Weibo Users Denounce Plan to Stop “Feminization” With More Gym Class

Weibo users this week hurled ridicule at a call from the Chinese Ministry of Education’s to prevent the “feminization” of boys by encouraging schools to hire more male gym teachers. The Ministry of Education’s statement was a reflection of officialdoms’ increasing unease with increasing social acceptance of, and even ardor for, diverse gender expression. The official anxiety over a “masculinity crisis” can be seen in state media’s condemnation of a group of handsome male movie stars, known as “little fresh meat” by their millions of fans, who present themselves with little regard for traditionally gendered style guidelines. A 2018 Xinhua article warned that love for little fresh meats, if left unchecked, might lead to the destruction of Chinese society. At Sixth Tone, Du Xinyu and Chen Qi’an reported:

The ministry said it would recruit better gym class instructors and improve their teaching methods by introducing incentives such as free college education. The goal of this would be to cultivate masculinity in young men by balancing physical strength and mental health.

The response came after a delegate of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a top political advisory body, had suggested that Chinese schoolboys are “weak, self-effacing, and timid,” and may be unduly influenced by so-called little fresh meats — handsome, well-groomed, delicate-featured celebrities in the vein of K-pop stars. The proposal also described the feminization of Chinese boys as “a threat to the development and survival of our nation.”

[…] Chinese authorities have long been preoccupied with a looming “masculinity crisis” and have proposed several solutions to this perceived problem, with some grassroots support. Last year, an article published by the state-run Xinhua News Agency ignited debate on whether hiring more male teachers would result in boys becoming more masculine. But with kindergarten, primary, and middle school teachers being disproportionately female, men already have an easier road to such jobs, getting offers even with lower qualifications than female applicants.

[…] Most recently, gym class has been touted as the silver bullet to ensure that boys grow into men. In September, the country’s top sports and education authorities announced that physical fitness would soon carry greater weight on the national high school entrance exam, while also suggesting that gym class should be considered as an addition to the national middle school core curriculum, alongside the usual academic subjects.

[…] Cui Le, a Ph.D. student at the University of Auckland’s Faculty of Education and Social Work, says the idea that male “femininity” should be corrected is rooted in sexism and discrimination. “This approach to education will only encourage stereotypical gender concepts and enable serious bullying based on sexual identity and gender expression,” he told Sixth Tone. [Source]

Chinese education authorities endorsing the idea that gym classes could fix the supposed feminization of young men prompted immediate public backlash.

“Lots of gay guys love the gym and have big muscles. You don’t see gyms changing their sexuality.”https://t.co/XZfhHuNwWx

— Sixth Tone (@SixthTone) January 29, 2021

China’s Ministry of Education issued a guideline to “enhance masculinity of male students” after a lawmaker suggested to “prevent teenagers’ feminization”

Best take is on Weibo: Why does ministry of education keeps trying to enhance masc? Ppl there can’t find enough tops? pic.twitter.com/1Hu6BMcSak

— Tony Lin (@tony_zy) January 29, 2021

Netizens found the statement insulting, trivializing, and absurd. CDT Chinese editors have collected a wide range of comments, several of which are translated below:

@Cosmic麻辣火龙果: I puked, is this a feudal society? You’re now in charge of how others dress, even their expression of gender identity? Being an honest person should be enough!

@南瓜大王Joyce: A thousand flowers in bloom is the natural state of our many universes. Human nature is similarly diverse. Promoting honesty, bravery, and sincerity is okay, but so-called masculinity and femininity are stereotypes. Are female soldiers masculine? Are dan [a female role in Peking Operas traditionally played by men] feminine? Is there something wrong with that?

@夕字如今: Truly impressive to publicly discriminate against so many groups at once.

@西去的枪侠 : Masculine as a fart! The masculinity of those self-proclaimed “manly men” means: scorn or abuse women at home, discriminate against them in society, curse them online, and gang up on female classmates and smaller boys in the schoolyard. The faster this “masculinity” ends the better!

@YouzijiangMia: This phrase, “preventing the ‘feminization’ of young men,” takes femininity to be some kind of negative word. [Chinese]

In a 2018 post at the Language Log, Victor Mair examined bilingual Chinese/English used in China to describe those who mix men’s and women’s clothing:

Don Clarke has called to my attention a new bilingual, digraphic expression: “娘man结合”. That’s “niáng man jiéhé (‘woman man [the English word] combination’)”.

It’s a women’s fashion style that combines femininity in one part of the outfit with manliness in the other — like wearing a colored print dress with an army jacket. Supposedly, “man” is read in the first tone.

[…] The reason “niáng man jiéhé 娘man结合” (“woman man combination”) and “niáng pào 娘炮” (“m/sissy bang”) have become intertwined in public discussion is because they both include the problematic term “niáng 娘” (“mother; woman; mum; ma; a woman; young girl / woman; young lady; a form of address for an elderly married woman; effeminate [coll.]”), while the former signifies a boyish / manly fashion adopted by young women whereas the latter suggests a girlish / feminine style embraced by young men. [Source]

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/weibo-users-denounce-plan-to-stop-feminization-with-more-gym-class/

Photo: Ice Skating in Dandong (2017), by Max-Leonhard von Schaper

Ice Skating in Dandong (2017), by Max-Leonhard von Schaper (CC BY-NC 2.0)

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/photo-ice-skating-in-dandong-2017-by-max-leonhard-von-schaper/

Photo: 普陀山 法雨寺 202012, by Thomas_Yung

普陀山 法雨寺 202012, by Thomas_Yung (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/photo-%e6%99%ae%e9%99%80%e5%b1%b1-%e6%b3%95%e9%9b%a8%e5%af%ba-202012-by-thomas_yung/

New Report by Ex-Google Head and Experts Call for “Technological Bifurcation” with China

A new report authored by China scholars and influential voices from the U.S. tech industry, including former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, has raised eyebrows after calling for “bifurcation” between the U.S. and China tech sectors. The report, leaked by Axios, wrote that there is “no returning to the pre-Trump ‘status quo,'” and argued in favor of “some degree of technological bifurcation” between the two countries.

Its release comes at a moment when observers in the U.S. and China are keenly watching the Biden administration for clues as to the extent to which it plans to reverse or continue hawkish policies introduced under former president Donald Trump, which included a slew of sanctions, bans, and export restrictions on Chinese tech companies. Observers suggest that the report’s authorship, including experts with close ties to the Democratic Party and figures in the new administration, indicate that U.S.-China technology competition is likely here to stay.

