Friday 30 October 2020

Minitrue Diary, February 13, 2020: Purged Officials, Donations, Proper Capitalization

CDT has recently acquired and verified a collection of directives issued by central Party authorities to at the beginning of this year. These directives were issued on an almost daily basis in early 2020, and we will be posting them over the coming weeks. The following three directives were released on February 13, 2020.

Reports involving leadership changes in provincial Party committees (including municipalities directly under the Central Government) should without exception take the text of authorized releases from Xinhua as standard. It is forbidden to release information without authorization until these are published, or to hype related topics. (February 13, 2020) [Chinese]

Do not report on disadvantaged members of the public donating money and goods, funeral parlor workers supporting Wuhan, etc. (February 13, 2020) [Chinese]

Pay attention to the use of upper and lower case in the English terms “Novel coronavirus pneumonia” and its abbreviation “NCP.” (February 13, 2020) [Chinese]

On February 13, it was reported that Beijing had purged officials in Hubei Province—the site of the initial coronavirus outbreak in late December—including the Party secretaries of both the province and Wuhan city as well as local health officials. The rapid spread of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan and the region led to public anger at local officials’ handling of the crisis, including their slow response to early cases and stifling of information. From a South China Morning Post article by William Zheng:

China’s official Xinhua news agency reported that Hubei party secretary Jiang Chaoliang had been replaced by Shanghai mayor Ying Yong, 61, a close ally of Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The Communist Party leader of the city of Wuhan, Ma Guoqiang, 56, also lost his job, Xinhua said. He will be replaced by Wang Zhonglin, 57, the party secretary of the city of Jinan, in the eastern province of Shandong.

Another Beijing heavyweight, Chen Yixin, was flown into Hubei last week. He is chief of the party’s top law enforcement body – the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission – and is now in charge of handling the outbreak. The virus is believed to have originated from a live animal and seafood market in Wuhan, Hubei’s capital city. [Source]

Several directives in January and February focused on donations from both China and abroad during the emerging coronavirus crisis.

真Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/10/minitrue-diary-february-13-2020-purged-officials-donations-proper-capitalization/

Translation: Dead Man’s Jaywalking Ticket Raises Questions About AI Policing

Concerns over China’s adoption, spread, and export of artificial intelligence-driven surveillance technology have grown as the technology has been applied to public services. While public support for the innovative potential of AI and big data-driven programs—such as those promising to help recover lost children, increase traffic safety and policing ability, or track and contain disease in a time of pandemic—has been covered and spurred on by state media positivity, distress over the imperfect application and the horrifying potential of normalizing the new technologies has also been expressed.

In an essay recently shared on WeChat, user @狐度工作室 looks at a recent case in which a deceased man was served a ticket for a jaywalking offense that allegedly occurred months after his death:

There was a report about an old man surnamed Xie, of Shanghai’s Pudong District, who passed away in January of this year. Recently, his family received a traffic ticket that claimed the elderly Mr. Xie ran a red light at an intersection on October 1. The fine: 20 yuan. When the police discovered the mistake, they personally went to the Xie household to apologize, claiming they would upgrade and update the system as soon as possible, increase manual verification, and improve the recognition accuracy of their systems as much as possible.

It was a humorous and intriguing case of misjudgment by the traffic police artificial intelligence system. But the story leaves us with two conversation points: First, the only reason they had to admit the system made a mistake this time was because Mr. Xie had already passed away. If the system mistakenly targeted a living person, how would they be cleared of wrongdoing and get rid of this random ticket? Second, is it really okay to use a public intersection as a biological information collection point, and then to make that private information public?

According to the police officers, the computer system mistakenly identified someone else running the red light as Mr. Xie. The system matched the individual with old household registration data. So first there was an error with the data collected by the crosswalk camera, and then it associated that data with the wrong person. One possibility is that the image, which was taken random and disorderly at the front end, was superimposed onto an equally messy database. The AI used by the traffic police made a quiet mistake in a place hidden from human view.

Shanghai is pretty strict about catching pedestrians crossing the street on a red light. In addition to traffic officers enforcing the law on the ground, the city has also launched automated systems, like the one that misidentified Mr. Xie, in order to further enforce jaywalking laws. Judging from the social media reaction, it seems that city residents generally understand or even support measures to punish pedestrians who cross at red lights. To a certain degree, stories of casualties and deaths involving jaywalking have contributed to people’s willingness to accept these measures. But more consideration should be given to the use of these AI systems.

A person jaywalks, an eye in the sky takes a picture, the person is identified through facial recognition, and a ticket is sent—all in one fell swoop. Efficiency has no doubt increased. But what about the important principles and privacy boundaries that also have to be considered? Should a person’s image be blown up and displayed on a huge screen above the intersection? Should they lose their privacy and be publicly shamed, just for jaywalking? Obviously, Shanghai’s AI surveillance system has tacitly accepted these aggressions—that is, until this “mentally impaired AI” made a mistake.

