previous night. “You should be getting a notification in your Health Kit tomorrow,” he said, and hung up.

I turned on the bedside lamp and checked my phone. It was 1:29 a.m. When I woke up the next morning, I checked my incoming calls, remembering the late-night phone call. It hadn’t been a dream. 

In my Health Kit app there was a notification saying that any individuals who had visited We-Life Shopping Center on or after June 7 should shelter in place and contact their community authorities immediately.

As I called the community authorities, the evening in question was still clear in my mind: I had come home at 7:00 and taken my daughter out for a simple birthday celebration, just dinner and a movie. I had even gone out of my way to pick a mall that wouldn’t be too crowded—the We-Life Shopping Center by Ciyunsi Bridge.

We arrived at We-Life at 7:30. Our first stop was the Burger King on the first floor, then up to the Nanjing Impressions on the second floor, where we scarfed down two bowls of duck’s blood vermicelli soup, and then to the third floor to catch the 8:00 showing of “Jurassic World: Dominion.” 

As we waited for the elevator after the movie, my daughter said, “This is the first time in more than a month we got to go out to eat and see a movie, Dad. It’s so nice.”

A Chaoyang District contact tracer would later tell me someone at the mall that day had tested positive for COVID, putting us in the same place at the same time, i.e. “spatial-temporal proximity.”

A week later, in our room at the Changping centralized quarantine site, my daughter told me it had been an unforgettable birthday. 

1

In early April, I was still feeling sorry for all the Shanghaiers who couldn’t manage to buy groceries during that city’s “temporary slowdown,” and sympathizing with those middle-aged men who wouldn’t ask for help unless they had nowhere else to turn.

Imagine my surprise when, not long afterward, I myself became the lucky winner of a quarantine vacation—and not just once.

On the afternoon of April 25, a co-worker sent an update to our WeChat group saying a COVID case had been found in a residential compound in the Chaoyang district of Beijing. It turned out to be the compound where I lived—in the building next to mine.

I called the property management office. They said, “Your building has been sealed off.”

This wasn’t as bad as a full lockdown. Seven days of in-home quarantine, with occasional yard breaks inside the designated areas, which the compound had fenced in with blue barriers. 

The worst of it was my daughter not being able to go to school. Like me, she started following the press conferences, tuning in at 4:00 every afternoon to watch [Beijing CDC deputy director Pang] Xinghuo and [deputy head of the Chaoyang District government Yang] Beibei.

That week went by very slowly indeed. The afternoon we got out, one neighbor livestreamed video to our WeChat group of the property management company dismantling the blue barriers. One neighbor said, “Free at last! Even the traffic noise doesn’t feel like noise pollution.”

Things may have eased up for our compound, but things were getting more serious outside. A lot of places were under full lockdown for 14 days.

On May 1, eating out became a thing of the past, malls closed their doors, and many bus and subway lines were shut down. My office got locked down, too.

When we went out, it was just to get our throats swabbed, and maybe pick up groceries while we were at it.

On the evening of May 6, I rode a bike-share to buy groceries, and took a quick spin near the office. It had just rained, and as I pedaled through empty streets and past ranks of skyscrapers, the vast stillness of Guomao seemed otherworldly. 

The skyscrapers and streets, washed clean by the rain, were nearly deserted.

On May 28, I asked the property management for our office why we were sealed off for a month if we weren’t in an at-risk area. “We don’t know what the rules are either,” they groused. “We’re going to raise it with the community authorities tomorrow.”

As experience bears out, you’ve got to fight for your rights. The next day, the person at property management told me they’d just had a meeting with community authorities and would be resuming regular operations the very next day. He also asked, “Do you think you could pay your facilities fees up front? We’re having a hard time making payroll.”

2

Beijing began gradually reopening public spaces at the start of June. Dine-in resumed, too. We went to We-Life that Friday.

The morning of June 15, I reported my visit to We-Life to the community authorities, who told me to begin isolating at home immediately. An hour later, sensors had been installed on our apartment door, and our Health Kit codes had gone from green to yellow, with the following words at the top of the screen: “In-Home Monitoring.”

That day, I got calls from community authorities and public health authorities for every place in Beijing I’d ever lived in: Tongzhou, Chaoyang, Haidian, and even some places whose addresses I could hardly remember, all asking more or less the same contact-tracing questions. I gave them the same answers again and again.

The phone woke me up again after midnight. “I’m already quarantining,” I told the caller. “I’ve answered the same questions time and again—do you not see that in your system?

“Sorry,” the man said. “We don’t see that here.”

I had 18 missed calls when I woke up at 7:00 the next morning. Most of them had come in at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m.

They sure were putting in long hours.

Just then, another call came in from a community worker. “Everyone in your household has to transfer to the Changping centralized quarantine facility,” they informed me. “You’ll be picked up at 9:00. Pack your things.”

