Friday, 25 March 2022
Solomon Islands and China Seek to Deepen Security Partnership, Unnerving Neighbors
On Thursday, a draft document outlining a security cooperation agreement between China and the Solomon Islands was leaked online. The proposed agreement opens the possibility of a greater Chinese military presence on the islands, and potentially a Chinese military base, raising concerns among Western governments fearful of China’s expanding influence in the Pacific. Damien Cave from The New York Times described the contents of the secret agreement:
The agreement, kept secret until now, was shared online Thursday night by opponents of the deal and verified as legitimate by the Australian government. Though it is marked as a draft and cites a need for “social order” as a justification for sending Chinese forces, it has set off alarms throughout the Pacific, where concerns about China’s intentions have been growing for years.
[…] The leaked document states that “Solomon Islands may, according to its own needs, request China to send police, armed police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands to assist in maintaining social order, protecting people’s lives and property.”
It allows China to provide “assistance on other tasks” and requires secrecy, noting, “Neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party.”
[…] For Beijing, the deal could offer its own potential reward. “China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of Solomon Islands, make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in and have stopover and transition in the Solomon Islands,” the draft states.
It also says the Solomons will provide “all necessary facilities.” [Source]
BIG: a leaked draft agreement between China and Solomon Islands puts Beijing on path to achieving at least naval access to SI, but perhaps even a new base down the line. Australia is deeply concerned, urges "Pacific family" to continue sticking together.https://t.co/LOLOLYfAPn
— Derek J. Grossman (@DerekJGrossman) March 24, 2022
With Parliament due to sit in Honiara (and the existing security concerns which led to a RPNGC deployment to Solomons) it will be interesting to see whether the agreement is raised by the Opposition. 2/6 pic.twitter.com/pQ96MFHLi2
— Dr Anna Powles (@AnnaPowles) March 24, 2022
Article 1 refs China's "own needs". What are these needs (strategic interests?) and what if they cut across Solomon Islands' interests or the interests of Solomon Islands' key partners such as Australia or PNG? 4/6
— Dr Anna Powles (@AnnaPowles) March 24, 2022
Article 5 of the security cooperation agreement refers to "confidentiality" and raises questions about the degree to which the parties will seek to control public information = controlling the political narrative. END 6/6
— Dr Anna Powles (@AnnaPowles) March 24, 2022
While it has yet to be confirmed by the cabinet of the Solomon Islands, the proposed agreement has come under strong criticism from Australian officials. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated that it was “one of the most significant security developments that we have seen in decades and it’s one that is adverse to Australia’s national security interests.” Defense Minister Peter Dutton stated that “we don’t want unsettling influences and we don’t want pressure and coercion that we are seeing from China.” Nick Perry from the Associated Press described contrasting reactions from New Zealand and Chinese officials:
“If genuine, this agreement would be very concerning,” Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta said. “Such agreements will always be the right of any sovereign country to enter into; however, developments within this purported agreement could destabilize the current institutions and arrangements that have long underpinned the Pacific region’s security.”
Questioned about the agreement, China’s Foreign Ministry said Beijing and the Solomons “conducted normal law enforcement and security cooperation on the basis of equal treatment and win-win cooperation.”
“This is in line with the international law and international practice, conducive to maintaining social order in the Solomon Islands and promoting peace and stability in the region, and helpful to enhance common interests of China and the Solomon Islands, as well as all countries in the region,” ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin told reporters at a daily briefing on Friday. [Source]
The draft security agreement between PRC🇨🇳 & the Solomon Islands🇸🇧 has implications for the security of all the Pacific islands. If a hostile power controls a base on the Solomons they can block shipping traffic from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean, into the Coral Sea, & beyond pic.twitter.com/vGfr1slVT5
— Professor Anne-Marie Brady (@Anne_MarieBrady) March 24, 2022
China has one official base in Djibouti. But, in past 24 hours, it's clear that Solomon Islands is on the radar. Cambodia, UAE, Guinea, and maybe others too. And unofficially, Beijing already has three bases in the Spratlys and one in the Paracels. Plus a PAP base in Tajikistan.
