Thursday, 7 October 2021

Photo: Untitled (Shanghai), by Hsiuan Boyen

A person, seen from above, walks down a spiral staircase

Untitled (Shanghai), by Hsiuan Boyen (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)



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New Accounts Describe Torture, Forced Labor Facing Xinjiang Detainees

More evidence is accumulating on torture in Xinjiang’s mass internment camps, referred to by the Chinese government as “Vocational Education and Training Centers.” New testimony from a former Chinese police detective and numerous witnesses in the Uyghur Tribunal have provided greater detail on the CCP’s reported atrocities against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. The growing momentum for international actors to confront the Chinese government on this human rights issue has motivated increased scrutiny from the U.N. and pushback from Chinese delegations. Accountability and justice remain elusive. 

On Tuesday, CNN published an interview with a former Chinese police detective turned whistleblower, now living in exile in Europe. As one of very few members of the Chinese security services to openly discuss the Xinjiang internment camps, he offered new detail about the systematic torture reportedly being perpetrated on Uyghur detainees. The detective said that while working at a police station in a different province, he was sent to Xinjiang on several temporary postings to support the “Strike Hard” anti-terrorism campaign. This was part of a program called “Aid Xinjiang,” in which 150,000 police officers from around the country were recruited and given lucrative bonuses to work in Xinjiang. The excerpts of his account of systematic torture in the camps contain graphic and disturbing detail: 

“Kick them, beat them (until they’re) bruised and swollen,” Jiang said, recalling how he and his colleagues used to interrogate detainees in police detention centers. “Until they kneel on the floor crying.”

During his time in Xinjiang, Jiang said every new detainee was beaten during the interrogation process — including men, women and children as young as 14.

The methods included shackling people to a metal or wooden “tiger chair” — chairs designed to immobilize suspects — hanging people from the ceiling, sexual violence, electrocutions, and waterboarding. Inmates were often forced to stay awake for days, and denied food and water, he said.

“Everyone uses different methods. Some even use a wrecking bar, or iron chains with locks,” Jiang said. “Police would step on the suspect’s face and tell him to confess.”

[…] “If you want people to confess, you use the electric baton with two sharp tips on top,” Jiang said. “We would tie two electrical wires on the tips and set the wires on their genitals while the person is tied up.”

[…] One “very common measure” of torture and dehumanization was for guards to order prisoners to rape and abuse the new male inmates, Jiang said. [Source]

The brutality of detention in Xinjiang was also documented by survivors of the internment camps during the second round of the Uyghur Tribunal, a non-governmental people’s tribunal which took place in London. During the first round of the tribunal in early June, and the second round in mid-September, over 70 witnesses and experts testified before an independent panel chaired by prominent British barrister Sir Geoffrey Nice. In December, the tribunal is expected to convene again to issue a non-binding verdict on whether the Chinese government is guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity. 

Throughout the tribunal, witnesses shared harrowing accounts of torture. Baqitali Nur described how prison guards tied his cellmate by the hands and suspended him for four consecutive days without his feet touching the ground, while he was beaten with a stun baton. Gulzire Awulqanqizi described how she was routinely forced to restrain female detainees while male prison guards raped them. Orynbek Koksebek described being subjected to beatings and multiple days of solitary confinement in a pitch-black room. Abdusalam Muhammad described how 70-year-old women were forced on long runs, and were beaten and kicked by guards if they ran too slowly or fell down.

As a result of this torture and mistreatment, many Uyghurs have died in detention. This was the reported fate of prominent Uyghur businessman and philanthropist Yaqub Haji, who was confirmed to have died in an internment camp in late September, after being arrested in 2018 on suspicion of “religious extremism.” The government campaign has targeted many Uyghur businessmen, whose assets and properties are often seized and sold during their detentions. Radio Free Asia described how Haji was tortured for not confessing to the “crime” of philanthropy:

Another friend of Haji’s who recently left Ghulja said Haji had been detained for his religious philanthropic contributions and that prison guards gave his body to his older brother after he died.

“I heard from community members that Yaqub Haji was imprisoned because of his donation to the building of the mosque and for giving 3,000 yuan to a religious cleric to build a house,” said the man who asked not to be named for safety reasons.

