Thursday, 4 February 2021

New Rules Tighten Scrutiny of Citizen Journalists, Self-Media Accounts

China’s internet watchdog has announced new rules designed to crack down on “self-media” accounts, the social media accounts of independent citizen journalists and content creators that have flourished on platforms such as WeChat and Weibo. The announcement by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) comes a week after it separately released new rules tightening oversight of verified and organizational social media accounts, suggesting that authorities are undertaking a broad effort to “clean up” speech on social media platforms.

“Self-media” accounts have flourished on Chinese social media platforms in recent years, creating a rare space where some citizen journalists have been able to circumvent editorial censors to report critically from China. The tightened regulations come after authorities arrested several citizen journalists last year for reporting on China’s coronavirus response, including Zhang Zhan, who was jailed for four years for her reporting, which was partially broadcast on WeChat.

At the South China Morning Post, Josh Ye and Tracy Qu reported on the new measures targeting independent content creators:

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) is exploring measures to control the distribution of information across all internet platforms to end “disruption to the order of internet broadcasts”, the agency said on Sunday. The campaign will primarily focus on cleaning up self-media accounts, but it also targets social media trending charts, push notifications and short video platforms, according to the report.

[…] The announcement makes it clear that the CAC aims to curb independent reporting and reposting of information considered illegal while promoting government-sanctioned stories.

[…] China’s clean-up campaigns often target different types of content, especially those considered morally objectionable such as pornography and gambling. However, CUHK’s Lee said this new campaign is specifically focused on political content.

“[Xi Jinping] cares a lot about the internet and the content regulation compared with previous administrations,” Lee said. “He also imposed more control over the internet and online information.” [Source]

The emergence of self-media has allowed citizen journalists to produce relatively unregulated news content, and its flourishing has made WeChat the most popular news source in China. But self-media accounts have also become a hotbed of misinformation and fake news–a legitimate problem that authorities have exploited to also crack down on critical journalism. State media has criticized the “chaos” of the self-media environment and the perverse incentives to attract clicks, though media scholars have written about how state propagandists also exploit clickbait to compete for visibility in an increasingly saturated information market.

In addition to fake news, Chinese internet regulators have also sought to regulate the tone of news coverage. Older rules for verified and organizational accounts mandated that publishers spread “positive energy.” CDT translated a post by one content creator who poked fun at the new regulations, sarcastically reflecting on the “negativity” of their own past news coverage:

Don’t ignore this notice. Make sure to read it and get the key points: First, you can’t do this anymore. What do you know, anyway? You’re just messing around. Second, this is not limited to the four big areas of politics, economy, military affairs, and diplomacy; it covers all major breaking news, which means you can’t blindly chase hot topics anymore. You may end up falling off a cliff, and no one is going to save you then.

I support this notice. Every time I read those public accounts, those bloggers, man, there’s nothing they won’t write about to get your attention, and it’s all negative. Just reading them makes me have a mental breakdown. And I’m always sad. I might actually have depression now.

Why don’t you produce more positive, uplifting, heartwarming stories?

Of course, I need to do some self-reflection, too. For a long time, I’ve been writing about negative stuff as well.

Any society has its fair share of bad stuff. That’s unavoidable! There’s all sorts of weird things in the world. You can’t be fixated on these negative things and ignore the mainstream, which is warm and sunny.

Even if you’ve seen a lot of bad stuff, don’t make a fuss. Just like what Professor Chen Guo says, “Learn to make peace with the darkness.” When you do, you become part of the sunlight. [Chinese]

For TechCrunch, Rita Liao reported that while independent content creators predicted the new regulations would likely stifle self-media reporting on sensitive topics, content creators were also likely find new ways to adapt:

The requirement of news accreditation will likely be a death knell for independent social media publishers that have taken on journalistic roles, particularly those covering politics. “It’s not something you can obtain easily unless you’re an official news outlet or an organization with unmatched resources and background,” a WeChat account publisher told TechCrunch.