— Derek J. Grossman (@DerekJGrossman) March 25, 2022
Australia's Pacific Minister @ZedSeselja pretty forceful on China / Solomon Islands draft security agreement. He says there's no need for an authoritarian state to make a security contribution in region. He's discussed it with Pacific counterparts, predicts "significant pushback" pic.twitter.com/vsU5p4789k
— Stephen Dziedzic (@stephendziedzic) March 25, 2022
The Solomon Islands government stated that the proposed agreement would help in “diversifying the country’s security partnership including with China” and that “broadening partnerships is needed to improve the quality of lives of our people and address soft and hard security threats facing the country.” Adding to the momentum, this month China delivered a secret shipment of hundreds of fake firearms to the Solomon Islands for use in police training. Paul Karp and Kate Lyons from the Guardian described other justifications, made by the Solomon Islands government, for increased cooperation with China:
“Solomon Islands continues to preserve its Security Agreement with Australia as it develops and deepens its relations with all partners including with China.”
However, the government added that it was “working to broaden its security and development cooperation with more countries”.
In a significant signal, the government statement referred at one point to Australia and China as “Solomon Islands two major partners”.
The government said the agreement with China had a “development dimension to it, covering humanitarian needs of the country besides maintaining rule of law” and was necessary given “the country is located in a global hotspot where the impact of climate change is three times the global average.”
“More development cooperation is being sought within and externally to ensure the country is put back on track especially during this difficult time with the impact of COVID-19 on people’s lives, building the economy including damages caused by the recent riots and looting and the population’s wellbeing.” [Source]
Breaking – Solomon Islands government issues a statement on the contentious draft security agreement it's negotiating with China. No sign of a back-down: "broadening partnerships is needed to improve the quality of lives of our people and address soft and hard security threats" pic.twitter.com/RJU2bcThdl
— Stephen Dziedzic (@stephendziedzic) March 25, 2022
This is one of the strangest stories I've written in quite some time. Controversy erupts in Solomon Islands over "replica guns" allegedly shipped into Honiara for a Chinese government run police training program. Story below, thread to follow 1/https://t.co/E0VYgFZVE8
— Stephen Dziedzic (@stephendziedzic) March 17, 2022
Last November, the Solomon Islands became engulfed in riots when protesters burned down numerous buildings in the capital’s Chinatown, stormed the parliament building, and ransacked police stations. China sent nine police officers to help the government improve their “anti-riot capabilities.” The chaos grew from a combination of domestic factors such as deep political rivalries and uneven distribution of government funds, and foreign factors such as Chinese and Taiwanese competition for influence and resource extraction. Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s 2019 decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China acted as a major catalyst to the conflict.
As news of the proposed agreement spread through international media, there was some criticism of the panicked reactions from Western officials, whose paternalistic language obscured Solomon Islanders’ agency in determining the course of their own relations with different external actors. One such official was Australian Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews, who declared: “That is our backyard. This is our neighbourhood and we are very concerned of any activity that is taking place in the Pacific Islands.” In The Conversation, University of Adelaide professors Joanne Wallis and Czeslaw Tubilewicz cautioned officials and observers to adopt a more nuanced approach that recognizes the complex interests of multiple actors, both foreign and domestic, some of whom may have purposely leaked the document:
[The] draft agreement is primarily about Solomon Islands domestic politics – not just geopolitics.
[..] Neither Solomon Islanders (nor other Pacific peoples) are “passive dupes” to Chinese influence or unaware of geopolitical challenges – and opportunities. Some do, however, face resource and constitutional constraints when resisting influence attempts.
[…] The version [of the proposed agreement] circulating on social media may prove to be an early draft. Its leak is likely a bargaining tactic aimed at pursuing multiple agendas with multiple actors – including Australia.
[…] Influence is exercised not only by national governments, but also by a variety of non-state actors, including sub-national and community groups.
And targets of influence-seekers can exercise their agency. See, for example, how various actors in Solomon Islands are leveraging Australia, China and Taiwan’s overtures to the country.
We must also consider how power affects the political norms and values guiding governing elites and non-state actors, potentially reshaping their identities and interests. [Source]
My plea to Australian security analysts today- before you comment on the *draft* security agreement between Solomon Islands and China ask yourself: (1) am I acknowledging that Solomon Islanders have agency and are not passive dupes? (2) have I spoken to anyone in Solomon Islands?