“He was tortured for not ‘confessing’ to those ‘crimes’ and kept in solitary confinement for a long time,” he said. [Source]

As word of these atrocities spread, the Chinese government has attempted to silence or discredit the victims and push back against any claims of wrongdoing. In the period leading up to the Uyghur Tribunal, the Chinese government tried to hack into organizers’ digital networks, harassed and blackmailed participants, attempted to pressure the venue into not hosting the event, and even tried to book another part of the building to disrupt the proceedings. On September 29, the Chinese delegation to the U.N. held an event titled “Xinjiang is a Wonderful Land.” It took place alongside but separate from the 48th session of the Human Rights Council, just hours after Beijing issued a barrage of sanctions against British public figures and institutions, including the Uyghur Tribunal, that have been critical of China’s human rights abuses. 

Beijing has not been able hold back the tide of international scrutiny, however. In September, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet stated that her office was preparing to publicize a report on the Chinese government’s alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and regretted that she has so far been denied access to the region. Human Rights Watch’s China Director Sophie Richardson wrote that the high-level public U.N. commitment was a strong signal that the Chinese government may soon be held to account for its actions. There is also mounting evidence that the campaign of re-education and torture in Xinjiang was not simply the product of local officials seeking to address local problems, but was in fact outlined and approved by the central government, notably by the Politburo Standing Committee.

Other recent developments have refocused global attention on detention and torture in Xinjiang. The return of the “Two Michaels” to Canada after over 1,000 days of detention was a visible reminder of the Chinese government’s extralegal practice of RSDL, residential surveillance at a designated location, which amounts to enforced disappearance and torture, according to human-rights experts. While many rejoiced at the Michaels’ return, there have been increased calls for deploying similar diplomatic resources to bring home Canadian citizens of Uyghur ethnicity still trapped in Chinese prison camps. One such individual is Huseyin Celil, a Candian citizen detained in 2006, who has allegedly been subjected to torture and forced confession. 

Given mounting evidence of the scale and systematic nature of torture, forced confessions, mass surveillance, property seizures and indentured labor in Xinjiang, governments and corporations are starting to take action to eliminate their complicity in these human rights abuses. Whether complicity involves directly selling biometric surveillance systems to Chinese law enforcement, producing cotton textiles or solar panels with detainee labor, or sourcing products from factories whose supply chains are tainted by forced labor practices, detection and enforcement can prove difficult. As the Guardian’s Johana Bhuiyan noted, there is still a long way to go in holding companies accountable for their complicity in systems of surveillance and torture in Xinjiang: 

The proliferation of face detection to monitor Uyghurs was a direct “outcome of state policy”, Ipvm’s government director, Conor Healy, said in his expert testimony submitted to the [Uyghur] tribunal. The feature is “routinely specified in tenders for public surveillance projects”, he wrote.

[…] Of the 11 companies reported at the hearings to potentially play a role in the Chinese surveillance state, six have been placed on the US entity list for complicity in human rights violations.

[…] Local and state entities in the US also continue to purchase equipment manufactured by some of these companies. Since 2019, at least 375 organizations have bought Dahua and Hikvision products, government procurement data shows. 

[…] In addition to other companies such as Tiandy and Uniview, which also reportedly developed Uyghur face detection, Alibaba has not appeared on any of the ban lists. [Source]

A recent exclusive by Cate Cadell of Reuters detailed how U.S. remote-control maker Universal Electronics Inc. (UEI) cooperated with Xinjiang officials to transport hundreds of Uyghur workers to work at its factory in the distant southern city of Qinzhou, the first confirmed instance of an American company being involved in a detainee-labor transfer program. The article also revealed just how thoroughly detainee labor has infiltrated the supply chain—not just in Xinjiang, but now in other regions of China, as well. 

UEI’s Uyghur employees are part of a much bigger system. Two separate labor agents hired by Hotan and Kashgar authorities in Xinjiang told Reuters they had each been set targets of placing as many as 20,000 Uyghurs annually with companies outside the region.

They, and one other agent, showed Reuters copies of three contracts for transfers already completed this year. These included a January contract to transport 1,000 workers to an auto parts factory in Xiaogan, Hubei province, who had to undergo “political screening” prior to transfer.