More than an hour later, after a few false turns on a road in Changping, we finally arrived at a quarantine facility consisting of seven or eight apartment buildings. The buildings looked new, but there were weeds sprouting from the pavements and ground floor shops.

The white-suited dabai intake worker said we’d be quarantined there for seven days, and after we got out, we’d have to quarantine at home for another seven days.

The room was about 20 square meters (215 square feet), and equipped with a small table, a sofa, and a 1.5-meter-wide (five-foot-wide) plank bed with a thin mattress on it. The walls looked like they’d been recently painted, and a Xiaomi TV set hung on one of them.

There were long hairs on the bed, sofa, and floor. Noting the very strong smell, I asked if the room had been recently renovated. The dabai told me the apartments had been built seven or eight years ago, but had been vacant ever since.

We’d barely closed the door behind him when another dabai came knocking to register us and pass out information packets. There was a quarantine risk agreement that stipulated 14 days of centralized quarantine, followed by seven additional days of home quarantine.

I pointed out to the dabai that the number of days mentioned on the document was different from what we’d been told when we registered. I asked what the quarantine rules were for people like us, who had had “spatial-temporal proximity” to a positive case, but no direct contact. They said they didn’t know, and told me to call the information hotline.

I called the hotline. They told me to ask whoever I’d talked to at registration.

I asked a community worker on WeChat what the rules for centralized quarantine were. They said it would be up to the quarantine hotel, and that going by prior experience, it would likely be 14 days of centralized quarantine. Apparently there are no standard rules, just “prior experience.”

Dinner the first night was a bowl of Baixiang instant noodles, a chicken sausage, and a marinated egg. The information hotline said they’d had more than 200 people arrive that day, and hadn’t been prepared for the influx.

My phone rang while I was eating my noodles: another contact-tracing call, this time from the community authorities in Haidian District. The caller asked my name, and where I was, and what I was doing.

I looked out the window at the gray sky, feeling like I’d been trapped in a flood.

3

It was a reasonably large residential compound, but it had no name on Baidu Maps.

The information hotline told me it was called the Haijingluo Medical Observation Site. Haijingluo is a village in Beijing’s Changping district, a few kilometers north of Tiantongyuan. 

There’s a lot of unlicensed residential construction in Changping. In March 2010, the village of Haijingluo decided to use collectively-owned land to build rental housing. Representatives from the municipal government visited and granted approval for construction to begin, even before the village had submitted all of the paperwork.

Work started on the first phase of construction—1,800 housing units—at the end of that year, and was completed in October 2014, but due to problems with the paperwork, the apartments remained vacant for eight years.

Now, a residential compound that hadn’t even merited a name was brightly lit up at night.

On the morning of June 17, I got a call from the Chaoyang District medical workgroup. I immediately asked how many days we’d have to be quarantined.

The woman said that in seven days, if our nasal swabs and environmental samples came back negative, they’d call our community workers and have them come pick us up.

I asked how long we’d have to quarantine at home after that. She said she didn’t know, because it varied from community to community.

The quarantine site at Haijingluo was like university housing. There were a dozen-odd units on every floor, with a red plastic stool in front of each one. Workers would place our meals on these, then knock on our doors to let us know the food had arrived.

Every day, I could hear the knocking getting closer and closer. When it finally reached our door, my daughter would cheerfully announce, “Feeding time!” And then she’d put on her N95 and trot over to the door to get the food.

The meals improved greatly after the second day. There was milk at breakfast, and our boxed lunches and dinners started coming with fruit. The boxed meals were three meat, two veg, and the portions were large.

Time passed slowly there. After breakfast, my daughter used her iPad for online classes at the little table, and I lay on the bed to read, occasionally getting up to look out the window.

We were on the second floor, above a small enclosed garden. Our unit faced west, and in the evenings the setting sun was faintly visible behind the high-rises.

We did jumping jacks in the afternoon after my daughter’s classes. When it wasn’t raining, we would lie on our bellies next to the window and watch the sun go down.

After dinner, I’d stream a movie from my phone to the Xiaomi TV. At 10:00, my daughter would go to sleep, and I’d take out my laptop and get some work done at the table.

Centralized quarantine was a hundred times more isolating than home quarantine. With our white-suited “keepers” trundling back and forth outside, we felt like we were living in outer space.

My daughter woke up early one morning looking disconsolate. I asked what was wrong, and she said she’d been dreaming about eating crayfish. 

At around 6:00 p.m. on June 23, after waiting all day for our nucleic acid test results, we learned we had tested negative.

The next day at noon, we finally caught our ride home. That was the first time I learned that 183 people who’d visited Nanjing Impressions were quarantined along with us.