From artificial intelligence to artificial mental impairment—thank goodness Mr. Xie’s name was “cleared through death,” or else it’s really hard to say what would have happened. If someone else were to run into the same problem, erroneously identified as an offender disrupting street order, I bet it would be an ordeal to prove their innocence. First you’d need to provide the perfect alibi, then submit an appeal. Don’t tell me you’d be able to get this all done in one trip. It’s daunting just thinking about it. Why should someone suffer this crime?

The traffic police and other supporters of the AI system would say that the increase in efficiency is so substantial that it outweighs the mistakes. It’s a  really marketable rationale. Take a look at what the Shanghai traffic police brought up when they made their house call apology. They said they would work to make the system better—not that they’d be more judicious in their use of the system. As always, the focus was not on the trouble the system causes for people, but on continuing to increase its efficiency, making it even stronger.

The Shanghai traffic police revealed some potentially vital information in their explanation: When you walk down the street, AI collects your biological data. The system then crunches your information into their database. Every person whose information has gone through the system has no choice but to passively hand over their biological information. Like guinea pigs, their information gets incorporated into a gigantic comparative database, where it’s used by the system to hone its recognition abilities, to teach itself.

False accusations aside, what’s really worthy of discussion is that this is a system that relies on huge amounts of biological data to train the AI. Those in favor of such public surveillance systems to catch jaywalkers perhaps have the ends and the means mixed up. Catching jaywalkers is not the only goal of the system. This is perhaps merely a strategy for heading off any public anxiety about the system. Perhaps preventing jaywalking is just a cover for openly collecting biological data from the public. Perhaps the real goal is improving the recognition and matching power of the system.

Jaywalking is inevitable, so the manpower and resources being spent on stopping it don’t seem to justify the outcomes. It doesn’t make economic sense to expend all this energy on AI just to prevent jaywalking. In the end, the only reasonable conclusion is that the traffic police have much larger, more ambitious plans for their AI systems, and the collection of the public’s biological information is the basis for how they will carry out this plan.

So when the Shanghai traffic cops explained their mistake, they unintentionally brought up other, unanswered questions they have a duty to explain: What is the true purpose behind such large-scale collection of people’s biological information? Is it legal? Does it comply with relevant regulations? How can you ensure mistakes by the AI system won’t be abused? These questions cannot be ignored. They await definitive answers. [Chinese]

Translation by Bluegill.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/10/translation-dead-mans-jaywalking-ticket-raises-questions-about-ai-policing/

Sharp Eyes Surveillance Program Expands Dramatically

Mao Zedong wrote, “The people have sharp eyes.” The phrase incited people to spy on their neighbors and loved ones during the Cultural Revolution. In 2015, that slogan was resurrected for Sharp Eyes, an aggressive government surveillance program designed to reinstitute the social monitoring that eased after economic liberalization eroded traditional means of control. In 2019, China Digital Times published a three-part series on Sharp Eyes: “Surveilling The Surveillers,” ”Sharp Eyes Project Map,” and “Shandong to Xinjiang.” The Sharp Eyes program, concluded report authors Joshua Rudolph and Dahlia Peterson, “is an attempt to combine advanced surveillance technologies with tried-and-tested methods of crowd-sourced monitoring harkening back to the Mao era…[that could] potentially be used to infringe on individual privacy and to persecute dissent in China.”

Today, ChinaFile published a new investigation into Sharp Eyes, “State of Surveillance: Government Documents Reveal New Evidence on China’s Efforts to Monitor Its People.” Through the analysis of tens of thousands of government procurement documents related to surveillance technology, Jessica Batke and Mareike Ohlberg were able to draw conclusions about Chinese authorities’ intentions:

Together, they paint a stark portrait of a leadership craving the ability to penetrate ever deeper into Chinese citizens’ private lives and animated by fear of a population on the move. They also portray the leadership’s utmost confidence—faith even—that if only it possesses sufficient quantities of the right technology, then there exists no threat it cannot detect and eliminate. [Source]

The report focuses on three locations: Xiqiao Township in Guangdong, Shawan County in Xinjiang, and the Heilongjiang provincial capital, Harbin, showing how Chinese officials see high-tech surveillance as a “breakthrough in addressing the difficult problem of how to control people.” These examples are seen as representative of the nation as a whole.

Officials in Xiqiao, a satellite township of Foshan in Guangdong, divided the city into three areas: “core,” “key,” and “auxiliary.” By tactically deploying hundreds of surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition technology, officials hoped to “ensure no one going about their business in town would escape notice.” The facial recognition technology would then be applied to fulfill a Maslowian hierarchy of the state’s surveillance desires:

Thus, the cameras would be arrayed to align with the “four basic needs” of human life: food, clothing, housing, and transportation and five additional “quality-of-life needs”: healthcare; finance; arts, education, and culture; entertainment; and leisure travel. Xiqiao would install its new facial recognition cameras at the entrances and exits of restaurants, grocery stores, shopping malls, bus stations, kindergartens, movie theaters, and even a martial arts gym—where they could detect the faces of passers-by and feed these “portraits” back into a larger monitoring system. [Source]

China’s new surveillance projects incorporate “grid management.” Introduced in Shanghai in 2004, “grid management” is, in a sense, a digital age replica of the Song dynasty’s Baojia system, wherein neighbors were responsible for each other’s behavior. Sheena Greitens wrote a synopsis of the “grid management” system in a 2019 article for China Leadership Monitor:

