Saturday, 23 January 2021

Translation: “The First Woman To Die by the Divorce ‘Cooling-off Period'”

On January 1, the Supreme People’s Court released the first interpretations of China’s Civil Code, putting into effect the nation’s first comprehensive collection of private laws on personal and property rights. When it passed last May, public attention was fixed on long-running crises of domestic abuse and violence against women in the country, and anger would rise as the year went on to include the grisly murder of a rural Tibetan woman, and a Mandopop star’s spirited advocacy against gender violence. While some initial commentary on the code cited the inclusion of clauses legally defining sexual harassment, protecting reproductive rights, or allowing property rights for LGBTQ+ couples as relative marks of progress, vagueness in the “largely symbolic” legislation was noted, and a lack of certain other protections was lamented.

One point that drew wide concern was the inclusion of a minimum 30-day “cooling-off” period for divorces, which many saw as directly imperiling the lives of women. When the nation’s first civil code went into effect on January 1, The Conversation reported on the resounding concerns:

Chinese feminists feel that their reservations about a newly introduced one-month cooling-off period before a divorce is finalised have been ignored. They argue that it undermines the freedom to divorce and disregards victims of domestic violence. There has been ongoing criticism online about the new rules since May.

[…] The earliest protest started before the civil code was passed in May. During the internal deliberation of the People’s Congress in May, one delegate, Jiang Shengnan, condemned the divorce cooling-off period in sharp words: “The freedom of the majority should not be restricted just because a few couples can’t sort themselves out.” She also raised the issue of domestic violence. According to the new code, after a couple file a divorce application, either person can withdraw the application during the cooling-off period without the other person’s consent. This rule could be dangerous for victims of domestic violence.

Jiang also boldly criticised the suspected real purpose of the cooling-off period. If the party intends to maintain a decent birth rate by keeping marriages afloat, she argued, imposing restrictions on divorce will not work, because people, especially women, will simply refuse to marry. Her comments were widely reported on Chinese social media. […] [Source]

A week into 2020, another grisly spousal murder case highlighted the prevalence of domestic violence; the social, cultural, and legislative disadvantages facing women in Chinese society; and the fatal flaws of the now codified divorce “cooling-off period.”

According to  friends and family, Kan Xiaofang dreamed of being teacher. The only of four children in her family to go to junior college, she worked in sales and ecommerce after graduating. Under intense social and family pressure at age 30, she married a man named Yu from a neighboring village in 2014. Her first daughter was born the same year, and five months later she became pregnant with her second. After her youngest daughter was born, a pattern of domestic violence began. Last spring, Kan decided to flee the violence, and took an assembly line job at an electronics factory about a half-hour drive from her home. She worked hard, alternating between day and more lucrative night shifts, but was in constant fear. When she heard that her husband was searching for her, she fled to Wuhan in the late summer. She worked double shifts, lived simply, and saved most of her earnings. After six years of marriage, she filed for divorce in 2021.

Over the New Year’s holiday early this month, she returned to Yangxin to collect necessities and proceed with the divorce. According to her sister, when the two saw an axe near the door of the empty house she used to live in, Kan commented “look, the axe is even ready, I guess he is planning to kill me.”  On January 8, after accompanying a judge and workers for a property appraisal for any potential division of assets, Kan Xiaofang was brutally murdered by her husband. A deleted article on the case, archived by CDT Chinese, includes excerpts from a hand-written last testament left for her family on January 7—another sign that Kan saw her fate on the horizon. The excerpt is translated below:

“This time it’s hard to tell whether going home is a good or bad idea. So just in case, I ask family to look for this posthumous letter  inside the iron box. It is best if you bury me at whichever place you wish, but if not please scatter my ashes above the Fu River, or down by the shore is also good. But by all means, don’t bury me in Shangyu (Yu’s hometown), for I wish to be peaceful in death. There is no need for a funeral or to select an auspicious date for burial or any other rites, and even more so no big coffin, just a simple urn will do. And I’ve no need for so-called sacrifices to the ancestors, just don’t forget my murderer, and don’t forgive him!” [Chinese]

A January 16 article by WeChat user @青橙故事 begins with an excerpt from another handwritten note showing that Kan feared for her life months earlier. An extended excerpt of the article, which directly implicates the “cooling-off” rule for perpetuating a pattern of violence, is translated below:

On January 8, 2021, a woman named Xiaofang from Yangxin County, Huangshi City, Hubei,  was hacked to death by her husband at the doorstep of her home. She died in the hospital three days later.

