Wednesday 31 March 2021

Translation: After H&M Incident, Netizens Reflect on the Meaning of Patriotism

Multinational clothing retailer H&M last week found itself the target of a state-sponsored storm of nationalistic scorn and a widespread boycott by Chinese consumers over a (recently deleted) October 2020 statement expressing “deep concern” about persistent allegations of forced labor in Xinjiang.

The Swedish retailer was the first and primary focus of the online rage, but other major companies who had previously made statements about ceasing use of Xinjiang cotton—including Nike, Adidas, Burberry, and Uniqlo—were also targeted by online ire. Subsequently, several Chinese celebrities and companies announced plans to terminate contracts with the brands. In reaction to the global tide of companies pledging to do their part in mitigating ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang—atrocities that the Chinese government continues to deny despite a growing body of evidence—many Chinese brands and influential figures joined nationalistic netizens in an online “support Xinjiang cotton” movement.

Meanwhile, authorities and state media played their part in fanning the flames of outrage. CDT Chinese editors found tight control of search results and social media commentary surrounding H&M and Xinjiang.

At the South China Morning Post, Celia Chen and Iris Deng reported on the role played by Chinese e-commerce firms’ in the boycott:

On Friday morning, an order placed for food to be delivered to an H&M store was denied by on-demand service giant Meituan. Hailing a car with an H&M store as the destination was not possible on ride-hailing app Didi Chuxing, which did not recognise the store address as being valid. Users were also not able to find H&M stores as destinations on China’s major online maps including Baidu, Tencent and AutoNavi maps.

[…] Further, H&M products were blocked for purchase on China’s leading e-commerce platforms including Taobao, owned by Alibaba Group Holding (owner of the Post), JD.com, and Pinduoduo.

[…On] Thursday, internet giant Tencent removed two Burberry-designed “skins”, outfits worn by video game characters, from its popular title Honour of Kings, just days after it unveiled a deal with the brand to promote its outfits in online games.

Tencent’s decision, according to two sources with knowledge of the matter, was related to Burberry’s position on Xinjiang-produced cotton as a member of the Better Cotton Initiative. London-based Burberry said last year that it did not use any raw materials from Xinjiang, where Beijing denies claims of genocide and forced labour in the region. [Source]

Up to 20% of the world’s cotton supply comes from Xinjiang. In January, the U.S. issued a complete import ban on cotton and tomatoes from the region. H&M is a member of the nonprofit governance group the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), and is one of many western brands to be targeted in the storm for membership in the organization. Prior to H&M’s now-deleted October statement, the BCI last year suspended activities in Xinjiang over “persistent allegations of forced labour and human rights abuses.”

At The New York Times, Raymond Zhong and Paul Mozur recalled last week’s state-fostered show of anger against the brands, noting it as an example of Beijing’s increasing ability to “whip up storms of patriotic anger to punish companies” that challenge Beijing’s politics with the help of Chinese social media influencers:

“The hate-fest part is not sophisticated; it’s the same logic they’ve followed going back decades,” said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, and the founder of China Digital Times, a website that tracks Chinese internet controls. But “their ability to control it is getting better,” he said.

[…] Squirrel Video, a Weibo account dedicated to silly videos, shared the Communist Youth League’s original post on H&M with its 10 million followers. A gadget blogger in Chengdu with 1.4 million followers shared a clip showing a worker removing an H&M sign from a mall. A user in Beijing who posts about television stars highlighted entertainers who had ended their contracts with Adidas and other targeted brands.

[…]Many web users who speak up during such campaigns are motivated by genuine patriotism, even if China’s government does pay some people to post party-line comments. Others, such as the traffic-hungry blog accounts derided in China as “marketing accounts,” are probably more pragmatic. They just want the clicks.

In these moments of mass fervor, it can be hard to say where official propaganda ends and opportunistic profit seeking begins. [Source]

Also at The New York Times, in a “user’s guide” to the Chinese movement to cancel Western fashion brands, Vanessa Friedman and Elizabeth Paton highlight the importance of the issue:

The issue has growing political and economic implications. On the one hand, as the pandemic continues to roil global retail, consumers have become more attuned to who makes their clothes and how they are treated, putting pressure on brands to put their values where their products are. One the other, China has become an evermore important sales hub to the fashion industry, given its scale and the fact that there is less disruption there than in other key markets, like Europe. Then, too, international politicians are getting in on the act, imposing bans and sanctions. Fashion has become a diplomatic football.