Avoiding sensitive topics, such as U.S.-China relations, is always the norm, but the red line on each platform is slightly different, a self-publisher who focuses on finance said. “Sometimes you will have to try it yourself,” the person said.

China’s control on news reaches into every corner of the internet, and regulations are always playing catchup with the pace at which new media, such as microblogs and live streaming, flourishes. [Source]

One space that Chinese internet users have found for the discussion of sensitive issues is on the group audio chat app Clubhouse, which has been exploding in popularity in both the U.S. and China this week. Protocol’s Shen Lu and Zeyi Yang reported that users had recently used the app as a new platform to discuss sensitive political issues:

Who’s on Clubhouse? China’s elites. More specifically: Tech workers, social media opinion leaders, dissidents, activists and journalists both in China and outside of China.

Clubhouse is on the Weibo trending chart. One day after Elon Musk appeared on Clubhouse, the hashtag “Clubhouse Invite Code” appeared as a trending topic on the Chinese social media platform.

What are users talking about? One big topic: Politics. As censorship becomes increasingly pervasive on Chinese social media, Mandarin speakers are using Clubhouse as a new public square for political discourse. Late Tuesday night, Asia time, users in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan stayed up late to debate Chinese identity and democracy. Things got heated when it came to Hong Kong protests, China’s handling of the pandemic and censorship. [Source]

But the flocking of new users to the uncensored platform has some questioning how long it will last in China:



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/new-rules-tighten-scrutiny-of-citizen-journalists-self-media-accounts/

Wednesday, 3 February 2021

Photo: The Ancient at Your Fingertips, by Gauthier DELECROIX – 郭天

The Ancient at Your Fingertips, by Gauthier DELECROIX – 郭天 (CC BY 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/photo-the-ancient-at-your-fingertips-by-gauthier-delecroix-%e9%83%ad%e5%a4%a9/

Women Detained in Xinjiang Camps Report Systematic Rape

An investigation by the BBC has uncovered evidence of systemic rape in Xinjiang internment camps, where approximately one million Uyghurs are believed to be or have been imprisoned. In January, on the last day of the Trump administration the U.S. State Department designated persecution in Xinjiang “genocide,” a move that the Biden administration has signaled support for. The shocking allegations in the BBC report include sexual humiliation, gang rape, and electrocution. Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter report on former detainees’ accounts of mass sexual violence:

[…] “My job was to remove their clothes above the waist and handcuff them so they cannot move,” said Gulzira Auelkhan, crossing her wrists behind her head to demonstrate. “Then I would leave the women in the room and a man would enter – some Chinese man from outside or policeman. I sat silently next to the door, and when the man left the room I took the woman for a shower.”

[…] Another teacher forced to work in the camps, Sayragul Sauytbay, told the BBC that “rape was common” and the guards “picked the girls and young women they wanted and took them away”.

She described witnessing a harrowing public gang rape of a woman of just 20 or 21, who was brought before about 100 other detainees to make a forced confession. [Source]

While sexual crimes are difficult to fully corroborate generally, the claims are exponentially more difficult to vet in Xinjiang due to surveillance and interference, and the report acknowledges that portions of its investigation, which drew on videotaped interviews with survivors, testimony from a former camp guard, and expert commentary, cannot be fully verified. Nonetheless, the preponderance of evidence presented in the report supports claims of systematized sexual violence against Uyghur women. Tursunay Ziawudun, who fled Xinjiang after her release and is now in the U.S., said women were removed from the cells “every night” and raped by one or more masked Chinese men. She said she was tortured and later gang-raped on three occasions, each time by two or three men. The BBC’s report also cites former detainees who were clear that camp guards, even those ostensibly not involved in the violence, were aware of rape and torture. Watch video of the the women’s testimony here.