Grid management works by dividing cities into geographic cells that become administrative units. In each grid, a grid manager and related staff collect information, identify and report potential problems, and address resident complaints. At the district level, information from the grids is integrated with other layers of data (on public utilities, traffic, sanitation, housing, population, crime, etc.), as well as with information collected via mobile applications and citizen/volunteer input provided through online portals and phone hotlines. [Source]

CDT reporting on the origins of the Sharp Eyes program in Shandong’s Linyi County documented how residents received “[upgraded] cable boxes…so that they could directly view surveillance feeds. This allowed citizens to report crimes by pressing a button on their remote control.” Mobilizing community members to report on each other is a key component of Chinese surveillance.

The Xinjiang portion of the ChinaFile investigation further analyzed public-private surveillance partnerships. In Shawan county, a majority-Han area near the Kazakhstan border, officials hope to integrate private cameras into government-directed surveillance networks. From the ChinaFile report:

To address these deficiencies, the study outlined a more comprehensive surveillance system. On the front end: 4,791 networked HD cameras, 70 of which were to be facial recognition units, would be positioned in crowded places with clear entrances and exits, including mosques, with others to be installed in train stations and bus stations. On the back end: a set of interlocking platforms would span three administrative levels (the village/township level, the county level, and the prefectural level) and three network layers (the public Internet, a private video network, and the Public Security Bureau’s own intranet). Critically, the system would allow for information to flow from private cameras to the police via a “societal resource integration platform” that drew from surveillance in “hotels, Internet cafes, gas stations, schools, hospital monitoring [sic], bicycle rental points, and shops along the street, etc.” Such systems are not unique to Xinjiang. Procurement notices from Shandong, Fujian, Heilongjiang, and Shanxi provinces, as well as Beijing, all mentioned the need for this type of platform in their jurisdictions. [Source]

In an October report for Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Dahlia Peterson explained how programs such as Sharp Eyes have been adopted and transformed by public security bureaus in Xinjiang to create the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). Through extensive monitoring of phones, vehicles, and ID cards, the IJOP “treats many ordinary and lawful activities—such as using WhatsApp or VPNs, driving a car that is not theirs, or using “too much” electricity—as inherently suspicious.” An ASPI report published this summer detailed how such electronic surveillance is also paired with a forensic DNA database in Xinjiang.

In Harbin, officials plan to use Sharp Eyes as a form of predictive policing, whereby digital surveillance and big data combine to “predict” crimes (and criminals) before they occur. By using algorithms to analyze mobile phone data, railway ticket purchases, hotel stays, vehicle numbers, financial transaction data, and more, authorities in Harbin’s Xiangfan district aim to draw connections between potential co-conspirators. Officials ascribe the necessity of this monitoring to anti-terrorism efforts, as they do in Xinjiang:

Finally, a terrorist and violent person prediction module would take existing case files involving “terrorism and violence” and use them to train police computers to “classify and make predictions about all people, to identify key persons with the potential to get involved in terrorism, bombings, and so on.” [Source]

Local surveillance systems are not always fully realized. The limits of bureaucracy, technology, and humanity mean that there is no “eye-in-the-sky” tracking and recording all movement in China. The ChinaFile report noted that “[g]aps in the overall surveillance system—between bureaucracies, between superior and subordinate offices, between projects, and between technologies—mean that the Chinese government does not have a seamless dragnet to ensnare any individual target.” Yet problems with integration do not prevent the Sharp Eyes program from realizing its ultimate goal, social control.

The impact of such surveillance, fragmented and unrealized as it yet may be, is in the “chilling effect” it has on behavior, said Daragh Murray in the report. CDT’s Founder and Editor-in-Chief, Xiao Qiang, quoted in the article, spoke of “internalized fear.” “You know the government can get you at any time. That fear is real in China. Once you have that fear—when there’s cameras all over the place—it instills that fear in you to get you to control your own behavior,” he said.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/10/sharp-eyes-surveillance-program-expands-dramatically/

Zhejiang Government Questions Wikipedia User for “Scaling the Wall”

Earlier this month, CDT reported that Zhejiang had published the names of individuals and businesses found Zhejiang had published the names of individuals and businesses guilty of circumventing China’s Great Firewall, listing the tools they used, the sites they visited, and the punishments meted out to them—including fines, warnings, and suspension of internet access. The latest screenshot taken of the Zhejiang Provincial Government Services website shows that one netizen in Zhejiang was detained and interrogated by the police for the “crime” of “scaling the wall”:

The screenshot, published on October 28 by Creaders.net, indicates that on October 24 an individual in Zhoushan City was detained from Mingzhuyuan in the Huannan Residential District and brought to a local police station for questioning. According to the case report, the individual downloaded Lantern (which they found through a Baidu search) and used the app to access Wikipedia beginning in 2019. They were given a warning by the police and instructed to stop “illegally connecting to international networks.”

All of these lists have disappeared from the Zhejiang government’s website.

