Friday, 5 February 2021

Photo: Lightning “passes through ”the highest landmark building in Beijing like a dragon, by Lu Qiao

Lightning “passes through ”the highest landmark building in Beijing like a dragon, by Lu Qiao (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/photo-lightning-passes-through-the-highest-landmark-building-in-beijing-like-a-dragon-by-lu-qiao/

Translation: “The Situation-That-Must-not-be-Mentioned” – Chinese Netizens Respond to Xinjiang Camps

This week, the BBC published an investigation into reports of systematic rape at internment camps in Xinjiang, including graphic and disturbing detail from former detainees and camp staff. This is the latest of many recent reports alleging mistreatment, political indoctrination, forced labor, and more at the camps. While Chinese censors prohibit any discussion of events in Xinjiang from entering the domestic media space, official statements responding to news reports dismiss the allegations, claiming that residents of Xinjiang are living “a happy life in such a stable environment.”

Despite the censorship and propaganda around the issue, Chinese internet users have found discreet ways to discuss the situation in Xinjiang, often in response to foreign media reports, such as when the New York Times published the leaked Xinjiang Papers in November 2019. Following the release of the Chinese-language version of the recent BBC report, several people commented on Weibo, showing a rare public display of empathy and solidarity with Uyghurs. Twitter users, including @big_ear_cat and @Chinese4Uyghurs screengrabbed some Weibo comments and reposted them. CDT has translated a selection below. All Weibo user names and profile pictures have been obscured or blurred out:

Saw a post that indirectly confirms the situation in Xinjiang.

@██████ On the 99 Charity Day [an annual fundraising campaign by the Tencent Charity Foundation] in 2018, a charity organization organized a fundraising campaign called “Love Together · Accompany Children in Kashgar.” The ad wrote:

In Kashgar, due to special circumstances, many school-age children do not have parents or any family members by their side. They can only turn to their schools for supervision and care, thus becoming “boarding students.”

Perhaps the “special circumstances” confirmed the situation-that-must-not-be-mentioned, many friends reposted this fundraising campaign. On the very same day, the event was taken off of Tencent Charity.

That perhaps forever changed my attitude about the western frontier.

Responses to the above post:

@██████ My classmate was a volunteer teacher [in Xinjiang] and saw the family records of the students there. They also learned about why the place lacked human capital, and why the cost of living was so high in a small town where the level of production was so low. This was all publicly discussed in the meeting with their target school.

@██████ In 2017, some friends and I donated a few shipments of diapers to a children’s welfare center in Ili [Xinjiang], as well as cream to help alleviate diaper rash. Later, the welfare center was shut down. The children were asked to return home. Many of them were orphans. I don’t know what happened to them. [brokenheart][brokenheart][brokenheart]

@██████ My attitude changed last spring when I saw a photo posted by BBC of a notice [from Xinjiang], the official parlance [on the notice] was just too… how should I put it? The language was just too familiar. No one outside of the system could have made it up. Once you had this realization, you’d notice that many seemingly irrelevant news stories actually indirectly confirmed the reporting by foreign media.

@██████ If we don’t help them, the children simply lose their lives, education, and bright future. But if we make a noise, the united, stable, wealthy, peaceful, beautiful, and great image of Xinjiang will be lost. Who can pay such a price!

People inside the Great Firewall are obscurely talking about the concentration camps in Xinjiang. Someone posted this picture. It’s about the Allied forces ordering some German people to visit concentration camps after WWII. Many Germans who didn’t know or didn’t believe in the camps’ existence broke down in tears or passed out after seeing the atrocities.

Actually every time mainstream English media publishes something about Xinjiang, many people inside the Great Firewall repost and discuss in an obscure way.

Screen-grabbed Weibo comments:

@██████ One doesn’t need to pass any bar to discuss history, but one does need conscience and courage to discuss the current reality. You are from that place, you feel the pain but aren’t sure about their truthfulness. I am from somewhere far away. I believe in your sincerity and the XXX [blurred]’s eyes.

@██████ I am also a Han person from the same place as OP [original poster]. I can’t say that my pain is as engraved as OP’s. But never will I cruelly and unscrupulously turn a blind eye. My pain is two-fold: one is for the victims; the other is for our Han people. Have we really become as evil as our own perpetrators from some 100 years ago?

@██████ OP is a witness, a survivor, and an exile. I dare not say that have felt pain because it’s simply incomparable. I hope those loved by XXX [blurred] can get happiness.

@██████ Maybe I just subjectively don’t want it to be true. It pains me to think that humans can be treated so atrociously.

@██████ I’m different. I know these things are true. That’s why I’m in pain.

