Tuesday, 24 November 2020

Minitrue Diary, February 28, 2020: Sun Yang, Tax Terminology, COVID Research

CDT has recently acquired and verified a collection of  directives issued by central Party authorities to  at the beginning of this year. These directives were issued on an almost daily basis in early 2020, and we will be posting them over the coming weeks. The following directives were released on February 28, 2020.

Regarding the arbitration result in the case of swimmer Sun Yang and the International Swimming Federation (FINA), take the Chinese Swimming Association’s official statements as standard without exception, and do not infer, decipher, or comment. Do not translate foreign media reports without authorization. Strictly control the temperature, do not put stories on the news or main front pages, and do not send news app push alerts. Strictly manage all kinds of attacking or defamatory commentary. (February 28, 2020) [Chinese]

On February 28, three-time Chinese Olympic swimming champion Sun Yang was suspended from competing for eight years for a drug testing violation. A ruling by the Switzerland-based Court of Arbitration for Sport in a complaint by the World Anti-Doping Agency will ban Sun from the upcoming games in Tokyo, and “most likely end his career,” reported The New York Times.

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1. The National Development and Reform Commission will soon publicly release minimum purchase price levels for the 2020 rice crop, and will also set limits on purchase amounts. In the absence of unified arrangements, do not report, comment, or republish.

2. Regarding the Central Propaganda Bureau and Central Culture Office’s launch in Wuhan of the “Voluntary Service and Care Campaign” for epidemic prevention and control, do not report for now until arrangements have been made. (February 28, 2020) [Chinese]

CDT editors were unable to find news in English or Chinese on the NDRC release mentioned in this directive.

The second point listed in this directive is the latest in a near daily succession of propaganda orders on the coronavirus pandemic. Several previous directives had also limited coverage of civil society aid in the midst of the crisis, especially donations from “disadvantaged social groups.”

 

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When some websites reported on the National Tax Office’s February 27 press conference, they abbreviated “digitized special VAT receipts” as “digital receipts,” creating a serious inaccuracy. Please change “digital receipts” to “digitized special VAT receipts” as soon as possible. If it cannot be changed, please immediately delete the relevant reports (February 28, 2020) [Chinese]

On February 27 Chinese authorities pledged to finish drafting new financial legislation, including a law on value-added tax.

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For reports about research findings on the efficacy of pharmaceuticals, Chinese medicines, or vaccines against the novel coronavirus pneumonia, standardize the distribution workflow for news dispatches, and proceed in strict accordance with information published by the State Council Joint Prevention mechanism and authoritative departments such as the National Health Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, etc. Do not rush to publish unverified information, and do not overstate or exaggerate curative effects. (February 28, 2020) [Chinese]

Among the many recent COVID-19-related propaganda directives since early January, several had aimed at medical research, vaccine development, and the promotion of Traditional Chinese Medicine for coronavirus prevention and treatment.

真Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/11/minitrue-diary-february-28-2020-sun-yang-tax-terminology-covid-research/

Cowed By Regulators, China’s Tech Giants Toe The Line

After Chinese regulators proposed sweeping antitrust regulations and took the unprecedented step of halting the IPO of Alibaba-affiliated Chinese fintech giant Ant Group earlier this month, major tech companies in China are tempering their attitudes and falling in line with the Chinese government. On Monday, state-affiliated tabloid Global Times reported that Alibaba’s chairman Zhang Yong had “expressed gratitude” towards regulators, noting a sharp difference between his tone and that of a speech given by company founder Jack Ma several weeks earlier:

Alibaba’s chairman expressed gratitude toward regulatory governance at a conference attended by internet giants and regulators on Monday, a stark contrast to Jack Ma Yun, founder of Alibaba, who blasted global financial regulatory authorities for stifling innovation back in October.

The chairman’s remarks came after a suspension of the dual listing of Ant Group, which was widely expected to become the world’s biggest ever IPO.

[…] He said China’s digital economy, which can hold its head high globally thanks to a number of excellent Internet companies and platforms that have emerged as a result of China’s reform and opening-up, is due to the government’s encouragement on development and innovation, and the fact that China is now the world’s largest market also provides huge opportunities for companies like theirs.