Read more from CDT Chinese.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/10/zhejiang-government-questions-wikipedia-user-for-scaling-the-wall/

Minitrue Diary, February 12, 2020: Donations, Migrants, Flags, Food Prices, and the People’s War on Coronavirus

CDT has recently acquired and verified a collection of directives issued by central Party authorities to at the beginning of this year. These directives were issued on an almost daily basis in early 2020, and we will be posting them over the coming weeks. The following three directives were released on February 12, 2020.

Regarding propaganda reports on the novel coronavirus pneumonia epidemic, please firmly hold to the following items:

  1. Reports on external support and purchases of prevention and control material by Chinese people and diaspora abroad should be low-key. Report cautiously on donations and quantities, and especially do not play up our global mobilization of prevention and control material procurement to avoid a public opinion backlash in the countries concerned and consequent obstructions to our overseas procurement work.
  2. In reports on the medical team supporting Hubei, there should not be too many flags, banners, slogans etc. onscreen.
  3. Be sure not to play up or magnify people’s current difficulties, particularly donations to groups for the elderly, which could lead to secondary waves of public sentiment.
  4. Regarding notices issued in parts of Jiangsu encouraging workers from other regions to go home, local governments are rectifying the situation. Do not further hype. (February 12, 2020) [Chinese]

Several other directives issued to control early coverage of the COVID-19 outbreak had focused on portrayal of donations and supplies from elsewhere in China, including Hong Kong, and from abroad. One, issued the previous day, had also warned against an excess of flags. The situation in Jiangsu referred to in the final section is one example of broader difficulties faced by migrant workers, many of whom found themselves unwelcome and under pressure amid the fight to contain the coronavirus.

Please note, with regard to public interest ads and announcements involving epidemic prevention and control: some phrases like "storming the stronghold" and "pre-emptive strike" etc. are inconsistent with the current wording (examples of which include "people’s war," "blocking action," "total war"). In addition, when experts remind people not to take medication on their own initiative, it is inappropriate to use the phrase "no medicine can cure" [the disease]. (February 12, 2020) [Chinese]

A directive issued on February 6 had stipulated that reports on the epidemic should "no longer use warfare-related terms and expressions," but this prohibition appears to have been abandoned following Xi Jinping’s subsequent declaration of a "people’s war" against the virus.

Increase positive interpretations of the current price situation, avoid strengthening expectations of further price increases, and avoid formulations like "hitting the highest prices in years," "rises exceeding expectations," "inflation rearing its head," and so on. Promptly deal with malicious hyping of harmful information. (February 12, 2020) [Chinese]

The coronavirus epidemic contributed to sharp food price increases, compounding affordability issues already stoked by swine fever. Food prices have long been linked to political unrest: they were widely cited as a major factor in the "Arab Spring" uprisings across the Middle East in 2011, which helped shape the CCP’s current strategy for ensuring its own survival.

真Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth since 2011.



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/10/minitrue-diary-february-12-2020-donations-migrants-flags-food-prices-and-the-peoples-war-on-coronavirus/

Thursday 29 October 2020

CDT Censorship Digest, September 2020: Opposition is Their Only Crime

In 2020, CDT Chinese editors launched the CDT Censorship Digest series. The series will collect and quote from news and online speech that was censored by Chinese authorities during the previous month, as well as summarize efforts to preserve and strengthen freedom of speech in Chinese society. When relevant to CDT English readers, we will translate the Chinese series in part or in full. CDT has translated an excerpt from the full CDT Chinese digest for September 2020, adapted to include links to English coverage when available:

gmh 33

Vladimir Nabokov’s 1935 novel “Invitation to a Beheading” can serve as a metaphor for today’s China. The novel’s protagonist, death row inmate Cincinnatus C. is forced to dance circles with his jailer. The greatest crime of totalitarianism is forcing the people—which include among them political victims—into the role of accomplices. To dance with the jailer is to participate in his crime, and execution is without a doubt the most extreme brutality. He was sentenced for the crime of “gnostical turpitude,” and, after battling with the system to even learn the date of his execution, watched the false world around him—including the executioner and his shackles—dissolve with him.

After the passing of the Hong Kong National Security Law on July 1, the city’s resistance movement faced a predicament. In the lecture “The Meaning of Public Life” Chinese University of Hong Kong Professor Zhou Baosong discussed how to continue public life when facing a leviathan:

When does the resistance break out? When we realize that we are free subjects and take initiative to say “no” to power. Resistance isn’t always vigorous, it can also occur silently and subtly in everyday places. This type of conscious resistance, as long as it is persistent and becomes a way of life, first will change our selves. Since we are part of the fabric of this world, when we change, the world must change accordingly. [Chinese]

Looking back on September, we see resistance carried out with vigor, and also subtly in daily life. Today, as the public sphere continues to deteriorate, all resistance is conscious resistance, all resistance is an active denial of authority. This is how Cincinnatus saved himself and won his freedom.

Their Only Crime is Opposition

Prisoners of conscience and political prisoners are a natural product of authoritarianism. While the names of the criminal charges used are myriad, they are all in fact a single crime: opposition.