Our driver told us he’d been taking people to quarantine centers for the last few days. The previous day, he’d driven an old woman who started complaining about the unfairness of it all as soon as she got in the vehicle: she’d only stood at the entrance of a steamed-bun stall in Dongcheng for 30 seconds, and now she was being shipped off to quarantine. “It’s all about health codes nowadays,” said the driver.

And in some places, the codes can be manipulated. In Henan, for example, you won’t be allowed to buy high-speed rail tickets if you can’t pay the banks what you owe them—but if the banks can’t pay you what they owe you, you won’t even be able to leave your own home.

4

Community and property management workers were waiting for us at the gate of our compound.

They escorted us to our door, and then pasted up a red paper seal that read, “Attention neighbors: For the sake of everyone’s health, we will begin medical home quarantine on June 24, to conclude July 1.”

I had already been quarantined for ten days: home quarantine on June 15, followed by centralized quarantine from June 16 to June 24. Now, according to this announcement, I wouldn’t be getting out until July 2.

At that point, it had been 22 days since I went to We-Life. According to China’s CDC, Omicron has an average incubation period of two to four days, and virtually all positive test results are detected within seven days.

People entering the country only have to do seven days of hotel quarantine and seven days of home quarantine, I told the community worker, and I wasn’t even a close contact. Wasn’t this going a bit overboard? He said he’d let us out early if it were up to him, but he had to enforce the policies the subdistrict authorities handed down.

Home quarantine was a lot more comfortable than centralized quarantine. But my daughter was getting antsy: her homeroom teacher had announced that finals would be the week after next, and she’d be stuck under quarantine until next Friday. 

A friend who lived near We-Life couldn’t believe that I was still under quarantine, or that I had to quarantine for another seven days at home.

He said their residential compound had been locked down without warning for seven days, but after residents called the 12345 hotline to complain, the lockdown was lifted just four days later. For that reason, I started calling 12345 and describing my own experience.

The person who answered the hotline listened patiently and passed my questions along to the subdistrict authorities, who passed them along to the community authorities, who passed them back to the subdistrict, and so on. Again and again, I was told by the community, “All we can do is carry out the policies the subdistrict hands down to us.”

On the 25th, the hotline’s subdistrict office called me back and asked what I wanted.

I said I wanted the same two things I always had: first, I wanted to know what the quarantine rules were; second, I wanted them to stop passing the buck to the community authorities, who were too busy and lacked the authority to do anything.

An hour later, I got a call from a contract tracer for Chaoyang District. She said she was looking at my case in their system and noticed that it was just a situation of “spatial-temporal proximity” to a positive case [i.e. not a direct contact]. There was a new policy for cases like ours: 14 days of home quarantine were sufficient.

She said to have the community worker call her.

He did so right away. Ten minutes later, he sent me a big thumbs-up emoji on WeChat, along with the news that the new rules would apply to my quarantine. “You can get out two days early,” he said, adding, “This is the first time anyone from our complex has gotten results from the higher-ups. You’ve sure got some pull.” 

I didn’t have any pull. All I had was one question: “What exactly are the rules?” 

Around noon on June 29, someone came to my apartment from the community hospital to administer my final nucleic acid test. The results came back at 9:40 that night, and I forwarded them to the community authorities.

At 12:20 a.m. on June 30, my yellow code turned green.

I removed the red paper seal from our door, placed it in a drawer, and posted an update on WeChat. A friend posted a comment asking why I’d had to quarantine for so long—had I gone somewhere I oughtn’t?

All I did was take my daughter to the mall for a birthday meal and a movie, I answered.

Two days before my quarantine ended, the State Council issued the ninth revision to its COVID control measures: the quarantine period for close contacts of positive cases and individuals entering P.R.C. territory was reduced to seven days of centralized quarantine and three days of home quarantine. For close contacts of close contacts, it was reduced to seven days of home quarantine.

Under these new rules, I might have only had to stay at home for seven days.

After leaving the Haijingluo Medical Observation Site, I looked up the name of the village.

Haijing are gyrfalcons—lords of the skies, hunting birds used by steppe peoples. How did a village in the middle of nowhere come to be called “Haijingluo?” [Luo means “to fall.”]

The story goes that at the end of the Yuan dynasty, there was a Mongol prince who enjoyed hunting on horseback. His hunts were a constant nuisance to the common folk, and on one of his hunts, a gyrfalcon he kept took to the air and refused to land, flying and flying until it dropped to the ground, dead. The prince was so heartbroken that he never hunted again.

Out of gratitude to the bird, the local folks dubbed the place where it fell “Haijingluo”—“Falcon’s Fall.” [Chinese]

Translation by Mick Barry.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/08/translation-quarantine-diary-all-i-had-was-one-question-what-exactly-are-the-rules/

Thursday, 18 August 2022

Photo: Untitled (Fish pond outside of Nanputuo Temple, Xiamen), by Matthew Stinson

 A gray carp peers out of the murky green water with its mouth open, as if to speak.