Axios’ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian reported on key arguments put forward by the report:

The nature of the challenge, according to the report:

​The competition is “asymmetric,” meaning “China plays by a different set of rules that allow it to benefit from corporate espionage, illiberal surveillance, and a blurry line between its public and private sector.”

We’re heading towards somewhat tech spheres. “Some degree of disentangling is both inevitable and preferable,” the authors write. “In fact, trends in both countries — and many of the tools at our disposal — inherently and necessarily push toward some degree of bifurcation.” That’s because the alternative to bifurcation is a world in which China’s non-democratic norms have “won.”

There will be trade-offs, such as between “creating risk-tolerant research environments that encourage innovation versus security/espionage risks.” [Source]

South China Morning Post’s Tracy Qu reported that the new report provided further evidence of a new consensus in Washington on China policy:

While it is not known whether the new Biden administration will accept the report’s recommendations, which include forming a diplomatic alliance of “techno-democracies” and creating new offices like a deputy national security adviser for technology within the White House, its publication reflects broad-based recognition in US policy circles that Washington must develop a systematic approach to dealing with competition from China.

“As we seek to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive levels of separation, we should also recognise that some degree of disentangling is inevitable and preferable,” the report says. “In fact, trends in both countries – and many of the tools at our disposal – inherently and necessarily push toward some kind of bifurcation.” [Source]

But the report was clear in criticizing the Trump administration’s approach to tech competition, writing that “the Trump administration’s policies have done little to arrest America’s eroding technological advantage.” A key point of disagreement was with the previous administration’s policies on immigration, with the report’s authors calling for a significant expansion of schemes to welcome highly skilled immigrants. Notably, the authors argued that “most scientists & engineers strongly prefer to live here over China,” pointing to the high rate of retention of Chinese-born STEM PhDs in the U.S. But officials in the Trump administration may have eroded those preferences, amid an initiative by the FBI to scrutinize academics of Chinese descent’s affiliations with Chinese government institutions. Most recently, the arrest of MIT professor Gang Chen in the final days of the previous administration spurred outrage in the academic community, with MIT speaking out vocally in his defense and pledging to cover his legal fees.

The report’s authors also laid out a menu of options short of a ban that could constrain the reach of Chinese apps in Western markets, while leaving the door open for total bans as a measure of last resort. Recommended measures include some policies that were adopted by the Trump administration, such as restrictions on U.S. high tech exports targeting individual Chinese companies. Other recommendations include requiring that Chinese companies adhere to certain technical requirements such as end-to-end encryption, open sourcing and code audits, and data localization.

While the authors include many influential voices in the tech and policymaking sectors, they contributed to the report in personal capacities. It is unclear how much sway the report will have on policies ultimately adopted by the Biden administration. For now, the White House has paused the implementation of many of the last minute actions against the Chinese tech sector announced by the Trump administration pending a review, a regular practice for incoming administrations. But analysts believe that it is ultimately unlikely to shift from the previous administration’s China tech strategy entirely. Protocol’s Emily Birnbaum reported on comments from new White House officials and D.C. insiders which suggest that at least some of the previous administration’s initiatives to compete with Chinese tech companies would likely be retained in some form:

But experts expect President Biden’s China strategy to look like a more polished and multilateral version of Trump’s as his team pushes forward a slew of policies aimed at curtailing the power and influence of Chinese tech companies in the U.S.

“Biden is most likely, on the technology front, going to keep things the way the Trump administration has made them,” said Abishur Prakash, a geopolitics expert at the Center for Innovating the Future. “Whether it’s regarding Alipay, whether it’s regarding TikTok, whether it’s regarding Chinese STEM students — across the board holistically, there’s not a lot of space for change.”

[…] The Biden approach to Chinese technology issues will be different than Trump’s in at least one key area: Biden officials have said they plan to work with other Western democracies to create a united front against China’s influence. “Whether the techno democracies or the techno autocracies are the ones that get to define how technology is used — the technology that dominates all of our lives — I think is going to go a long way to shaping the next decades,” Anthony Blinken, who was confirmed Tuesday as secretary of state, said last week. [Source]

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/new-report-by-ex-google-head-and-experts-call-for-technological-bifurcation-with-china/

From Shijiazhuang to Hong Kong, Residents Under Lockdown Decry Inequalities

In China’s northern provinces, health authorities are contending with the most severe domestic spread of coronavirus since the initial outbreak more than one year ago. To the south, Hong Kong has been struggling to contain a weeks-long wave of double-digit cases, and has introduced “ambush style” localized lockdown measures for the first time. As Wuhan marks the one year anniversary of its bruising city-wide lockdown, measures used to control the outbreak there have formed the playbook for how the rest of the country handles new ones. But the Chinese government has worked hard to censor and minimize stories about negative effects of its most draconian measures, and one year on, familiar accounts of confusion, discrimination, and mental hardship continue to emerge.

Cities across Hebei, Heilongjiang, and Jilin have imposed lockdown measures on their residents. In Tonghua, Jilin province, a plea for help from residents running out of food prompted a rare public debate online about the country’s lockdown measures. Sixth Tone’s Du Xinyu and Chen Qi’an reported that city authorities issued a public apology after a Weibo hashtag about residents’ struggles to find enough to eat generated over 300 million views:

“Dongchang District (where the city of Tonghua is located) has been severely hit with supply shortages. Residents there can’t go out at all, and their front doors are taped (so authorities can tell if anyone is violating the stay-at-home order),” Chen said. “Many of us Tonghua locals were posting on Weibo, trying to make our situation become a trending topic to get the public’s attention.”

[…] Starting this week, Tonghua residents will be supplied with half-price “vegetable packages” to sustain them for five days, local authorities said in an official announcement. Over 7,000 cadres and volunteers will be assembled to distribute the foodstuffs to residents, and citywide nucleic acid testing will begin Monday.