On August 31, Weiquanwang published their “Monthly Report on Political Prisoners and Prisoners of Conscience in Detention in Mainland China”:

The statistics included 868 political prisoners of various ethnic groups (including Han Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Kazakh, Hui, Mongolian, Korean, and Manchu). Among them, 691 have received sentences ranging from the death penalty, life imprisonment, or fixed term imprisonment. The remaining 177 have been detained without knowing what punishments or sentences they will receive.

The report specifically pointed out that the CCP’s current sentence against Uyghurs, Kazakh elites, and the people is so severe that it is horrifying. It is not uncommon to see imprisonment for more than ten years or death sentences; torture and mistreatment of detained political prisoners and prisoners of conscience are widespread and serious. Many have been subjected to torture or long-term abuse during their detention, and they were forced into mental hospitals, and some were even tortured to death. The authorities’ suppression of religious figures continues. Since Xi Jinping took power, the CCP’s persecution of religious figures has become increasingly serious. In addition, Falun Gong is still one of the most severely suppressed groups by the CCP. Every month, dozens of Falun Gong practitioners are sentenced across the country. [Chinese]

With no doubt, September’s highest profile political prisoner was Ren Zhiqiang. Back in March Ren ruthlessly ridiculed Xi Jinping in an essay that circulated online:

I saw [in Xi’s teleconferenced February 23 speech] not an emperor standing there exhibiting his “new clothes,” but a clown who stripped naked and insisted on continuing being emperor. Despite holding a series of loincloths up in an attempt to cover the reality of your nakedness, you don’t in the slightest hide your resolute ambition to be an emperor, or the determination to let anyone who won’t let you be destroyed. [Source]

Shortly after this essay was published, Ren went missing, and a month later was reported to be under investigation by disciplinary authorities. In late July, he was expelled from the Party for “consistently differing with the Party Central Committee on issues of principle.” On September 22, Ren was sentenced to 18 years on corruption charges.

On September 10, retired Central Party School professor Cai Xia, who is now in the United States, discovered that her bank account in China had been closed. Not only had the CCP cancelled her pension, but now she couldn’t even draw from her savings. In August Cai was expelled from the Party and saw her retirement package disintegrate over remarks she made severely criticizing Xi Jinping.

Also in September, an open letter by former People’s University professor Leng Jiefu to top Party leader Wang Yang began circulating online. The letter put forward two main suggestions: that Xi retire honorably from all Party, government, and military posts; and that China adopt a federal model to safeguard unity in regards to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and ethnic autonomous regions. Leng also called for programs to revitalize the rural economy. In 2012, Leng published an open letter warning that China was “facing conflicts of a political, economic, ideological, and military nature that threaten, in the long term, to rip us apart from north to south.”

On September 10, Beijing-based publisher and film producer Geng Xiaonan was detained with her husband Qin Chen on suspicion of “illegal business operations,” a charge used in the past to suppress dissent. Geng, an energetic supporter of prominent activists, was an outspoken advocate of Xu Zhangrun, the law professor fired by Tsinghua University after a brief detention in July following his earlier suspension over scathing critiques of Xi Jinping. Geng denounced authorities’ accusation that Xu had solicited prostitutes on a trip she had arranged as “just the kind of vile slander that they use against someone they want to silence,” and gave an extended interview to RFA’s Bei Ming—translated by Geremie Barmé at China Heritage—to praise Xu’s work and defend his innocence. Prior to her detention, Geng had voiced concern over the pandemic being used to tighten the surveillance of politically sensitive people.

Former lawyer Chen Qiushi, who late last year was barred from leaving China and banned from social media after visiting Hong Kong to observe the anti-extradition protests, went to Wuhan in the capacity of a citizen journalist to cover the early coronavirus outbreak. He disappeared in February, and after months with no news, his friend Xu Xiaodong, a high-profile MMA fighter, in September revealed that the government had decided not to press charges against him, and that he was healthy and being held under official surveillance in Qingdao.

Wang Qiaoling, wife of former “Black Friday” detainee Li Heping, had planned to attend a Constitution Day celebration at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on September 17. After leaving her home that day, she lost contact with the outside world. She told Radio Free Asia that after leaving the Dongfeng Beiqiao metro station she was robbed of her phone by two plain-clothed men and pushed to the ground, then was forced into a police car and driven home.

[…]

Xi Dada, Emperor of the World

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly by video for the annual General Debate of the 75the session on September 22, Xi Jinping took the tone of a global leader, stressing China’s willingness and ability to guide and assist the world in the fight against COVID-19. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Zhang Jun also expressed Beijing’s ambitions to take a lead in the multilateral global order, saying that Xi’s speech “pointed out the direction, added confidence, and added strength to the future of the United Nations.” As CDT Chinese editors have noted with a list of examples, Xi Jinping has long been known to take all possible opportunities to “point out the direction” for the Chinese people—and increasingly, for all of mankind.

So, which way does that direction lead? Deutsche Welle columnist Chang Ping looked at Disney’s recent retelling of Mulan, widely criticized for whitewashing Chinese history and ongoing human rights abuses, as a campaign film for Xi’s vision of governance. As Hollywood attempts to signal its collective support for social justice in the contemporary U.S. context, Chang notes that Mulan displays its increasing willingness to “slavishly follow orders as part of China’s great propaganda campaign.”