Many Weibo users had their accounts shut down since yesterday for discussing Xinjiang, including some personal accounts that had been used to document people’s lives for many years. Many people knew about the risks of losing their accounts, but they nevertheless believed that it was worth it. Thank you to all those from inside the Great Firewall who did their bit to light up the world. :heart:

Translation by Yakexi.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/translation-the-situation-that-must-not-be-mentioned-chinese-netizens-respond-to-xinjiang-camps/

Taiwan in Geopolitical Crossfire as Biden Formulates China Policy

With tensions high on many issues as former president Trump reluctantly left the White House last month, strained relations between Washington and Beijing are showing no signs of a quick thaw under a new U.S. president. From the campaign trail last year, Joe Biden himself wrote of the “need to get tough with China,” and since coming to power his administration has pledged to continue pushing Beijing on issues such as the ethnic crackdown in Xinjiang, trade, and toughness towards China-based tech giants. While the Biden administration has yet to lay out a comprehensive strategy concerning China (indicating repeatedly since inauguration that “strategic patience” is in order as policy strategists jockey in D.C.), the Taiwan issue is sure to be on the agenda as Beijing continues to ramp up its rhetoric and issue military threats to the island nation.

Sticking to a pattern that defined his administration’s approach to the region before he was even inaugurated, Donald Trump drew two final blasts of condemnation from Beijing with a last minute Taiwan policy shift just before leaving office. Secretary of State Pompeo on January 8 announced the relaxation of restrictions on interactions between Taiwanese and American officials, a largely rhetorical move signaling a further warming in relations with Taipei and raising the stakes for then-incoming president Biden. Days later, the short-lived scheduling of a trip to Taiwan for Kelly Craft, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, again drew Beijing’s anger.

Last month at Foreign Policy, Jack Detsch and Christina Lu noted unease in Taiwan about the approach the new U.S. administration would take to China, and the role Taiwan would play in that approach:

Taiwanese officials and lawmakers have been playing out the same worst-case scenario in their head for years now: China attacks the island across the Taiwan Strait, and officials in Taipei call for backup from the United States and other allies. With Joe Biden now sitting in the Oval Office, Taiwan wants to know: How would the United States respond?

[…] Many experts expect Biden to hold off on the public saber-rattling and use of U.S. policy toward Taiwan as a way to push back at China that typified the Trump approach.

[…] In recent years, the Trump administration has redoubled U.S. military support for the island, extending over $5 billion in arms sales last year, including drones, coastal defense systems, missiles, and artillery. […]

While Wang [who co-chairs the foreign affairs and defense committee in Taiwan’s parliament] and others have hoped to see Taiwan’s representation in Washington upgraded, the relationship is likely to remain more low-key.

“My guess is the Biden administration just decides to go back to the practice of being less public. And that is because there is no perceived need to use Taiwan as a weapon against China—that’s harmful to Taiwan’s interests,” said Bonnie Glaser, a senior advisor for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “I think that using Taiwan as a card or weapon to poke Beijing in the eye … that practice will disappear.” [Source]

In an unprecedented move, President Biden invited Taiwan’s top U.S. envoy (the nation’s de facto ambassador) to his inauguration, the first presidential invite since the U.S. stopped recognizing Taipei as China’s legitimate seat of government and normalized relations with Beijing in 1979. Last month at Focus Taiwan, Yeh Su-ping and Emerson Lim reported on her attendance as a positive sign:

In a video clip posted on Facebook, Hsiao said she was honored to attend the event on behalf of the people and the government of Taiwan, adding that she looks forward to working with the Biden administration to advance the mutual values and interests of Taiwan and the U.S.

Observers in Taiwan regard the attendance of a Taiwanese delegation at a U.S. presidential inauguration as an important gauge of Taiwan-U.S. relations, due to the complicated tripartite relations between Washington, Taipei and Beijing.

[…] This is the first time a Taiwanese top envoy to the U.S. has received an invitation from JCCIC since 1979, when the U.S. severed formal ties with Taiwan, the source said, adding that it demonstrates the close and friendly relationship between Taiwan and the Biden administration.

It also shows that maintaining the relationship is a trend that has bipartisan support in the U.S., the source said. [Source]

In his highly anticipated first foreign policy address, President Biden told the nation on February 4 that “America is back, diplomacy is back,” as he pledged to work on “reclaiming our credibility and moral authority” on the international stage. Regarding China, he labeled China the U.S.’ “most serious competitor” and promised to hold Beijing to account on a host of issues, but also to “work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interest to do so.” At the South China Morning Post, Owen Churchill reports on Biden’s comments, noting optimism in Beijing’s official reception of them:

[…] Beijing said on Friday that there were inevitably differences between China and the US, but their common interests “outweigh their divergences”.

“China hopes that the US will conform to the opinions of people of the two countries as well as the trend of the times, treating China and China-US relations objectively and rationally, adopting a positive and constructive policy towards China,” foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said.