Alibaba pledges to actively learn and respond to government policies and rules to build a healthier platform economy, Zhang added. [Source]

The prospect of greater government scrutiny over China’s tech giants has dampened enthusiasm among investors as well. The Financial Times reported that new regulations, alongside the Trump administration’s recent orders to prohibit American investors from investing in companies with ties to the Chinese military, had heightened the risks of investing in Chinese tech companies:

Investors are reviewing their record holdings of mainland internet companies after Beijing proposed sweeping new antitrust rules for China’s technology industry.

Leading groups including Tencent, Alibaba and Meituan-Dianping have attracted record investment during the Covid-19 pandemic, according to data from Copley Fund Research, which tracks the investment activities of more than 180 of the world’s largest funds.

[…] Wong Kok Hoi, chief investment officer of Singapore-based APS Asset Management, said his view of the sector had “changed drastically”, adding: “I believe the bull run in the tech sector in China has halted.” [Source]

It was widely reported that Jack Ma’s incendiary speech in October – in which he accused Chinese regulators of having a ‘pawn shop mentality’ – was the trigger for the delay of Ant Group’s IPO. But observers have disagreed about whether the fallout from the speech was an accidental or deliberate move by Jack Ma. English-language media had widely framed Ma’s speech as a misstep, suggesting that he had become cocky and gone too far. Other experts such as Kevin Xu, the author of bilingual China/tech newsletter Interconnected, saw the speech as an inspired, strategic move by Ma to give himself a voice in government discussions about tech regulation:

Sadly, most of the media coverage has been flat and simplistic, roughly summarized as: Jack Ma spoke out of turn and Chinese authority showed him who the boss is by canceling Ant’s IPO and he lost billions. It’s almost as if no one actually read the full speech or bothered to spend some mental cycles absorbing and contextualizing it, even though most of these coverage cited the speech in one way or another.

[…] Entrepreneurs at the calibre of Ma, Musk, Bezos, Zuckerberg, Gates, etc., don’t care about money, even though the only thing the rest of us seem to notice about them is money. As cheesy as it sounds, for them, it is about building a world they want to see and live in, and money is just the instrument they need to get there. It’s a rarefied field that many entrepreneurs aspire to, labor for day in and day out, but don’t achieve simply because it’s near impossible.

The hallmark of a consequential speech is not its soaring oratory or flowery turn of phrase, but its ability to move the needle in a society and leave something behind that could stand the test of time — legacy. While I wouldn’t quite place Ma’s speech in the pantheon of historical speeches, I do think it has moved the needle, which is particularly remarkable given China’s unique environment when it comes to public speech-making. [Source]

Subsequent reports that Xi Jinping personally oversaw the halting of Ant Group’s IPO after becoming incensed with the speech, before greenlighting new and more significantly more onerous capital requirements for fintech firms, may undermine theories that the speech could have bought Ma influence among regulators.

The widely publicized apology by Alibaba’s chairman this week suggests that the humbling of China’s tech giants still has some ways to go.

The Chinese government’s apparent enthusiasm for exerting greater control over China’s tech sector has contributed to growing worries about the vulnerability of private firms in China. Those concerns were compounded last week after well-known entrepreneur Sun Dawu was detained on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles” amid a public feud over a long-running land dispute with a state-owned farm. (CDT has translated a 2009 op-ed on heroism by Sun that has circulated online since his detention.) The Economist reported this month on the growing obstacles faced by entrepreneurs in China amid escalating state intervention:

At a summit with China’s richest entrepreneurs in late 2018 Xi Jinping sought to allay concerns that the state had declared war on the country’s private sector. Although officials in Beijing had spent the previous year bringing to heel unruly tycoons, China’s president insisted that rumours of a forceful push for party influence in the private sector were untrue. He exhorted the business leaders to “take a pill of reassurance”.