— Joanne Wallis (@JoanneEWallis) March 24, 2022
Meanwhile, competition for influence in the Pacific-Island region remains fierce. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced in February that the U.S. would open an embassy in the Solomon Islands, a move seen as a response to the increased Chinese presence there. This week the U.S. named an experienced senior diplomat to lead talks with Pacific Island nations about economic aid, yet another effort to counter China’s influence in the Pacific. Some commentators have wondered whether the gap between American spoken commitments and their actual implementation has only encouraged countries in the Global South such as the Solomon Islands to diversify their external partnerships by embracing China. Beyond the U.S., Taiwan and China have sparred over who should get credit for rescuing nine Papua New Guinean sailors lost at sea this past month. A Global Times article initially claimed Chinese credit, before Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called it “a blatant lie” and the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force confirmed that it had Taiwan to thank for the rescue.
China lied and tried to steal the credit for rescuing 9 Papua New Guinean sailors lost at sea in Solomon Islands waters for 29 days, but the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force confirmed that the 9 PNG sailors were rescued by 🇹🇼 fishing vessel Yi Siang #8. https://t.co/6vqnJoVea0
— Byron Wan (@Byron_Wan) March 23, 2022
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/03/solomon-islands-and-china-seek-to-deepen-security-partnership-unnerving-neighbors/
Repression in Tibet Remains Shrouded in Opacity
In recent weeks, Tibet-focused media outlets have reported that Tsewang Norbu, a popular young singer, died after self-immolating in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa. CDT was unable to independently confirm the reports and there has been no official announcement regarding his death. The singer’s Weibo account, which boasts nearly 600,000 followers, is currently suspended. A notice appended to the account reads: “The user is currently suspended for violating relevant laws and regulations.” The comment sections on all his posts have been locked by Weibo and a chat room-style hashtag dedicated to the singer has also been deleted from the platform. However, the singer’s name still returns search results, among them posts mourning his loss and subtly referencing reports of self-immolation.
The difficulty in confirming Tsewang Norbu’s death and its circumstances stems in part from the severe restrictions the Chinese government places on international journalists’ access to the region. The Foreign Correspondents Club of China noted in its annual report that all four journalists who applied for access to the Tibet Autonomous Region had their applications denied. Tibet remains one of China’s least accessible regions. The U.S.-based think tank Freedom House ranked Tibet the least free region in the world. At South China Morning Post last week, Owen Churchill detailed a U.S. State Department assessment that found diplomats and journalists were systematically denied access to Tibet:
The obstacles, the report alleged, included harassment of US journalists, the stonewalling of diplomats’ engagements with locals in Tibetan areas outside Tibet, and the refusal by the Chinese government to greenlight any visits to Tibet by the US chargé d’affaires at its Beijing embassy.
In one incident, a US diplomat reported being blocked from boarding a plane during a personal trip to a Tibetan prefecture – referring to one of the areas outside Tibet that are home to large populations of ethnic Tibetans. Another was prevented from accessing a prefecture on a cycling tour.
[…] Those [members of the press] who were selected for [Chinese government-organized tours of Tibet] were “closely watched and prevented from visiting locations or meeting people other than those presented by [Chinese] officials hosting the tour”, the State Department said. [Source]
In February, Associated Press correspondents Dake Kang and Sam McNeil reported on the state of society in Tibet; during the course of their reporting, Kang was deported from a Tibetan region of Sichuan:
Why have Tibetans seemingly acceded to Chinese rule after centuries of self-governance and decades of fervent protest and civil disobedience? The answer, based on interviews with more than a dozen Tibetans inside and outside of China, is that in many ways Beijing’s plan to tame Tibet is working.
[…] Such efforts have helped win support from some young Tibetans, said one Tibetan from a poor, rural part of the plateau, who agreed to speak anonymously in order to be candid. Generational rifts are emerging, as memories of an independent Tibet recede into the past and young urban Tibetans adopt Han Chinese manners and attitudes.
[…] “I am a true Tibetan, and at the same time I am also a true Chinese,” said Kunchok Dolma, 28, a Tibetan in Chengdu who is a devout Buddhist and also teaches modern dance in flawless Mandarin. “There’s no conflict between these things.”
She is bothered that Tibetans can no longer obtain passports, by job postings that openly bar Tibetans from applying, and by restrictions on travel to Lhasa. But, given the region’s troubled past, she largely accepts state policy as being for the greater good. [Source]
3/As we approved a town, we got stopped at a checkpoint. Police checked everyone's documents. I got pulled off, and officials from the local foreign affairs office were waiting for me. It appears they knew I was coming.