“We hope the US can meet China halfway and focus on cooperation while managing divergences,” he said. [Source]

With Taiwan retaining a degree of international focus unheard of before its exemplary response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its role in the Trump administration’s serial norm-breaking, the Xi administration has worked to significantly ramp up pressure since Biden’s inauguration. On January 25, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry reported that dozens of Chinese warplanes entered the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in a two-day period, prompting defensive measures. CNN reported on the move as an early test for the Biden administration, and put it into the context of other recent moves by Beijing to isolate Taiwan and put pressure on the U.S.:

According to Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, Chinese military planes made more than 380 flights into the island’s air defense identification zone last year. The US Federal Aviation Administration defines an ADIZ as “a designated area of airspace over land or water within which a country requires the immediate and positive identification, location, and air traffic control of aircraft in the interest of the country’s national security.”

[…] The US showed a strong commitment to Taiwan’s defense during the Trump administration, approving the sale of advanced military hardware to Taipei, including F-16 fighter jets, while sending high-level envoys to the island, both moves that angered Beijing.
In an early show of support from the Biden administration toward the island, Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to the US, Hsiao Bi-khim, attended Biden’s inauguration last week. It was the first such official invitation to a representative of the Taipei government since 1979, when Washington established formal diplomatic ties with Beijing. On the same day, Beijing announced sanctions against outgoing US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and 27 other high-ranking officials under Trump, accusing them of “prejudice and hatred against China.”

[…] In a display of that solidarity [expressed by Biden’s state department towards all military allies in the region], a US Navy aircraft carrier strike group entered the South China Sea at the weekend, the first deployment during the Biden administration of one of the 100,000-ton warships with its contingent of more than 60 aircraft. [Source]

The Financial Times described the move as Beijing simulating an attack on a nearby U.S. carrier, which “highlight[s] that the intense military competition between the two superpowers around Taiwan and the South China Sea has not eased.” Days later, China’s rhetoric spiked sharply when the Chinese defense ministry’s explanation of the maneuvers included the warning “independence means war.” Reuters’ Tony Munroe and Yew Lun Tian report:

“The military activities carried out by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait are necessary actions to address the current security situation in the Taiwan Strait and to safeguard national sovereignty and security,” [Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian] said.

“They are a solemn response to external interference and provocations by ‘Taiwan independence’ forces,” he added.

[…] “We warn those ‘Taiwan independence’ elements: those who play with fire will burn themselves, and ‘Taiwan independence’ means war,” he added.

While China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control, it is unusual for Beijing to make such overt, verbal threats of conflict. […] [Source]

On January 31, Taipei reported that more Chinese aircraft had entered its ADIZ, and also took uncharacteristically public note of the presence of a U.S. military plane. From Reuters:

Taiwan’s Defence Ministry said a total of seven Chinese aircraft flew into the same waters near the Pratas Islands on Sunday – two J-10 fighters, four J-11 fighters and a Y-8 reconnaissance aircraft.

It added that a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was also present in the same southwestern part of the defence zone, but neither named the aircraft type nor provided details of its flight path, which it does for all Chinese flights.

It was the first time Taiwan had mentioned the presence of a U.S. aircraft since it began near daily reports of Chinese activity in its defence zone in mid-September.

Taiwan rarely speaks publicly about U.S. activity near it, normally when U.S. warships sail through the Taiwan Strait, though diplomatic and security sources say there are frequent U.S. air and naval missions close to the island. [Source]

At The Financial Times, Kathrin Hille and Demetri Sevastopulo analyzed Beijing’s increasingly belligerent  rhetoric and military posturing over the last year, culminating in the additional spike since Biden’s inauguration, as a clear attempt to draw Washington a red line in the region:

The escalation in Chinese air force activity has been widely interpreted as a sign of the unprecedented level of tensions between Beijing, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory and retains a threat to take it by force, and Taipei.

But defence experts believe two bigger forces are at play: the open military rivalry between Washington and Beijing; and the Chinese military’s need for a location to train for ambitious and far-flung missions and practise with increasingly sophisticated equipment.

Taiwan, however, is at greater risk because China, its main enemy, and the US, its unofficial security guarantor, have drifted towards confrontation — a course that analysts believe the Biden administration will struggle to alter. […] [Source]

At Slate this week, Joshua Keating assessed the risks of a major crisis arising from the “strange and hypocritical arrangement […] that has benefited both the U.S, and Taiwan” since 1979. After providing a brief history of U.S. ties to Taipei up to the recent culmination of Beijing’s sharpening cross-strait rhetoric and military posturing, Keating looked at the complicated potential implications of the ambiguous U.S. Taiwan Relations Act that has fostered the “strange and hypocritical” relationship:

[…] The dark question hanging over U.S. Taiwan policy is the question of what the U.S. would do if China actually tried to take over Taiwan by force. While Taiwan has gotten less media attention than other Asian flashpoints like North Korea and the South China Sea in recent years, an invasion could be a nightmare scenario that should be taken seriously, if only because it’s the most likely place where the two most powerful countries in the world would go to war.