However, not everyone in Dongchang District — which local authorities designated a “high-risk” area last week — has seen these vows bear fruit. A Dongchang local surnamed Chen, who is not related to Chen Shutong, told Sixth Tone that while the vegetable packages were being delivered as promised to large residential complexes, some smaller communities, including the one where his family lives, are still waiting. [Source]

In Hong Kong, authorities issued an abrupt weekend lockdown order for one of the city’s poorest districts, where many residents live in tiny subdivided apartments, provoking confusion about how residents would obtain food and prevent community spread in their own living spaces. Authorities emphasized the lockdown should not be named as such, while Chief Executive Carrie Lam referred to the measures an “ambush style operation” on Tuesday, and said more would be conducted in the future. The New York Times’ Vivian Wang and Tiffany May reported on the lockdown measures, which highlighted the extreme economic inequality in the city:

Officials suggested that the dilapidated living conditions of many residents in Jordan had fueled the virus’s spread. A densely packed neighborhood known for a lively night market, aging high-rise apartments and plentiful eateries, Jordan is home to some of the city’s highest concentrations of tenements, the subdivided flats that are created when apartments are parceled out into two or more smaller ones.

More than 200,000 of the city’s poorest residents live in such units, where the average living space per person is 48 square feet — less than one-third the size of a New York City parking space. Some spaces are so tiny and restrictive that they are called cages or coffins.

The same conditions that may have led to the outbreak also made the lockdown particularly painful for many residents, who worried about missing even a day of work or feared being trapped in poorly ventilated hotbeds of transmission. Officials admitted that they did not know exactly how many people lived in the subdivided apartments, complicating efforts to test everyone. Discrimination against low-income South Asian residents, many of whom are concentrated in the area, also caused problems. [Source]

Disclaimer: Getting labelled as “black journalist”, “rioters”, or being doxxed is within my expectations. But as a journalist who has witnessed the 48-hr lockdown in Jordan, and a long-time (20+ years) YMT resident, I feel like I have the right to write this: 1/ https://t.co/SSBcChRHOI

— K (@K_krazy_xoxo) January 25, 2021

If your home is only a 50 sq ft subdivided flat, with only a bed and a toilet, would you cook on your toilet or your bed? Would you have cooking utensils or a stove lying around? Or would you go to a restaurant literally downstairs?
8/

— K (@K_krazy_xoxo) January 25, 2021

A number of district councillors have already expressed intent to help with the logistics right after the rumors became known in the district. But the government did not respond at all.
11/

— K (@K_krazy_xoxo) January 25, 2021

In Hebei and Hong Kong, citizens have challenged decisions about which populations are ordered into lockdown. In Hong Kong, where the most recent wave of cases was initiated by wealthy residents flouting community gathering restrictions, critics have questioned why authorities only imposed a lockdown in one of the city’s poorest neighborhoods. The number of cases detected within the lockdown zone accounted for just a fraction of the total number of new infections over the weekend. A second “ambush” on Tuesday night that led to the overnight lockdown of a block of buildings netted just one positive test result.

For South Asian Hong Kong residents, many of whose homes are concentrated in the weekend lockdown area, the measures are likely to worsen already pervasive discrimination. In recent weeks, government health officials and local media have been singling out ethnic minorities for failing to observe social distancing rules. The city’s anti-discrimination watchdog spoke out against customers requesting in food delivery apps that their orders not be delivered by South Asian drivers during the pandemic, but found the behavior was legal, and refused to take action. For The Diplomat, Jessie Lau wrote about how systemic racism in Hong Kong has been exacerbated by the pandemic:

In Hong Kong, dark-skinned ethnic minorities have a long history of being framed as scapegoats for the city’s social problems. During last year’s anti-government protests, minorities were tokenized as symbols of diversity that set the city apart from those in mainland China – but also demonized as criminals after rumors circulated regarding ethnic minorities being hired to attack pro-democracy protesters.

Various anti-refugee campaigns – such as those in 2016 – have unfairly painted dark-skinned asylum seekers as criminals and illegal migrants taking advantage of local resources. Foreign domestic workers have also been accused of practicing “poor hygiene” and disrupting public order by politicians and members of the public for simply utilizing public spaces on their days off.

“For too long, we have just been easy targets. It’s exhausting and traumatic to keep having to defend ourselves, justify each time there is an isolated incident involving an ethnic minority,” said Jeffrey Andrews, a prominent social worker of Indian descent, in a Facebook post condemning the recent racist incidents and calling for more unity amongst minority communities. [Source]

In Hebei, where 11 million people are in lockdown, abrupt announcements also left residents unprepared and facing basic survival challenges such as finding enough food. Hebei residents fear having to contend with suspicion and discrimination, which some compared to the ill treatment received by Hubei residents travelling to neighboring provinces last year after the completion of their two month lockdown.

CDT translated an account by one resident, who expressed her frustration with discrimination against Hebei residents and the harsh burden placed on them in the name of “protecting the capital”:

There’s also another reason for the soaring anxiety in the region: the principle of “protecting the capital.” Because Beijing is essentially surrounded on all sides by Hebei, [the town of] Langfang, near the border of Beijing, was placed under complete administrative lockdown on January 12, even though there was only one mid-level risk area in the city (a neighborhood in Gu’an County). The goal was clear: to create a firewall around Beijing, ensuring the capital was insulated from the pandemic.

[…] Under the surface of this pandemic is the fear of “contamination.” Once “Hebei’ers” were determined to be a source of contamination, they all became suspect. Many would argue this is necessary to stop the spread of the virus, and there’s always going to be some people who need to make sacrifices. Drastic times require these kinds of drastic, one-size-fits-all measures to keep things from getting even worse.

But there’s an unavoidable problem with this: namely, the way these groups are defined is mostly arbitrary. If you do take such drastic measures, why is it that “Heibei’ers” are the problem? The infections were in Shijiazhuang, so why aren’t “Shijiazhuang residents” the scapegoat, or else the residents of those villages? And aren’t all of these people Chinese? So, shouldn’t we be suspicious of all Chinese people? Let’s take it to the extreme—aren’t all of these cases occurring among Earthlings? [CDT Translation]

The problems reported by residents subject to the latest lockdowns aren’t new. Familiar grievances can be read in Fang Fang’s diary from Wuhan last year, where she wrote about desperate low-income residents sorting through trash for discarded food, and widespread discrimination within China towards Wuhan residents. But as China marks one year since the Wuhan lockdown, fêting the heroism of its residents and the bravery of frontline medical workers, nary a word can be found about the negative side effects of that experience. Residents who speak about their grievances from that period continue to be censored–this month, a WeChat group of close to 100 relatives of coronavirus victims was shut down without explanation. Citizen journalists like Zhang Zhan, who candidly documented life inside the lockdown zone, have been jailed.