[…] Many of the businessmen who once fancied themselves as a Chinese Warren Buffett are in prison or worse. Wu Xiaohui, the chairman of Anbang, which bought the Waldorf among other assets, was handed an 18-year prison sentence in 2018 for financial crimes. Ye Jianming, who attempted to buy a $9bn stake in Rosneft, a Russian oil producer, was detained in early 2018. His whereabouts is still unknown. Xiao Jianhua, a broker for China’s political elite who once controlled Baoshang Bank, was kidnapped by Chinese agents from his flat at the Four Seasons Hotel in Hong Kong in 2017 and is thought to be co-operating with authorities in the unwinding of his financial conglomerate.

[…] The party has also been increasing its influence over private firms in more subtle ways. Under a strategy referred to as “party building”, firms have been asked to launch party committees, which can opine on whether a corporate decision is in line with government policy. The number of committees in publicly traded but privately controlled companies is still low. According to a survey of 1,378 Chinese listed firms by Plenum, a consultancy, of the 61% that were privately controlled only 11.5% had party-building clauses in their charters compared with 90% of state-owned firms. [Source]

On the other hand, in the context of the tech sector at the very least, some observers view Beijing’s antitrust moves as a possible remedy to a greater problem for the economy, namely the anticompetitive practices of China’s tech behemoths. For the London School of Economics’ China Dialogues blog, Xin Sun and Jiawei Hai wrote that a return to ‘comprehensive reform’ might be necessary to tackle worsening competition in the private sector:

In conclusion, during Xi’s era, the asymmetric alliance between the Party and the private sector formed since the reform remains in place. In the meantime, the political and regulatory restrictions faced by private firms have been tightened. Firms that cross red lines are relentlessly penalized. However, we believe the largest hurdle to innovation and efficiency lies in the deteriorating competitive environment faced by private firms as well as other deeply-rooted structural deficiencies in China’s business environment. To address these perennial issues requires the Party and its leaders to not only preserve the alliance with the private sector but also return to the political agenda of comprehensive reform that has been abolished for nearly two decades. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/11/cowed-by-regulators-chinas-tech-giants-toe-the-line/

China Curtails Islam Nationwide, Targeting Intellectuals

A campaign of repression against Islam is underway in Muslim-majority areas across China. While the construction of mass internment camps seemingly remains unique to Xinjiang, two new reports by The Los Angeles Times and National Public Radio indicated that China is attempting to systematically curtail Islam nationwide. At The LA Times, Alice Su described the impact of the government’s campaign to “Sinicize” Islam in northwest China :

[A] Linxia propaganda official confirmed that they had received orders from the central government to combat “Arab-ization, Saudi-ization, and pan-Islamification” in Gansu, and to restrict mosque-building and participation in the hajj, an annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca.

[…] Adults had relative freedom to worship, he said, but Communist Party cadres, following new state guidelines, sat outside the mosques to ensure no minors entered for Friday prayers. Summer religion and Arabic schools once attended by many Hui children were banned. The call to prayer was forbidden as a “public nuisance,” Ma said, despite Muslims making up 60% of Linxia’s population.

[…] On the road approaching Bulengou, two icons towered over the village: a gongbei, an old Islamic-Chinese religious structure in rusty shades of red and blue, and a bright red billboard quoting Xi Jinping. The gongbei was enclosed behind a padlocked gate, with a sign forbidding photos. The Xi billboard welcomed visitors to a museum honoring Xi’s visit to the village in 2013, with images and video of grateful Muslims flocking to see the party leader. [Source]

The LA Times report also detailed how officials hoped that new factories built in Muslim-majority areas would “[transform] people’s thinking,” inspiring secularization. The drive to bring factories inland is part of a larger poverty alleviation campaign, which is in part aimed at “changing the mindsets” of China’s rural poor.

A new report detailed the official drive to reform thought in Muslim communities through the co-option of intellectuals and scholars. Six years to the day after a Chinese court affirmed Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti’s life sentence on dubious separatism charges, Emily Z Feng wrote for NPR about China’s campaign to silence Muslim thinkers and the resilience of those attempting to maintain their faith:

“What dominates Muslim [government] cadres is the [Communist] party line and the official version of Islam promoted by government agencies and organizations,” says Ma Haiyun, an associate professor at Frostburg State University, where he studies Islam in China. “The result of this restriction is to make traditional discourses on Islam more commercial, patriotic and Chinese.”