The three agents told Reuters that separate dormitories, police escorts and payments overseen by third-party agents are routine elements in such transfers.

“Uyghur workers are the most convenient workers for companies,” one of the agents told Reuters. “Everything is managed by the government.” [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/10/new-accounts-describe-torture-forced-labor-facing-xinjiang-detainees/
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Tuesday, 5 October 2021

Photo: Untitled (Hong Kong), by Thomas REMY

A panoramic shot of Hong Kong taken from a drone

Untitled (Hong Kong), by Thomas REMY (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)



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Translation: Chang Ping on the Hong Kong Alliance and the Fight to Save Historical Memory

Hong Kong’s civil society is buckling under the weight of the National Security Law. Non-profits, media outlets, and advocacy groups are being forced shut, or else making the difficult decision to shut themselves down before the authorities do it for them. The latest victim of this purge is the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, founded in 1989 to spirit democracy protestors out of China following the state’s brutal crackdown. On September 9, police raided the Alliance’s June 4th Museum and arrested four of the organization’s leaders on charges of inciting subversion of state power. The Alliance disbanded on September 25.

But the Alliance’s efforts to safeguard and transmit the history of the 1989 protests have a new life online at the 8964 Museum. Chang Ping, the award-winning journalist and commentator who now serves as chief curator of the digital museum, delves into the museum’s mission to save truth and memory from state violence in this powerful piece for Deutsche Welle Chinese, translated here in full with the permission of the author:

September 25, 2021 is a day of shame for the history of the Hong Kong resistance, the Chinese democracy movement, and human civilization. On this day, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China announced that it would disband.

On May 21, 1989, the second day of martial law in Beijing, a million Hongkongers marched through the streets in the pouring rain, protesting the Chinese Communist Party’s armed suppression of the democracy movement. When the skies cleared, the Hong Kong Alliance emerged from the procession.

That June, when the smell of Beijing’s bloody crackdown wafted through the air, the Alliance launched “Operation Yellowbird,” secretly ferrying political dissidents on China’s wanted list out of the country and helping them find safe harbor in Western countries. The mission was one of utter devotion.

In the 30 years that followed, the Alliance organized an annual candlelight vigil in Victoria Park, calling for justice for the June 4 Movement and for a democratic China. At least tens of thousands of people came, sometimes more than a hundred thousand, a marvel of resistance the world over.

I have written many times about how being at the vigil has shaken me. It made me realize that in years of silence, there was a kind of voice that had left people in China, that had escaped from their bodies. We must overcome our absurd reality, restrain our internalized fear, and enter the realm of history as it ought to be. Only then can we recover our own memories.

An “Operation Yellowbird” for Historical Memory

On the organization’s last June 4 day of remembrance, Albert Ho, then vice chair of the Alliance, said in an interview, “It is the duty of the Alliance to make people remember this history.” This was the courageous, vital mission of the Alliance: to preserve historical memory.

In 2012, the Alliance set to work creating a museum to preserve material culture, literature, and news media from the 1989 democracy movement and the June 4 massacre. The exhibitions would help visitors to understand the events of 1989, safeguarding truth and memory.

Certain CCP leaders, in their immense ignorance, thought the whole thing was just one big political joke. As a ruling clique, however, the CCP is well-versed in distorting history and constructing memory.

Last year, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson  spoke of recording “the correct collective memory of all mankind.” The concept of “collective memory” comes from French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who in turn drew on Émile Durkheim’s concept of “collective consciousness” to describe the process by which people’s ideas are conformed by society. Scholars followed after Halbwachs en masse, studying historical memory and historical reality, including the German scholar Jörn Rüsen, who has spent much of his career studying the Holocaust. Rüsen believes that memory can extend history—or cut it off.

There is also a discourse around the “violence of memory,” arguing that violence is behind forgetting, lies, and silence. In totalitarianism, violence to bodies and violence to memory go hand-in-hand. This point is crucial to understanding how the CCP constructs historical memory. The tanks rolling through Tiananmen did not just massacre the bodies of protesters, but also the memory of the Chinese people.