This is a perfect case study of what happens when market imperatives come up against global morality. […] [Source]

For a detailed roundup of the “support Xinjiang cotton” movement—who’s associated hashtag as of March 28 had garnered more than six billion views on Weibo—and Beijing’s activities over the last year that led to it, read “Support Xinjiang MianHua!” – China’s Social Media Storm over Xinjiang Cotton Ban at What’s on Weibo. In the article, Manya Koetse noted that amid the chaos, another hashtag emerged reminding angry netizens of the impact this has on many ordinary Chinese:

In light of the heated discussions and calls for boycotts, there was also another hashtag that popped up on Weibo, namely that of “don’t make it hard for the workers” (不要为难打工人). The hashtag came up after some Chinese staff members at Nike and Adidas stores were scolded on a live stream, with netizens calling on people to stay rational and not let the boycott turn into personal attacks on people. But another popular video showed a man in Chongqing calling customers out in an H&M store for buying their “trash.” [Source]

CDT earlier translated examples of Chinese web users who criticized the “support Xinjiang cotton” movement, including some from commenters who urged their angry compatriots to support Chinese workers and also the Xinjiang people.

CDT Chinese editors have since archived further examples of online commentary deviating from the “anti-anti-forced labor” sentiment of the widely covered and state-sanctioned uproar of nationalism. In one WeChat essay that appears to still be live on the platform, @有病要讀書plus recalled the 2012 case of Li Jianli, who was left paralyzed and traumatized after being violently attacked during anti-Japanese protests in Xi’an for driving a Japanese car. CDT has translated a short excerpt from the article, in which the author points out a major contradiction in the conduct of  these self-described patriots:

I’m saying that some people these days are truly amazing. They are perpetually bursting with rage or exploding in tears as if they have some sort of mental illness.

Their naiveté and cynicism is extremely vicious. They are keen to make arrests among fellow ordinary citizens. They are very good at tagging others with unfair labels and collecting backup material. […]

Each and every one of them is like an accountant, looking to the whole wide world to settle accounts. They are not looking for the correct stance, but rather looking to fight with a team on their side. They want only to hear patriotic slogans being shouted, so that’s all they will allow.

I just wonder, how can these people have such a great sense of and urging for “justice” while maintaining indifference to the many injustices and abnormalities that surround them?

How does that work?

[…] Supporting something is of course the easiest and least costly thing one can do. But, what about supporting the tens of thousands of workers in the industrial supply chain that are facing unemployment?

Could it be that some people here are living a type of life that you can’t stand to believe?

Your boycotts only invite boycotts, your condemnation leads only to condemnation, and your resentment breeds only resentment.

[…] It is impossible for those with no love for their compatriots to truly be patriotic. If they care not for these specific individuals, then they don’t deserve to use the term “comrade.” […] [Chinese]

Also on WeChat, @南方找北 similarly analyzed the meaning of patriotism. After reminding the “protesters” who live broadcast themselves destroying Nike sneakers not to forget that “there are still 600 million people in China who make less than 1,000 yuan a month and can’t afford a pair of Nikes,” the author explains their understanding of patriotism with a long list of examples, including: “In my understanding, patriotism exists not only in people’s words, but in concrete actions that show love for those around them,” and “my understanding of patriotism is [shown in the words of] the whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang: ‘There should be more than one voice in a healthy society’.”

Another WeChat essay archived by CDT Chinese (but, apparently still online in China) is titled “Behind the H&M Incident Lies the Livelihoods of Countless Workers.” The post offers a detailed look at China’s position in the global textile and garment supply chain, and at the mainstream nature of ethical standards and multi-stakeholder governance organizations like the Better Cotton Initiative in modern international trade. The author concludes: “If our firms wish to continue engaging with Western markets, then rather than simply bullying they must comply with the guiding principles of supply chain risk management and maintain dialogue with the international community in transparency and trust.”

One Weibo user, @YvonnAlmond, spoke out against rampant online nationalism, writing: “A country where you can’t protest in the streets has raised a den of internet vigilantes… They’re always making trouble, making noise.” She was later detained by the Beijing Public Security Bureau.

The Wall Street Journal this week reported that Chinese propaganda authorities “quietly celebrated in Beijing two days after a Chinese social-media post helped ignite a frenzy of outrage against Western clothing brands […] in what they saw as a victory in a new effort to inoculate China against criticisms from the West.” At Bloomberg, opinion columnist Clara Ferreira Marques questions the accuracy of the reportedly victorious propagandists, noting that a surefire result of the high profile nationalism Beijing has fanned over the last week: sustained focus on the situation in Xinjiang both in China and abroad:

For now, there’s only one clear outcome from this mess, and that’s noise. Boycotts will keep bringing attention to accusations of brutal abuse against Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in parts of China where too little light is shed.

That’s not necessarily what Beijing, for all its wolf-warrior aggression, was aiming for. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/03/translation-after-hm-incident-netizens-reflect-on-the-meaning-of-patriotism/

BBC Reporter Moves to Taiwan After Harassment in China

After a months-long campaign to discredit the BBC for its reporting on Xinjiang, the BBC reports that China correspondent Jon Sudworth has relocated to Taiwan along with his wife, RTÉ News China correspondent Yvonne Murray:

He and his family were followed to the airport and into the check-in area by plainclothes police officers. His wife, Yvonne Murray, reports on China for the Irish public broadcaster RTÉ.

