Friday 29 April 2022

Photo: Sunday Morning, by 古力 朱

Viewed from below, the barred windows of a high-rise apartment building look like a collection of metal cages filled with plants, clothing and other sundries.

Sunday Morning, by 古力 朱 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/04/photo-sunday-morning-by-%e5%8f%a4%e5%8a%9b-%e6%9c%b1/
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China’s Global Influence: New Reports Detail Influence, Dependencies, and Fluctuating Investments

A series of recent reports from think tanks in Europe, Taiwan, and the U.S. have highlighted the extent of China’s influence in other countries. Using a variety of metrics and case studies, the reports map malign influence, rhetoric regarding dependencies, foreign direct investment, loan commitments, and false debt-trap claims. Together, they paint a complex picture of China’s varied relationships with countries across the globe, and attest to the growing interest in understanding China’s role on the world stage.

On Monday, Taiwan-based Doublethink Lab launched the pilot version of its China Index, an initiative to investigate Chinese influence and disinformation campaigns and their impacts abroad. Justin Ong from The Straits Times reported on the initiative and its methodology:

The index is billed as the first to gauge the extent of Chinese influence using comparable data, collected from March to August 2021 and involving 99 indicators across nine domains: media, foreign policy, academia, domestic politics, economy, technology, society, military and law enforcement.

The indicators further fall into three categories: exposure – how vulnerable the country is; pressure – actions taken by China to change the behaviour of people in the country; and effect – the degree to which the country accommodates China, and the impact of these actions.

A committee convened by Doublethink Lab designed the indicators, each of which was then assessed on a four-point scale by at least two anonymous local experts – either academics, journalists, researchers or community leaders – who must provide corresponding evidence. [Source]

In the media domain, the China Index evaluates how PRC entities influence public debate and media coverage in each country. This includes the entities’ engagement with media organizations, promotion of content supporting Chinese state interests, and censorship of narratives, journalists, and critical voices. In the current pilot version, which includes 36 countries, the country subject to the most Chinese influence in the media domain is Taiwan, followed by Canada, Peru, Germany, and Australia. 

The initiative garnered supportive reactions online, and sparked a lively discussion of methodological issues involved in quantifying and presenting China’s influence abroad, particularly when using a comparative lens: 

Also on Monday, the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) released a lengthy report titled “Dependence in Europe’s Relations with China: Weighing Perceptions and Reality.” Bringing together independent analyses from 18 countries in addition to EU agencies, it examines how dependencies on China are reflected in European public and policy-level debates. Here are some of the key findings of the report:

A cross-cutting analysis of the chapters reveals that there is a broad diversity in the content and intensity of public debate and in the policy-level assessment and understanding of dependencies on China across Europe. In some countries, the issue is treated both as a significant concern in the public debate and a significant priority at the policymaking level. For others it is significant at one level but not the other, and in still other countries there is a limited, or even lacking discussion on this topic, both among the general public and in policymaking debates.

[…] A striking observation from our country-level analysis is that beyond the EU institutions, surprisingly few states have made concerted efforts to assess their dependencies with any degree of depth. 

In only a quarter of countries observed has there been a significant level of public debate coupled with concerted policy-level action to both understand and address issues around dependence

[…] Europe today is clearly in the midst of searching for a balance between openness and security—between yielding the benefits of interdependence and reducing the vulnerabilities of dependence. This is not a process that is solely about China, but it is nevertheless one that will fundamentally impact relations with it. [Source]

On Wednesday, MERICS and Rhodium Group released a report summarizing China’s investment footprint in Europe for the year 2021. Despite a minor increase from the previous year, Chinese investment in Europe remains at a low level. As the report states, “2021 was the second lowest year (above only 2020) for China’s investment in Europe since 2013.” The report offered a pessimistic projection for Chinese investment in 2022: “The Chinese government is expected to stick to strict capital controls, financial deleveraging and Covid-19 restrictions. The war in Ukraine and expanding screening regimes and scrutiny of Chinese investment in the EU and the UK will create additional headwinds.” 