Untitled (Fish pond outside of Nanputuo Temple, Xiamen), by Matthew Stinson (CC BY-NC 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/08/photo-untitled-fish-pond-outside-of-nanputuo-temple-xiamen-by-matthew-stinson/

Latest Targets of Hong Kong Censorship Include Films, Publishers, and Pro-Transparency Social Media Pages

Over two years after the National Security Law went into effect, government censorship continues to stifle free expression in Hong Kong. Authorities have recently taken measures to conceal from the public various books, films, and social media pages deemed a threat to national security, and in some cases punish those who create them. Last week, national-security police arrested two administrators of a Facebook group that shared anonymous comments about the city’s civil service institution. Newley Purnell from The Wall Street Journal reported that a host of similar social media pages were subsequently shut down

Soon after the arrests, a Facebook page called Civil Servant Secrets that had more than 204,000 followers went offline. It displayed a message saying its content was no longer available, which typically means administrators have deleted it. Last month the page hosted a video showing a police officer who appeared to be sleeping in a break room while on duty.

[…Similar Facebook groups] included pages for sharing information from the city’s public healthcare workers and one for Hong Kong parents. Also shuttered was a page for the Chinese University of Hong Kong, called CUHK Secrets, which had more than 109,000 followers, along with pages dedicated to several other Hong Kong universities.

[…Sandra Marco Colino, law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong] said the uncertain circumstances in which the social-media administrators were arrested, combined with the national-security law’s vagueness and severe penalties for violations, have “understandably instilled fear in the admins of social media groups sharing anonymous posts which often touched upon politically sensitive topics.” [Source]

The two administrators were civil servants arrested on charges of sedition, which holds a maximum penalty of two years in prison. Police suspected them of “publishing posts on that social media group to disseminate seditious messages that promote feelings of ill-will and enmity between different classes of the population of Hong Kong.” Two other civil servants were also arrested on sedition charges for their posts in the Facebook group. On Tuesday, the government disclosed a document vowing “more resolute” disciplinary action against civil servants. During the 2021-2022 financial year alone, the government removed 51 bureaucrats from their posts, accounting for approximately one third of all civil service dismissals over the last five years.

On Sunday, Secretary of Security Chris Tang stated that criticism of the government is allowed if it intends to make the government “perform better,” and claimed that the arrests do not suppress freedom of expression. On previous occasions, comments and complaints in these social media pages have helped to raise public awareness and demand accountability for government corruption, and have even compelled authorities to begin various investigations. Francis Lee Lap-fung, a professor at CUHK’s School of Journalism and Communications, also noted, “Many posts did not criticise the government at all and some even expressed support for a government decision.”

Meanwhile, Hong Kong police announced that they have been working with a tech company to create a 24-hour public opinion tracker that monitors online discussions and words that “smear” the police. This is part of the police force’s new public relations wing, unveiled on Monday, whose major responsibility is to “detect rumours early, and proactively provide clarifications as soon as possible.” Fiona Sun at the South China Morning Post described how the new public relations wing also aims to disseminate positive propaganda to improve the image of the police

[Assistant Commissioner of Police and new head of public relations Joe Chan Tung] said the new wing would also commit itself to “telling good stories” about the police, the city and the country, as well as highlighting the force’s professionalism to win public confidence.

He explained it would also make better use of new media and technology to help get the force’s message across.

Chan said the wing would also work to form partnerships with media organisations as well as community representatives to build better relationships.

[…] He said the wing would also carry out more activities in the community and schools, and use new technology, including augmented and virtual reality as well as elements of the metaverse to attract more participants, especially the young, in an attempt to instil values and a sense of national identity in them. [Source]

Due to national security concerns, a film was pulled from a local screening in Hong Kong this weekend. “Losing Sight of a Longed Place,” which won the Best Animated Short Film prize at Taiwan’s Golden Horse Awards in 2017, portrays a young gay man’s struggles in Hong Kong. The filmmakers announced in a Facebook post last week that Hong Kong’s Office for Film, Newspaper, and Article Administration (OFNAA) demanded they cut out a scene of the 2014 Umbrella Movement. Under the National Security Law, the government now possesses the legal powers to stifle any digital documentation of past protest movements. Anyone who exhibits an unauthorized film deemed contrary to national security, as stipulated under the film censorship law that was amended last year, could face a HK$1 million (US$127,419) fine and imprisonment for three years. Hillary Leung from the Hong Kong Free Press reported on the censorship of the seven-and-a-half-minute film, due to a one-second clip:

In an emailed reply sent on Monday, OFNAA ordered the film producers to delete a scene that it said had “reconstructed the illegal occupation movement.” If they did not comply, the film would not be allowed for public screening.