Sudworth says he and his team faced surveillance, threats of legal action, obstruction and intimidation wherever they tried to film.

[…] “Only in recent days when we were faced with the task of renewing Sudworth’s press card did we learn that Sudworth left without saying goodbye. After he left the country, he didn’t by any means inform the relevant departments nor provide any reason why,” Hua Chunying told a news conference in Beijing. [Source]

Last year, 18 journalists were expelled from China and two, Cheng Lei and Haze Fan, were arrested and charged with national security crimes. Australian journalists Bill Birtles and Michael Smith were evacuated from China in connection with Cheng Lei’s case. Sudworth had reported extensively on family separations, forced labor allegations, and international corporations’ operations in Xinjiang.

The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China issued a lengthy statement on Sudworth’s departure:

In an interview with Irish television broadcaster RTÉ, Yvonne Murray shared the circumstances behind her family’s hasty departure from China:

Speaking on RTÉ’s News At One, Ms Murray said: “We left in a hurry as the pressure and threats from the Chinese government, which have been going on for some time, became too much.

“The authorities took issue with my husband’s reporting. He works for the BBC and has reported extensively on the incarceration of Uighurs in Xinjiang, as well as the origins of the virus in China.”

[…] “Two of our children were born in China, they all speak fluent Chinese, so for them it is home and it’s particularly distressing for them facing the reality that they might never be able to go back, as long as the Chinese state is so determined to target and punish journalists for simply doing their job.

[…] “The secret police who followed us as we left – while a sad departing memory – can’t erase all the other happy memories.” [Source]

The couples departure did not end the Chinese government’s attacks. The Chinese Embassy in Ireland posted a series of agitated tweets accusing Murray and Sudworth of defamation:

The Global Times also published an anonymously sourced diatribe against Sudworth’s reporting:

BBC’s Beijing correspondent John Sudworth, who became infamous in China for his many biased stories distorting China’s Xinjiang policies and COVID-19 responses, has left the Chinese mainland and is now believed to be hiding in Taiwan island after Xinjiang individuals said they plan to sue BBC for fake news, sources told the Global Times.

[…] As a reporter from an established Western media outlet, Sudworth unscrupulously spreads rumors and slanders against China and thought there is no way for the Chinese to get him as a foreign journalist, but he forgot that China is a country under the rule of law and there is a cost for spreading rumors, observers said.

[…] However, no matter where he flees to and in what capacity he reports on China, as long as he continues to adhere to ideological bias and continues to churn out false news to attack and smear China, he will not be able to escape righteous condemnation, they said. [Source]

The British and Chinese government have clashed multiple times over press freedom in the early months of 2021. In February, Ofcom, the U.K. media regulator, suspended Chinese state broadcaster CGTN’s license because the Chinese station had aired forced confessions. Beijing responded by taking BBC off the air. In response, British Ambassador Caroline Wilson wrote a WeChat essay criticizing China’s lack of press freedoms. According to Bloomberg News, the Chinese government replied, “Wilson’s article showed ‘patronizing arrogance.’ It said her actions were ‘inconsistent with the status of diplomats’ and cited Chinese public anger over its publication.”

Chinese reporters often face even greater dangers for their work. Zhang Zhan, a citizen journalist who reported from Wuhan during the early days of the pandemic, was sentenced to four years in prison in December 2020. This makes the reported release of Chen Qiushi, a lawyer-turned-journalist who also reported from Wuhan, a rare bright spot for press freedom in China. According to his friend, MMA fighter Xu Xiaodong, Chen is living with his parents in Qingdao, yet still under house arrest. At The South China Morning Post, Mimi Lau:

In a video posted to YouTube on Monday, Xu Xiaodong said: “Qiushi is now in Qingdao with his parents … I cannot reveal how I know it but I have seen a video [about him recently]. His health has improved under his parents’ care – much better than the time when he was taken away.”

[…] In his latest video, Xu said Chen could now access the internet and watch the news, but had yet to regain his freedom and was not allowed to communicate with the outside world. “He can stroll near his [parents’] home, go jogging and buy some basic daily necessities within a designated area,” Xu said.

[…] Based on his own analysis, Xu said he was hopeful Chen would be released from surveillance in the autumn. According to Xu, the authorities had given no indication they intended to press charges against him or strip him of his lawyer’s licence.