On a related subject, this week the Boston University Global Development Policy Center updated its Chinese Loans to Africa (CLA) Database for the year 2021. The CLA Database tracks loan commitments from Chinese policy and commercial banks, government entities, companies, and other financiers to African governments and state-owned enterprises. The center’s researchers recorded only 11 new loan commitments worth $1.9 billion from Chinese lenders to African government borrowers in 2020, which is the lowest amount in over 15 years and down 77 percent from 2019, when Chinese lenders signed 32 loan agreements worth $8.2 billion. Part of the downturn is a result of the pandemic, and researchers predict that the number of loans will increase in the post-pandemic period. A recent policy brief by the center explored trends in Chinese loans to Africa during the pandemic and over the past two decades: 

In 2020, Chinese lenders and African borrowers signed 11 loan agreements for projects in the transport, power, information and communications technology (ICT) and banking sectors across Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda and the African Export–Import Bank, a regional bank. The Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM) financed eight of the 11 projects, while Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Dongfang Electric International Corporation provided the other three.

From 2000-2020, Chinese financiers signed 1,188 loan commitments worth $160 billion with 49 African governments, their state-owned enterprises and five regional multilateral organizations.

[…] A loan reduction in 2020 may not reflect a definite pullback of Chinese lending to the region, as the decline highlights how Chinese loan amounts tend to fluctuate during times of crisis and exposure to structural risk levels.

The decrease is also consistent with pullbacks of Chinese lending in other parts of the world in 2020. [Source]

Last week, the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University released a substantial report titled: “How Africa Borrows From China: And Why Mombasa Port is Not Collateral for Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway.” The report provides a detailed analysis of Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway project and thoroughly debunks claims that debt from the project would lead to the seizure of the port of Mombasa by the Export-Import Bank of China. Cobus van Staden at the China-Africa Project summarized highlights of the report: 

NO SEIZURE OF PORT: “This paper examined Kenya’s SGR project, focusing on the widespread conspiracy theory that the Kenyan government had used Mombasa Port as collateral for the China Eximbank loan. Although Kenya’s government has not released the actual loan documents, we believe that enough evidence exists to say, categorically, that Mombasa Port was not used as collateral and, further, that there is no question of the port ever being “seized” by China Eximbank should Kenya default on the SGR loans.”

SECRECY COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM: “Transparency has been a significant failure in this case, with blame on both the Chinese lender and the Kenyan borrower side. As one Kenyan remarked: “No one outside of an elite circle within the State House has even the faintest idea as to why they’re so afraid to tell us the truth about this loan that we, the people, are obligated to pay!” This failure fueled the conspiracy theory.”

CHINESE LOANS DON’T FOLLOW AID RULES: “Why did China Eximbank, a policy bank, require waivers of sovereign immunity and the use of escrow accounts and TOPAs [Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Acts], features that are unusual in foreign aid and more commonly seen in straight commercial project finance? Part of the answer is that none of the loans in this deal were “official development assistance” (ODA), according to criteria developed by the OECD. The Chinese loans were commercial loans. The features they employ only seem unusual to those who have become used to seeing project finance as coming from donors like the World Bank, which is a preferred creditor with multiple ways to protect its loans from the risks inherent in frontier and emerging market countries.” [Source]

 



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/04/chinas-global-influence-new-reports-detail-influence-dependencies-and-fluctuating-investments/
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POLITICO China Watcher – U.S. turns the screws on Solomon Islands to counter China



source https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2022/04/28/u-s-turns-the-screws-on-solomon-islands-to-counter-china-00028449#new_tab
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NYT – Under Lockdown in China (interactive)



source https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/29/world/asia/shanghai-lockdown.html#new_tab
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Photo: Theme Park Shantou China, by Chris

A giant green apple with other theme park attractions in the background

Theme Park Shantou China, by Chris (CC BY-NC 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/04/photo-theme-park-shantou-china-by-chris/
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Chinese Social Media Giants Launch New Campaign Against “Historical Nihilism”

Several of China’s major social media companies have launched a campaign to clean up “historical nihilism” on their platforms. The push comes on the heels of an April 20 essay published in Study Times by the head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, the national internet watchdog, on strengthening the Party’s control of the internet. CAC Party Secretary Zhuang Rongwen declared the Party must “dare to brandish the sword” in the struggle to suppress heterodox history. Days later, Douban, Douyin, Toutiao, and Weibo announced efforts to encourage users to report others for posts tainted with historical nihilism, a catch-all term for accounts of the history of the People’s Republic of China and the Communist movement that engage with the less-than-glorious aspects of either. The CAC’s previous moves to combat the phenomenon include the curious publication last August of what might be termed a Terrible Ten list of historically nihilist rumors, which CDT posted in translation together with some at times bewildered expert commentary.