That hardly any space has been left open to discuss the negative effects of China’s lockdown measures suggests that, at least publicly, little has been learned about how to avoid repeating those outcomes. In the absence of those lessons, the lockdown harms seem destined to repeat themselves in the regions where new lockdown orders are imposed. As Human Rights Watch’s Yaqiu Wang wrote in an opinion piece for NBC News, this recurring outcome is less an exception born from the coronavirus, but the inevitable outcome of decades of “continuous suppression of liberal ideas and activism”:

Beijing’s purported “victory” in containing the virus compared to the U.S. has prompted some ruling elites and ordinary people in China to express support for public order and security over individual freedoms. “Only by safeguarding public interest can individual rights be protected,” wrote a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government research center. “The individual should give way to the collective. This is what harmony is about,” said a Weibo post calling for Wuhan people not to leave the city.

Such views aren’t the result of the pandemic and the short period of heightened censorship and propaganda. They’re the result of decades of continuous suppression of liberal ideas and activism, which has increased since Xi ascended to power in late 2012.

[…] Despite the hypervigilance — and perhaps giving credence to those who question its Covid-19 track record — Beijing still struggles to keep the country virus-free. This month, new, small outbreaks in Hebei and Jilin provinces again prompted authorities to put tens of million people under strict lockdown.

But whether the virus has been contained — and whether people will continue to cheer an approach based on repression — may mean a future less rosy for Xi than he’d be willing to admit. [Source]

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/from-shijiazhuang-to-hong-kong-residents-under-lockdown-decry-inequalities/

Xi Wants “Patriotic” Hong Kong Politicians, a New Party Leaps at the Chance

During a video-conference call with Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam, Xi Jinping announced that “Hong Kong must always be governed by patriots.” Xi’s demand for “patriotic” politicians mirrored mainland calls that Hong Kong’s education system become more patriotic, which only intensified after the 2020 passage of the National Security Law (NSL). Earlier this month, the Hong Kong government arrested every single pro-democracy candidate for upcoming LegCo elections and charged them with “subversion” under the NSL. At the South China Morning Post, Tony Cheung, William Zheng and Lilian Cheng reported on Xi’s insistence on “patriotism” within Hong Kong’s government:

[…] “The central government’s comprehensive jurisdiction over Hong Kong can be effectively implemented, the constitutional order established by the constitution and the Basic Law can be effectively safeguarded … only when we achieve ‘patriots governing Hong Kong’,” [Xi] said.

Xi stressed the principle was a precondition for resolving deep-seated problems in the city and fostering “its contribution to the realisation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.

[…] Tam Yiu-chung, the city’s sole delegate to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the country’s top legislative body, said he believed that patriotic legislators and district councillors must become the main body governing Hong Kong and the principle could be extended to the Election Committee that selected the chief executive.

“The government already confirmed that district councillors will soon be required to pledge allegiance to the city and President Xi was just reiterating this idea, in which no one else but patriots can run the administration,” Tam said. [Source]

Luo Huining, Beijing’s top liaison officer in HK is sitting on #CarrieLam’s right when Lam made her delayed duty report to Xi via video chat today, CCTV news footage showed.

This is a new arrangement following CE’s seat being moved aside in 2015. pic.twitter.com/1fomAxzyXD

— Xinqi Su 蘇昕琪 (@XinqiSu) January 27, 2021

Amid speculation of overhaul to election system, Xi highlighted the principle of "patriots ruling HK" is matter of "sovereignty, national security & interest", and the only way to preserve constitutional order & China's overarching jurisdiction over HK.https://t.co/RK280wERz0

— Alvin Lum (@alvinllum) January 27, 2021

 

One mysterious new political party is positioning itself to answer Xi’s call. The Bauhinia Party, named after the orchid which graces Hong Kong’s flag, was founded by three mainland Chinese businessmen who are permanent residents of Hong Kong. The Bauhinia Party was founded on a cruise of Victoria Harbor in a direct nod to the Chinese Communist Party’s own apocryphal founding on a boat in Nanhu Lake on the mainland. The party’s platform is a hodgepodge mix of anodyne calls for unity, the continuation of One Country, Two Systems, and proposals to replace the LegCo, the city’s main legislative body, with a mainland-style “consultative” system. At Bloomberg News, Kari Soo Lindberg profiled the party’s political positions, many of which overlap with those of the Chinese government:

The party’s purpose, he added, was to support people to stand for the position of chief executive, which will be up for grabs next year when Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam’s first term expires. One possibility is Li Shan, the party’s chairman, who is chief executive of Silk Road Finance Corp. Ltd., a board member of Credit Suisse AG and a delegate to the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory body to Beijing. Li declined an interview request.

[…] Wong said the root causes of the 2019 unrest had “nothing to do with China” while pointing to factors such as high-priced housing, poor local governance and an opposition he said was “tearing apart the social fabric and getting everybody angry.” The national security law, he added, was “timely to help stabilize Hong Kong” and had no impact on “one country, two systems” — the framework that guaranteed the territory’s autonomy for 50 years after Britain handed over the former colony in 1997.

[…] Wong said the party aims to eventually have as many as 250,000 members. He added that the party’s communication with China’s government would likely be “quite fluid,” while saying it was “silly” that critics said it had Beijing’s backing.

“A lot of people try to pin us down as to whether we are from China,” Wong said. “I think they really miss the point. We should look at whether we are for Hong Kong or not. And China is there to help, but there are bottom lines, there are red lines.” [Source]

"Trying to “reset” Hong Kong, if you will."

With Hong Kong’s pro-democracy opposition effectively neutralized, the new pro-China Bauhinia Party has emerged with a mission to “respect ‘one country,’ cherish ‘two systems.’"

More: https://t.co/OFknmUcth1 #香港 pic.twitter.com/kaKSCkjFby

— Bloomberg Quicktake (@Quicktake) January 27, 2021

In an interview with the South China Morning Post’s Phila Siu and Natalie Wong, Bauhinia Party co-founder Charles Wong was similarly evasive about his party’s relationship with the Chinese Communist Party:

Both Li and Chen are delegates to the nation’s top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which sparked rumours the new party was supported by Beijing’s liaison office in Hong Kong. But Wong said that was the “wrong way” to look at the matter, as the central question was whether the party had the backing of residents.