“After being taken away from Wuhan, he was brought to Tianjin for investigation. I regretted how authorities in Tianjin handled [Chen] but I’m grateful for the physical care extended by Qingdao authorities to him,” Xu said. “So far, there is not a single official document about charges to be laid against him,” he added. [Source]

The campaign against Sudworth had notable parallels to that against Tzu-i Chuang, a famous Taiwanese food writer and the wife of the former U.S. consul general in Chengdu. When China ordered the consulate closed in the summer of 2020, Chuang posted a farewell that included an unfortunate analogy to Jews fleeing the Nazis. She has since apologized. Chinese internet trolls seized on the post and, primed by state media outlets, mercilessly hounded her for months. By Liza Lin at The Wall Street Journal:

[…] Communist Party-run news outlets like the Global Times and Hubei Daily, alongside the party-run Communist Youth League, amplified the controversy with at least six posts and news articles about Ms. Chuang’s post in the week after the consulate was asked to shut, said Doublethink, which gets the bulk of its funding from nongovernment organizations that promote democratic institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Foundations. Nationalistic social-media influencers with millions of followers then piled on.

[…] After the trolls tracked down her residence in Maryland, Ms. Chuang said she stopped leaving her house, afraid of being recognized. At one point, she said, she contemplated suicide.

[…] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a reply to the Journal that it didn’t know of Ms. Chuang’s situation, and that the State Department’s comments were groundless. China has a free internet, its users can freely express their opinions, and Chinese media is unbiased, truthful and accurate, the ministry said. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/03/bbc-reporter-moves-to-taiwan-after-harassment-in-china/

Tuesday 30 March 2021

Hong Kong Electoral Downgrade Slashes Elected Share of Legislature, Puts Candidate Vetting Above Law

On the eve of Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, Jiang Zemin famously held up a piece of calligraphy that declared: “Hong Kong’s tomorrow will be better.” Article 68 of the city’s Basic Law states in that its ultimate aim is the election of all members of the legislature by universal suffrage. Despite setbacks, for years that ethos of continued progress guided Hong Kong’s electoral system forward in small but tangible ways, as the Legislative Council (Legco) became incrementally more democratic with successive reforms.

23 years later, that ethos guides the system no longer. On Tuesday, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) unanimously voted for sweeping changes to Hong Kong’s election mechanism, in effect downgrading it from an election system to a selection system with extra steps.

Among many other changes, the proportion of seats in Legco directly elected by Hong Kong residents has been slashed from 50% to 22%. New seats have been handed to the 1,500 person Election Committee and additional corporate interests. Mainland companies in Hong Kong, including state owned enterprises, now have a dedicated seat in the legislature. Democratically elected district councillors have been booted from the Election Committee, which chooses the Chief Executive, replaced by government-selected neighborhood groups. The national security police, along with the Chief Executive and Beijing’s representative to the city, will vet all election candidates—including for the Chief Executive position itself—in secret deliberations that are explicitly immune from judicial oversight.

For South China Morning Post, Jeffie Lam, Lilian Cheng, Natalie Wong, and Gary Cheung reported on key changes to the Legislative Council:

Key points:

– Election Committee will enjoy biggest share of Legislative Council seats with 40, while 30 seats go to the trade-based functional constituencies, leaving the directly elected geographical constituencies with just 20, down from 35

– First-ever chief convenor will assume top role on Election Committee, must hold state leadership position to qualify

[…] – Legco hopefuls must now secure nominations from each of the five sectors of the Election Committee, making it extremely difficult for opposition candidates to run

[…] – The vetting committee will pick candidates based on information provided by police’s national security unit, and no judicial review or appeal of the decision will be allowed [Source]

Under the new arrangements, anybody hoping to run for Chief Executive or for Legco must obtain a minimum number of nominations from each of the five sectors of the 1,500 person Election Committee, a closed committee comprised of overwhelmingly pro-Beijing interests. A newly added fifth sector is comprised of “patriotic groups” and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), meaning that candidate hopefuls would need to receive the blessing of at least two delegates closely tied to Beijing.

After candidates secure the requisite nominations from Election Committee members, they then face a triple vetting procedure. Candidates for Chief Executive, the Election Committee, and the Legislative Council must go through three vetting processes, all of which are exempt from judicial oversight or appeal, operating in effect above the law. Candidates would be reviewed first by the national security police, second by the city’s national security leadership committee, and third by a newly created vetting committee.

For Hong Kong Free Press, Selina Cheng explained the three vetting steps that would determine whether a candidate is permitted to run:

After potential candidates gain the minimum amount of nominations required, the national security unit of the Hong Kong police will conduct an initial screening of individuals hoping to run in the city’s top-level elections for the office of chief executive, the chief executive election committee and the legislature, according to the new version of the Basic Law’s annexes 1 and 2 handed down by Beijing on Tuesday.

[…] Findings from the police review will be handed to the city’s national security committee. The committee will determine whether the potential candidates support the Basic Law and are loyal to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

[…] The national security committee is headed by the city’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam and has China Liaison Office Director Luo Huining as its advisor. Other than the top three secretaries of the government and the director the Chief Executive’s Office, the remaining five members of the committee are the heads of the city’s security forces, including the secretary for security, the police commissioner, head of national security police, immigration and customs.