The relatively liberal site Douban, which has been gradually muzzled by the CAC, issued a shorter statement warning of harmful historical nihilism and noting that it had established a number of avenues for users to report such posts when they see them. Douban’s announcement coincided with newly instituted barriers to foreigners’ registration on the platform. The moves may be a response to increased government scrutiny. In March, the Beijing office of the Cyberspace Administration of China sent a steering group to Douban’s headquarters to more closely monitor the company’s censorship efforts. 

Other sites posted similar warnings. Weibo issued a notice urging users to post “positive, value-oriented content” and report historical nihilism. The platform subsequently announced that it had shuttered 76 accounts and deleted 3,368 posts after an “inspection tour” discovered users were exploiting trending topics and discussions of historical personages to post historically nihilist content. Bytedance subsidiaries Douyin, the domestic counterpart to TikTok, and Toutiao, a news aggregator, issued identically-worded statements that said users were using Party, national, and military history to spread rumors about “sensitive issues.” The statements also railed against attacks on Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, though they made no mention of similar assaults on Xi Jinping’s eponymous “Thought”.  

Since at least December of last year, the Party has been running an internal education campaign about historical nihilism. Cadres have been required to attend screenings of a “revealingly odd” documentary, “Historical Nihilism and the Soviet Collapse”. At The New York Times early this month, Chris Buckley reported on how Chinese Party members are indoctrinated with a fear of Western ideological infiltration: 

“The most powerful weapon possessed by the West is, aside from nuclear weapons, the methods they use in ideological struggle,” says the documentary’s stern-voiced narrator, citing a Russian scholar. The documentary was marked for internal viewing — that is, for audiences chosen by party officials and not for general public release — but the video and script have recently surfaced online in China.
[…] The documentary attributes the decline of the Soviet Union to political liberalization, especially what Beijing calls “historical nihilism,” or emphasizing the Communist Party’s mistakes and misdeeds. It accuses historians critical of the Soviet revolution of fabricating estimated death tolls by many millions for Stalin’s purges.
“They’ve taken only one lesson from all of this, and that is you do not allow any freedom of expression,” said Sergey Radchenko, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies who studies Chinese and Soviet history, “because this kind of freedom inevitably leads to loss of political control and that creates chaos.” [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/04/chinese-social-media-giants-launch-new-campaign-against-historical-nihilism/
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Thursday 28 April 2022

Photo: Zhangjiajie, 张家界国家森林公园, china, by Catherine Poh Huay Tan

Viewed from below, these towering quartz-sandstone pillars of Zhangjiajie National Forest Park in Hunan Province, China, rise into a cloudy sky like strange monoliths.

Zhangjiajie, 张家界国家森林公园, china, by Catherine Poh Huay Tan (CC BY 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/04/photo-zhangjiajie-%e5%bc%a0%e5%ae%b6%e7%95%8c%e5%9b%bd%e5%ae%b6%e6%a3%ae%e6%9e%97%e5%85%ac%e5%9b%ad-china-by-catherine-poh-huay-tan/
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Wednesday 27 April 2022

NYT – China’s Covid Lockdown Outrage Tests Limits of Triumphant Propaganda



source https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/world/asia/china-covid-propaganda.html#new_tab
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In Shanghai, The Jokes Are No Longer Funny

An essay tracing the evolution of Shanghai lockdown memes from giddy jests about Shanghai culture to gallows humor and gloomy meditations on the state of society was censored last week after going viral on Weibo. The essay, published on WeChat by ​​two authors 猫猫虎 and 山顶洞人 (aka catiger11), was part of a broader creative outpouring of politically tinged works that have taken China by storm in recent weeks. In one example, a national student poetry competition went viral on Weibo after a number of students submitted entries on generally taboo subjects such as Xiaohuamei, the war in Ukraine, and the death of Li Wenliang. “I’m surprised they came out in such a tightening environment where many poems depicting the dark sides of society, or defying the authorities’ general ideology, have been censored,” Chris Song, a professor at the University of Toronto Scarborough, told The Washington Post. Another striking incident occurred late in the evening on Friday, April 22. “Voices of April,” a six-minute compilation of audio clips of Shanghai citizens in distress, went massively viral on WeChat, despite unequivocal censorship directives ordering the video erased, “leaving no gaps in coverage.” The essay is also a contribution to the growing body of pandemic humor that ridicules “Epidemic Prevention Hobbyists,” and, quite often, lockdowns. The essayists, unintentionally paraphrasing John Donne, warned against the impulse to wisecrack about lockdowns. “Before too long,” they wrote, “You will find the clown is thee.”  CDT has translated a selection of the 66 memes and jokes included in the essay “From Hilarity to Reflection: An Evolutionary History of Shanghai Lockdown Jokes,” as well as some reader reactions to the essay and to its subsequent censorship: 