[…] “The printing plant was closed and our equipment and all books were confiscated. In the first days [of my imprisonment], I was almost completely cut off from the outside world,” Ma Zhixiong wrote in an essay widely circulated this fall among chat groups on the Chinese WeChat app. “During my prison days, human dignity disappeared. Every day, people had to take off their clothes for inspection and to hold our heads while squatting down while being interrogated… We lived like ghosts.”

[…] He and hundreds of other Chinese Muslims used to moderate online forums and events and curated websites that discussed issues of scripture and philosophy. By 2016, those sites were shut down or censored within China’s Great Firewall. They moved to WeChat, where the writer now runs chat groups of 500 people each, but doing so requires constant vigilance: “Even on WeChat,” he says, “it is a continuous process of continually being shut down by censors and starting a new group.” [Source]

Nowhere in China is repression of religious expression more severe than in Xinjiang, where over one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups are held in interment camps. After a seemingly miraculous journey, a poem by famed Uyghur scholar Abduqadir Jalalidin has escaped the camps even as its author remains imprisoned. Transmitted orally and committed to memory by released detainees, the poem found its way to Joshua L. Freeman, a Princeton historian and a former student of Jalalidin’s. The New York Times published Freeman’s translation, and his broader reflections on poetry and resistance in Uyghur culture:

Poetry permeates Uighur life. Influential cultural figures are often poets, and Uighurs of all backgrounds write poetry. Folk rhymes pepper everyday conversation — popular wisdom like “Don’t forget about your roots / keep the shine on your old boots” — and social media pulses with fresh verse on topics from unemployment to language preservation. Every Uighur knows the words of the poet Abdukhaliq, martyred by a Chinese warlord in 1933: “Awaken, poor Uighur, you’ve slept long enough…”

[…] Today, as the Chinese state bans Uighur books and paves over Muslim graveyards, poetry remains a powerful form of persistence and resistance for the Uighur people. Uighurs around the world are turning to poetry to grapple with the calamity in their homeland. “The target on my forehead / could not bring me to my knees,” wrote the exile poet Tahir Hamut Izgil from Washington in 2018.

[…] The world has much to learn from a culture that has made art its antidote to authoritarianism. From behind the barbed wire and guard towers, my old professor has reminded us that we must not stand silently while that culture is annihilated. [Source]

Pope Francis recognized Uyghurs as “persecuted peoples” for the first time in a soon-to-be-published book. Francis’ conspicuous silence on the Uyghur crisis elicited broad criticism from human rights groups, and increasingly from within the church as well. In July, the Archbishop of Yangon wrote, “[in] China, the Uighur Muslims are facing what amounts to some of the contemporary world’s worst mass atrocities[…] And I urge the international community to investigate,” according to The New York Times. The Pope’s comments were published after the ordination of the first Chinese bishop to be appointed under a secret Vatican-Beijing treaty, believed to give the CCP some degree of control over bishop appointments. A spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry said the Pope’s statement has “no factual basis at all,” but did not further elaborate on China’s relationship with the Holy See.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/11/china-curtails-islam-nationwide-targeting-intellectuals/

Monday, 23 November 2020

Photo: Baodingshan Cliff Carvings, by Hugh Llewelyn

Baodingshan Cliff Carvings, by Hugh Llewelyn (CC BY-SA 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/11/photo-baodingshan-cliff-carvings-by-hugh-llewelyn/

China’s Surveillance Infrastructure Powered by U.S. Tech

An investigation by The New York Times has exposed how chips made by U.S. technology giants Intel and Nvidia have been used to power the expansive digital infrastructure behind China’s surveillance state. Reporting from a vast “cloud computing center” in Xinjiang built to handle the reams of surveillance footage picked up across the region, Paul Mozur and Don Clark noted the role of these centers in China’s surveillance infrastructure, and the U.S.-made tech that keeps them operating:

The computers inside the complex, known as the Urumqi Cloud Computing Center, are among the world’s most powerful. They can watch more surveillance footage in a day than one person could in a year. They look for faces and patterns of human behavior. They track cars. They monitor phones.