The shot in question – lasting less than a second – showed canopies and placards reading “Don’t forget the original intention.” The scene also had a scroll partially flipped up by the wind with a yellow umbrella and the characters “I want,” an apparent allusion to banners hung around protest camps during the 2014 movement that read “I want universal suffrage.”

[…] According to the Ground Up Film Society, the [Open University of Hong Kong, since renamed Hong Kong Metropolitan University, where the film creators were enrolled,] uploaded the short onto its YouTube channel three years ago.

But a day after the group announced it would withdraw the film from the festival, the video had been set to private with an error message reading “video unavailable.” [Source]

Censorship also continues to plague Hong Kong’s publishers. In The Guardian, Sum Lok-kei described how publishers who sold politically-sensitive books were barred from participating in a trade fair last month:

Hong Kong publishers have decried a “new form of censorship” after vendors selling books deemed politically sensitive were allegedly excluded from the industry’s traditional annual trade fair.

[… T]his year publishers that showcased books last year about the protests that swept the city in 2019 have been banned from the book fair, without explanation.

[…] “Publishers like ourselves, who put out political and so-called ‘sensitive’ books, are starting to be censored,” said [Raymond Yeung of publisher Hillway Culture], adding that some local printers have also refused to print their publications after the introduction of the national security law in June 2020.

[…] “This is not a matter of the law … there are hidden forces stopping these events and books from seeing the light of day,” he said.

“This form of censorship is scarier, because there are no rules we can follow.” [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/08/latest-targets-of-hong-kong-censorship-include-films-publishers-and-pro-transparency-social-media-pages/

Wednesday, 17 August 2022

Another U.S. Congressional Delegation Visits Taiwan, Beijing Restarts Military Drills

On Sunday, another U.S. Congressional delegation traveled to Taiwan, less than two weeks after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to the country. In response to the latest delegation’s visit, Beijing announced it would stage new military exercises, following those conducted in unprecedented proximity to the island immediately after Pelosi’s departure. These tit-for-tat measures have left many wondering what new equilibrium will emerge from the regional tensions and how to prevent further escalation

Johnson Lai of the Associated Press reported on the motivation and composition of this recent bipartisan delegation:

The U.S. lawmakers, led by Democratic Sen. Ed Markey of Massachusetts, met with President Tsai Ing-wen, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and legislators, according to the American Institute in Taiwan, Washington’s de facto embassy on the island.

[…] Markey is one of the few members of Congress still serving who voted for the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act that ensured continued relations with the island following the switch of U.S. diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The other members of the delegation are Republican Rep. Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, a delegate from American Samoa, and Democrats John Garamendi and Alan Lowenthal from California and Don Beyer from Virginia.

In a statement from his Senate office, Markey cited the 1979 law in saying the U.S. must maintain its commitment to “help Taiwan withstand cross-Strait coercion” and avoid conflict. [Source]

When the delegation met with President Tsai Ing-wen on Monday, Chinese state media announced sanctions on seven individuals—including Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to the U.S., Hsiao Bi-khim; the head of Taiwan’s national security council, Wellington Koo; and Lin Fe-fan, the deputy secretary general of the governing Democratic Progressive party—designed to “resolutely punish” those purportedly encouraging Taiwanese independence. The People’s Liberation Army announced that it had begun new combat drills the same day and that it “continues to train and prepare for war.” In The Financial Times that day, Kathrin Hille reported on Beijing’s additional military response and increasing encroachment around Taiwan:

The People’s Liberation Army’s new “multiple services joint combat-readiness patrols and exercises” come barely five days after it completed week-long drills that followed US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. China said last week those drills had succeeded in “obliterating” the median line in the Taiwan Strait, an unofficial buffer zone, and that the PLA would from now on regularly patrol around the island.

Since then, PLA aircraft and warships have been conducting daily manoeuvres around Taiwan in numbers far exceeding those prior to Pelosi’s visit and in areas close to Taiwan where they were not frequently active before the current crisis.

According to the Taiwanese defence ministry, 96 Chinese military aircraft were active around the island between last Thursday and Sunday — after Beijing had said its exercises were over, but that it would keep a “close eye” on Taiwan and the US and conduct frequent patrols in the area. [Source]

On Monday, AFP’s Rachel Yan, Clara Ip, and Jeff Li wrote about the wave of pro-Beijing, anti-American misinformation that accompanied China’s military drills:

Taiwanese defence officials said they had identified some 270 “false” online claims in recent weeks.

[…] In other widely viewed posts, a warning message purportedly issued by China’s state-run Xinhua news agency erroneously claimed China would “resume sovereignty” over Taiwan on August 15.

The message — viewed more than 356,000 times on the Chinese-owned app TikTok — said Taiwan’s army would be disbanded and that an opposition party politician would be installed as governor.

The same claim also circulated repeatedly on Facebook.