Stage One: Hehehehe

imgA WeChat screenshot of the lockdown announcement with the comment: “They only gave Pudong residents four hours to stock up on food. They gave Puxi residents four days. I guess all the leaders live in Puxi.”


imgOnly Old Tan’s Pickled Cabbage & Beef Instant Noodles remain on the shelves of a cleaned out grocery store: “Shanghai residents’ last stand.”


imgShanghai residents show up for mandatory testing in style.

img“Jessica: Is it safe to eat sprouted potatoes?”
 “Answer: In Shanghai it is. “


 imgAn alarm clock set for the rumored best delivery times for four different delivery service companies: 5:56 Dingdong Maicai, 6:58 Freshippo, 21:00 Missfresh, 23:58 Meituan.

 

Stage Two: This Again?

img“I feel like we’re thinking about this all wrong.

Test result: Negative, test again.
 Negative, test again.
 Negative, test again.
 Negative, test again.
 Positive, OK, I can finally breathe.”

imgA framed collection of negative tests. 

img“My friend found true love in central quarantine. He’s dating someone in the field hospital.
 “He says there are lots of new couples.
 “He says when he’s working, he usually has no time for romance, so this is a pretty good opportunity, and he’s grateful to the nation.”
(row of laughing/crying emoji) “Guaranteed room, board, and a wife!”

imgFamous businessman Liu Run asks: “Does anyone in our compound want to learn about ‘Competitive Strategy’? I charge four eggs an hour.”

img

A “Big White” (a white-suited pandemic worker) has written a phrase in Shanghai dialect (“Messing around every day”) on the back of their PPE.

 

Stage Three: We Can’t Take It Anymore

img
Quarantine Hierarchy of Needs
The creme de la creme: Coca-Cola
The elite: cake & KFC
 The middle class: chocolate, snail noodles, ice cream, Mandarin oranges, eggs, and beef jerky
 The average joes: meat, eggs, milk, and bread
 The poor: vegetables and rice 

img
Mother: “You lie every day, what will you do when you grow up, huh?”
 Child: “I’ll be a politician.”

Text at bottom: “My brain tells me it’s true. My eyes tell me it’s true. It’s true.”

imgIf you’re sick, you’re sick. If you’re not sick, you’re not sick. There is no such thing as an “asymptomatic case.”

So if anyone brings up “asymptomatic cases,” tell them they’ve lost their mind. If they deny it, say they’ve got a case of “asymptomatic insanity”!

 

Stage Four: Reflection & Change

imgPersonally speaking, I’m an endorser of  Shanghai’s “zero-COVID” policy. I think everything about the policy is very good, but for one small hiccup: I’m currently in Shanghai. 

img

A reinterpretation of a line from Mao’s famous speech “The Foolish Old Man Who Moved Mountains,” where he perhaps best defined his belief in volunteerism and the ability of the masses to achieve any goal through sheer will—which later proved disastrous during The Great Leap Forward.
“I am resolute / and unafraid to sacrifice you. / You will surmount every difficulty / so that I may claim victory.” 

imgSuzhou’s PCR testing system broke down.
 The government cursed the data center.
 The data center cursed the developers.
 The developers cursed the program managers.
 The program manager cursed his programmers.
 The programmers cursed their laid-off predecessors.
 While the laid-off predecessors stood in line for their PCR test,
 They cursed the testing system.
 A perfect loop.