[…] “It’s just normal, and we have communications with the Hong Kong government and we also have communications with some key individuals and different political parties,” he said. “Our consultation in forming a party was quite comprehensive.”

[…] Regarding suspicions its members belonged to the Communist Party, Wong said: “It’s not correct to judge our party [on] whether we have underground members or not. And we never really asked our members whether you are underground [members] or not. We just look at whether you’re Hongkongers and do you want to do things for Hong Kong?” [Source]

At The New York Times, Keith Bradsher and Vivian Wang reported on Hong Kong’s already established pro-Beijing parties’ wariness of the political newcomers:

But the news was equally, if not more, unsettling for Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing bloc, the coalition of local business tycoons, established politicians and trade unions that has long been allowed to govern as the central government’s proxy. Many have wondered if the emergence of the new party is Beijing’s signal that it has less use for those traditional power brokers and may replace them with figures deemed more effective or trustworthy.

[…] Central planks of the party’s platform include combating discrimination against mainland transplants to Hong Kong and fostering a love of Chinese language and culture. Mr. Li said he wants to encourage more Hong Kong students to study at mainland universities and undergo “patriotic education,” an echo of Mr. Xi’s own calls for young Hong Kongers to “increase their sense of belonging to the motherland.”

[…] “I don’t think he begins to understand how complex the job is,” [Regina Ip, the founder of another pro-Beijing party] said of Mr. Li’s hints about running for chief executive. “If you have some financial credentials, it doesn’t mean you are qualified.”

Mr. Li acknowledged that he was not fluent in Hong Kong politics, despite his long residence in the city. He said he had never voted until late 2019. Asked about his position on a contentious proposal to allow Hong Kong residents living in mainland China to vote in the city’s elections, he said he had not heard of the issue. [Source]

At The Washington Post, Shibani Mahtani and Theodora Yu reported that the internecine conflict between the Bauhinia Party and other pro-Beijing outfits might already be rendered moot by the ascension of the Chinese government’s Hong Kong Liaison Office:

Sitting apart from this bickering is the Chinese government’s liaison office in Hong Kong, sometimes described as a shadow government pulling the strings. Last January, Beijing suddenly appointed Luo Huining, a mainland party cadre whom it called out of semi-retirement, as its new chief. The following month China named Xia Baolong, an official known for tearing crosses off church roofs in China, to head its Beijing-based Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office.

[…] Ho-fung Hung, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who studies Hong Kong politics, notes that the liaison office’s role has been expanding for years, coordinating election campaigns on behalf of the establishment camp, commenting openly on local political issues and visiting ordinary citizens.

“The perception is it has been coming to the fore as the true power center of Hong Kong,” Hung said. [Source]

Recent personnel moves have added to the perception that Beijing is increasingly assuming direct control of Hong Kong’s government. At the South China Post, William Zheng reported on the appointment of Shi Kehui, who worked closely with key Xi allies, to the central government-controlled Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office:

Shi spent most of his career in Zhejiang province, including a spell as secretary to the former party chief Zhao Hongzhu. Zhao succeeded Xi Jinping in the role after the latter was transferred to Shanghai.

[…] Shi was transferred to the CCDI in 2014 and was soon promoted to become deputy secretary general and director of the commission’s general office, working under Wang Qishan, now China’s vice-president. He was appointed as Guangdong’s disciplinary chief in 2017.

[…] According to Li Xiaobing, an associate law professor and Hong Kong affairs specialist at Nankai University in Tianjin, Shi’s appointment underlines Beijing’s caution in selecting officials responsible for Hong Kong and Macau affairs. [Source]

1/ "China sends Guangdong anti-corruption chief to take on similar role in HK". Bill @niubi comment on this story: "It is important to note that the CCDI is not just about 'anti-corruption'. It is the political and ideological enforcer for the Party." https://t.co/3TmWKUpk80

— Antony Dapiran (@antd) January 27, 2021

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/xi-wants-patriotic-hong-kong-politicians-a-new-party-leaps-at-the-chance/

Translation: in Heibei Lockdown, Big Picture is Bitter Pill

The latest COVID-19 outbreak in Hebei, first detected in the provincial capital of Shijiazhuang, has triggered a strict lockdown likened by some to wartime measures. People with Hebei residency (hukou) have been suddenly stranded, unable to get to work or seek medical treatment in next-door Beijing. In the annals of pandemic discrimination, Hebei is the new Hubei, according to self-media writer Wei Zhou (@维舟), who reflected on the social implications of such ostricization in a public WeChat post from around January 17. Wei Zhou’s musing on Hebei’s involuntary sacrifice to the seat of national power got 49,000 visits in the seven hours between when it was posted and when the censors got to it:

Hebei: The Pain of “Big Picture Awareness”

1

At first glance, the beginning of 2021 looks like a repeat of 2020. Over a three-day period beginning on January 2, 19 symptomatic and 40 asymptomatic cases of COVID-19 were confirmed in Shijiazhuang, thrusting the normally inconspicuous capital city of Hebei Province into the national spotlight. On January 4, the city entered a “state of war,” and a day later, the provincial government declared that the “entire province was immediately entering a state of war.” It seemed that Hebei had suddenly become the Hubei of one year ago.

It’s been tumultuous times since. Sometimes it feels like a repeat of last year’s Hubei, and other times it feels even worse. On January 9, all Shijiazhuang public bus and taxi services were suspended, forcing medical and security personnel to drive or e-bike themselves to work. Those without a car were left with no option but to walk, a proposition made worse by the cold weather this time of year. These developments are once again coinciding with winter break, complicating college students’ trips home for the holiday. Those returning to Shijiazhuang are finding they “made it to the doorstep but cannot enter,” some spending 2,000 yuan over a nine-day period—some returning students have reportedly walked 20 kilometers [over 12 miles] to get back home.

Village residents who tested positive for COVID-19 were swiftly moved to quarantine facilities, but apparently their accommodations were not ready for them. In some cases, patients arrived only to find the accommodations were already full. Many were left exhausted. Strict disinfection protocols were implemented in these villages, and residents taken away to quarantine were unable to bring any pets or livestock. Many of these animals were unfortunately unable to survive unattended over the ten-plus-day disinfection period.