[…] Chips made by Intel and Nvidia, the American semiconductor companies, have powered the complex since it opened in 2016. By 2019, at a time when reports said that Beijing was using advanced technology to imprison and track Xinjiang’s mostly Muslim minorities, new U.S.-made chips helped the complex join the list of the world’s fastest supercomputers. Both Intel and Nvidia say they were unaware of what they called misuse of their technology.

[…] The Urumqi Cloud Computing Center — also sometimes called the Xinjiang Supercomputing Center — broke onto the list of the world’s fastest computers in 2018, ranking No. 221. In November 2019, new chips helped push its computer to No. 135.

Two data centers run by Chinese security forces sit next door, a way to potentially cut down on lag time, according to experts. Also nearby are six prisons and re-education centers. [Source]

The New York Times investigation offers an examination of the hardware that is central to the processing of surveillance data. A recently published report by ChinaFile looked at the physical and human infrastructure, examining government procurement notices to trace officially purchased thermal-imaging cameras, WiFi sniffers, or facial recognition software.

While domestic Chinese hardware manufacturers such as Hikvision and Dahua have played a critical role in supplying the cameras used in some domestic surveillance programs, China has so far struggled to build up a domestic chipmaker capable of competing with established semiconductor companies such as Intel and Nvidia. For that reason, it has relied on the semiconductor chips built by foreign multinationals to construct the supercomputers and surveillance data processing centers. In June 2019, the Trump administration banned the sale of advanced chips to Chinese companies implicated in human rights violations.

See more recent coverage of how China’s reliance on foreign semiconductors has driven the country to spend vast amounts to foster a homegrown chipmaking sector as part of its efforts to achieve “national self-reliance,” via CDT.

There is no evidence that Intel or Nvidia broke any laws in selling their chips to China, as the sales took place before the 2019 ban. For its part, Nvidia has denied and tried to obfuscate its role in supporting China’s surveillance network, despite having boasted about it in the past:

Intel and Nvidia are not the only major tech companies that have helped to prop up the Chinese surveillance network. As The Wall Street Journal’s Liza Lin and Josh Chin reported last year, other well-known companies including Seagate, HP,  and Western Digital have “nurtured, courted and profited” from China’s surveillance industry:

Participation in China’s surveillance market offers companies and investors an opportunity to grab a piece of a booming new field and improve their products. China’s video surveillance market reached $10.6 billion in 2018, with the government accounting for about half of those purchases, according to industry analyst IDC.

Of 37 Chinese firms singled out last November by the Beijing-backed China Security and Protection Industry Association for outstanding contributions to the country’s surveillance industry, 17 have publicly disclosed financing, commercial or supply-chain relationships with U.S. technology companies. Several had multiple connections. [Source]

Joint ventures founded by tech giants such as Google and IBM have also contributed to systems used to monitor the internet usage of millions of Chinese citizens.

Analysts are also concerned about the implications of a fully-developed domestic Chinese chipmaking industry—not only over how it could enable China’s its domestic surveillance infrastructure development, but how it could affect surveillance globally. In April, a report by Sheena Greitens for the Brookings Institution examined the implications of the growing demand for China’s global surveillance exports:

Countries and cities around the world have increasingly opted to employ public security and surveillance technology platforms from China. The drivers of this trend are complex, stemming from the expansion of China’s geopolitical interests, the increasing market power of its technology companies, and conditions in recipient states that make Chinese technology an attractive choice despite concerns about security and privacy.

[…] In addition to Huawei, Chinese companies such as Hikvision, ZTE, Dahua, China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), and others are often involved. The identity of some of the companies involved in the export of surveillance technologies is one factor that has raised concerns in the U.S. national security and foreign policy community. At least some of the companies are directly linked to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) defense-industrial complex. CEIEC, for example, has contributed significantly to public security technology projects in several countries in Latin America; it is a state-owned enterprise under China Electronics Corporation that concentrates on defense electronics, and was previously sanctioned by the U.S. for nonproliferation violations. Others, such as Hikvision and Dahua, have been implicated in and sanctioned for human rights violations — as the filing termed it, “the implementation of China’s campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, and hightechnology surveillance” — in Xinjiang. [Source]