[…] It will submit a recommendation document to the election vetting committee, before the latter finally approves their candidacy in accordance with the recommendation. The candidates are then allowed to run in Hong Kong’s elections. [Source]

Aside from making it harder for opposition candidates to run for office, the changes also reduce the number of seats that could conceivably be filled by opposition figures. Hong Kong’s legislature has never been fully democratic, but from 1997 to 2012, successive electoral reforms gradually increased the proportion of its 70 seats directly elected by Hong Kong voters to half. Now, that proportion will fall to less than a quarter. Remaining seats will be filled by functional constituencies–professional special interest groups from various industry sub-sectors such as finance, medical, legal etc.–and the tightly controlled Election Committee.

Even functional constituencies that have historically leant pro-democracy have had their influence diluted. Medical and health services sub-sector seats, most recently represented by pan-democrats or independents, are being merged into one. Pro-democracy professional and civil society groups such as the Bar Association and Professional Teachers’ Union are now limited to just one single corporate vote each. The IT sub-sector seat, which has historically been reliably pro-democracy, has been replaced with a “technology and innovation” sub-sector, which will be voted in by exclusively corporate votes. Justifying the decision to disenfranchise IT workers, Carrie Lam said that the industry lacked a registration system for practitioners and corporate voting would return the “best talents.”

It is perhaps ironic that the IT sector’s influence is to be watered down, as the new electoral process is an infinite loop. As AFP’s Xinqi Su pointed out using an annotated flow chart of the new electoral system, the end result of the changes is that the Chief Executive is now tasked with vetting candidates for the position of Chief Executive, including their own competitors or successors. Local media outlet Stand News reported that Hong Kong University Professor Joseph Chan described the arrangement as an “absurdity.” Carrie Lam defended the arrangement, saying that she could not single-handedly decide eligibility, and that “the public can judge whether the decision has been made rightly or wrongly,” despite the decision being immune to formal challenge.

For district councillors, Hong Kong’s lowest-level elected representatives, many of whom gained office in a sweeping victory for the pro-democracy camp in 2019, the electoral changes strip them of their already minimal political influence by booting them from the Election Committee. Hong Kong Free Press’ Kelly Ho explained the significance of the changes:

Tam also said district councillors will be ousted from the Election Committee, which increase its membership by 300, from the current 1,200. He said the move will “depoliticise” the government advisory body, preventing it from becoming a platform for “anti-China forces” to disrupt the city and paralyse the government.

Currently, 17 out of 18 district councils in Hong Kong are controlled by the pro-democracy camp, following their landslide victory in 2019. They are seen as the last opposition force left in the government, after pan-democratic lawmakers resigned en masse last November in protest to the disqualification of four of their colleagues. [Source]

Instead, unelected Area Committees, District “Fight Crime Committees,” and District “Fire Safety Committees” dominated by pro-Beijing individuals would serve on the Election Committee.

Taken together, the changes comprehensively lock out the pro-democracy camp from ever gaining an influential foothold in government. Earlier this month, Hong Kong political scientist Ma Ngok described the electoral changes as akin to “a fence, a gate, a lock, a security guard, & an infrared line.” Moreover, the restructuring puts the city’s new national security police front and center in the electoral process, directly integrating its surveillance and intelligence powers into the political process, while elevating it above judicial oversight.

In her press conference on Tuesday, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that the 2020 Legislative Council election, delayed to September of this year, would again be delayed until December, in order for the formation of the Election Committee to be completed first. Lam postponed the election last year citing “virus concerns,” and the postponement was approved by the NPCSC despite it contravening the Basic Law.

But within the pro-democracy camp, it is not even clear who would be available and willing to make an election run. Almost every single pro-democracy Legco hopeful is currently behind bars, pending trial on charges of subversion, for which they could face life sentences. Lo Kin-hei, chairman of the once powerful Democratic Party and one of the few remaining pan-democrats not in prison, refused to commit to running on Tuesday.

What is clear is that, nine months after the implementation of the National Security Law, democratic progress in Hong Kong is over. On Twitter, Sebastian Veg translated an op-ed by Hong Kong political scientist Ray Yep, who described the current moment as Hong Kong’s “second handover.”



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/03/hong-kong-electoral-downgrade-slashes-elected-share-of-legislature-puts-candidate-vetting-above-law/

World Health Organization’s Coronavirus Investigation Report Meets Widespread Condemnation

On Tuesday, March 30, the World Health Organization published its coronavirus origins investigation report, which promptly met criticism from a surprising source: the organization’s own leader, Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. In January 2021, a team of WHO researchers arrived in Wuhan, after a long delay, to investigate the beginning of the pandemic. The investigation did not reach an immediate conclusion, and some team members alleged that political interference had hindered their work. The final report found that coronavirus most likely spilled into humans from animal sources, and ruled out the possibility that the virus escaped from a laboratory in a “lab leak.” Tedros sharply criticized the latter conclusion and China’s opacity with critical early pandemic data, much of which was off-limits to WHO investigators. At The Washington Post, Emily Rauhala summarized the mission’s findings, which some team members complained were based on incomplete access to data:

The report, officially launched Tuesday, concludes that the virus probably jumped from animals to humans and downplayed the idea it could have leaked from a Wuhan lab.