What type of world is it that Xi is pointing out the direction toward? Perhaps what happened in China’s direct and peripheral control in September can offer a hint?  A Twitter user, for example, disclosed that they’d been “invited to tea” for  “ridiculing Xi Jinping” in a QQ group. Screenshots showed their likely offense: triggering alarm by posting a combination of the sensitive words “Xi Dada” and “emperor.”

Mainland: Pervasive Surveillance and Censorship

As people continued to mourn Dr. Li Wenliang in September, the concealing of a separate, still ongoing epidemic was exposed. In a 23,000-character September 11 exposé, Caixin Weekly detailed a Brucellosis outbreak in Lanzhou, Gansu that as of September 14 had been confirmed to have infected 3,245 people. The bacterial outbreak was the result of a leak at a local biochemical pharma factory. Prior to Caixin’s reporting, there had been no formal disclosure of the diagnoses, as local cover-ups and then the COVID-19 outbreak provided ample distraction.

Is it only the drug factory that’s to blame? What about the local authorities? How about the Health Commission? Haven’t we yet learned that concealing a disease can lead to as much harm as the disease itself? If nobody is held responsible, then no lessons are learned and more will suffer next time. The relationship between transparency and public health is clear as day, but this doesn’t stop the CCP from tightly controlling all information and speech.

On September 14, the Cyberspace Administration of China announced the results of a “Clear and Bright” internet rectification campaign. The report noted that a total of 64 websites have been suspended from updating, while 6,907 illegal websites have been closed or seen their licenses canceled. Relevant websites and platforms shut down more than 860,000 illegal accounts and groups in line with user agreements during the campaign.

Meanwhile, the CAC said it had dealt with 13,600 illegal  “eating broadcast” accounts in September as part of a crackdown on virally popular mukbang style eating streams, and had advanced other centralized campaigns to manage commercial website media platforms and self-media, disposing of 928,000 “zombie accounts,” 169 accounts with more than a million followers, 72,000 applications for news media qualifications, and also closed 74,000 broadcast accounts.

In September, Xinhua News published a CCP Central Committee document requiring private enterprises to strengthen United Front political and ideological work, instructing them to “be politically sensible people.” VOA Chinese summarizes:

In this document, titled “Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era,” central CCP authorities stated, “As our own people, private economic figures have always been an important force that our party must unite and rely on for long-term governance.”

This united front work, the document states, should be oriented toward all private enterprises and individuals working in private industry, including main investors, actual controllers, main shareholding operators, major shareholders, Hong Kong and Macau businesspeople who invest in mainland China, and representative individually-owned businesses. However, the document does not mention Taiwanese or foreign businesses.

According to Xinhua News, this is the first document published by the CCP regarding private enterprise united front work since Opening and Reform in 1978. [Chinese]

In Zhejiang this August alone there were 18 cases of administrative penalties for “individuals circumventing the firewall,” making a total of 60 for the year.

Review and e-commerce site Douban Books posted an announcement that the site would be undergoing modifications. From midnight on September 4 until midnight October 3, 2020, certain functionality would be temporarily disabled as internal modifications were underway. During this time, the creation of book reviews, ratings, and comment functions would be temporarily suspended. This marked bad news for the many readers who found community on the site, and worse news for editors and the rest of a publishing industry that relies on the platform.

On September 11, the official Weibo account for bookstore app Shaishufang announced that a user’s account had been banned in the Apple China region for adding 16th century erotic novel “The Golden Lotus” as a favorite.

And, the CCP’s control of speech has already extended overseas.

The English-language film “Five-Cent Life,” released exclusively online, tells the story of Lin Zhao, a victim of Mao-era Chinese political movements. In 1957, she was labelled a rightist and sent to work in the countryside. She was later imprisoned for being seen as participating in a “counterrevolutionary group.” In 1968, she was secretly executed by firing squad in Shanghai by authorities for the crime of “counterrevolutionary activities.” Afterward, authorities collected five cents from Lin Zhao’s mother to cover the cost of the bullet. Lin Zhao was officially rehabilitated in 1980, and she became a symbol of freedom in China. In an interview with RFA Chinese (also published in English), director Phoebe Liu explained that the choice to make the film in English was one of necessity: the sensitive nature of the film’s topic made it impossible to find native Chinese-speaking actors in both the mainland and Taiwan.

An American named Kevin, who randomly became mildly famous on B Site because of the pandemic, originally intended to become a professional blogger. But then, he encountered the terrifying reality of Chinese censorship. “I don’t want to become the next Michael Spavor, the next Michael Kovrig some day. They’ve already been imprisoned for over a year. You can pretty much say the charges against them were fabricated.” He subsequently left China and returned to the United States, because he could freely speak there. […]

The Xinjiang Model Expanding to Tibet, Mongolia, Hong Kong, and the World

The treatment of the Uyghur people has drawn condemnation from international rights organizations and leaders. It’s been called genocide—a question that the International Criminal Court has been asked to weigh in on. However, in the eyes of Xi Jinping, Xinjiang has proven to be a successful management model.