 

Violence against Xinjiang detainees has been widely documented. In a 2019 interview with Haaretz, a premier Israeli newspaper, Sayragul Sauytbay (the teacher quoted in the BBC report) alleged gang rape in detail. Other violations of bodily autonomy documented in the BBC report serve to support earlier allegations published elsewhere. In September 2020, the Guardian published an interview with Qelbinur Sidik, who was sterilized against her will in 2019. In-depth interviews with former detainees conducted between November 2019 to May 2020 by the U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia Department of Research, Training, and Evaluation, likewise found widespread physical abuse:

All participants described extensive use of extreme violence and torture in detention centers and prisons to extract forced confessions to a range of offenses relating to Uyghur nationalism or religious extremism. Extreme violence and torture also appear common as punishments for infractions of behavioral rules or for failure to correctly memorize songs or slogans. Participants described themselves and others as having been subjected to many of the forms of torture catalogued by the International Society for Human Rights and Amnesty International, such as severe beatings, including with electric batons and with rubber straps designed not to leave marks; twisting and overstretching of limbs, including through specific instruments of torture such as the “iron/tiger chair”; forced abidance in painful positions; hanging; electroshocks; hunger and thirst; and isolation in painful conditions.

[…] Another said that staff may face questions from other government officials if a detainee is injured or dies. “They are very frightened of people with high blood pressure and heart disease. There is tension between the security bureau and the courts; they are opposing each other. If a prisoner dies because of the police, because of the guards, it will be recorded,” said one participant. However, other participants said that they had witnessed people beaten to death and dying of injuries sustained during torture. Said one participant: “I saw girls coming back from interrogation who fainted; they would scream and cry madly, and the police would repeat the interrogation again and again until they lost their minds. A 27-year-old girl died from that.” [Source]

The Chinese government denies all allegations of systematic violence. In a February 3 press conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin said, “The report on alleged abuses of women’s rights in Xinjiang you mentioned has no factual basis at all.”

Uyghurs fleeing persecution have not always found safe haven abroad. Those applying to reside in the United States are often ensnared by the country’s byzantine immigration system. Those fleeing to Turkey are now facing a possible extradition treaty between the country and China. China’s National People’s Congress recently ratified an extradition treaty between the two countries, which Turkey has not yet ratified. Uyghur-rights groups have rallied against the treaty, warning that it exposes refugees to repatriation and abuse. At The Wall Street Journal, Eva Xiao reported on fears that a recent uptick in arrests of Uyghurs in Turkey portends a mass deportation of asylum-seekers back to China:

Local police accused her husband, Abdullah Metseydi, of engaging in terrorism, said Melike, who asked to withhold her surname, which is different from her husband’s. One officer said her husband had conducted “activities against China,” she said, before he was taken to a deportation center, where he remains.

[…] Like many foreigners in Turkey accused of terrorism, Uighurs are first sent to deportation centers before allegations are thoroughly investigated, said Mehmet Okatan, a lawyer who had more than 20 Uighur clients last year with that experience. Many are eventually released because of a lack of evidence, but the accused, including children and elderly people, can languish in deportation centers for as long as a year, he said.

[…] According to Mr. Doğan, [a law professor], the number of Uighurs arrested and sent to deportation centers has increased significantly during the past four months. Mr. Okatan estimates that more than a hundred Uighurs have been detained in the past half-year. The Wall Street Journal couldn’t independently verify the number of Uighurs detained.

[…] “When we first came, Turkey embraced us,” said 24-year-old Melike, who moved to Turkey in 2014 to practice religion more freely. Now, she said, she worries her husband could be deported back to China. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/women-detained-in-xinjiang-camps-report-systematic-rape/

Tuesday, 2 February 2021

Tibetan Language Advocate Tashi Wangchuk Released After Five-Year Imprisonment

Five years after his arrest on charges of inciting separatism, Tashi Wangchuk, an advocate for Tibetan-language education, has been released from prison. He attempted to use legal avenues to reinstitute Tibetan-language education in his home county of Yushu, Qinghai Province, a majority-Tibetan area where fewer than 20 percent of people were believed to be literate in Tibetan. He was arrested two months after the release of a 2015 New York Times film documenting his efforts to file a lawsuit in Beijing, and held in pre-trial detention for two years, during which he was allegedly tortured. At his trial in 2018, he argued that “his idea was to use litigation to force local governments to stop ignoring Tibetan language education, and he was exercising his right as a citizen to criticize.” At The New York Times last Friday, Chris Buckley reported on Tashi Wangchuk’s release and the current human rights situation in Tibet:

The businessman, Tashi Wangchuk, returned to Yushu, his hometown in the northwestern province of Qinghai, and was staying with a sister, the lawyer, Liang Xiaojun, said on Twitter and in a telephone interview. But Mr. Liang said he could not be sure that Mr. Tashi was “fully free.”