It presented data gathered by Chinese scientists and analyzed by the international team, recommending further study of the possible path of transmission between species and through frozen food — a fringe theory favored by Beijing. It did not recommend additional research on the lab-leak hypothesis.

[…] Tedros said Tuesday that members of the joint mission team raised concerns to him about access to raw epidemiological data needed for the report, according to a WHO transcript of his remarks. [Source]

In explaining the team’s reasoning, Peter Ben Embarek, the leader of the WHO’s origins investigation team, said that “Lab accidents do happen . . . so of course it’s possible […] But we have not been able to hear or see or look at anything that would warrant a different conclusion.” The lab leak theory received a renewed flurry of attention this past week after the former Trump administration’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention chief Robert Redfield opined that coronavirus might have escaped from a lab during a CNN interview. Tedros’ criticism is not an endorsement of that narrative, instead targeting the shallow nature of the team’s investigation. At The New York Times, Javier C. Hernández wrote that the WHO team simply accepted the Wuhan Insititue of Virology’s assurance that the virus did not escape from its lab:

“I do not believe that this assessment was extensive enough,” [Tedros] said on Tuesday at a briefing for member states on the report, according to prepared remarks released to the news media. “Further data and studies will be needed to reach more robust conclusions.”

The experts had said that officials at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses a state-of-the-art laboratory known for its research on bat coronaviruses, assured them that they were not handling any viruses that appeared to be closely related to the coronavirus that caused the recent pandemic, according to meeting notes included in the report. They also said that staff members had been trained in security protocols.

The report noted that a separate laboratory run by the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention had moved in late 2019 to a new location near the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, where many early cases of Covid-19 emerged. The expert team said that there appeared to be no connection, writing that the lab had not reported any “disruptions or incidents caused by the move” and had not been doing research on coronaviruses. [Source]

At The New York Times, Javier C. Hernández, again, and James Gorman dove further into the scientific community’s views on the WHO team’s investigation into the lab leak hypothesis:

Jesse Bloom, an evolutionary biologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle, said he was not convinced that a laboratory leak was extremely unlikely, after seeing a copy of the report. He said he agreed that it was highly plausible that the virus could have evolved naturally to spread to humans, but he did not see any reasoning in the report to dismiss the possibility of a lab escape.

One member of the team of experts, Peter Daszak, a British disease ecologist who runs EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based pandemic prevention group, pushed back against the criticism of the team’s work and of China’s level of cooperation. He said the lab leak hypothesis was “political from the start.” Dr. Daszak added that the W.H.O. team was not restricted in its interviews with scientists who were on the ground at the start of the pandemic.

He himself has been accused of having a conflict of interest because of his past research on coronaviruses with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which, he said, was what a disease ecologist should be doing. [Source]

At the prominent science publication Nature, Amy Maxmen documented the report’s findings on Wuhan’s Huanan Market, where the virus may have first jumped from animal to humans:

Much of it is devoted to COVID-19 cases occurring in December 2019 and January 2020. Two-thirds of the 170-odd people who had symptoms in December reported having been exposed to live or dead animals shortly beforehand, and 10% had travelled outside Wuhan.

Chinese researchers sequenced the genomes of SARS-CoV-2 from some of the people in this group, finding that eight of the earliest sequences were identical, and that infected people were linked to the Huanan market. This suggests an outbreak there, according to the report.

[…] The researchers also looked at death certificates in China, and found a steep increase in the number of weekly deaths in the week beginning 15 January 2020. They found that the death rate peaked first in Wuhan, and then, two weeks later, in the wider province of Hubei, suggesting that the outbreak began in Wuhan. The report also publishes data on people seeking care for respiratory infections, which similarly suggests that COVID-19 didn’t begin taking off until January. [Source]

An international coalition led by the United States mirrored Tedros’ criticism. A statement issued by the governments of Australia, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America read: “we voice our shared concerns that the international expert study on the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was significantly delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and samples.” At The Wall Street Journal, Drew Hinshaw and Jeremy Page reported on international criticism of the WHO’s investigation:

The WHO report lacks crucial data, information and access, said White House press secretary Jen Psaki. “It represents a partial and incomplete picture,” she said Tuesday. “We don’t believe that in our review to date that it meets the moment, it meets the impact that this pandemic has had on the global community, and that’s why we also have called for additional forward-looking steps.”

[…] The EU delegation’s statement said it regretted the late start of the Wuhan mission and the limited availability of early samples and related data, although it described the report released Tuesday as an important first step.