AFP’s Fact Check team found no evidence that the state-run news agency had run such a report.

Another video falsely claiming the Kinmen Islands –- a collection of Taiwanese-controlled islands off the coast of mainland China –- had agreed to be transferred to Chinese rule racked up more than 80,000 views on YouTube within two days. [Source]

A Chinese military expert told the Global Times on Monday that the “Taiwan encirclement” drills have not finished, adding, “The current military exercises and drills are being held on a regular and long-term basis.” Ryan Hass, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, described in Foreign Affairs the new status quo that China is trying to cement, and how the U.S. and Taiwan should push back:

In the case of Taiwan, Beijing appears to be putting force behind two of its recent assertions. The first is that China does not recognize any median line in the Taiwan Strait. The second is that China has “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait.” From Beijing’s perspective, these positions stem from its policy that Taiwan is a part of China. By operating aircraft and naval vessels across the median line of the Taiwan Strait in unprecedented numbers after Pelosi’s visit, Beijing is seeking to establish that its military will no longer be constrained to its half of the Taiwan Strait. And by lobbing ballistic missiles into waters near Taiwan’s commercial ports, Beijing appears to be signaling that from now on, it will act militarily wherever it deems necessary in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s firing of multiple missiles into waters within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone similarly serves as a warning to Tokyo about further involvement in cross-strait affairs.

[…] One issue in need of attention between policymakers in Washington and Taipei is how they define the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Senior officials in Washington and Taipei have vowed to uphold the status quo, but neither side has provided much clarity on how they identify it. If Washington and Taipei publicly define the status quo narrowly around pushing the Chinese military back across the Taiwan Strait median line in the near term, they risk setting themselves up for failure. Rather than grant Beijing such a perception of progress, Washington and Taipei would be wise to define the status quo around a more principled set of objectives. These could include preserving non-war in the Taiwan Strait, maintaining Taiwan’s political autonomy, steadily strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations, preventing the Chinese military from operating in Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace, and continuing to fly, sail, and operate anywhere that international law allows. [Source]

According to Bonnie Glaser, the director of Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund, this weekend’s Congressional delegation was planned a month ago, and another is expected to visit Taiwan before the end of the month. Prior to Pelosi’s trip, the last U.S. Congressional visit to Taiwan was made in April by a delegation of six U.S. lawmakers led by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham. A Bloomberg tally shows that 33 lawmakers have visited Taiwan during President Joe Biden’s term thus far, compared to 35 during President Donald Trump’s entire term and 71 during President Barack Obama’s second term. Sixty percent of the U.S. lawmakers who visited in the past decade were Republican. Some analysts have criticized Congressional visits to Taiwan by Pelosi and other lawmakers as being merely symbolic and unnecessarily provocative. Adding to this criticism in The Diplomat on Monday, Andrei Lungu argued that there are other less risky, more sustainable actions that U.S. lawmakers can take to support Taiwan:

[T]here are other actions that can really help Taiwan and reduce the risk of invasion. For example, because Taiwan’s budget is quite limited and, therefore, there are only so many weapons it can buy, billions of dollars in foreign aid would help Taipei redirect some money from domestic needs toward its military budget and defense industry. This sort of spending would also be far less provocative, because the West would provide money for schools and hospitals, not submarines and rockets.

[…] Instead of visiting Taipei, Western politicians can play a far more important role by visiting their own constituents and spending countless hours explaining to them, so they won’t fall prey to propaganda, where Taiwan is, what Taiwan is, the intricacies of the cross-strait situation and why Taiwan matters. Leaders should try to convince voters affected by the high cost of living, sometimes driven by feelings of isolationism or nationalism or simply lack of knowledge about faraway issues, that Taiwan is worth spending dozens of billions to defend, whether in direct aid or in the costs of sanctions – or that Taiwan will even be worth the sacrifices of American lives. [Source]

Even if lawmakers adopt more meaningful actions than symbolic visits, The Economist described how escalating tensions in the Taiwan strait will likely create a perilous new era of hostility

Some foresee a cycle of action and reaction, with increased risks of accidents and miscalculations. “Historians may very well look back at the summer of 2022 as the moment when US-China relations shifted from competition for relative advantage to overt confrontation, with a much greater risk of crises and escalation,” says Taylor Fravel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

[…] America is also likely to strengthen Taiwan’s defences by selling it more offensive weapons, training more of its troops, and lending or giving it cash to buy more kit, including small, mobile arms like those that have proved so effective in Ukraine. “Confrontation will go to a higher gear,” predicted Shi Yinhong of Renmin University in Beijing.