On September 25 during the third “Central Xinjiang Work Forum,” Xi Jinping called the CCP’s work in Xinjiang “a success.” The Xinjiang policy, called the “New Era Party Strategy for Xinjiang Governance,” according to Xi’s assessment, had been proven “entirely correct,” and should persist for the long-term to continue to “Sinicize Islam,” and to deepen ideological work. Xi urged authorities to fully and accurately implement the Party’s “Xinjiang Strategy,” “Lawful Xinjiang Governance,” “Xinjiang Unification and Stability,” and “Long-term Xinjiang Development,” to build a united and harmonious Xinjiang.

As Xi praises the policies that have terrorized Xinjiang in recent years, it is obvious that many of the experiences gained and templates utilized in the Xinjiang model are spreading. Not just in the provinces, they’re also spreading in Tibet, in Inner Mongolia, in Hong Kong—and even going global.

An exclusive Reuters investigation revealed that the Chinese government was sending large numbers of Tibetans into “military-style training centers” and forcing them to engage in labor—a similar situation to the Xinjiang “re-education camps.” Reuters reviewed over 100 official Chinese policy documents, procurement lists, and official media reports to find that the government was moving a large number of rural Tibetan laborers to other regions and setting quotas to provide labor for domestic industry. Reuters noted that the Tibet program is expanding even as the international community begins to put pressure on China for the Xinjiang camps.

In Inner Mongolia, protests continued over the regime’s decision to replace local language education with Mandarin. Authorities claimed the protests were incited by foreign forces and carried out large-scale arrests. The Inner Mongolia police continued to issue notices offering rewards for help apprehending hundreds of people wanted for “provoking trouble,” posting photos of many individuals believed to be grabbed from video taken on the scene of the protest. Additionally, police began demanding students report to school on time, holding local officials or the school responsible for failure. Police even entered classrooms to take Mongolian students away.

This terrifying type of totalitarianism has now also begun to permeate Hong Kong classrooms.

According to an Initium Media report, there has been a wave of reports against teachers in Hong Kong. They are being reported by mobilized civilians, and a former chief executive is even offering rewards. One middle school teacher was reported to the Education Bureau for posting anti-extradition movement content on his personal Facebook page:

A month-and-a-half later, he received a notice from the Education Bureau stating that he was ruled to have engaged in “professional misconduct,” but his teacher’s license would not be revoked. It asked him to please respond. He responded, and he then received a letter of official ruling. It was very sparsely worded, simply stating he was deemed to have engaged in professional misconduct and was therefore being sent this letter condemning his actions. “Just one sentence. You engaged in professional misconduct. That’s it. No mention of the considerations, nor any mention of whether or not they accepted the evidence I submitted proving my professionalism.” [Chinese]

This was no isolated case. According to official statistics, from June of last year through June of this year, the Education Bureau received 222 complaints involving the professional misconduct of instructors. Of these, 180 have already been fully investigated, 17 were officially reprimanded, and nine received written warnings. No teacher had his or her teaching license revoked. Another 63 complaints were deemed unsubstantiated. According to the Education Bureau, most of these complaints involved teachers saying inappropriate things, others were suspected of breaking a law.

The report notes that teachers not involved with social movements weren’t necessarily spared—there were also complaints for using “inappropriate teaching materials.” Most Hong Kong middle and primary school teachers use educational videos, plan activities, and/or design their own worksheets outside of the textbook.

Since the report came out, it hasn’t been just the Education Bureau scrutinizing Hong Kong teachers. As the Initium Media report explained, when it comes to the history curriculum of Hong Kong middle schools, there’s a red line that cannot be touched.

September 6 was election day for the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Once again, Hong Kong residents demonstrated in the Kowloon area. The situation evolved into conflict between police and civilians. By five in the afternoon, 90 individuals had been arrested on various charges, including illegal assembly and assaulting police officers. Another 22 people were issued summons for violating pandemic restrictions prohibiting gatherings of two or more people. […]

Twelve Hong Kongers who were caught trying to flee to Taiwan, including “Hong Kong Story” member Li Yuxuan, continue to be detained at the Shenzhen Yantian Detention Center. Mainland defense lawyers representing them were given multiple warnings from the National Security Council to drop the cases. The lawyers were warned that their credentials were at risk if they did interviews. By the end of September, no representing attorneys have been allowed to meet with the detained persons. They are not optimistic about the trial and possible return of these people to Hong Kong. Legal scholars and social activists have criticized the Hong Kong government for not doing its best to protect the human rights of the people of Hong Kong.

Additionally, September suggested that the CCP’s Xinjiang governing model is aimed not just at the people of China, but at free people the world over. The rejection in September of an article written by the U.S. Ambassador to China is an example of this.

The U.S. Embassy in China recently submitted an article to CCP party newspaper The People’s Daily, hoping to have the opinion of U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad be published in the paper. The article was rejected, triggering a shouting match between U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo and a People’s Daily spokesperson, making the incident yet another manifestation of a media organization’s involvement in U.S.-China relations.