For now, the fact that many parts of China’s surveillance network are reliant on foreign technology means that Western countries still have some leverage to push back. As the roles played by some U.S. tech companies in abetting the construction of China’s surveillance state becomes increasingly clear, a question is emerging over whether the firms should be viewed as producing a good which begets greater control:



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/11/chinas-surveillance-infrastructure-powered-by-u-s-tech/

Translation: “True Heroes Choose the Difficult Path,” by Sun Dawu

Earlier this month, billionaire agricultural entrepreneur and ouspoken political commentator Sun Dawu was arrested with more than 20 family members and colleagues for “provoking quarrels and disrupting production.” While many details of the case still remain unclear, some have questioned if Sun’s political advocacy could be related to his arrest. Long an outspoken critic of the CCP, in 2003 Sun was sentenced to three years in prison for “illegal fundraising” after running afoul of local officials while operating a private cooperative that intellectuals praised for extending credit to disadvantaged farmers. More recently, Sun publicly praised detained human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong, who represented Sun in the 2003 trial.

Following his recent detention, a 2009 op-ed by Sun has been referenced and reposted online. In the article, originally published in Green Companies, Sun recalled his day in court six years prior as he reflected on the topic of heroism. The op-ed has been translated below:

If Roosters Aren’t Allowed to Crow, Can I Be a Dog?

Six years ago, I shed tears in court twice.

Before the hearing began, I’d already made a compromise by agreeing to remain silent in court. But when the witnesses presented Dawu Group’s “loan documentation” purporting to show these as “evidence of deposits” for illegal fundraising, I couldn’t help but say, “I wrote out IOUs, not deposit slips.  Can’t any of you read?”

At this time, the chief procurator screamed: “Sun Dawu! How dare you speak! Don’t you know that your wife is evading arrest, your two brothers are being detained, and that there are still two people in their eighties in your household . . .” When I heard this, I shed tears. I understood the saying: “A true hero is not heartless.”

The second time I shed tears was when my team of lawyers was delivering my defense. They surveyed a lot of the townspeople and were very surprised that there was such broad support among the people for an entrepreneur like myself. In court they said to me, “Using the Criminal Law to destroy a private business, to destroy a quality business that doesn’t have any record of dishonesty, that doesn’t have any societal problems—this is not the purpose of the law. If the law must be used to judge and punish this type of business, this would only show that the law itself has a problem!” At the time I was moved. I had heard the voice of the people and felt the support of the ordinary folk in the town.

Before this, during the trial, the chief procurator said: “We can’t refrain from judging you, Sun Dawu, just because you have a high moral character. We can’t not punish you just because you’re a decent person. We proceed according to the law, not according to morality . . .” I felt this was ridiculous, as they were using the law to judge morality. I’ve studied law. Law is the minimum moral requirement of people. The purpose of establishing laws is to protect moral people and punish immoral people. However, it was exactly the moral things I had done which were being attacked by the law. It makes one recall this exchange from the Indian movie, Awaara.

Judge: The law has no conscience. 

Rita: Your honor, the conscience has no law.

I think a lot of people at the time all saw me hide my face and cry, perhaps even saw my tears, but no one heard me weep. There was no weeping. Weeping is audible, but I was crying soundlessly, shedding in silence. That was a kind of repressed, hard-to-describe, sorrowful emotion.

The moment I shed tears in court I felt that the best people in the world and the worst people in the world were all in jail. There’s nothing scary about jail, jails are just another place that people go to. I believe that people often have no control over whether things turn out good or bad. Sometimes you want to be a good person but are unable to. Sometimes bad people want to be good, but are also unable to. Death row inmates, too—a lot of them wanted to be good people but wound up in jail. They feel like fate is playing tricks on them, not that their situation was caused by their human nature. Deng Xiaoping said, “Good institutions can make bad people good; bad institutions can make good people bad.” I believe these words.