Further progress “will require further and timely access to all relevant locations and to all relevant human, animal and environmental data available, including data from the first identified Covid-19 cases and cases picked up by surveillance systems, as well as further serologic testing of blood samples,” it said.

Neither the EU statement or the one involving the U.S. mentioned the possibility of a laboratory origin. [Source]

The report ruled out the possibility that the virus had been brought to Wuhan by the United States military during the October 2019 Military Games hosted in the city. During a press conference, an AFP reporter asked about the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs previous attempts to push a conspiracy that the virus originated in Fort Detrick, an American military base. Hua Chunying, a ministry spokesperson, claimed that “there is still a big question mark over the the lab at Fort Detrick.” At Global Times, Chen Qingqing, Zhao Yusha, and Cao Siqi’s wrote that some Chinese scientists still believe the virus was imported into Wuhan on frozen food provided to the soldiers during the Games:

The WHO report also touched upon the hypothesis of the 7th Military World Games regarding virus origins, a possibility previously raised by a Chinese epidemiologist. The WHO report said that “no appreciable signals of clusters of fever or severe respiratory disease requiring hospitalization were identified during a review of these events,” but recommended a further joint review of the data on respiratory illness from on-site clinics during the games.

[…] The Chinese expert, who asked for anonymity, said that they obtained records from the Wuhan government, which show many countries had transported food to Wuhan during the event, many via cold chain route. “But now we only have records, no samples, so it will be difficult for us to find the evidence,” he admitted.

The scientist also said it is highly probable that the virus was transmitted via cold chain, given the fact that cold chains triggered most of the later outbreaks in China after the one in Wuhan. “But at the early stage, all eyes were fixed on animals, so not enough samples were connected in the cold chain environment,” said the expert, suggesting further research in this area. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/03/world-health-organizations-coronavirus-investigation-report-meets-widespread-condemnation/

Photo: Xiangyang Tangcheng Film and Television Base, film scenery, by tom_stromer

Xiangyang Tangcheng Film and Television Base, film scenery, by tom_stromer (CC BY-NC 2.0)



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/03/photo-xiangyang-tangcheng-film-and-television-base-film-scenery-by-tom_stromer/

Monday 29 March 2021

Beijing Announces More Sanctions as Academics Rally Behind Targeted Colleagues

The E.U., U.K., U.S., and Canada on March 22 announced targeted sanctions against a handful of Chinese officials linked to human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and a week of angry retaliation against politicians, diplomats, and academics followed. This past weekend, the Chinese government issued additional sanctions against individuals and entities in Canada and the U.S. The Globe and Mail’s Nathan Vanderklippe reported on the sanctions against individuals and entities in the Canada and the U.S., which included a prominent opposition politician and a parliamentary subcommittee:

The Chinese government has issued sanctions against foreign affairs critic Michael Chong and on a Canadian parliamentary sub-committee that has accused China of committing “genocide” against Muslim groups in its Xinjiang region.

Canada’s Subcommittee on International Human Rights, however, unanimously found that China’s policies in Xinjiang amounted to genocide, in a non-binding decision last October. “Nearly two million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims are being detained, including men, women, and children as young as 13 years old,” the sub-committee said in a statement. “Witnesses noted that this is the largest mass detention of a minority community since the Holocaust.”

The Chinese government said it would also sanction Gayle Manchin, chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, as well as the commission’s vice chair, Tony Perkins.

Mr. Chong, a Conservative MP from Ontario, said in an interview that Beijing had issued sanctions rather than investigating evidence of abuses.

[…] “We have a responsibility to speak up for human rights abroad, for those people who are being subjected to gross human rights violations,” he added. “And if that means that China sanctions me, I wear it as a badge of honour.” [Source]

On social media, Chinese diplomats dialed up rhetorical attacks against the Canadian government as well. Apparently eager to join in the pile-on, a Chinese diplomat in Brazil called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau a “running dog,” bringing back to a favorite insult from the Mao era. The Guardian’s Leyland Cecco reported on the insult, which was met by swift backlash in Canada:

But on Sunday, Trudeau was singled out for insult by China’s consul general to Rio de Janeiro, Li Yang in a tweet blaming him for the diplomatic crisis.

“Boy, your greatest achievement is to have ruined the friendly relations between China and Canada, and have turned Canada into a running dog of the U.S,” he tweeted.

[…] Because Chinese diplomacy is typically tightly controlled, Li’s message marks a rare and “disturbing” break from public statements by government officials, said David Mulroney, Canada’s former ambassador to China.

“[Li’s tweet] is a tremendous failure in Chinese digital diplomacy and soft power,” Mulroney said. “It’s as if someone has decided that it’s it’s okay to let people off the leash – or they’re unable to keep them on the leash. The first troubling, the second is worrying.” [Source]

With the tit-for-tat exchange of sanctions at an apparent pause, some observers were left wondering if Beijing had overreacted. In the end, the U.S., E.U., U.K., and Canada cumulatively targeted four Chinese officials and one entity, the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau. The E.U., U.K., and Canada notably opted not to sanction Chen Quanguo, the Xinjiang Party chief hit with U.S. sanctions last year. Meanwhile, Beijing hit back against no fewer than 22 people and nine entities across the regions, including an academic, a centrist research institution, and a U.K. barristers’ chambers that included several sitting arbitrators in Hong Kong and a future non-permanent judge on Hong Kong’s highest court.