The Hong Kong Alliance’s Last Stand

At the vigil in 1996, a huge banner stretched over the stage: “Leap Over 97.” As the crowd stood solemnly with candles in their raised hands, Szeto Wah, the chair of the Alliance at the time, read his speech out word-for-word:

“Brothers and sisters who died in the 1989 democracy movement: in 391 days, our land will become part of China once again. The troops who butchered you will show their strength here; the tanks that flattened you will parade through our streets; the machine guns that shot you full of holes will be aimed at our chests. We only wish to let you know that we are prepared in every way possible for the grim test we face. We have no fear, we are at peace ….”

The National Security Law went into effect in 2020, reclassifying the June 4 vigil as an illegal assembly. The June 4th Museum was forced to close soon after. The Alliance ran a crowdfunding campaign to create a permanent space to house historical memory, the Museum of June 4 Remembrance and Human Rights [also known as the 8964 Museum]. I was honored to accept the invitation to be chief curator and build this museum along with my outstanding colleagues.

The museum seeks to counter the CCP’s manipulation and massacring of public memory by actively building memory.

On September 28, 2021, the Hong Kong authorities blocked the museum’s website within the city’s borders. In our response to media inquiries, we made it known that this was a shameful act of erasure. We believe that through the hard work of all those who resist totalitarianism, historical memory will persist across generations, living on forever in our hearts.

Back in the Hong Kong of May 21, 1989 [after the declaration of martial law in Beijing], protesters held up copies of the day’s edition of Wen Wei Po, whose entire op-ed section was taken up by one word: “Heartbroken.” It was a striking condemnation of the CCP’s brutality. Thirty-two years later, Wen Wei Po is cryptic and accusatory toward the Alliance, reiterating that the organization is implicated in violating the National Security Law—inscribing another “heartbreak” into the historical memory of the massacre!

From the day it was founded to the day it was dissolved, the Alliance “had no fear” and was “at peace.” To protect the organizations and individuals involved in China’s democracy movement, as well as civil society organizations, think tanks, and foundations, the remaining Alliance committee refused to hand over documents to the police. They would rather go to prison than give up. It was a stirring curtain call to history. [Chinese]

Translation by Anne Henochowicz.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/10/translation-chang-ping-on-the-hong-kong-alliance-and-the-fight-to-save-historical-memory/
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Photo: Shanghai Bus, by Bowen LI



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/10/photo-shanghai-bus-by-bowen-li-2/
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Better Living through Algorithm Regulation: Less Exploitation and Profit-Seeking, More “Mainstream Values” and “Positive Energy”

The latest target in the Chinese government’s regulatory blitz against big tech is algorithms. Last week, a host of ministries announced a new plan to introduce the world’s first comprehensive, nationwide regulatory system for algorithms. The decision follows the release of a set of draft guidelines in late August elaborating provisions meant to bolster this future regulatory system. While the system aims to promote social stability and redistribute power from tech companies to internet users and delivery workers, its implementation is far from guaranteed, and would also tighten the CCP’s control over internet content. Xinmei Shen and Tracy Qu from the South China Morning Post described the government’s full-court press on algorithms:

China has laid out a three-year plan to rein in the use of algorithms, marking Beijing’s latest effort to bring the country’s internet industry firmly under state control.

Under the new policy guidelines, local governments are urged to tighten the regulation of algorithms, while companies are told that they will be held accountable for misusing the technology, according to a notice published on Wednesday by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s internet watchdog

[…] The guidelines were jointly signed by the CAC and eight other regulators, including the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the State Administration for Market Regulation and the National Radio and Television Administration. [Source]

Sapni G K and Mihir Mahajan from the Diplomat explained the significance of algorithm regulation and which algorithms will be regulated:

Data and algorithms are the fundamental blocks of cyberspace, but while data practices are increasingly being regulated around the world[,] algorithm regulation is relatively untouched. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for example, remains the groundbreaking model for data protection regulations in most parts of the world. However, there is a void in the regulation of algorithms.

In August, China issued the Draft Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions, with an interest in standard setting in this space.