[…] “No one wants to live in an environment that’s full of pressure and fear,” [Mr. Tashi told The New York Times in 2015,] “In effect, there is a systematic slaughter of our culture.”

[…] Between 1998 and 2016, Chinese courts tried 11,810 people on charges of separatism or inciting separatism, and only 15 were acquitted, according to official statistics analyzed by the Dui Hua Foundation, a group based in San Francisco that monitors human rights issues in China.

[…] “Tashi’s only ‘crime’ was to peacefully call for the right of Tibetans to learn in their own language and governments must take strong, assertive action calling for his human rights to be upheld following his release,” Tenzin Tselha, an officer with the International Tibet Network who is based in India, said in an email.[Source]

Tashi’s lawyer, Liang Xiaojun, told the AFP that he fears Tashi is still subject to official surveillance. Tashi’s political rights have been suspended for five years. It is possible that he is being held under a form of “non-release release,” an “extra-legal and extra-judicial practice of re-detaining someone informally who under law should be set free, for example after having served their sentence, been given a suspended sentence or been released on bail from a detention centre.” Non-release release has been used against human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang and other activists. It is one of many tools the security state uses against those released from prison, alongside house arrest, police “escorts,” and “being touristed.”

Ethnic language education is a political flashpoint. In the fall of 2020, Inner Mongolian authorities’ mandate that key curriculum areas in bilingual schools be phased into Mandarin sparked massive protests that included school boycotts, petitions, and physical clashes between parents and police. The authorities’ expansion of Mandarin-language education induced scholarly debate about whether China had embraced “second generation ethnic policies” to roll back legally protected “minority privileges” like native-language education. In late January 2021, Shen Chunyao, head of the National People’s Congress’ Legislative Affairs Commission, stated that the use of minority languages in classrooms was “incompatible with the Chinese Constitution.” NPC Observer covered the NPC’s revisions to legal provisions governing ethnic minority education:

The Legislative Affairs Commission took issue with two sets of unidentified local regulations (legislation adopted by local legislatures) that govern the languages used in teaching at ethnic schools—schools principally educating students of minority ethnicities. One set of regulations provided that ethnic schools “shall” use ethnic languages in teaching, while the other prescribed the same requirement but allowed some classes at ethnic schools to be taught in Mandarin Chinese if the local education department approves. We found only two regulations that fit the Commission’s descriptions: Inner Mongolia’s 2016 Regulations on Ethnic Education [内蒙古自治区民族教育条例] in the former set, and Jilin Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture’s 2004 Regulations on Education for Ethnic Koreans [延边朝鲜族自治州朝鲜族教育条例] in the latter.

[…] The Commission did not mention how the two local regulations—both several years old—came to its attention in the first place. If private citizens had requested review, it would have likely said so, as it does elsewhere in the report. Considering the authorities’ push for Mandarin-language education in Inner Mongolia and China’s northeastern provinces (with a sizeable ethnic Korean population, especially in Yanbian) last fall, it is probably not a coincidence that the ethnic education regulations of Inner Mongolia and Yanbian were reviewed and found unconstitutional.