While sorting through the relics, Xiaofang’s family found a note dated May 22 which read: “If anything unexpected happens to me, all of my property shall belong to my mother, including: half of the property rights to room 2902, accident compensation fund, and all assets in my personal bank. There is no need to organize a big funeral or prepare a big coffin, after cremation my remains can be placed in an urn and buried on the hill at the Kan family reservoir along the stone steps, the higher, the deeper, the better.”

Xiaofang’s sister told the media in an interview that her parents are now feeling very guilty, that they pushed her too hard to marry—at 30 Xiaofang was still unwed, and was urged to marry her husband Yu Hu two months after meeting him.

After marriage, Xiaofang had two daughters. She alone was responsible for all of the family’s expenses, housework, and childcare. Those who knew her remember Xiaofang as a hard-working person. She worked as a courier before the incident, and she took her daughters with her to run her routes so that they would be looked after.

Due to Yu Hu’s repeated domestic violence against Xiaofang, she sued for divorce. The case was opened on July 28 of last year. On January 1, after the judge and appraisers finished their second appraisal of Xiaofang’s house and left, Yu Hu hacked and killed Xiaofang.

Xiaofang’s family said that Xiaofang had long ago written a last testament having had a premonition of being harmed. Her family will arrange the burial according to her wishes.

This case has triggered a new round of public discussion about the “cooling-off period for divorce.” Regarding this, some legal practitioners have suggested that the “cooling-off period” is only applicable to divorces negotiated by the Civil Affairs Bureau. No “divorce cooling-off period” applies in court litigation, so they claim there is no need for concern.

Is this really the case?

On September 26, 2019 a homicide occurred in Nanjing’s Jiangning District. A husband named Wei murdered his wife Dong in public in their neighborhood. Dong had sued for divorce—in August 2018.

During the marriage, Wei had engaged in domestic violence against Dong on several occasions—six police reports for incidents of domestic violence had been left behind, two subpoenas written, and a [lawsuit had been underway for a year]. The final result, a man killed his wife.

Looking at over 150,000 divorce case judgements in Henan and Zhejiang provinces between 2009-2016, Indiana University Bloomington Professor Ethan Michelson discovered the following features:

1. Even if the woman has sufficient evidence of domestic violence, if the man does not agree to divorce the court will usually find that “the relationship has not broken down”;

2. The average time between an initial application for divorce and the final judgment is close to one year—which, as it were, is equivalent to the “cooling-off period”;

3. Men often make threats related to the outcome of their sentences, whether to the safety of the woman’s life, or to that of the judge’s career.

In summary, the final verdict: the experience of domestic violence has very little influence on the sentence, the primary variable is the man’s agreement to divorce.

Not only that, but after the Civil Code’s “cooling-off period” for divorce protocol came into effect on January 1, 2021, the court took things a level further by directly issuing a “Notification on the Cooling-off Period for Divorce.”

In the notice, the judge not only announced the “divorce cooling-off period,” but also gave the parties two follow-up options: 1) extend the divorce cooling-off period; 2) if things have reconciled, retract the lawsuit.

In this case, to say the least, the court tried to block the road to divorce.

Is it only China that makes it so difficult to divorce?

No, it isn’t.

In the United States, state laws vary, but typically require a waiting period of between 60 days and six months. In Germany, a one-year waiting period is usually required. Divorce tends to be more difficult in countries more affected by religious and social traditions.

In these countries, however, safeguards for women are relatively comprehensive—for example, separation protected by law; higher and more effective penalties against domestic violence; habeas corpus orders efficiently enforced; low-income parties compensated by the other party and if enforcement isn’t possible, various types of social service bureaus offer subsidies, etc.

Domestically, however, both separation and marital rape exist in a gray zone, and under most circumstances women are the vulnerable group. If as long as one day goes without divorce, there are still “sexual duties” and an obligation to maintain marriage. At the same time, the Marriage Act also protects the wealthy. In practice, with the socio-economic status of the sexes still far from equal, this means it favors men. In the case of the murdered wife introduced at the beginning of this article, the man did not support his family, did not do housework, did not take care of the children, did not seem to fulfill any obligations at all. Still, the survival of the marriage still relies mainly on his will.