At the time I did not despair. Rather, I felt a type of power. I have never despaired before, I honor the principle of caring about right and wrong, not about winning or losing. “No matter what everyone else does, I must take the high road.” I was very stubborn as a child. People said that I was an ox [牛], that the last character in my name “Wu” [午] had grown a head. I’m not saying this to brag or to be self-deprecating, this is just a description of my personality. When I set my mind on something, I will complete it; when I set my mind on a way forward, I will pursue it to the end.

Even today, I don’t think that I’m a hero who has benefited ordinary folks. I’m just a builder.

I know that with the things I’ve done I’ve always strived to keep my tail down and keep a low profile. But at a certain stage, I couldn’t keep my tail down any longer. It’s not that I wanted to raise my tail or that I’m that prideful. No, it’s that I feel like a rooster and must crow at first light. This is the rooster’s responsibility, but its owner wants to sleep in. Once you start crowing and wake him from his sweet dreams, then he’ll be unhappy and want to kill you and eat you. The sun can rise only after the rooster crows, but people just want to sleep in. Households no longer need roosters so they are bound to kill them off.

Sometimes, I think if this world must kill roosters, then can I be a dog? If our great Eastern dragon is like a sleeping lion deep in the middle of dreams, then would it be okay for me to be a dog and stand watch over this sleeping lion, with my ears pricked up and my eyes wide open, waiting for my master to awake?

A Hero’s “Justice and Strength,” “Tearing Down and Building Up”

True heroes are those who are willing and able to make incredible sacrifices of themselves.

Ying” [英, The first character in the word hero] means “wise.” It implies rationality, judgment, and decision-making.  “Xiong” [雄 the second character of the word] means “strength.” It implies power, setting into action, and taking responsibility. “Ying” implies justice, “xiong” implies power. A hero is one who combines both justice and power. Heroes are those who dedicate themselves to justice, who make sacrifices for the values of their group. This type of sacrifice has a solemn quality; the lighter sacrifice is to go to jail—the greater sacrifice is to die a martyr. Some heroes are fervent for a time—this is easy enough to do—but I admire more those heroes who face martyrdom calmly. It’s easy to be fervent for a moment, but it’s hard to face martyrdom calmly. However, people often view those who are fervent for even a moment as heroes.

Heroes should be immortal, they are gods and not mortals. Heroes conduct themselves reasonably and become gods by devoting themselves completely to justice. Sakyamuni Buddha and Confucius were not heroes, they were just philosophers. Gandhi and Giordano Bruno, on the other hand, were heroes.

At first, compromise is a virtue. It is good forgiving evil, and evil conceding to good. If you compromise once, people usually will forgive you, but if you compromise for your whole life, people won’t usually consider you a hero. This is to say that the wise use the method of compromise to enlighten society, but they are not likely to become heroes. Heroes must have a solemn quality and the willingness to work at something even if success is impossible. Heroes are those who consciously choose the difficult path.

Qin Shi Huang was a hero. Jing Ke [who attempted to assassinate Qin Shi Huang] was also a hero. Opposing parties can both be considered heroes. Every group has heroes that it acknowledges. That’s because what is represented by every group’s hero aligns with the interests and the sense of right and wrong of the group where the hero is located, rather than some universal interest or sense of right and wrong. Therefore, we usually speak of “folk heroes” or “local heroes,” rather than “world heroes.” It’s hard to find a world hero. A world that doesn’t need heroes may be a peaceful world, but a nation that doesn’t need its heroes is certainly a fallen or a depraved nation.

The historical figures [ancient Chinese military strategist, politician, and businessman]  Fan Li and [early Han Dynasty statesman] Zhang Liang deserved to be called heroes because their purpose was to eliminate armed conflict and spread peace throughout the land, rather than to become important officials themselves.

Chairman Mao once said that without destruction there can be no construction, that we must destroy the old to establish the new. Heroes must be able to tear down and build up at a large scale. However, large scale destruction is much easier than building up at scale. A hero who tears down but doesn’t build is a hero in a relatively narrow sense. A hero who can tear down and wants to build—but doesn’t build—doesn’t fulfill their ideal; he is a great hero, but a tragic hero. A hero who can both tear down and build, and does so on a large scale, is truly a great hero, like Washington—a war hero, he was also a hero in governing the country. But from ancient times to today, there are far too few that can break down and also build up on a large scale.