Lockdown decisions were made just like that—one word, and cities were closed off. Residents were left no time to buy supplies, and those sheltering at home faced the challenges of basic survival. Those in charge offered no guidance on how to deal with the food issue caused by the lockdown. Because anyone entering the city had to have a negative nucleotide test, the trucks that normally deliver the city’s food supply were suddenly denied entry. Even volunteers like those who helped last year in Wuhan weren’t allowed in, because many of them hadn’t gotten the results of their nucleotide tests.

There’s also another reason for the soaring anxiety in the region: the principle of “protecting the capital.” Because Beijing is essentially surrounded on all sides by Hebei, [the town of] Langfang, near the border of Beijing, was placed under complete administrative lockdown on January 12, even though there was only one mid-level risk area in the city (a neighborhood in Gu’an County). The goal was clear: to create a firewall around Beijing, ensuring the capital was insulated from the pandemic.

The fact is, the shutdown of Wuhan last year wasn’t solely for the benefit of Wuhan residents—it is often thought of as a kind of sacrifice for the rest of China. In fighting the pandemic “at all costs,” the people of Wuhan were the “cost.” However, Hebei’ers’ “big-picture awareness” is different this time. They know their sacrifice isn’t for themselves, but for others—that is, for the capital.

2

On January 14, fencing was installed along the Chaobai River in the town of Yanjiao, Hebei. The river divides Yanjiao from Beijing. Tents were set up at the southern end of Friendship Bridge, and security personnel now guard the bridge 24 hours a day.

All this was to “prevent the risk associated with passage [across the bridge].” But the real reason is this: There are over 300,000 people living in Yanjiao, and ever since the pandemic began, their trips to work have become exceptionally difficult. A one-hour commute has turned into a three-hour commute. Some people even thought about “slipping through the border” to Beijing by crossing over the frozen river.

Some have joked that as soon as the pandemic hit, Beijing turned into West Berlin. Others have parodied Trump: “Build the wall! Paid by the Hebeier, and make Beijing great again [sic]!”

Yanjiao is known as “Hebei’s No. 1 Town.” It is part of a larger county-level city called Sanhe, one of the three counties that comprise the “Northern Three Counties” of Langfang Prefecture, an exclave of Hebei separated from the rest of the province by Beijing and Tianjin municipalities. Ordinarily, as long as there aren’t any cases of the virus in the area, this area should be considered even lower-risk than Beijing, because you would have to first pass through Beijing or Tianjin in order to enter Yanjiao by foot. But this matters not, as Yanjiao is still part of “Hebei.”

This “one size fits all” approach isn’t the only issue. The situation also demonstrates a certain way of thinking in Chinese society: Judgments are based not on the behavior of the individual, but rather on the group to which that individual belongs. Because of this way of thinking, no matter how one were to plead his or her innocence, it won’t make a difference, because you’re seen as a uniform unit of a homogenous larger whole—not as a unique individual.

Under the surface of this pandemic is the fear of “contamination.” Once “Hebei’ers” were determined to be a source of contamination, they all became suspect. Many would argue this is necessary to stop the spread of the virus, and there’s always going to be some people who need to make sacrifices. Drastic times require these kinds of drastic, one-size-fits-all measures to keep things from getting even worse.

But there’s an unavoidable problem with this: namely, the way these groups are defined is mostly arbitrary. If you do take such drastic measures, why is it that “Heibei’ers” are the problem? The infections were in Shijiazhuang, so why aren’t “Shijiazhuang residents” the scapegoat, or else the residents of those villages? And aren’t all of these people Chinese? So, shouldn’t we be suspicious of all Chinese people? Let’s take it to the extreme—aren’t all of these cases occurring among Earthlings?

3

Perhaps because I’m a father, to me, the saddest story I saw about the “provincial lockdown” was from a father. The man’s child fell critically ill—right on the night before the “state of war” began. As a result, Beijing Children’s Hospital would simply not let them in. “Whatever health report didn’t matter, being from a low risk region didn’t matter—as long as you were from Hebei, Beijing Children’s Hospital wouldn’t take you, no exceptions!”

He struggled to stay calm: “We Hebei’ers have shut down so much of our energy-intensive industry for the good of everyone’s air quality. Our GDP has fallen from the top ten to 13th. Hebei’ers make great sacrifices for the good of the capital—that is plain for all to see. Now with the pandemic, why is Beijing treating us like this?”

The sacrifice of which he speaks is a “conditional sacrifice,” in that he believes Hebei’s “sacrifice” should be repaid with better treatment. But in reality, their sacrifice is not conditional. Under a system of moral absolutism, only total, selfless sacrifice is worthy of praise—and it can’t be exchanged for anything.

Absolute loyalty is unconditional. “If the king wants the minister to die, the minister must die,” as the saying goes. Absolute filial piety—children completely filial to their parents no matter how their parents treat them—is the same way. There’s an implied mutual benefit: “I am good to my parents, and so they should also be good to me,” but this inherently contradicts the hierarchical system.

Such absolute moralism is not random. This is something that permeates China’s social consciousness. The pandemic has revealed that Chinese society seeks absolute security. As I said last year, as Chinese society faced the three-pronged dilemma (uncertainty, unreliability, and insecurity), what people wanted was absolute security. However, absolute security invariably leads to absolute control.

In his book “Propaganda: Ideas, Discourse and its Legitimization” [宣传：观念、话语及其正当化], Liu Hailong writes, “Utopia has a special admiration for order, and it regards ‘filth’ and uncertainty as crisis.” COVID-19 is precisely this kind of crisis: it at once is the source of an enormous amount of uncertainty, and also inspires fear of “filth” (contamination). In order to reestablish order, the Chinese people are willing to “pay whatever price it takes.” It’s just a matter of who ends up paying. Often, it is society’s weakest or those who self-sacrifice, willingly or unwillingly.

For this reason, some people say “Hebei Strong” from a place of sincerity (especially Wuhanese, who went through similar pain). But other times, the admiration Chinese people have for dedication and sacrifice reminds me of what archeologist Lothar von Falkenhausen said on the topic of Chinese cultural psychology. By the Warring States period, Chinese held a contradictory, complex dual mentality toward their ancestors: they were at once the object of great reverence, but also of fear. People came up with ways to separate themselves from their ancestors, providing tombs with the material pleasures of life so that they would stay in the underworld.