Finally, we will note that here, as has usually been the case, the Commission has not publicly offered any reasoning as to why it thought the local regulations at issue violated either of the relevant statutes or the Constitution. We also have no idea whether it engaged with any legal authority pointing in the other direction. For instance, China’s semi-constitutional statute on ethnic autonomy, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [民族区域自治法], expressly allows ethnic schools to teach in minority languages while offering classes on the Chinese language—which was exactly what Inner Mongolian and Yanbian schools had been doing. On top of that, the P.R.C. Constitution also guarantees all ethnicities “the freedoms to use and develop their own spoken and written languages” (art. 4, para. 4). It is arguable that the Commission’s interpretation would have a negative impact on these freedoms. [Source]

The Economist’s Chaguan column for January 30 detailed changes in Korean-language education policy and their implications for China’s other ethnic minority languages:

Yanbian is home to fewer than a million members of an officially recognised Korean ethnic minority, most of them descended from migrants who fled wars and famines on the Korean peninsula in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Chinese scholars study the region as a model of co-existence with the country’s Han majority. Education is part of that story. Ethnic Korean schools in Yanbian have offered bilingual education for more than 60 years. Until recently, classes in maths, science and foreign languages were offered in Mandarin, while Korean was used to teach hard-to-grasp concepts in subjects like history, politics and other social sciences.

[…] Now Yanbian finds its education laws under direct assault. On January 20th a powerful body, the Legislative Affairs Commission of the npc Standing Committee, announced that education laws in two unnamed places violate an article of China’s constitution that says the state promotes the nationwide use of Mandarin. As first reported by NPC Observer, an invaluable blog run by Changhao Wei of Yale University Law School, the only education laws that match the announcement are in Inner Mongolia and Yanbian.

The ruling is shocking in several ways. For one thing, it is the bluntest of legal instruments to declare a law unconstitutional. For another, the npc ruling made no mention of another article in the constitution that offers protection for ethnic-minority languages. In reality, those protections are a relic of policies that date back to the founding of Communist China in 1949. Today, the political tide is with prominent scholars and officials who call for “second-generation ethnic policies”, built around assimilating minorities into a single, Chinese civilisation. Such nationalists justify their centralising zeal with claims that China risks ethnic unrest and a Soviet-style break-up if minority privileges are not ended. [Source]

In a December article for The Wall Street Journal, Eva Xiao, Jonathan Cheng, and Liza Lin documented the Chinese government’s recent embrace of assimilationist policies, a significant departure from Mao’s vision of regional ethnic autonomy:

“Under Xi Jinping, the China Dream is the dream of Han-centric cultural nationalism,” said James Leibold, a professor who specializes in China’s ethnic policy at La Trobe University in Australia. Chinese leaders believe “the party needs to be involved in manufacturing this stability and this national belonging.”

[…] Although the Communist Party always retained ultimate control, Mao set up a system of autonomous regions, prefectures and counties that granted minorities important posts in local governments. Many benefited from state investment. Members of minority groups also got exemptions from China’s one-child policy and extra points on the country’s all-important college entrance exam.

[…] The two Hus, who aren’t related, took inspiration from the American idea of a melting pot, which they said helped “maintain the U.S.’s national unity, development vitality, and social order” by minimizing cultural divisions and creating a shared identity. Citing the collapse of the Soviet Union, they cast the “fusion” of ethnicities as a matter of national security.

[…] During a government conference on ethnic affairs following the Kunming attack, Mr. Xi rejected calls to do away with China’s system of minority autonomous regions, which is enshrined in China’s constitution, but doubled down on ethnic fusion. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/02/tibetan-language-advocate-tashi-wangchuk-released-after-five-year-imprisonment/

Friday, 29 January 2021

Weibo Users Denounce Plan to Stop “Feminization” With More Gym Class

Weibo users this week hurled ridicule at a call from the Chinese Ministry of Education’s to prevent the “feminization” of boys by encouraging schools to hire more male gym teachers. The Ministry of Education’s statement was a reflection of officialdoms’ increasing unease with increasing social acceptance of, and even ardor for, diverse gender expression. The official anxiety over a “masculinity crisis” can be seen in state media’s condemnation of a group of handsome male movie stars, known as “little fresh meat” by their millions of fans, who present themselves with little regard for traditionally gendered style guidelines. A 2018 Xinhua article warned that love for little fresh meats, if left unchecked, might lead to the destruction of Chinese society. At Sixth Tone, Du Xinyu and Chen Qi’an reported:

The ministry said it would recruit better gym class instructors and improve their teaching methods by introducing incentives such as free college education. The goal of this would be to cultivate masculinity in young men by balancing physical strength and mental health.