Therefore, under the premise that this environment is just too difficult to change, all that an individual can do is set up their own cooling-off period before marriage. […] [Chinese]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/translation-the-first-woman-to-die-by-the-divorce-cooling-off-period/

Friday, 22 January 2021

Foreign Ministry Spokespeople Atwitter Over American Social Media Bans

A new investigation by China Media Project revealed how Twitter’s decision to label certain Chinese accounts as “state-affiliated” throttled their reach, curbing China’s “borrowed boat” propaganda strategy yet also impacting independent Chinese media outlets. In August of 2020, Twitter attached labels to accounts connected to the Chinese, French, Russian, U.K., or U.S. governments and stopped boosting the reach of their posts by removing them from search bar recommendations. Chinese state-backed accounts had taken to Twitter to spread messages both benign, such as images of pandas, and pernicious, including denialism about the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. At China Media Project, Kevin Schoenmakers and Claire Liu investigated the impact of Twitter’s new policy and its unintended consequences:

The three accounts with the most followers, belonging to state broadcaster CGTN, state news agency Xinhua, and the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, all saw drops of over 20 percent per tweet. The numbers for China Daily and the Global Times, English-language newspapers published by the Information Office of the State Council and the People’s Daily respectively, also shrank by double digits. Tweets by the latter, a national tabloid long known for its often provocative comments on world affairs, received 31 percent fewer likes after the labeling.

[…] For many businesses, advertising services on Twitter, through tools like “Quick Promote,” are an important way to boost engagement, increasing followers and website traffic. But Chinese state media and diplomats have also seen platforms like Twitter and Facebook as essential channels in getting global audiences to hear official state narratives, and redress what China’s propaganda officials regard as a serious deficit in what they call “international discourse power” (国际话语权), and what they regard as a key aspect of China’s “comprehensive national power” (综合国力).

[…] But despite China’s massive external media investments, reaching foreign audiences has been difficult, and so these same outlets rely on Western social media to share China’s viewpoints. They have been aggressive in making sure they have a big audiences – or at least appear to have them – on major platforms like Twitter. Some Chinese state media have spent millions of yuan to expand their base of followers on both Twitter as well as Facebook, as tender documents show. A government notice published in August 2019 showed that China’s top internet control body, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), had a one-year agreement with the People’s Daily for the latter to promote information about China on Facebook for 5.8 million yuan, or just over 800,000 US dollars. State media have also been suspected of buying followers on social media networks. [Source]

They also found that independent outlets like Caixin, a pathbreaking investigative outlet founded by famous journalist Hu Shuli, was rather misleadingly labeled a “state-affiliated” account:

It is important to recognize that media like Caixin, while also state-affiliated, can have room for critical and investigative journalism, [Fang Kecheng, an assistant professor of journalism and communication at the Chinese University of Hong Kong] says. He suggests Twitter could refer users to a third-party website with detailed information. It might be possible, he says, for social media companies to commission such a site. At present, there are no reliable expert sources for a more detailed understanding of how various media operate. YouTube, which began labeling “news broadcasters that receive some level of government or public funding” in 2018, links users to Wikipedia. [Source]

The Economist reported on the Twitter rule’s effect on China’s “Wolf Warriors,” the new style of bombastic government spokespeople and diplomats, who have spread vaccine disinformation on the platform:

The findings raise questions about the role Twitter and other Western social-media platforms play in helping China’s propagandists fulfil Mr Xi’s wishes. In March 2020 Zhao Lijian, a foreign-ministry spokesman, prompted a furore (including in the White House) with a viral tweet suggesting that American military visitors may have seeded covid-19 in China. Mr Zhao is often called a “wolf warrior” because of his pugnacious style on Twitter (the nickname refers to the titles of popular Chinese films featuring a Rambo-like character). On January 17th he was prowling again, retweeting two posts by Liu Xin, a cgtn presenter, that called on Western media to focus on deaths in Germany and Norway of old people who had taken the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine for covid-19.

Such posts, along with others promoting the adoption of China’s own vaccines abroad, suggest an attempt by China’s propagandists to sap faith in non-Chinese vaccines. That is reckless at a time when public acceptance of well-tested ones is so vital to ending the pandemic. (Twitter said Ms Liu’s tweets did not violate its rules.)

[…] Mr Zhao and Ms Liu have a total of more than 1m followers, but the diplomat’s recent retweets of Ms Liu’s concerns about vaccine deaths have not been shared nearly as widely as his troublemaking tweets of last March. The wolf warriors are still online, but their snarls are less audible. [Source]

Twitter locked the account of the Chinese Embassy in the United States after an inflammatory January 7 tweet called Uyghur women “baby-making machines” who were liberated by “eradicating extremism.” The United States’ State Department has designated the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang both genocide and a crime against humanity, in part because of new reports detailing forced sterilizations of Uyghur women. A Twitter spokesperson said that the account was suspended “for violating our policy against dehumanization,” but Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claimed that, in fact, China was a “major victim” of the ban. At Bloomberg, Kurt Wagner and Peter Martin reported on the Chinese government’s reaction to the Twitter ban:

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying on Thursday said authorities were “puzzled” about why Twitter restricted the account, calling it the embassy’s responsibility to correct “fake reports and information related to Xinjiang.”