The Financial Times’ Primrose Riordan and Jane Croft reported that Essex Court Chambers removed a reference to a legal opinion written by four of its lawyers that found a “credible case” that the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghur people amounted to genocide. One of its members who sat as an arbitrator in Hong Kong also reportedly left the chambers shortly after the sanctions were announced:

Essex Court Chambers removed a reference to the legal opinion from its website after it was included in sanctions on Friday that targeted UK politicians, lawyers and academics in retaliation for criticism of China’s mass internment campaign in Xinjiang.

[…] A statement from the chambers said: “No other member of Essex Court Chambers was involved in or responsible for the advice and analysis contained in the legal opinion or its publication.” It did not respond to a request for comment on why the reference was removed.

[…] It is unclear if the sanctions apply to individual barristers but they cast uncertainty over the ability of Lord Lawrence Collins, who joined Essex Court Chambers as an arbitrator in 2012, to serve as a non-permanent judge for Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal. [Source]

The presence of foreign judges on Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal has been a contentious issue since the passing of the Hong Kong National Security Law. The Hong Kong government hails their presence on the Hong Kong bench as evidence of the city’s continued commitment to the rule of law.

But the sanctioning of a foreign barristers chambers may have also catalyzed a rude awakening for the U.K. legal community engaged in commercial legal business and other legal work with China and Hong Kong. The U.K. government is currently formally reviewing whether to pull its judges from the court, and a decision is expected soon. On Monday, senior barrister and former chair of the England and Wales Bar Council Guy Mansfield QC,  published a letter describing the Chinese sanctions against Essex Court Chambers as a “call to arms”:

The sanctions and these actions against these lawyers for doing their job must be seen as an outright attack on all who offer services whether as lawyers or arbitrators to businesses and individuals in China. For what it means is that if a lawyer advises someone in terms which are unappealing to the Chinese government and the recipient of that advice makes it public or the Chinese government otherwise takes a dislike to what is being done by the client that lawyer is at risk of similar future sanctions.

The ramifications affect all British companies who do business with Chinese clients. Typically, such contracts include provision for disputes to be resolved by arbitration, often within Hong Kong. Henceforth, the members of the sanctioned chambers are to be refused admission to the territory of Hong Kong and the whole of China. So, unless the Chinese clients agree to an arbitration outside China, for instance in Singapore, the British firm’s freedom of choice of advocates is now subject to Chinese Government vetting.

[…] Today it is the members of Essex Court Chambers who are sanctioned. But tomorrow it might be Clifford Chance, Freshfields or some other major city law firm or Chambers of barristers which wittingly or otherwise offends the Chinese state. The Financial Times is right to say that ‘the situation underlines the increasingly difficult position for UK lawyers that are exposed to potentially lucrative arbitration work in China via Hong Kong’s legal system.’

[…] The commercial world must rapidly revise the basis on which it is prepared to contract with Chinese firms to insist on dispute mechanisms outside China if future contracts are to be made. [Source]

Within the academic community, researchers also rallied in support of Dr. Joanne Smith Finley, a reader in Chinese Studies at Newcastle University who was one of the people individually targeted with Chinese sanctions. The Times published an open letter, titled “Freedom threat,” signed by more than 400 academics in solidarity with Dr. Finley:

Sir, Beijing’s sanctioning of Dr Joanne Smith Finley is a threat to universities’ core principle of academic freedom. This unprecedented step matters profoundly for three reasons.

First, the Chinese Communist Party has long used covert attempts to silence critics outside its territory, but these overt new measures against academics are a serious escalation. Second, it reflects a misunderstanding of British universities. They are not organs of the state but autonomous institutions devoted to the pursuit of truth — however inconvenient to those in power. Finally, by in effect insisting that self-censorship is a prerequisite for academic partnership with Chinese universities, UK scholarly co-operation with China is rendered very difficult, if not impossible. We, as fellow academics, stand in full solidarity with Dr Smith Finley and assert our commitment to academic freedom. We call on the government and all UK universities to do likewise.

[…] [Source]

Cumulatively, the backlash in the political, legal, and academic spheres paint a picture of an emerging “whole of society” pushback against China’s aggressive foreign policy. But as The Washington Post’s former China correspondent and future Brussels bureau chief Emily Rauhala commented on Twitter, is it unclear whether this increasingly unified rebuke is being recognized in Beijing.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/03/beijing-announces-more-sanctions-as-academics-rally-behind-targeted-colleagues/