The provisions provide a framework for the regulation of recommendation algorithms. The provisions apply to “search filters” and “personalized recommendation algorithms” as used in social media feed algorithms (Weibo), content services (Tencent Music, streaming), online stores (e-commerce, app stores), and so on. It also regulates “dispatching and decision making” algorithms, such as those used by gig work platforms (like transport and delivery services) and “generative or synthetic-type” algorithms used for content generation in gaming and virtual environments, virtual meetings, and more.

Through the provisions in this draft, China seeks to address multiple concerns, such as the spread of mis- or disinformation, lack of user autonomy, perceived economic harms of price discrimination, online addiction, and issues regarding platformized gig work. They also reflect China-specific concerns like the fear of disaffection and consequent social mobilization. [Source]

The guidelines will form another pillar of China’s overall cybersecurity regulation, in tandem with the 2017 Cybersecurity Law. On September 1, China’s Data Security Law went into effect, regulating the collection and transfer of data across borders. On November 1, the Personal Information and Protection Law will go into effect; modeled on the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, it aims to protect the use and processing of individuals’ personal information. As for regulation of algorithms, Zheping Huang at Bloomberg summarized the main provisions in the draft document:

Here are some of the key proposed regulations.

  • Companies must disclose the basic principles of any algorithm recommendation service, explaining the purpose and mechanisms for recommendations in a “conspicuous” manner.
  • They must provide users convenient options for turning off algorithm recommendations and “immediately” implement any requests to opt out.
  • Algorithms should not be used for price discrimination based on users’ preferences and habits.
  • Providers must regularly assess and test their algorithms and data to avoid models that will induce users’ obsessive behaviors, excessive spending or other behaviors that violate public order and morality.
  • They must adhere to “mainstream values” and “actively spread positive energy, and promote the application of algorithms for the better.”
  • Algorithms cannot be used to set up fake accounts or falsely influence rankings and search results to benefit the provider, influence online discourse or avoid regulatory oversight.
  • Algorithms cannot endanger national security, disrupt economic and social order or infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of others.
  • Algorithm providers who can influence public opinion or mobilize the masses need to submit their services for the CAC’s approval. Those without approval could be fined by up to 30,000 yuan and ordered to terminate service. [Source]

Some of these new regulations aim to protect citizens from real-world dangers and exploitation. Delivery workers have long been overworked by algorithms that dictate their working lives with ruthless efficiency. Recent reports exposing their suffering have prompted stricter measures on delivery companies such as Meituan and Ele.me. After the government released the draft regulations on algorithms, Meituan published new rules describing how its platform’s algorithm would alleviate the burden on its workers by expanding the time allotted to complete orders. 

Similarly, the government has singled out online addiction among youth as a serious, if not socially constructed, problem. In late August, the National Press and Publication Administration limited minors’ screen time for online gaming to no more than three hours per week, as state-run media called Tencent’s video games “spiritual opium.”

Algorithms are also a source of online price discrimination against consumers. In January, a government-backed consumer group criticized Chinese big tech firms’ algorithms for providing targeted search results that obscure true costs and negative reviews of products, and for using consumers’ personal data to calculate different prices based on how much individual consumers might be willing to pay. In early July, China’s market regulator issued draft rules that would ban online price discrimination and force businesses that violate these rules to pay a fine of 0.1 to 0.5 percent of their annual sales, or even to suspend their operations. 

A related objective of the government’s algorithm regulation plan is to prevent companies from manipulating search results for end users. This entails exposing existing search algorithms and revising them to prevent “abuses such as interference in public opinion.” In doing so, the CCP will be adding to its censorship arsenal. As Yun Jiang points out in China Neican, limiting algorithms to only those that “orient towards mainstream values” and “actively transmit positive energy” could in practice mean censoring those that spread values unacceptable to the CCP and content that is critical of the CCP. Shen Lu at Protocol described how the draft guidelines aim to control public opinion and moderate content:

[T]he drafted rules also evince CAC’s strong desire to control public opinion and moderate social media content. Service providers are asked to “uphold mainstream value orientations” and optimize algorithmically-based recommendation mechanisms to “disseminate positive energy.” Tech companies are blocked from “entering illegal or undesirable keywords as user interests or as user tags” and then “push information content accordingly,” nor may companies “set discriminatory or biased user labels.” And they are also required to allow autonomous user choices and build mechanisms that allow humans to manually curate hot topics, popular search terms, trending topic charts and pop-up windows to “vigorously present information content that conforms to mainstream value orientations.” [Source]

However, achieving the desired effects of the regulatory system is no simple task. Since algorithms are often formed from constantly shifting dynamic inputs and unpredictable organic content, making them transparent to users and codifying them into law is complex. Eliminating “addictive” features from platforms such as Duoyin, whose entire business model depends on users spending more time watching an endless stream of videos, might destroy such apps. And netizens faced with information overload might not be willing to renounce the convenience of content curation algorithms. 