Below, right, is Jampa, the official who stopped me. pic.twitter.com/BJQSVxRMl0
— Dake Kang (@dakekang) February 17, 2022
5/They drove me back to the airport intending to put me on a flight to Chengdu. But the flights got cancelled for weather reasons.
After an hour of deliberation, they decided to drive me all the way back to Chengdu – a 10 hour drive.
"Tonight?" I asked. "Tonight," they said. pic.twitter.com/Gp1XzLfpAw
— Dake Kang (@dakekang) February 17, 2022
12/Most Tibetans I spoke to know people who got in trouble for things like speaking up about self-immolations or having pictures of the Dalai Lama. They get interrogated, even detained. Monasteries are watched by cadres in "temple management offices", seen in this org chart below pic.twitter.com/dHIe1EN0ai
— Dake Kang (@dakekang) February 17, 2022
The Tibetan language is in particular danger. Both Tibetan and Uyghur were reportedly removed from the language learning application Talkmate and banned from the video streaming site Bilibili in late 2021. Tashi Wangchuk, a Tibetan language activist, was released from prison into likely house arrest in early 2021 after spending five years in prison on “ethnic separatism” charges for speaking to The New York Times about his language-education activism. In December, James Griffiths of The Globe and Mail wrote about a system of assimilationist boarding schools that threaten to strip Tibetan children of their cultural and linguistic heritage:
While boarding schools for Tibetan children have been promoted by the state for decades, the scale of the system and its growth since 2008 have not been previously reported. The Tibet Action Institute drew on official data to estimate that 806,218 Tibetans between the ages of 6 and 18 currently attend a boarding school – 78 percent of the 1,039,370 children attending school in Tibetan regions.
[…] One Tibetan who attended one of those schools – whom The Globe and Mail is identifying by the pseudonym Tenzin so he could speak freely, without concern for his family back in Tibet – said that while instruction was still largely in a Tibetan language, “the content of what we studied was almost all Chinese.
[…] “When you are cut off from your language and culture and history, you lose a sense of who you are, and eventually it feels like you’re losing the very fabric of your humanity,” he said. “You don’t feel complete.”
[…] Officials in Sichuan recently published a “10-year action plan for educational development in ethnic minority regions,” which calls on local governments to “advance the boarding school system” with the aim of increasing capacity to 820,000 students by 2030. [Source]
An op-ed published in the state news tabloid Global Times in February of this year accused Canada of “projecting” its own “genocide” against indigenous communities onto China. “Canada is the legacy of imperialism and genocide masked with a smiling face,” the opinion piece alleged. Such criticism is far from original: The Tibet Action Institute report on which The Globe and Mail based its report draws an explicit connection between North American residential schools and the Tibetan boarding school system. As the report states: “There is strong evidence that the colonial boarding school system for Tibetans is designed to achieve the same end as the residential school systems in Canada and the United States, and the state-run training schools and institutions for the ‘Stolen Generations’ of Aboriginal children forcibly removed from their families in Australia.”
recognition of difference, as the reason many non-Han have yet to embrace their identity as loyal Chinese citizens and could even lead to Soviet-style collapse. Building on this logic, XJP has called for forging a “communal consciousness” through “great ethnic fusion." 9/
— Tweeting Historians (@Tweetistorian) March 12, 2022
but also broader acts of repression against non-Han communities, such as the “sinification” of Hui Muslim mosques and the likely end of education in minority languages, all efforts to subjugate non-Han identity and complete the transition from empire to nation. 11/
-BW— Tweeting Historians (@Tweetistorian) March 12, 2022
Meanwhile, the long-running tension between Chinese authorities and Tibet sympathizers in Hollywood has continued with the removal of actor Keanu Reeves’ films from the Chinese internet after he performed at a benefit concert for charity Tibet House US in early March. Reeves was once a darling of the Chinese film scene. He filmed his directorial debut, “Man of Tai Chi,” in China with backing from the state-run China Film Group—although not without running into censorship issues. A scene depicting underground fighting and police corruption had to be shot in Hong Kong because, as Reeves told a Canadian interviewer, “In Beijing there’s no underground fighting. And there’s no corrupt police officers.” Now, he has been scrubbed from the internet in seeming retaliation for performing in a benefit concert for Tibet House US.