Don’t Be a “Grumbling Hero,” Don’t Be a “Boasting Hero”

When people want to accomplish something, especially something relatively major, then they must endure loneliness and indifference and be able to work hard without complaining. Working hard is easy, not complaining is difficult. There are a lot of people who can endure hardship but there are few people who don’t complain. Frequently there are people who complain that they’ve been wronged, or complain that others don’t understand them. People who are quick to complain cannot accomplish great things and cannot be heroes. It’s hard not to complain.

I think that being able to “to repay kindness with kindness, and repay enmity with justice” is best. But without that kind of environment one must be tolerant. I think of when Jesus was crucified and asked people for a drink of water. In return the people gave him rags dipped in salt water. Jesus looked heavenwards with pity and said, “Forgive them, for they know not what they do.”

The opening line of the Tao Te Ching is understood by people to mean “The Dao that can be told is not the eternal and unchanging Dao” [道可道,非常道]. The earliest writings of Laozi didn’t have punctuation, so I choose to understand this line to mean: “The Dao can, the Dao can’t, the Dao remains” [道可,道非,常道]. This is similar to saying that you can be for or against something, but not halfway in between. Therefore, you can’t wait until it’s time to “repay enmity with justice” to acknowledge this saying. Heroes should already be without complaint or regret.

Heroes will not back down from the face of any adversity, after being successful they will know how to depart tactfully, they will choose to fade away and let others make all the noise. Heroes must learn how to leave quietly, they must bear the grievances of  being misunderstood, of isolation, and of loneliness.

Some heroes after being successful become “boasting heroes.” Chairman Mao said that in the face of enemy fire we were not brought down, but were defeated by the enemy’s sugar-coated bullets. Heroes have difficulty passing the test of beauty, power, and wealth. Heroes change, which isn’t to say that they were false heroes from the start. It just means that after they became heroes they didn’t think clearly what they would do with fame, profit, wealth, and power.

I don’t think that people hold the ideal of becoming an official, or earning money, or being a hero. Rather, it’s what they do after they become an official, how they use their money after they make it, or what they do after they acquire their status that makes a hero. In order to be a hero that stands the test of time, in order to establish virtue, merit, and a legacy of words, in order to leave behind a good name, a hero must not pause. A hero’s work must not come to an abrupt end after acquiring fame.  [Chinese]

Contributed by an anonymous CDT translator. 



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/11/translation-true-heroes-choose-the-difficult-path-by-sun-dawu/

Minitrue Diary, February 27, 2020: Epidemic Control, Aid, Child Patients, A Woman Named Huang

CDT has recently acquired and verified a collection of directives issued by central Party authorities to at the beginning of this year. These directives were issued on an almost daily basis in early 2020, and we will be posting them over the coming weeks. The following four directives were released on February 27, 2020.

Coverage of press conferences of all kinds related to epidemic prevention and control must standardize sourcing and report accurately. Do not quote out of context or distort the meaning; do not engage in “clickbait.” Keep tabs on posts and comments. (February 27, 2020) [Chinese]

Please find and delete false content based on this sample, and do not republish. (February 27, 2020) [Chinese]

1. Regarding China’s provision of aid to relevant countries, take care not to give undue prominence to our material assistance, and do not report details.
2. Many media outlets have published and broadcast images of cured child patients bowing to medical workers with inconsistent explanatory information. Newsgathering and editing workflows must be strictly standardized, and the accuracy of reports’ content ensured. (February 27, 2020) [Chinese]

On the matter of the woman surnamed Huang from Wuhan, Hubei, do not take independent action, and report in strict accordance with regulations. (February 27, 2020) [Chinese]

Directives sent almost daily throughout the first two months of 2020 focused on restricting and controlling coverage of the novel coronavirus and of Wuhan, the outbreak’s epicenter. A directive two days earlier ordered media “do not report, do not reprint, and do not comment” on mask donations to Hong Kong. Some general directives do not indicate the specific news or article they are targeting in the version seen by CDT.

真Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/11/minitrue-diary-february-27-2020-epidemic-control-aid-child-patients-a-woman-named-huang/