In an interview with China Media Project, Rogier Creemers listed other factors that could explain the CCP’s concerted push for greater regulation in cybersecurity:

[…] because the Chinese government regulates according to purposes and not to principles, it can actually be more agile. It can say: “This wasn’t a problem when these businesses were relatively small and serving 100 million people. Now, these businesses are really big and serving a billion people. So the game has changed, and we now need different rules to deal with this situation.”

On the one hand, you might say this is a centralized campaign. On the other hand, you might say that the stars have aligned — that political conditions are now so that it is logical for all these bureaucracies to intervene because the problems are just getting so big.

The People’s Bank of China is looking at the financial stability risks that emerge from having unregulated money creation through Ant Financial’s services. The Cyberspace Administration of China is looking at the fact that suddenly you have smart cars with lots of sensors, generating all kinds of data. And then you have a situation where if one ministry does something the others don’t want to be seen to be doing nothing.

Another aspect is that for several regulators, this is actually an opportunity to raise their profile. They can raise their bureaucratic standards, get bigger budgets, bigger staff allocations, more prestige, and so on. All of these things are factors. It’s all part of that complex witch’s brew. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/10/better-living-through-algorithm-regulation-less-exploitation-and-profit-seeking-more-mainstream-values-and-positive-energy/
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Monday, 4 October 2021

LinkedIn Censors More Journalist Profiles in China, Suggests Self-Censorship as Solution

Using methods that include censoring posts, hiding or deleting profiles and proposing that users practice self-censorship, LinkedIn continues to cleanse its Chinese platform for the benefit of the CCP. This week, several Western journalists and academics took to Twitter to share notifications from LinkedIn stating that their profiles had been removed from the Chinese version of the site due to unspecified “prohibited content.” Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, a China reporter at Axios whose profile was recently censored, wrote a Twitter thread detailing the situation:

While this is not the first time LinkedIn has censored profiles in China, these recent notifications point to the company’s increasing potential to export China’s censorship demands beyond the Great Firewall. Allen-Ebrahimian drew attention to the fact that correspondence from LinkedIn clearly placed the onus on her to make her content available on the Chinese platform: “[…] the decision whether to update your profile is yours,” the message stated. As this would force her to delete the sensitive content on her own end, as opposed to merely having it removed from the Chinese version, she concluded, “This goes beyond China’s model of ‘internet sovereignty’ and imposes China’s censorship extraterritorially.” LinkedIn’s suggestions to self-censor resemble censorship messages from Weibo, which recommend that users “refrain from posting or forwarding similarly sensitive content…to avoid disruptions to the normal functioning of [their] account.” 

LinkedIn, the only major American social media company operating in China, has a history of censoring content deemed sensitive to the CCP, ever since it created a webpage for Chinese users in 2014. Immediately after the launch, it censored part of the profile activity of Bill Bishop, creator of the Sinocism newsletter, as well as some Hong Kong users. In early 2019, it censored CCP critics Peter Humphrey and Zhou Fengsuo. In March 2021, the Cyberspace Administration of China criticized LinkedIn for failing to sufficiently control political content, and forced the company to submit a self-evaluation report and suspend new user sign-ups for thirty days. To regain the government’s favor, an in-house censorship crusade ensued, whereby LinkedIn’s Chinese version blocked the accounts of dozens of individuals around the world, including journalists, researchers, and academics whose work relates to China.