Hollywood movie studios and actors often self-censor in order to avoid such fates. References to Tibet are often scrubbed from American films hoping to secure Chinese theatrical releases: examples include “World War Z,” which excised a note mentioning that Lhasa was the last zombie-free city, and Marvel’s “Doctor Strange,” which re-envisioned a Tibetan character as a Celtic woman played by Tilda Swinton. At The Los Angeles Times, Rebecca Davis reported on Keanu Reeves’ erasure from the Chinese internet shortly after his film “The Matrix: Resurrections” became the first Hollywood film to be released in Chinese theaters in months:
Last Monday, China’s major streamers removed the vast majority of Reeves’ filmography from their sites and wiped search results related to his name in Chinese — the cumbersome transliteration “Jinu Liweisi.”
[…] At least 19 films starring Reeves were removed from the Tencent Video platform, while all but one — “Toy Story 4” — were removed from other top streamers Youku and Migu Video. Sites like Bilibili and Xigua Video also saw purges. Though “Toy Story 4,” which features Reeves as the voice of motorcycle-riding stuntman Duke Caboom, remains online, its credits are unusual: They unfurl in English except for the voice cast, which alone switches over to Chinese and lists only the local dubbing cast, avoiding any mention of Reeves’ name.
[…] “It’s a curious case that’s worth following. We tend to think of the censorship machine in China as this really coordinated monster, but the fact that we’re seeing these conflicting signals [between the online and theatrical markets] suggests that some of these measures come from different places,” said Alex Yu, a researcher at China Digital Times, a U.S.-based news organization that translates and archives content censored in China. [Source]
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/03/repression-in-tibet-remains-shrouded-in-opacity/
Thursday, 24 March 2022
Photo: Untitled (Shanghai), by Matthias Jokisch
Untitled (Shanghai), by Matthias Jokisch (CC BY 2.0)
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/03/photo-untitled-shanghai-by-matthias-jokisch/
U.S. Struggles to Find Balanced Approach Against CCP’s Transnational Repression
Last week, federal prosecutors from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) opened three criminal cases accusing five Chinese government agents of attempting to spy on, intimidate, and silence dissidents living in the U.S. The high-profile cases come only weeks after the same agency closed the China Initiative, a controversial program aimed at countering Chinese espionage in American businesses and universities. These contrasting developments demonstrate the complexity of protecting citizens and society from both transnational repression by the CCP and domestic overreach by the U.S. government.
https://twitter.com/FBI/status/1504203371594407938
DOJ Charges Defendants With Harassing and Spying On Chinese Americans for Beijing https://t.co/5yYbHoOjre
— Paul Charon (@PaulCharon) March 18, 2022
The first of the new cases involved the targeting of a Chinese dissident who was a former student leader in the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Jan Wolfe from Reuters described this case and a Chinese agent’s alleged actions against the dissident:
In one of the cases, federal prosecutors said a Chinese government agent approached a U.S. private investigator to help manufacture a political scandal that would undermine a China-born man seeking the Democratic nomination to run for a New York seat in the U.S. House of Representatives.
At one point, the Chinese agent proposed that the private investigator consider physically attacking the candidate to prevent his candidacy, according to prosecutors.
"You can start thinking now, aside from violence, what other plans are there," the Chinese agent allegedly said. "But in the end, violence would be fine too. Huh? Beat him, beat him until he cannot run for election."
The candidate was not identified in court documents, but fits the description of Xiong Yan, who is seeking the Democratic nomination to run for a House seat representing the eastern part of New York’s Long Island. The seat is held by Republican Lee Zeldin, who opted to run for governor rather than seek reelection. [Source]
“In one of these schemes, the co-conspirators allegedly orchestrated a campaign to undermine the U.S. congressional candidacy of a U.S. military veteran who was a leader of the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing."https://t.co/2jSZqdciL4
— Sheridan Prasso (@SheridanAsia) March 16, 2022
Aruna Viswanatha, Kate O’Keeffe, and James Fanelli from The Wall Street Journal described other dissidents targeted by the agent involved in the first case:
A man working as an agent of the Chinese government also plotted to appear at another dissident’s house pretending to represent an international sports committee in a bid to get his passport and that of a family member, prosecutors said. The dissident isn’t named but was confirmed by a person familiar with the investigation as Arthur Liu, the father of American figure-skating Olympian Alysa Liu, who has said he fled China after organizing student protests in 1989.
[…] Representatives for Alysa and Arthur Liu also didn’t respond to a request for comment. The complaint alleges that the surveillance and harassment campaign against Mr. Liu included looking to pay a reporter to let an agent tag along on an interview and ask his own questions, put a GPS tracker on his car, and get his Social Security number.