“We hope Twitter can adhere to objective and fair principles and not display double standards on this issue,” she said at a briefing in Beijing.

[…] China’s embassy in Washington joined Twitter in 2019 in the midst of heated trade talks between the countries, as more Chinese officials started using the platform to aggressively defend Beijing across the world in what has become known as “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. Chinese officials and state-run media have used Twitter to accuse the U.S. of hypocrisy, particularly after a deadly riot at the Capitol earlier this month.

After the Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka’s account was suspended last year, it argued its “freedom of speech” must be honored, even though Twitter posts are blocked in the mainland. [Source]

 

Although China has banned most major American media and tech companies from operating within its borders, officials often complain about restrictions imposed by the United States. When the Trump Administration moved to ban TikTok and WeChat in 2020, China complained that such a ban would violate World Trade Organization rules.

In a recent peculiar twist, Chinese state media cited Twitter’s suspension of former President Donald Trump’s account as the end of America as a “beacon of democracy.” Some voices pushed back. CDT translated Peking University law professor He Weifang’s article “On the U.S. President’s Twitter Freedom,” which argued that the ban was both constitutional and necessary. His article was quickly scrubbed from the internet by Chinese censors.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/foreign-ministry-spokespeople-atwitter-over-american-social-media-bans/

Photo: Lightning “passes through” the highest landmark building in Beijing like a dragon, by World Meteorological Organization/Lu Qiao

Lightning “passes through” the highest landmark building in Beijing like a dragon, by World Meteorological Organization/Lu Qiao (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/photo-lightning-passes-through-the-highest-landmark-building-in-beijing-like-a-dragon-by-world-meteorological-organization-lu-qiao/

Thursday, 21 January 2021

After Disappointing Sinovac Trial, Beijing Snipes at Western Vaccines

A week after stage three trial data from Brazil revealed lower-than-expected efficacy numbers for one of China’s main coronavirus vaccines, Beijing’s spokespersons and several reputable Chinese experts have doubled down on a new tactic to promote their vaccine: sniping at competitors. From accusing Western media of covering up deaths associated with the Pfizer vaccine to doubling down on conspiracy theories that the virus came from a U.S. military lab, media and official representatives have been fanning the flames of the kind of “vaccine nationalism” it once echoed warnings to avoid. The Washington Post’s Gerry Shih reported on comments from multiple sources casting doubt on vaccines produced in the U.S., including several from highly respected Chinese scientists:

[…] After Chinese officials and researchers spent months telling the public that China’s vaccines would win the global development race, [Yanzhong Huang, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations] added, “there’s now a gap between expectation and reality that needed to be addressed, so you see this effort to disparage Western vaccines.”

[…] The nationalist Global Times newspaper ran stories that seized on the deaths of 23 elderly ­Norwegians who had taken the ­Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, and quoted Chinese experts who urged countries from Norway to Australia to halt its use.

[…] George Gao, head of China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention, recently pondered publicly whether the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines could cause cancer. Zhong Nanshan, who is considered a ­national hero for his work on the SARS and covid-19 outbreaks and sometimes speaks on behalf of the government, dismissed ­Pfizer-BioNTech’s and Moderna’s clinical trials as “very insufficient” in November. China’s vaccines, Zhong added, “are developed with rigor.”

Dali Yang, a political science professor at the University of Chicago who researches China’s health system, said that he was surprised a prominent health official like Gao would cast doubt on U.S. vaccines but that it was not clear whether such comments represented a concerted government strategy. Chinese factories, after all, have been contracted to produce millions of doses of ­Pfizer-BioNTech’s vaccine, and it’s still possible that China could buy the vaccine to inoculate elderly citizens because the Chinese vaccines have not been tested on people over 59, he said. [Source]

This week, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hua Chunying repeated a conspiracy theory that the coronavirus may have come from a U.S.-military affiliated lab in her January 18 press conference. As The Guardian’s Helen Davidson reported, the comments came in response to claims from the outgoing Trump administration of new evidence that the virus was made in a Chinese lab:

Hua accused the US of spreading “conspiracy theories and lies” as part of the “last-day madness of Mr Liar”, apparently referring to either Donald Trump or his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo.