As Allen-Ebrahimian mentioned in her Twitter thread, there are many unanswered questions surrounding LinkedIn’s motivations for this censorship. LinkedIn has not been transparent about whether it is censoring preemptively by its own initiative, or after specific requests from the Chinese government, or both. Deliberating these questions, the Hong Kong Free Press reported on LinkedIn’s vague response and eagerness to comply with Beijing’s orders:

When approached by HKFP, LinkedIn […] did not directly address what content was at fault on Allen-Ebrahimian’s account, or how profiles are censored. They also did not state which content may be forbidden. However, a spokesperson said: “We’re a global platform that respects the laws that apply to us, including adhering to Chinese government regulations for our localized version of LinkedIn in China. For members whose profile visibility is limited within China, their profiles are still visible across the rest of the globe where LinkedIn is available.”

LinkedIn did not clarify which Chinese law or regulations they were obeying.

According to its Transparency Report, LinkedIn declined two government data requests from China between July 1, 2020 and December 2020. However, it complied with 16 out of 18 data removal requests from Beijing in the first half of 2020, and 22 out of 24 requests in the latter half of that year. In all, it complied with 89 per cent of such requests. The report did not state which content was removed. [Source]

The public outcry in response to the latest round of censorship was swift. U.S. Senator Rick Scott sent a letter to the leadership of LinkedIn and its parent company Microsoft expressing his deep concern and demanding a detailed explanation. This follows another letter, sent to LinkedIn last week by U.S. Senator Jim Banks, that also criticized the company’s censorship practices.

PEN America issued a strong statement decrying LinkedIn’s state-influenced censorship: 

“It’s hard to conceive of any explanation for this action other than an American tech firm censoring its users at the apparent behest of the Chinese government,” said PEN America CEO Suzanne Nossel. “This appears to be an alarming and unabashed capitulation to censorship from a company that claims to prize democracy and freedom of expression. If LinkedIn’s behavior is normalized, it sends a message to companies across the globe that it is business as usual to enforce Beijing’s censorship demands globally. This is a flashing red light that unless big tech firms like LinkedIn—owned by Microsoft—stand up to censorship, free speech worldwide will suffer.”  

“The effect of LinkedIn’s actions is to extend China’s net of censorship across national borders, reaching deep into free societies to chill and punish  criticism of Beijing,” Nossel continued. “We call on LinkedIn and Microsoft to clarify their actions, lift baseless account suspensions and affirm their commitment to upholding the speech rights of users everywhere.” [Source]

Nossel’s statement highlights the broader issue at stake: whether it is morally acceptable for Western companies to censor at the behest of the CCP in order to maintain access to the Chinese market. It has become increasingly difficult for businesses of all sizes, especially in the social media realm, to avoid pressure from Beijing. Some have given up and chosen one market over another. Others have attempted to toe the line, calculating that the benefit of collaborating with the CCP censorship apparatus outweighs the cost of criticism from Western free speech advocates. As Allen-Ebrahimian noted, civil society action against businesses may not be enough to protect free speech outside of China. 

The CCP’s ability to extend the reach of its censorship is facilitated by exploiting the asymmetry of global information flow. While Chinese social media sites remain closed off to Western free-speech advocates, Western social media sites are open to the Chinese government. This has allowed the CCP to wage disinformation campaigns on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, and even use LinkedIn to recruit spies abroad. 

The mechanisms of CCP-driven censorship on LinkedIn and other Chinese platforms go beyond brute deletion of content. As Vincent Brussee at Merics explained, albeit before this year’s wave of censored profiles, the digital design of these platforms is an overlooked part of the information control apparatus: 

On LinkedIn’s Chinese app, for example, some features that are available in the international version are strategically disabled for being potentially sensitive. One might not attribute many of these “features” to political motivations but simply to choices made purely in the commercial interests of the platform. Yet closer scrutiny suggests these choices are not merely coincidental. Compared to the international version, LinkedIn China disabled the “groups” function, the news feed and does not allow users to upload videos or PDF and Word attachments.  The nature of these features indicates that this is for political reasons: the news feed is likely to contain political content, videos and attachments are technically more difficult to censor, and groups are the most effective tools to organize collective action. LinkedIn did not bother with censorship and risk a similar backlash to Zoom, it outright disabled these functions for Chinese users. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/10/linkedin-censors-more-journalist-profiles-in-china-suggests-self-censorship-as-solution/
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