The Taiwan Relations Act states that any threat to Taiwan is a “grave concern to the United States” and that in the event of such a threat, “The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States.” This is pretty vague, and some say it doesn’t go far enough.

The problem with such a policy of “strategic clarity” [advocated by some U.S. policy thinkers and opposite to the current ambiguous relationship] is that it would put Tsai in a position of having to pursue independence more aggressively. Tsai is a member of the Democratic Progressive Party, which is often referred to as the more “pro-independence” of the country’s two main political parties. Taiwan is already de facto independent, but it has not formally declared independence under the name Taiwan, which would likely provoke an aggressive response from China. The convenient fiction that the Taiwanese government is the “Republic of China” allows Taiwan to have its cake and eat it too: It’s for all intents and purposes a separate country but doesn’t call itself one. […] [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/taiwan-in-geopolitical-crossfire-as-biden-formulates-china-policy/

Thursday, 4 February 2021

Hong Kong Government Brings National Security to Education System, Cracks Down on Dual Citizens in Custody

The Hong Kong Government has introduced comprehensive guidelines to securitize the city’s schools in line with the National Security Law, in a move aimed at quashing political dissent in the education system and restricting critical inquiry. Starting from elementary school, students will be required to learn basic concepts of the National Security Law including naming its key offenses and recognizing central state institutions in Hong Kong, while older students will be taught that their rights and freedoms are “not unrestricted.” Schools will also be urged to call the police to discipline students in cases “beyond administrators’ control.”

South China Morning Post’s Chan Ho-him, Ng Kang-chung, and Lilian Cheng reported on the sweeping curriculum changes announced on Thursday:

The guidelines, spelled out in seven documents covering all grades, specifically instruct schools to ban any display of words or material around campus that would constitute an endangerment to national security, prevent teachers from approaching national security as a debatable matter, and bar outsiders from conducting activities on campus involving political propaganda.

[…] While national security would not be an individual subject, it would be taught through different subjects such as general studies, Chinese history, civic education, geography, biology and music.

According to the teaching framework laid out in the guidelines, pupils as young as six years old are expected to learn about how the national security law was formed and its importance to the city, as well as identify the offences. Students in secondary school should know what acts constitute a breach of the law, the relationship between national security and terrorism, war and colonialism, and “the country’s opportunities and challenges” in its participation in international affairs.

[…] In situations where students were chanting slogans, singing political songs on campus or displaying separatist materials, the school could consult a police community relations officer if illegal acts were suspected. But in a “grave or emergency situation”, the police force should be notified immediately and provided with details about the acts and suspects. [Source]

The guidelines are also noteworthy in requiring action from Hong Kong’s international schools, impacting expat children who are typically insulated from the Education Bureau’s curricular requirements. Financial Times’ Nicolle Liu and Primrose Riodan reported on those requirements, which may influence expats’ decisions to locate themselves in Hong Kong:

Hong Kong’s education bureau released the guidelines on Thursday, which will also impact expat students at international schools. The department said that while they accepted these schools’ curricula was different, teachers would be expected to ensure students “acquire a correct and objective understanding” of principles in line with Beijing’s tough national security law introduced last year.

[…] There are 52 international schools in Hong Kong that cater to expatriate and local students, especially those looking to study abroad. The territory is home to 587 primary and 504 secondary schools.

Teachers of subjects such as geography and biology will also need to incorporate lessons about national security into the topics taught in class. The resources provided by the bureau suggested that biology students should, for example, study how the local and mainland Chinese government protected the country during the pandemic. [Source]

Significant new changes have also been proposed to the embattled liberal studies subject, which pro-Beijing figures have frequency criticized for “radicalizing” Hong Kong students. Introduced by Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, now a vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, it aimed to promoting students’ awareness about contemporary social issues and encourage greater critical thinking. Following the 2019 protests, numerous pro-Beijing politicians and Tung’s own think tank had called for the subject to be revamped. In November, Secretary for Education Kevin Yeung said cuts would be made to the syllabus and textbooks would be subject to vetting. South China Morning Post’s Chan Ho-him reported on further changes this week to introduce content on “national security, lawfulness, and patriotism”:

Liberal studies, first introduced in 2009 as one of four compulsory subjects for senior secondary students under a curriculum reform, was aimed at enhancing young people’s awareness of social issues and developing their critical thinking skills.

[…] The Hong Kong section covers topics related to sociopolitical participation and local identity, while some textbooks on the modern China module mention the mainland’s legal system and bring up the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.

[…] According to the document sent to schools on Tuesday, the focus of learning proposed in the new syllabus under the Hong Kong theme will include the significance of safeguarding national security, upholding and abiding by the rule of law, as well as the fundamental rights and duties of Hong Kong residents.