Congress will probably demand more. It is currently considering the Taiwan Policy Act, which would allow the island to join military exercises with America and declare it a “major non-NATO ally”, facilitating the provision of more advanced weaponry. It would also authorise “de facto diplomatic treatment for Taiwan equivalent to other foreign governments”. China would almost certainly consider any one of those moves as crossing a red line. [Source]

However, war may not be inevitable. The Wall Street Journal reported that in a telephone conversation shortly before Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Xi told Biden that while he strongly condemned the Speaker’s plan, he had no intention of going to war. Beijing’s saber rattling in reaction to the Congressional visits and its nationalist visions of annexation may be aimed more at distracting a domestic audience from other issues on the home front. Speaking to The New York Times about Chinese state media’s steady barrage of nationalist headlines and hashtags related to Taiwan, CDT’s Xiao Qiang noted, “Covid control, the economy going through this dramatic decline — those are real issues. […] There are many other things that people are concerned about in their daily life. And right now it’s all being repressed […] under this nationalist issue.”

Moreover, while the superpowers “play with fire,” the Taiwanese people appear to be unperturbed by Beijing’s military posturing. A recent public opinion poll in Taiwan revealed that the majority of respondents welcomed Pelosi’s visit and were less inclined towards unification after China’s new military drills:


Several cartoons capturing this Taiwanese sentiment of confident apathy spread throughout social media:

Reacting to China’s latest round of military drills, an editorial in the Taipei Times on Wednesday explained that Taiwanese resolve is only strengthened by continued bellicosity from Beijing

What Beijing fails to comprehend is that the more it ratchets up each of the battlespaces — conventional, cyber, information and psychological — the more it stiffens the resolve of ordinary Taiwanese, and strengthens the case for independence. Each time Beijing holds high-profile military exercises, firing ballistic missiles in ever-closer proximity to Taiwan or saturates the information space with jingoistic military propaganda and video footage of warships and military aircraft encircling Taiwan, they signal to ever greater numbers of Taiwanese that China is an implacable enemy with designs on their homeland.

[…] It has been said that “the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.”

The more Beijing steps up military coercion against Taiwan, the more it shoots itself in the foot. It is the definition of insanity. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/08/another-u-s-congressional-delegation-visits-taiwan-beijing-restarts-military-drills/

Kimono Detention Latest Incident of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in China

Police detained and interrogated a young woman for wearing a kimono in Suzhou, the latest apparent example of a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment across China. The woman posted a video of her detention to Weibo, capturing the moment when police accused her of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles” and yelled: “If you were wearing hanfu, I would never speak like this, but you’re wearing a kimono. Speaking as a Chinese person… you’re a Chinese person! Are you Chinese?” The street upon which she was arrested, Huaihai Road, is lined with Japanese restaurants and is a popular spot for cosplayers. At CNN, Nectar Gan reported on the incident and the woman’s posts detailing her disillusionment after a five-hour interrogation

The woman said in the Weibo post she was interrogated at the police station for about five hours until 1 a.m., during which she said her phone was searched, her photos deleted, and her kimono confiscated. She said she was also “educated” and warned by the police not to talk about her experience on the internet. 

[…] In an earlier post on Qzone, another Chinese social media platform, the woman said police also asked her to write a 500-word letter of self-criticism.

“I feel like I have no dignity right now,” she said in the Qzone post on Friday. “The police said what I did was wrong. I feel powerless … I like Japanese culture, European culture and I also like traditional Chinese culture. I like multiculturalism, I like watching anime, is it wrong that I like anything?”

“I have always been very patriotic — or rather, I had been very patriotic and trusting of the police, until now … I can only say I’m very disappointed, it turns out I never had the freedom to wear or say what I want.” [Source]

Her detention follows a number of similar incidents this past summer: the arrest of a Buddhist practitioner who paid for a Nanjing temple to erect memorial tablets to Japanese war criminals, the cancellation of Japanese-style summer festivals and anime conventions, complaints about a mural in a Beijing subway that critics said looked too similar to Japanese woodblock prints and, most notoriously, jubilation on the Chinese internet about Shinzo Abe’s assasination. While the exact origin of this latest wave of anti-Japanese sentiment is difficult to pinpoint among the protean stew of nationalism, Wang Ke, a professor Kobe University in Japan, told Vice News: “It is definitely supported by the Chinese government, which is fanning the flames of nationalism to send a political message.”

Fashion can be a flashpoint and this is not the first time kimonos have pricked at nationalist sensibilities. Last August, a woman was turned away from a mandatory coronavirus test for wearing a kimono, an incident which went viral on Weibo. Earlier this year, nationalist students accused Dior of cultural appropriation for a skirt they held mimicked a mamianqun, or “horse-faced skirt,” popular among those who wear hanfu. A professor at Peking University told Global Times: “by using elements of the horse-face skirt while claiming their design is original, Dior has shown cultural arrogance and disrespect for Chinese culture.” 