The complaint said investigators had also secured an international sports committee ID card bearing the name of an actual representative and an image of one of the agents. The plan to get Mr. Liu’s passport and that of a family member, the complaint said, was discussed in November 2021 and involved going to the Lius’ house with the identification card under the guise of checking if they were prepared to travel.
The 16-year-old Alysa Liu competed at the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, finishing seventh in the women’s competition. [Source]
The second case involved Chinese agents targeting dissident artist Chen Weiming, creator of the Goddess of Democracy statue at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, which has since been removed. Some of his work is also exhibited in Liberty Sculpture Park in Yermo, California, including a replica of a tank from the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, and “CCP Virus,” a giant sculpture fusing the head of Xi Jinping with a coronavirus molecule. Last July, the sculpture was destroyed in a fire, which Chen suggested was an attack by the Chinese government “to shut down our free speech.” Richard Winton from the Los Angeles Times described how the DOJ says Chen was targeted by Chinese agents involved in the second case:
The three [agents] also tried unsuccessfully to get Chen’s tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service, thinking they could get him charged for tax evasion, according to indictments unsealed Wednesday.
[…] In a series of communications, Sun encouraged Liu “to have Ziburis destroy the sculpture,” but they also considered whether that could backfire and give the artist publicity.
When Ziburis posed as an art dealer, according to the complaint, he secretly installed surveillance cameras and GPS devices at the dissident’s workplace and in his car. While in China, Sun watched the live video feed and location data from these devices, the charges allege. [Source]
https://twitter.com/Stand_with_HK/status/1401876045645549570
https://twitter.com/paulmozur/status/1504244497718206467
From what I can tell, the DoJ accuse the defendants of conspiring to burn the sculpture. I can’t imagine there are other burned sculptures of Xi as virus molecule, so this must be it. https://t.co/qr98jhrU31 pic.twitter.com/0KU9HiKLjd
— Paul Mozur 孟建國 (@paulmozur) March 17, 2022
Ellen Nakashima and Shayna Jacobs at The Washington Post described the third case against a CCP agent who informed on dissidents, one of whom was later jailed in Hong Kong:
In the third case, Shujun Wang of Queens was arrested and charged with acting as an agent of the Chinese government and lying about his participation in a transnational repression scheme orchestrated by the MSS. Wang, a former visiting scholar and author, helped found an organization that memorializes two former leaders of the Chinese Communist Party who promoted political and economic reforms and were forced from power.
Since at least 2015, however, Wang has secretly operated at the direction of the MSS, prosecutors allege. Given his stature within the Chinese American community in New York City, he was able to induce activists to confide in him, including sharing their views on democracy in China, as well as planned speeches, writings and demonstrations against the party.
The victims of his efforts included groups that Beijing considers subversive, prosecutors alleged, including Hong Kong pro-democracy activists, advocates of Taiwan independence, and Uyghur and Tibetan activists in the United States and abroad.
In April 2020, one victim about whom Wang allegedly reported information to the Chinese government, a Hong Kong democracy activist, was arrested in Hong Kong and jailed on political charges, prosecutors said. In April 2019, Wang allegedly flew from China to New York carrying a handwritten document with the names and contact information of dozens of other well-known dissidents, including Hong Kong democracy activists who were subsequently arrested in 2019 and 2020. [Source]
Harper Neidig and Rebecca Beitsch from The Hill described the DOJ’s justification, citing the need to protect the U.S. from attacks on the rule of law by foreign governments:
“This activity is antithetical to fundamental American values, and we will not tolerate it when it violates U.S. law,” Matthew Olsen, the assistant attorney general leading the DOJ’s National Security Division, said in a statement. “The Department of Justice will defend the rights of Americans and those who come to live, work, and study in the United States. We will not allow any foreign government to impede their freedom of speech, to deny them the protection of our laws or to threaten their safety or the safety of their families.”