“Emblematic of ‘with Chinese characteristics’”

img

Speaking of bad things, this paragraph is getting passed around Shanghai media circles:

Curiously enough, the disasters of the so-called pandemic prevention policy prove that Shanghai was once an energetic, free, and wealthy city. Take a glance at the world. Every lockdown of a major cosmopolitan city failed, without exception. All successful lockdowns occurred in impoverished backwaters, again without exception. An open, diverse, wealthy society cannot flourish under military-style management. Which is to say that all of the “chaos” we see before us is powerful proof that Shanghai is not an ignorant, isolated, poor backwater. 

 

Netizen comments reached for historical analogies ranging from the Cultural Revolution to ancient dynastic history to describe the situation:

Acrm319：When I used to hear about the Cultural Revolution, I thought it was absurd—that is, until I lived to see 2022.

南街33号：This is how the history will be written: “A group of people with malevolent intentions tried to abduct the entire population of Shanghai and dragged the entire country down with them, all so that they could look good to their overlords.”

我使愿无违：In the past, the historical record was dependent on writers like Sima Qian, who is said to have concealed his writings in one of China’s famed mountains so that his collected wisdom could be passed down to future generations who might appreciate it. But given the present situation, we need a new way of phrasing this. Maybe instead of “concealing them in the famed mountain,” we could say “conceal them abroad, that their wisdom might be passed down to those who would appreciate it.” Not half bad.

鲁十五而志于学：😭😭😭 It’s been deleted. I wanted to read it again. [Chinese]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/04/in-shanghai-the-jokes-are-no-longer-funny/
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Tuesday 26 April 2022

Hong Kong Human Rights Press Awards Canceled; Journalists Association Considers Disbanding

The Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents’ Club (HKFCC) has canceled its annual Human Rights Press Awards over fear of violating the National Security Law. HKFCC president Keith Richburg shared the news with members on Monday, two days after the board made the decision. Scheduled to be announced on World Press Freedom Day (May 3), the Human Rights Press Awards are among the oldest and most prestigious journalism awards in Asia, and this marks the first time in their 26 year history that they will not be held. Christy Leung and Danny Mok from the South China Morning Post reported on Richburg’s explanation for canceling the awards: 

In a statement sent to members on Monday, club president Keith Richburg said the FCC board had reached the “tough decision” to cancel the accolades pending further review after a “lengthy discussion” on Saturday.

“Over the last two years, journalists in Hong Kong have been operating under new ‘red lines’ on what is and is not permissible, but there remain significant areas of uncertainty and we do not wish unintentionally to violate the law,” Richburg said. “This is the context in which we decided to suspend the awards … We explored a variety of other options, but could not find a feasible way forward.”

[…] “But we still have a strong Press Freedom Committee, with myself and the club vice-president as co-conveners, and we’ll continue to speak out on press freedom issues as appropriate,” he said.

[…] “The FCC intends to continue promoting press freedom in Hong Kong, while recognising that recent developments might also require changes to our approach,” he said. [Source]

The cancellation drew criticism from several HKFCC members. At least eight members of the organization’s Press Freedom Committee resigned in protest. One of them was independent journalist Timothy McLaughlin, who stated, “By censoring statements and ending the awards the club is not only failing to uphold this mission but risks being used as a prop to keep up the myth that things in Hong Kong are carrying on as normal.” Theodora Yu from The Washington Post described other critical reactions:

Mary Hui, a reporter at Quartz and former Post intern, was one of eight members who resigned from the press freedom committee at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club on Monday. Hui called the club’s decision “regrettable and disappointing.”

“By canceling the awards, I think we send a rather worrying message that defending press freedom as the stated mission of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club is no longer tenable,” Hui said.

[…] Veteran documentary filmmaker Connie Lo, one of the adjudicators for four categories of the awards, said the club’s choice to suspend the awards is “an insult to the journalism industry.”

“Many times reporters had to risk their lives to pursue their journalistic works,” Lo said. “This year’s awards holds a special meaning to journalists from news outlets that have already disappeared.” [Source]

HKFCC members informed the Hong Kong Free Press that the decision to cancel the awards stemmed in part from the fact that nine recognitions—four awards and five mentions—were to be given to the now-defunct local outlet Stand News. In late December, police raided Stand News’ headquarters and arrested numerous employees for allegedly publishing seditious material, forcing the organization to shut down. Two weeks ago, police also arrested Stand News columnist Allan Au on sedition charges. 