But up here in the land of the living, we’re all interconnected. It may seem at first glance that division helps protect us (at least some of us), but the truth is this: absolute security does not have a 360-degree view. There are holes in any division or hierarchy. It’s no coincidence that this outbreak in Hebei occurred in the countryside.

Some people say that “the virus can distinguish between city and countryside.” Rural villages are now the weak link in pandemic control efforts. At its root, this is a function of the separation of city and countryside. Perhaps some people think that since “resources are limited, we can only prioritize what’s important.” Indeed, it would be impossible to set up fortifications everywhere. But we must recognize that this is a trade-off. In the end, we are all in the same boat. [Chinese]

Translation by Little Bluegill.

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/translation-in-heibei-lockdown-big-picture-is-bitter-pill/

FT – Chinese city suffers food shortages during Covid-19 lockdown

source https://www.ft.com/content/7ed987cb-195e-4f53-bd86-2b21277f6a27#new_tab

Chinese Countryside Better Off Than Ever Before, While Some Reforms Stagnate

In early December, President Xi Jinping declared that China had eliminated absolute poverty. His announcement was the culmination of a years-long campaign that sought to raise the annual income of every person in China’s countryside above 4,000 yuan. The Economist reviewed the campaign and found it largely effective in eliminating the destitution previously endemic to China’s countryside:

Sceptics understandably ask whether China fiddled its numbers in order to win what it calls the “battle against poverty”. There are of course still isolated cases of abject deprivation. China, however, set itself a fairly high bar. It has regularly raised the official poverty line, which, accounting for living costs, is about $2.30 a day at prices prevailing in 2011. (By comparison, the World Bank defines as extremely poor those who make less than $1.90 a day, as roughly a tenth of human beings do. Poverty lines in rich countries are much higher: the equivalent line in America is about $72 a day for a four-member household at 2020 prices.) In 1978, shortly after Mao’s death, nearly 98% of those in the countryside lived in extreme poverty, by China’s current standards. By 2016 that was down to less than 5% (see chart).

[…] The government’s approach changed in 2015 when Xi Jinping, its leader, vowed to eradicate the last vestiges of extreme poverty by the end of 2020. Officials jumped to it. They tried to encourage personal initiative by rewarding poor people who found ways of bettering their lot (see picture). They spent public money widely. In 2015 central-government funding earmarked for poverty alleviation was an average of 500 yuan ($77) per extremely poor person. In 2020 the allocation per head was more than 26,000 yuan (see chart).

[…] A bigger challenge is relative deprivation, a problem abundantly evident to anyone who has travelled between the glitzy coastal cities and the drabber towns of the hinterland. People may have incomes well above the official poverty line, but they can still feel poor. A recent study by Chinese economists concluded that the “subjective poverty line” in rural areas was about 23 yuan per day, nearly twice the amount below which a person would be officially classified as poor. That conforms with a standard used by many economists, namely setting the relative poverty line at half the median income level. It suggests that about a third of rural Chinese still see themselves as poor. [Source]

Declarations that China has ended extreme poverty understandably arouse scepticism.

So it's worth noting that:
–China actually set itself a fairly high poverty line (20% above the World Bank's);
–and the end of extreme poverty doesn't mean the end of poverty!

(3/5)

— Simon Rabinovitch (@S_Rabinovitch) December 31, 2020

It also accords with experiences at bottom of the income ladder. One villager in a county newly "lifted from poverty" described his struggles paying for his kids' schools & his dad's cancer care. In no mood to celebrate the end of poverty. "Speaking frankly, it's a lie." (5/5)

— Simon Rabinovitch (@S_Rabinovitch) December 31, 2020

The campaign is a major point of pride for China’s ruling party. ”Poverty alleviation dramas,” TV shows that glorify similar campaigns past and present, are quite popular. In his Sinocism newsletter, Bill Bishop noted that “Minning Town,” a dramatized small screen depiction of a 1990s poverty alleviation campaign in Ningxia, was purportedly based on a program led by Xi Jinping during his time in provincial government.

Yet stark inequalities remain. Earlier this month, the sudden death of a Sichuan-based livestreamer, brought about by the twin ills of poverty and disease, shocked Chinese netizens. Reporting by Sixth Tone indicates that the “left-behind” children of China’s first economic boom, a reference to their rural childhoods spent apart from their parents who labored along China’s coast, are today confronted with the same impossible choices of their parents.

Indermit Gill, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, believes that China’s poverty line is nearly $20 lower than where it should be, meaning up to 90% of the population could be considered impoverished. The Economist reviewed Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell’s “Invisible China,” a book that exposed the shockingly unequal conditions that define lie in rural China:

After decades of research, Mr Rozelle and Ms Hell present some startling data. Their team gave an iq-like test to thousands of rural Chinese toddlers. They found that more than 50% were cognitively delayed and unlikely to reach an iq of 90 (in a typical population, only 16% score so poorly). There were several reasons for this.

Half of rural babies are undernourished. Caregivers (often illiterate grandmothers) cram them with rice, noodles and steamed buns, not realising that they also need micronutrients. Studies in 2016 and 2017 found that a quarter of rural children in central and western China suffer from anaemia (lack of iron), which makes it hard for them to concentrate in school. Two-fifths of rural children in parts of southern China have intestinal worms, which sap their energy. A third of rural 11- and 12-year-olds have poor vision but no glasses, so struggle to read their schoolbooks.

[…] Among the entire labour force in 2010, 44% of urban and 11% of rural Chinese had graduated from high school. Among the current crop of students, the figures are much better: 97% of urban students graduated from high school in 2015, and 80% of rural children went to a high school of some sort. But the rural “high schools” were often dreadful, opened rapidly to meet official targets and staffed by teachers with little interest in teaching. The authors tested thousands of children at “vocational” rural high schools, and found that 91% had learned practically nothing: they scored the same or worse on tests at the end of a year of schooling as at the beginning. [Source]

30% of China's labor force have finished high schoolhttps://t.co/WKhKWP7Hfq pic.twitter.com/Bq6NpOtMyx

— Jordan Schneider 司马乔丹 (@jordanschnyc) January 14, 2021

Current reports state his mom left at young age (divorce). Dad unreliable / ran from debt. He’s from a notoriously poor place in China. Even if his specific case untrue, can vouch personally w 1st hand exp that single parents v common in rural China. Lots of abandonment, disease.