“I’d like to stress that if the United States truly respects facts, it should open the biological lab at Fort Detrick, give more transparency to issues like its 200-plus overseas bio-labs, invite WHO experts to conduct origin-tracing in the United States, and respond to the concerns from the international community with real actions,” said Hua.

On the microblogging platform Weibo, the Chinese hashtag for “biological laboratory in US Fort Detrick” has been viewed more than 900m times, with comments latching on to the conspiracy theory that the US could be the source.

“The origin of coronavirus – American virus!” said one commenter. Another said: “Apologise to the bats!” [Source]

Allowing “Fort Detrick” to go viral on Chinese social media suggests the tactic of casting doubt on foreign vaccines has won some degree of approval from Chinese authorities.

This is not the first time that Beijing has fanned nationalist rhetoric regarding Western vaccines. As early as March 2020, theories alleging that the United States was the true origin of the coronavirus were allowed to flourish on Chinese social media. In November, People’s Daily reported in a Facebook post that “all available evidence” suggested the coronavirus “did not start in central China’s Wuhan.”

But Beijing’s challenge is not only to secure the confidence of its domestic population–who have already expressed record high willingness to take a Chinese-made vaccines–but to win the trust of potential overseas recipients of its vaccines as well. A recently published public opinion poll by British market research from YouGov measured confidence in vaccines made in different countries. Among respondents polled from 17 different regions, only China and Mexico had a net positive number of people who felt comfortable taking a vaccine made in China. Meanwhile, respondents reported feeling most comfortable receiving vaccines produced in Germany, Canada, or the U.K.

Ultimately, most people likely won’t get a say in which vaccine they receive, even though some governments have delayed approval of the Sinovac vaccine in light of the disappointing results. By most indications, demand for China’s vaccines remain steadfast. Financial Times’ Christian Shepherd and Max Seddon reported that foreign appetites have allowed China’s two largest manufacturers to secure deals with over a dozen countries:

Chinese and Russian manufacturers are seeing growing appetite from foreign buyers for their Covid-19 vaccines as the international scramble for jabs intensifies, despite lingering concerns over incomplete trial data and the rigour of domestic approval processes.

Russia’s Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology has agreed to sell its Sputnik V vaccine to countries including Algeria, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, while the two leading Chinese manufacturers, Sinopharm and Sinovac Biotech, have signed deals with more than a dozen countries including Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Philippines, Indonesia and Hungary. [Source]

In Southeast Asia, governments have also readily embraced China-developed vaccines. Last week, Indonesia’s president Joko Widodo appeared on livestream receiving his shot of the Sinovac vaccine. The Philippines has also approved Sinovac trials, accepting half-a-million donated doses.

China is a member of the COVAX initiative–a WHO led program to ensure that every country has access to coronavirus vaccines–while the U.S., for the moment, is not. Analysts have previously written about how China’s participation in the initiative could burnish its reputation against the  negative views of China that have deepened during the pandemic. This week, Secretary of State nominee Tony Blinken said in his confirmation hearing that the Biden administration would bring the U.S. into the initiative.

Meanwhile, The Economist reported on comments from one expert on who is less worried over the disappointing rates recorded in the Brazil trial:

The Brazilian trial is the largest, and probably the best run, of the bunch. It involved more that 10,000 volunteers who were health-care workers. Maurício Nogueira, a professor of virology at a state medical school in São Paulo, who is one of the principal investigators involved in this trial, points out that 50% is a conservative estimate of the vaccine’s efficacy. He offers three reasons.

One is that, because of the trial participants’ professions, they were more frequently exposed to high concentrations of virus than was the average Brazilian. A second is that health-care workers are more likely than others to notice that they have a symptom of covid-19. The third is that the trial used a particularly sensitive definition of what constituted a potential case of the disease that should therefore be put forward for testing. This was that participants should be tested after reporting only one symptom, rather than three, as demanded by some other trials. The trial’s organisers say that if these “very mild” cases of covid-19 are ignored, and only “mild”, “severe” and “fatal” cases considered, then the vaccine’s efficacy reaches 78%.

This sort of after-the-fact tinkering is frowned on by statisticians. Brazil’s medical regulator has nevertheless decided that, though Sinovac’s vaccine may not be the best in the world, it is still useful. The country will now roll out millions of doses under an emergency authorisation. [Source]

Also undermining public confidence in Chinese vaccines is the industry’s long history of corruption and quality scandals. But, The Economist reported that experts from the WHO who are currently in China to study the origins of the coronavirus will additionally assess whether Sinovac and Sinopharm’s manufacturing facilities meet international standards, which could serve to assuage public fears.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/after-disappointing-sinovac-trial-beijing-snipes-at-western-vaccines/