Online many expressed disgust with the “cultural witch hunt” that has leaked from the internet into daily life. Some pointed out the hypocrisy of nationalist Weibo commentators who have egged on anti-Japanese sentiment by highlighting posts in which the nationalists had shilled Japanese condoms and, in one case, the joys of eating sushi while wearing a kimono. Online comments collected by CDT, a selection of which are translated below, reveal widespread dissaproval of the policeman’s actions and a wariness towards cultural nationalism

@解雪時_:Everybody knows that Old Fogey knows no rule of law, he acts on the authority [given him] by the ghosts of the descendants of Yan and Huang.

@雾绘:The cultural witch hunt is not restricted to the internet, alas. This is but a first taste of the bitter fruit that comes from whipping up nationalism.

@内向红红:“When a brave man is enraged, he draws his sword on someone stronger; when a cowardly man is enraged, however, he draws his sword on someone weaker.” Abuse of power that results in a major loss of public property or seriously damages the national or public interest is punishable by up to three years of imprisonment or detention. Reject campaign-style law enforcement. When law enforcement is not constrained by the law, nobody is safe. Today, you can get arrested for cosplaying in public. Tomorrow, you might get beaten for watching anime on the subway. I hope that all law enforcement personnel will give serious thought to the fact that justice lives in the hearts of the People.

@卧龙岗的风花雪月:If wearing a kimono is illegal, then wearing pretty much anything can be construed as a crime. Suits pander to foreigners, hanfu hints at feudal restoration …

@魔法瓶子99:I recommend we cancel suits. In the future, the cops should arrest every suit-wearer they see. And why would true sons and daughters of China want to wear the garb of European and American powers, anyway? It’s really very hurtful to the public’s feelings. [Chinese]

The kimono incident was doubly heartbreaking, argued one WeChat essayist, because it showed the limited results of decades of backbreaking work to establish the substance and awareness of rule of law in China

The girl’s voice was even quieter and less confident while asking her second question: “On what basis?” In other words, she was asking the policeman the legal grounds for his behavior. He understood her perfectly and answered loudly: “You’re picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

That second question reveals that she understood her due rights under the law. In fact, that timid question encapsulates the blood, sweat, and tears of countless educators, legal professionals, and journalists—it is a microcosm of two decades of work establishing the rule of law in China. Every step in our society’s progress is built, in some form or another, on the behavior of “our children.”

Yet as we have seen, her voice was too soft, lost in the wind, destined for oblivion. She was taken to the police office and only released five hours later, after having written something akin to a self-criticism.

This is truly heartbreaking. It is for precisely this reason that I hope Suzhou police will make a public apology. You’ve not simply repressed one girl, but also three decades of progress for China’s civilization. [Chinese]

Censors did not allow free discussion of the incident. A WeChat essay reflecting on the “quotidian terror” of living in a society where anyone can be stripped of their freedom on any pretext was taken down by censors:

First they came for the people wearing kimonos. Next they’ll come for the people watching anime. Then those who watch Japanese dramas. After that it’ll be those who read Japanese. Finally, it’ll be everyone who has ever interacted with foreign cultures. Considering the degree of China’s current openness and connection to the world, it’ll be hard for any one of us to escape. One netizen left a comment on Weibo arguing that it was a good thing the girl was arrested. Then someone pointed out that Resident Evil, the commenter’s profile picture, was a product of a Japanese gaming company.

This is a perfect metaphor for “quotidian terror.”

You believe that you’ll never break the law, or wear a kimono, so this sort of thing will never happen to you. You’re just like her when she headed out that morning, as happy as could be, never expecting that she’d be detained. Perhaps it was brief eye contact, perhaps the officer was in a bad mood, perhaps it was something else (there are so many possibilities), but in a single moment, her destiny was altered. She lost her freedom, the contents of her phone (including her chat records) were scrutinized, and her personhood and privacy were peeled away for all to see.

Similarly, one day you might be wearing an item of clothing adorned with words or symbols you’ve never taken much notice of, or you might happen to be driving to work in an American car on a certain sensitive date. If wearing a kimono on a Japan-themed street can get you detained and your phone searched, then a simple question such as “How dare you drive an American car (or a Japanese, German, or Korean one) on a day like today?” might cause you to lose your freedom, or even become a victim of violence.

This indeterminate terror stalks every one of us. [Chinese]

State media made little, if any, comment on the kimono incident amid a blitz of coverage on the 77th anniversary of Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War II. State media coverage focused on memories of the Nanjing massacre, including the assembly of thirteen descendants of survivors of the massacres whom the Memorial Hall of the Victims of Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders have deemed the “first batch” of “inheritors of historical memories regarding Nanjing Massacre.”



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/08/kimono-detention-latest-incident-of-anti-japanese-sentiment-in-china/

Photo: Zhengzhou, by Xiquinho Silva



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/08/photo-zhengzhou-by-xiquinho-silva-2/