One topic highlighted will also be the constitutional relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China. On this, the document stated that “China has indisputable sovereignty and jurisdiction over Hong Kong”. [Source]

The timing of the announced education system changes is noteworthy, arriving at a similar time that new guidelines were issued in mainland China to boost ideological education among students there. On Wednesday, schoolchildren with the Chinese Young Pioneers, a national youth organization under the Party’s Central Committee, ordered that all students in elementary school take classes about Xi Jinping Thought.

In 2012, a protest in Hong Kong against a proposed Moral and National Education curriculum aimed at promoting patriotism among Hong Kong’s students drew tens of thousands of protestors into the streets. The anti-national education protests were a watershed moment for the modern Hong Kong democracy movement, ushering in a new generation of stars: the demonstrations were led by a crop of young activists including three high school students named Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam. After the protests succeeded in getting education reforms shelved, Wong, Chow, and Lam were propelled to political fame, and took leading roles in the 2014 Umbrella Protests and beyond. Last year, Wong, Chow, and Lam were all jailed on charges of illegal assembly relating to the 2019 protests. Eight years on, it seems that the Hong Kong government will finally get its way with its education reforms.

The sweeping changes to the education system will likely spark further alarm among parents sympathetic to the pro-democracy movement, with possible implications for the city’s ongoing emigration wave. This week, London opened the U.K.’s doors to Hong Kongers holding British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) passports, allowing them to relocate with an eventual option of gaining citizenship. Numerous profiles of families who have chosen to emigrate have cited the desire to shield children from politicization of the education system as a primary motive for leaving. Still, pro-Beijing politicians in Hong Kong have called for even more stringent measures to police Hong Kong’s schools, including CCTV cameras in all classrooms to monitor teachers.

The political crackdown in Hong Kong’s schools this week has not been limited to the K-12 system. Early this week, the University of Hong Kong (HKU) issued a warning to the student union urging it to cancel a screening of “Lost in the Fumes,” a documentary about Edward Leung, the jailed pro-independence activist who coined the phrase: “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” Hong Kong Free Press’ Selina Cheng reported on the warning from HKU’s administration:

HKU’s Student Union (HKUSU) had planned on screening the film in early February, but staff from the university contacted the union’s committee to discuss “possibly illegal” issues over the film’s screening. Citing union Vice-President Tracy Cheung and other sources, the union’s Campus TV reported on Tuesday that the university indicated that security guards may be deployed to block the screening, if it were to go ahead.

[…] The union also received an informal document from the school, saying it was offering the “strongest possible pieces of advice” and asked students to seek legal advice and mitigate risks, since the screening would generate “serious legal concerns and consequences,” the document read.

The nine-page document contained a series of screenshots taken from the documentary, such as when Leung discussed his beliefs about using force against the authorities, and dialogue that included the phrase “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.”

The slogan – initially used by independence activists – became much more popular during protests against the China extradition bill in 2019. The government said last year that it was illegal under the Beijing-imposed national security law, though no films have been banned in Hong Kong. [Source]

Notably, HKU said in its warning letter that the current environment “is fundamentally different from Oct, Nov 2020. It’s far more stringent and taxing.” The student union ultimately went ahead with the screening, after blocking out windows of the viewing auditorium with black trash bags. CDT has previously written about fears about the impact of the National Security Law on Hong Kong’s higher eduction sector.

At the Chinese University of Hong Kong last week, police arrested three students, including the student union president, in connection with a protest last month. As of now, five of Hong Kong’s eight universities have no elected student unions, amid fears of legal repercussions under the National Security Law.

Sweeping political changes that have affected Hong Kong’s legislature, courts, independent media, financial sector, and now the education system, have highlighted the heavy hand of the new law and its long shadow over Hong Kong society. Other new measures introduced in the past week include a decision by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) to suspend recognition of the BN(O) passport as a valid travel document, in retaliation towards the U.K.’s offer of a path to citizenship for BN(O) passport holders. While that decision will have limited effect for most Chinese Hong Kong residents who will be able to travel on their HKSAR passports instead, the revocation threatens to strand ethnic minorities, who face difficulty applying for HKSAR passports as non-Chinese nationals. Then on Thursday, following MoFA’s decision, local banks were instructed to stop recognizing BN(O) passports, a decision that could complicate matters for financial institutions already caught in the political crossfire.

Finally, in a move that has alarmed Western governments, Hong Kong’s Correctional Services Department, in charge of managing the city’s prisons, has reportedly demanded that a Hong Kong-Canadian dual citizen choose between his nationalities. Declaring themselves as Canadian would mean losing their right of abode in Hong Kong, while declaring themselves Chinese would remove their ability to seek assistance from the Canadian government. Last year, China’s ambassador to Canada issued a thinly-veiled threat against Canadian dual citizens in Hong Kong in response to moves by Ottawa to create a scheme for young Hong Kong college graduates to immigrate. Pro-Beijing figures in the city have in recent weeks urged the government to crack down on dual citizenship, a special right which Hong Kongers possess, but mainland Chinese nationals technically do not. For AFP, Su Xinqi and Jerome Tylor reported that diplomats were scrambling given the implications for hundreds of thousands of dual-citizens in the city:

A US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP they were also aware of more examples than the single case Canada went public with.