The response came after a delegate of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a top political advisory body, had suggested that Chinese schoolboys are “weak, self-effacing, and timid,” and may be unduly influenced by so-called little fresh meats — handsome, well-groomed, delicate-featured celebrities in the vein of K-pop stars. The proposal also described the feminization of Chinese boys as “a threat to the development and survival of our nation.”

[…] Chinese authorities have long been preoccupied with a looming “masculinity crisis” and have proposed several solutions to this perceived problem, with some grassroots support. Last year, an article published by the state-run Xinhua News Agency ignited debate on whether hiring more male teachers would result in boys becoming more masculine. But with kindergarten, primary, and middle school teachers being disproportionately female, men already have an easier road to such jobs, getting offers even with lower qualifications than female applicants.

[…] Most recently, gym class has been touted as the silver bullet to ensure that boys grow into men. In September, the country’s top sports and education authorities announced that physical fitness would soon carry greater weight on the national high school entrance exam, while also suggesting that gym class should be considered as an addition to the national middle school core curriculum, alongside the usual academic subjects.

[…] Cui Le, a Ph.D. student at the University of Auckland’s Faculty of Education and Social Work, says the idea that male “femininity” should be corrected is rooted in sexism and discrimination. “This approach to education will only encourage stereotypical gender concepts and enable serious bullying based on sexual identity and gender expression,” he told Sixth Tone. [Source]

Netizens found the statement insulting, trivializing, and absurd. CDT Chinese editors have collected a wide range of comments, several of which are translated below:

@Cosmic麻辣火龙果: I puked, is this a feudal society? You’re now in charge of how others dress, even their expression of gender identity? Being an honest person should be enough!

@南瓜大王Joyce: A thousand flowers in bloom is the natural state of our many universes. Human nature is similarly diverse. Promoting honesty, bravery, and sincerity is okay, but so-called masculinity and femininity are stereotypes. Are female soldiers masculine? Are dan [a female role in Peking Operas traditionally played by men] feminine? Is there something wrong with that?

@夕字如今: Truly impressive to publicly discriminate against so many groups at once.

@西去的枪侠 : Masculine as a fart! The masculinity of those self-proclaimed “manly men” means: scorn or abuse women at home, discriminate against them in society, curse them online, and gang up on female classmates and smaller boys in the schoolyard. The faster this “masculinity” ends the better!

@YouzijiangMia: This phrase, “preventing the ‘feminization’ of young men,” takes femininity to be some kind of negative word. [Chinese]

In a 2018 post at the Language Log, Victor Mair examined bilingual Chinese/English used in China to describe those who mix men’s and women’s clothing:

Don Clarke has called to my attention a new bilingual, digraphic expression: “娘man结合”. That’s “niáng man jiéhé (‘woman man [the English word] combination’)”.

It’s a women’s fashion style that combines femininity in one part of the outfit with manliness in the other — like wearing a colored print dress with an army jacket. Supposedly, “man” is read in the first tone.

[…] The reason “niáng man jiéhé 娘man结合” (“woman man combination”) and “niáng pào 娘炮” (“m/sissy bang”) have become intertwined in public discussion is because they both include the problematic term “niáng 娘” (“mother; woman; mum; ma; a woman; young girl / woman; young lady; a form of address for an elderly married woman; effeminate [coll.]”), while the former signifies a boyish / manly fashion adopted by young women whereas the latter suggests a girlish / feminine style embraced by young men. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/weibo-users-denounce-plan-to-stop-feminization-with-more-gym-class/

Photo: Ice Skating in Dandong (2017), by Max-Leonhard von Schaper

Ice Skating in Dandong (2017), by Max-Leonhard von Schaper (CC BY-NC 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/photo-ice-skating-in-dandong-2017-by-max-leonhard-von-schaper/