— Rui Ma 马睿 (@ruima) January 23, 2021

Adding to thread since multiple news media reporting that his family wasn’t “super” poor. I don’t think it negates fact that he died from lack of proper care. Whether that care should have come from his family folks might disagree, as he was not a minor. It’s tragic either way.

— Rui Ma 马睿 (@ruima) January 25, 2021

 

At The Financial Times, Kristen Looney wrote on the challenges created for newly urbanized farmers by China’s campaign-style approach to poverty alleviation:

But Mr Xi’s milestone is not about economic growth lifting all boats or an authoritarian government simply declaring poverty gone. It reflects China’s status as a campaign state, or a mobilisational regime, whose leaders have long relied on the extraordinary deployment of resources and people to accomplish key goals.

[…]But for tens of millions of families, poverty alleviation has meant abandoning their homes, farmland and village communities, and moving into mass housing complexes on the outskirts of unfamiliar cities. Many have assumed debt to purchase the subsidised housing. It is unlikely, given China’s slowing economy, that the proliferation of “peasant apartments” on the urban fringe has been accompanied by sufficient non-farm jobs. The result may be concentrated poverty, as previous inequalities are reproduced.

[…] By barrelling on with the anti-poverty campaign, China remains on course to become a “moderately prosperous society” by the middle of this year. But integrating this fabricated middle class into the rest of the economy will be a feat of a different scale.  [Source]

Xi Jinping’s address to the recent Central Rural Work Conference gave little indication that future rural reforms might include significant changes to the hukou—or household registration—system, a long-cherished goal of activists, rural residents, and academics alike. At The South China Morning Post, Zhou Xin reported on Xi’s speech, which heralded the end of the poverty alleviation campaign while introducing its successor “comprehensive rural revitalization”:

It is a remarkable improvement from 2000 when Li Changping, a rural cadre, wrote in a famous letter to then-premier Zhu Rongji that “our peasants are really suffering, our countryside is really poor, and our farming is in great danger”.

But despite this, the countryside remains a weak link. Per capita income in rural China is around a third of that in urban areas, and retail sales – a rough measure of consumer spending – was just a sixth of that in urban areas last year, even though 40 per cent of the population lives in the countryside.

[…] The meeting, however, did not offer any substantial changes to the existing institutional framework in rural China. Land will continue to be owned collectively and contracted to rural households for a very long period of time, while grass-roots governance will be firmly in the hands of Communist Party cells.

[…] As such, China’s rural revitalisation will be about the commercialisation of agriculture, the improvement of public services, and fixing problems such as pollution. [Source]

A second stagnant era of rural reform is village democracy. The Economist published an analysis of the “carrying across one shoulder” system that spells the end of rural democracy in all but name:

In 2018 the party began calling for all-out efforts to implement a system it describes as yijiantiao, or “carrying across one shoulder”. This refers to the way that farmers suspend two loads on either end of a pole across their backs. In this case the loads are the two parallel structures that run China’s villages: the elected village committees and the party committees. The party wants memberships of both committees to be the same, and to be led by a single person: the village party secretary.

[…] This requires some sleight of hand. The election law says that “no organisation or individual may designate, appoint or replace any member” of elected committees. But localities have introduced rules that all but ensure the village party secretary gets the concurrent job of village chief. Commonly, the village’s party members (usually just a small fraction of the population) choose a party secretary and other members of the party committee—ie, endorse the choice made by higher-ups. Next, a member of this committee organises the election for the post of village chief. Finally an election is held in which every adult villager may vote. The party secretary wins.

[…] A tighter vetting system typically ensures that no one stands against him (village leaders are rarely female). It involves consulting official organs in the local township, including the police. These can block the candidacy of a wide range of people. The south-western city of Kunming, for example, has a list of ineligible types called the “seven forbiddens and 15 unsuitables”. Among the forbiddens are “politically two-faced” people. A propaganda video explains this with an illustration of a man dreaming of a protest for freedom and democracy. The unsuitables include those with “strong religious feelings”: a cartoon shows people bowing to a Jesus-like figure. [Source]

The tighter controls on village elections mirror general trends at the local government level. At The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Jude Blanchette published a translation of an internal document that laid out officials’ governing priorities, namely fighting against “hostile forces”:

In order to better understand local-level governance, the CSIS Freeman Chair is releasing the following translation of an official notice by the town’s CCP committee on the eve of the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2019. The lengthy document comprehensively catalogues various economic, political, and security risks, many of them understandable, while others seem more fanciful or remote. Interestingly, a large portion of the document is focused on protecting Niangziguan from so-called “hostile forces,” including overseas elements of the Catholic church and pro-democracy activists. While it is possible that Niangziguan officials truly believe that the town must actively guard against “color revolutions” (as the document declares), it is more likely that Xi Jinping’s relentless campaign to snuff out any and all threats to the CCP has infused small-town governance. Regardless, the document is a revealing window into the concerns of the CCP in the first half of the twenty-first century.

Here is an excerpt of two of the directives included in Blanchette’s CSIS report:

1. Prevent and crack down on “color revolutions” [颜色革命]. Keep a close eye on major activities, sensitive points, and hotspots, closely monitor new developments in disruption and destruction by hostile forces [敌对势力], and establish and improve control mechanisms for key political figures, organizations, and groups. Strictly prevent infiltration by hostile forces into ethnic, religious, and other fields; interference by hostile forces using sensitive cases, mass incidents, and the “rights-defense” activities of interest groups; and hostile forces from engaging in activities that undermine political security and social stability, never allowing the formation of flag bearers [扛旗人物], nor the emergence of illegal parties and activities, nor the formation of political opposition.[…] 8. Eliminate blind spots in the supervision of social groups. Emphasize and improve the level of social-organization management, accelerate construction of information platforms, and guide social organizations to participate in public services and provide public products so we can make full use of their positive role in social-governance innovation. Strictly prevent overseas NGOs, as well as certain domestic social organizations that receive Western support, from going around under the banners of “democracy,” “human rights,” “religion,” “charity,” “environmental protection,” and “poverty alleviation.” Strengthen oversight of overseas organizations’ activities in our town, quickly grasp the fundamentals and figure out the situation, and actively guide them in operating in accordance with laws and regulations. [Source]

source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/01/chinese-countryside-better-off-than-ever-before-while-some-reforms-stagnate/