[…] In response to enquiries, a State Department spokesman said Washington had “deep concerns that this new Hong Kong policy will compel people to declare their citizenship under duress and without an opportunity to understand the full implications of the declaration”.

The city’s Security Bureau cited China’s nationality laws to explain why consular visits might be rejected.

[…] While residents are allowed to have more than one passport, those of Chinese descent are considered Chinese nationals inside Chinese territories, which includes Hong Kong, the bureau said.

It did not address why the regulations were only being enforced now. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/hong-kong-government-brings-national-security-to-education-system-cracks-down-on-dual-citizens-in-custody/

Chinese Global Media Influence Faces Pushback, in the U.K. and Elsewhere

A new report from the National Endowment for Democracy’s Sharp Power and Democratic Resilience series, written by Freedom House’s Sarah Cook, looks at the Chinese government’s media influence globally. She examines four tactics used by the government—propaganda, disinformation, censorship, and gaining influence over key nodes in the information flow—and also highlights notable efforts by media, researchers, non-governmental organizations, and others to stymie such efforts. She especially focuses on the more subtle ways this influence is pushed, through content-sharing and media partnerships with cash-strapped agencies, and pressure to silence voices critical of the CCP. From the report:

The CCP’s tactics range from widely accepted forms of traditional public diplomacy and other forms of soft power, to more covert, corrupt, and coercive activities. In the gray zone between the latter two poles of this spectrum are “sharp power” efforts that take advantage of the public sphere within open societies but which have the effect of compromising democratic integrity. These practices go beyond simply “telling China’s story.” Their sharper edge often undermines democratic norms, erodes national sovereignty, weakens the financial sustainability of independent media, and violates local laws. Moreover, no country is immune: the targets include poor and institutionally fragile states as well as wealthy democratic powers.

While Beijing’s growing investment in foreign media influence has yielded some gains, the campaign has also encountered obstacles such as journalistic integrity and public skepticism about state-run media. In fact, the past three years have featured a wave of pushback. In many countries, governmental and nongovernmental actors alike have come to recognize the threat that CCP media influence poses to democratic freedoms and structures. Resistance has come from the media industry itself, as well as policymakers, the technology sector, and civil society.

But as China’s leadership refines its strategy and expands its efforts to new countries, a more coordinated and comprehensive response is needed. At the center of such a response must be an acknowledgment and understanding of the challenges that the Chinese party-state and related actors pose to media freedom globally—not only by China experts, but by the full array of nongovernmental actors engaged in the media, news, and technology sectors. [Source]

In recent years, the Chinese government has especially focused on controlling the global narrative on two major stories: internment camps holding Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, and the origins and spread of COVID-19. As Cook notes in her report, the Chinese government has increasingly relied on spreading disinformation around COVID-19 and several other topics—including Taiwanese democracy, Hong Kong protests, and prominent critics of the CCP—which “appeared designed to sow divisions within democratic societies and alliances, rather than simply promote pro-Beijing viewpoints.” In this strategy, Beijing appears to be aligning itself with Moscow, which has long used disinformation as a defensive tactic.

At SupChina, Eric Olander writes about how the Chinese government is targeting Africa for a propaganda campaign, through diplomatic Twitter accounts, aimed at influencing public opinion over events in Xinjiang:

The key message that Chinese officials are trying to convey is that the well-documented accusations that up to a million Uyghurs have been forcibly interned are spurious and put forth by Western media, governments, and human rights organizations that are all hostile to China.

Instead, ambassadors like Zhào Yànbó 赵彦博 in Botswana promote a different story about Xinjiang that they clearly hope will resonate with stakeholders in developing countries. “China’s Xinjiang has never been more prosperous than it is now, with unprecedented achievements in socio-economic development and improvement of people’s life,” he tweeted on Tuesday. “I’m happy to see that the residents in Xinjiang could live a happy life in such a stable environment.”

Chinese missions and diplomats in Chad, South Africa, the DRC, Rwanda, Liberia, and Lesotho among many others all posted similarly upbeat narratives and statements on Tuesday about the purportedly great quality of life for Uyghurs in Xinjiang. [Source]

In her discussion of effective efforts to moderate Chinese government influence, Sarah Cook mentions an investigation by Ofcom, the British media regulator, into CGTN, the overseas branch of China’s state broadcaster. On Thursday, Ofcom withdrew CGTN’s license to operate in the U.K. based on a procedural violation. Charles Riley and Julia Horowitz report for CNNBusiness:

Ofcom said that Star China Media Limited did not have “editorial responsibility” for the channel’s output, and therefore “does not meet the legal requirement of having control over the licensed service.” Star was acting as the distributor, rather than the provider of the news channel, it added.