[…] “The complaints unsealed today reveal the outrageous and dangerous lengths to which the PRC government’s secret police and these defendants have gone to attack the rule of law and freedom in New York City and elsewhere in the United States,” Breon Peace, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, said Wednesday. [Source]
Defusing national security threats from China has not been simple for the DOJ, whose China Initiative has left scars on many in the research community. The program began under the Trump administration in 2018 with a focus on cases of grant fraud or visa fraud in universities. Over time, it has come under intense criticism by civil rights groups claiming that it created an atmosphere of fear among Chinese and Chinese-Americans in the U.S., especially in the context of the administration’s call for a “whole-of-society” response to the national security threat from China and rising hate crimes against Asian Americans. Critics also lambasted the initiative’s disproportionate reliance on criminal prosecutions and the DOJ’s lack of expertise in university research culture, the subject of most prosecutions. Natasha Gilbert & Max Kozlov from Nature described how the initiative went adrift:
Scientists and civil-liberties groups had been calling for the China Initiative to end for more than a year. Critics of the initiative said it was biased against researchers of Chinese descent, and pointed to the damaged lives and careers of those who have been arrested. For instance, nanotechnology researcher Anming Hu at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, was acquitted in September last year after a mistrial. He had been under house arrest for over a year while awaiting trial, and was fired from his job (the university rehired him this month).
[…] The reforms to the China Initiative were driven in part by concerns from the academic and scientific community, Olsen said. A number of university and advocacy groups submitted letters to US attorney-general Merrick Garland asking for a review of the programme last year. Olsen was asked to evaluate the initiative, a process that took three months. He acknowledged that the cases brought against researchers under the China Initiative gave a perception of bias against those of Chinese descent, and undermined international collaboration. However, he said he hadn’t seen any evidence to suggest that the DoJ had taken any decisions owing to racial prejudice.
The volunteer group APA Justice, which has been advocating on behalf of researchers of Asian descent, disagrees with Olsen’s assessment but welcomes “the end of the ill-conceived initiative and DOJ’s openness to listen and respond to community concerns”. In December, an analysis by the news outlet MIT Technology Review found that nearly 90% of all China Initiative defendants were of Chinese origin — a fact that Lee says is indisputable evidence of racial profiling. [Source]
https://twitter.com/PhelimKine/status/1501598314697007116
https://twitter.com/PhelimKine/status/1497331884157812742
https://twitter.com/lmatsakis/status/1496559988973928448
https://twitter.com/tom_kellogg/status/1486095052141178880
“By grouping cases under the China Initiative rubric, we helped give rise to a harmful perception that DOJ applies a lower standard to investigate/prosecute criminal conduct related to that country or that we view people with racial, ethnic or familiar ties to China differently."
— Emily Weinstein (@emily_sw1) February 23, 2022
In place of the China Initiative, the DOJ announced a new plan in February called the Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats, focused on nefarious activity from a broader set of countries including Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as China. Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen also stated that the department would alter its approach to grant fraud cases by potentially taking civil or administration actions rather than criminal prosecutions. But as Jeffrey Mervis wrote in Science, some researchers argue that the change in name may bring little concrete change going forward:
“Dropping the name is good,” says Steven Pei, an electrical engineer at the University of Houston who has been a prominent advocate for reforming an initiative critics say has unfairly targeted U.S.-based scientists of Chinese origin and improperly subjected researchers who made paperwork errors to criminal prosecution. “But the real issue is how the new policy will be implemented.”
[…] “If you don’t admit that you’ve done something wrong, then how can you prevent it from happening again?” asks Pei, a co-organizer of the nonprofit Asian Pacific American Justice Task Force, which has highlighted the plight of scientists it believes have been unjustly prosecuted. Pei and others would like DOJ to conduct a blanket review of all pending cases. “That would go a long way toward winning back the trust of the Asian and scientific communities,” Pei says.
[…] Such thorny issues are a big reason many scholars see DOJ’s announcement as only a first step. The name change “recognizes that our concerns were legitimate,” says John Yang, president of Advancing Justice-AAJC, an advocacy group. “But there is a lot more work to be done.” [Source]
https://twitter.com/mauracunningham/status/1496111309418553349
https://twitter.com/LinZhang9/status/1504526800621350916
https://twitter.com/jwdwerner/status/1496661345835618314
“A difficult Phase One has ended on an encouraging note. Phase Two may be worse, and it is right around the corner.”
Read our latest commentary by @TheWilsonCenter’s Robert Daly on US-China rivalry and the end of the DOJ #ChinaInitiative: https://t.co/jd8HODmYUA
— U.S.-China Perception Monitor (@uscnpm) February 23, 2022
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/03/u-s-struggles-to-find-balanced-approach-against-ccps-transnational-repression/