Facing similar pressure, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) held an extraordinary general meeting on Saturday to discuss whether or not to disband. Members have been increasingly worried about their safety in the face of government investigations and scrutiny by Security Secretary Chris Tang, particularly after Au’s arrest and the targeting of Apple Daily, Stand News, and Citizen News. Recently, the pro-CCP newspaper Ta Kung Pao published an opinion article titled “Dissolution is the only solution for the HKJA,” and pro-Beijing lawmaker Edward Leung called the HKJA “a suspected anti-China organization that disrupts Hong Kong.” The Hong Kong Standard described HKJA chairman Ronson Chan Ron-sing’s deliberations over disbanding: 

Speaking on a radio program this morning, Chan said the online meeting has discussed whether the association’s constitution should be amended to allow the 54-year-old group to disband amid mounting political pressure, with the decision currently requiring the consent of at least five-sixths of the members, according to its constitution.

He confirmed that the topic of disbandment came up during the [Saturday general] meeting, but said such a rushed decision should not be made by a minority of its members.

[…] Chan said those in favor of disbanding the group took into account the danger and risks the group executives faced, while those against the decision noted the group’s historic value to both the industry and Hong Kong.

Meanwhile, Chan stressed it was “valuable” for the association to stand up and speak out for the industry when journalists were being criticized for simply doing their job.

“Some people think there is not much our association can do, but it is valuable for us to give a fair comment on things, especially when our fellows were being criticized for fulfilling their duties,” he said. [Source]

On Sunday, Hong Kong’s sole chief executive candidate John Lee stated, “Freedom of the press always exists in Hong Kong. I think there’s no need to use the word ‘defend’ because it exists.” A new report by Hong Kong Watch—”In the Firing Line: The Crackdown on Media Freedom in Hong Kong”—paints a very different picture. Based on interviews with Hong Kong journalists, the report documents how press freedom in the city is “being dismantled.” Helen Davidson from The Guardian described the scope of the report and the distortion of information in the absence of a free press:

The working environment for local and foreign journalists in Hong Kong has become increasingly difficult, the report said, detailing the widespread use of “lawfare” against journalists – including with the national security law – acts of intimidation and police violence, mass sackings, and government intervention or censorship of outlets. It noted the redefinition by police of who constituted a journalist, the pending introduction of a fake news law, and the criminalising of traditional research methods.

[…] The report also detailed multiple acts of police violence against journalists during the [2019 pro-democracy] protests, including some which appeared targeted.

[…] “In the absence of pro-democracy media, it is worth pausing here to consider the implications of the erosion of press freedom and how it creates further space for the pro-Beijing media,” the report said, accusing the outlets of “providing propaganda for the Chinese Communist party regime and the Hong Kong government, and threatening their critics, both in print and through various forms of harassment.” [Source]

Earlier this month, a survey by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI) revealed that only 28 percent of respondents were satisfied with Hong Kong’s press freedom, the lowest rate since records began in 1997. In a further sign of declining press freedom, HKPORI deputy-director Chung Kim-wah revealed that he fled Hong Kong Sunday night due to “threats from powerful bodies” and fears over crossing “moving red lines.” Chung was taken in for questioning by police in January of last year when police raided his office for its involvement in an unofficial primary. On Tuesday, a Hong Kong political cartoonist who goes by the pen name Ah To announced on Instagram that he is leaving the city over the lack of freedom of expression. Kelly Ho from the Hong Kong Free Press reported on Ah To’s regretful departure:

The comic artist, who has drawn satirical cartoons about local politics for 11 years, made the announcement on social media on Tuesday. He shared a drawing of one of his iconic characters standing in front of what appeared to be the London cityscape and said he left because he “wanted to continue creating for Hong Kong.”

[…] The artist has more than 142,000 followers on Facebook and 123,000 followers on Instagram. He is known for being critical of Beijing and the Hong Kong government and has produced work on various controversial issues, including the national security law, the electoral overhaul and the 2019 unrest.

[…] In Tuesday’s post, Ah To said he had made the decision to leave Hong Kong in a hurry and would not have time to bid farewell to his friends. He said he felt “guilty” about his departure, adding he would “speak up for the voiceless” and hoped Hong Kong’s history would not be left with “silence” in the future. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/04/hong-kong-human-rights-press-awards-canceled-journalists-association-considers-disbanding/
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