The regulators also rejected a proposal by CGTN to transfer the license to a new entity after finding that it would ultimately still be controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, and therefore disqualified under UK law.

“We’ve provided CGTN with numerous opportunities to come into compliance, but it has not done so. We now consider it appropriate to withdraw the license for CGTN to broadcast in the UK,” an Ofcom spokesperson said.

The channel will be removed from UK airwaves with immediate effect. CGTN has the right to request a judicial review, according to an Ofcom spokesperson, and it could apply for another license in the future. [Source]

In their announcement, Ofcom further stated:

Correspondence from CGTN submitted during the course of our investigation makes clear that CGTNC is controlled by CCTV, which is also the sole shareholder of CGTNC.

Given CGTNC is controlled by CCTV – which, as part of the China Media Group, is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and therefore disqualified from holding a broadcast licence under UK broadcasting laws – we consider that CGTNC would be disqualified from holding a licence. [Source]

Ofcom is also in the process of deciding whether it will impose sanctions against CGTN in a separate case “for failing to preserve due impartiality in its coverage of the Hong Kong protests.” Last year, the regulator sided with Peter Humphrey, who had filed a complaint over CGTN’s airing of his forced confession while he was detained in China in 2013, one of several such broadcasts.

Human rights group Safeguard Defenders first filed a complaint to Ofcom about CGTN almost a year ago. In a statement on Thursday, the group explained how this decision would impact China’s media influence campaigns worldwide:

It cannot be stressed enough how important CGTN is in the CCPs planned expansion of soft power and influence in Europe, which with the deterioration of the relationship with the US has only grown more important.

While CCTV and CGTN plan for their future new headquarters, likely in Brussels, this will cause severe disruption to Chinese TV-based influencing operations in Europe.

Far worse, for CGTN, Ofcom’s decision may draw attention to a type of violation that has gone largely unnoticed and may commit other TV regulators to take a closer look at the operations of both CCTV and CGTN in other jurisdictions. The process in how CGTN has dealt with this, and the other complaints, are not surprising, but nonetheless shocking to any outsider, as they continue to act as if regulations do not apply to them, and that hostile and aggressiveness alone, would allow them to somehow escape punishment.

This is likely to be a wake-up call for CGTN and CCTV, but it is doubtful whether they will be able to change, as political control from the CCP is too strong. As seen in other instances, even when a change in action would clearly help China/the CCP, they are simply unable to make such changes. [Source]

On Thursday, following Ofcom’s announcement, the Chinese government issued a complaint to the BBC over their coverage of COVID-19, which it said constituted “fake news.” This week the BBC had also issued a hard-hitting report on forced rape in the Xinjiang camps. BBC responded:


The same day, The Telegraph reported that three Chinese citizens had been expelled from Britain for spying while claiming to work for three separate (unnamed) Chinese media agencies.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/chinese-global-media-influence-faces-pushback-in-the-u-k-and-elsewhere/

Arrests At Video Company Threaten Beloved Subtitling Groups’ Uncensored Content

Volunteer subtitle groups that translate uncensored American television shows and films are highly popular in China. Yet the future of one of the largest and most popular subtitling sites, Renren Yingshi, is murky after police raided the company’s Shanghai office, arresting 14 people in an ostensible crackdown on video piracy. At SupChina, Jiayun Feng reported on the raid on Renren and the social media outcry that arose as fans feared the loss of a rare source of uncensored international culture:

After the arrests were made public, Renren’s website remained accessible. But there are reasons to believe that Renren is on its last legs. Earlier last month, its mobile app suddenly went out of service, and a person who claimed to be close to the situation wrote in a viral post (in Chinese) that Renren had entered its last days. Although members of Renren later denied rumors that the website was under pressure from authorities to shut down, many users were convinced that the service was in government crosshairs.

[…] Launched in 2006, Renren Yingshi was one of the pioneering Chinese subtitle sites run by a loosely-connected community of passionate volunteers, who translated foreign movies and TV programs and offered pirated video downloads. Over the years, the team’s extraordinary efficiency and professionalism earned it a cult following among Chinese fans of uncensored foreign programming, and the website evolved into a for-profit streaming platform that allowed users to watch and download subtitled content from not only English-speaking countries, but also from other parts of the world. [Source]

At The South China Morning Post, Phoebe Zhang reported that Renren filled a niche left by strict censorship of and limits on foreign films and television in China:

China is one of the fastest-growing film markets in the world and a top destination for Western films. And yet piracy has flourished in part because of quotas set by the authorities limiting how many foreign films can be shown in Chinese theatres each year. In addition, China lacks a movie rating system and state censors exercise tight control over programme content, removing scenes that may be deemed politically sensitive, violent, pornographic or vulgar.

For decades, the subtitling sites have filled the void, providing the public with uncensored shows deemed “sensitive” by authorities, including LGBT shows such as Queer as Folk as well as Western blockbusters such as Game of Thrones and Disney’s Mandalorian.

[…] “I’m willing to spend money on copyrighted shows, but I don’t have the chance to do that,” another wrote. “Can we ever watch shows that are original, uncensored and with reliable captions?” [Source]

A PEN America report last year detailed China’s growing importance as a global film market, and that growth’s role in promoting self-censorship among filmmakers and studios elsewhere.

Many of the translation crews have an almost two-decade long history. Renren Yingshi was founded in 2003 under the name YYeTs.com. Subtitling sites have already weathered multiple rounds of government crackdowns. In 2014, a campaign to end online piracy nearly closed the company. CGTN, a state-owned media company, wrote that this round of arrests is likewise part of an effort to stop copyright infringement.

Subtitling groups have been pivotal in the spread of American popular culture in China. In 2014, Yang Guobin, a professor who specializes in the internet and China, told Foreign Policy that many perceive subtitle groups to have “‘[inaugurated] the most important ‘mental emancipation’ movement’ since the late 1970s, when a wave of translated foreign literature ignited China’s collective imagination and profoundly affected people’s ways of thinking.” In 2006, the New York Times profiled a subtitling group and found that “[to] a person, the translators say they are willing to devote long hours to this effort out of a love for American popular culture.” In 2011, People’s Daily, the chief mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, praised Renren subtitle groups for their translations of American university Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCS), which allowed “youths who have already left campus to taste the joys of study without pressure or purpose.” Renren’s translations caused Yale professor Shelly Kagan’s course on death to briefly become one of the most popular university courses in China. In an essay posted on CDT Chinese in 2020, a former subtitle translator shared their perception of the importance of subtitling work in China’s cultural sphere:

In 2012, a Sina Weibo post, shared more than 26,000 times, called subtitle groups “China’s greatest teacher of cultural exchange in the past 50 years”. Popular magazine New Weekly’s commentary on the post was also widely shared: “Their contribution is humble, low-key, and selfless. In their patient yet systematic manner, they gently guided us and made their contributions quietly. They’ve taught us more than all of China’s television stations combined.

[…] Some have named the subtitling groups “Fire Thieves,” after Prometheus.

In them, I have seen the internet era’s most precious spirit of cultural equality. Once, cultural production and distribution was controlled in the hands of the elite. Today, culture is more democratized. The subtitle groups have a grip on the technologies and resources behind videos (translating, aligning subtitles with timestamps, embedding) and yet are not monopolistic nor profit-seeking but rather share it with the public for free. It is only because they have no worries and do not work for the sake of being compensated that they are able to enjoy this freedom. [Chinese]

Subtitle groups still play important roles in other marginalized Chinese communities. At Rest of World, Zeyi Yang reported on QAF, an LGBTIQ subtitle group that has become a haven to China’s queer community:

QAF, which resembles a cross between Reddit and an early internet chatroom, started out in 2004 as a message board for Chinese fans of the hit American-Canadian show “Queer as Folk” and grew into a forum for LGBTIQ cinema resources. Four years after its launch, the site pivoted to subtitling. Subtitling a movie requires hours of work by a whole team of people. Right now, there are about 120 volunteers, and two-thirds work in translation. Every time a new movie arrives, QAF volunteers form a one-off group, with each member taking on a specific task. This works like an assembly line: one person will translate, another will synchronize, and others will take on graphic design, subtitle embedding, and uploading. Since 2008, coordinated teams of volunteers have translated more than a thousand movies and TV series for QAF, ranging from major English-language studio productions to short films in Hebrew and Vietnamese. The full films, embedded with colorful subtitles, are available for download in the forum. Today, the site has over 700,000 registered users, 60,000 followers on its public WeChat account, and about 1,000 active daily users.

Over the years, QAF established a reputation as the go-to place for LGBTIQ content in China. It now functions not only as a place to access foreign queer media but also as a hub of exchange and support in a country where LGBTIQ people are still often discriminated against. In the forum, users can freely discuss news, like Thailand’s draft bill that would legalize same-sex unions, and share experiences, like wanting to run away from homophobic parents. “For other communities doing fan subbing, it’s more like a hobby, or a place to share resources,” said Ting Guo, senior lecturer in the department of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. But of QAF, she noted, “It’s more like a community.” On average, volunteers spend about a year working on the site, and many stick around to nurture the next generation of subtitlers. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/arrests-at-video-company-threaten-beloved-subtitling-groups-uncensored-content/

Photo: The fan seller, by Gauthier DELECROIX

The fan seller, by Gauthier DELECROIX (CC BY 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/photo-the-fan-seller-by-gauthier-delecroix/