According to The People’s Daily, Branstad’s article “Resetting the Relationship Based on Reciprocity” was “full of loopholes and seriously inconsistent with the facts,” and it was therefore rejected for publication. “For a long time, People’s Daily has held an active and open attitude to the submission of articles from international friends who are objective and impartial about China, including Ambassador Branstad,” the newspaper spokesperson said.

The move drew criticism from U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo, who stated in an English-language press statement, titled “The Hypocrisy of the PRC’s Propaganda System,” that the People’s Daily’s response once again exposed Beijing’s hypocrisy and the Chinese Communist Party’s fear of free speech.

Pompeo’s statement appeared on the official WeChat account of the US Embassy in China, but it was quickly blocked.

At a regularly scheduled press conference on September 10, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said, “This action by the United States obviously has nothing to do with freedom of the press. It was designed to find fault [with China] and was a deliberate set up.” [Chinese]

What did Branstad write, anyway?

According to a bilingual backup of the article on the U.S. Department of State’s website, Branstad states that for years, the U.S. has accepted the urging of Chinese leadership to focus on areas of cooperation while setting aside differences. Yet, at the same time, the United States “has made very little progress” in addressing its concerns. Branstad writes: “The Chinese leadership has exploited this approach. Often it has insisted we sweep differences under the table as a prerequisite for engagement.” In addition, sometimes the Chinese leadership “made promises to address our concerns yet failed to follow up.” As a result, the relationship of the two countries “has delivered fewer and fewer of the results that matter to the American people,” as the relationship “became increasingly imbalanced.” Branstad called on the two countries “to build a foundation for understanding and true reciprocity,” and this “must start with the Chinese government being willing to address our concerns about the imbalance in the relationship and allowing our two peoples to build relationships through unrestricted engagement and uncensored discussion.”

On September 13, Terry Edward Branstad suddenly announced he was resigning and preparing to return to the United States, triggering a new round of speculation by Chinese and foreign media about the direction of U.S.-China relations. Some looked back three-quarters of a century to a similar diplomatic situation.

When U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart recommended negotiating with and understanding the Communist Party in a State Department white paper, Mao replied with a sarcastic essay that became a piece of his classic literature. Stuart was the last U.S. Ambassador to China to serve until decades later, when the U.S. and China resumed their diplomatic relations. Following Mao’s template, WeChat user @二大爷 couldn’t help but wonder if history was repeating itself:

U.S. Ambassador Stuart, who was born in China, spent most of his time in service in China. He even said “I’m more of a Chinese person than an American.” He sadly left in August, 1949, because of a famous sarcastic essay, “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!” left nothing but the shadow of ridicule in the hearts of the Chinese people. Thirty years of darkness for US-China relations followed—the most difficult thirty years for the people of China.

Today, we bid another farewell. History will always repeat itself, but it may not always do so in a simple manner.

Farewell, Branstad. [Chinese]

 



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/10/cdt-censorship-digest-september-2020-opposition-is-their-only-crime/

With Ant IPO Looming, Speculation About Company’s Future

Chinese financial services giant Ant Co. is set to go public next Thursday with record-breaking IPOs in Hong Kong and Shanghai. A financial technology business spun out from Alibaba, it is expected to raise at least $30 billion USD, topping the previous record of $29.4 billion raised by state-owned oil behemoth Saudi Aramco in 2019. Ant’s public debut has inspired plenty of speculation about its future. It is hailed as a pioneer in fintech and a frontrunner in e-payment technology, but has also spurred concerns about privacy and its role in enabling growing levels of household debt. Others debate whether the arrival of China’s central bank digital currency (CBDC) will complement or compete with Ant’s services.

Ant already enjoys an enormous customer base. More than 730 million people use its Alipay app every month to pay for a broad variety of goods and services, as well as to make investments and take out loans. As The New York Times’ Raymond Zhong notes in an interview, the app once positioned itself as a competitor to China’s “stodgy, state-dominated banking system.” But Zhong and Cao Li also reported in an article for the Times that the company now frames its role as complementary to the state, as opposed to a competitor:

These days, Ant talks mostly about creating partnerships with big banks, not disrupting or supplanting them. Several government-owned funds and institutions are Ant shareholders and stand to profit handsomely from the public offering.

[…] The company has played give-and-take with Beijing for years. As smartphone payments became ubiquitous in China, Ant found itself managing huge piles of money in Alipay users’ virtual wallets. The central bank made it park those funds in special accounts where they would earn minimal interest.

After people piled into an easy-to-use investment fund inside Alipay, the government forced the fund to shed risk and lower returns. Regulators curbed a plan to use Alipay data as the basis for a credit-scoring system akin to Americans’ FICO scores.

[…] Ant has learned ways of keeping the authorities on its side. Mr. Ma once boasted at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, about never taking money from the Chinese government. Today, funds associated with China’s social security system, its sovereign wealth fund, a state-owned life insurance company and the national postal carrier hold stakes in Ant. The I.P.O. is likely to increase the value of their holdings considerably. [Source]

While Ant may have tempered its aggressive stance towards China’s big banks, founder Jack Ma continues to press barbs at international financial regulators. As The Financial Times’ Yuan Yang reported, Ma recently railed against global financial rules for being outdated and excessively risk-averse:

“The Basel Accords are like an old people’s club . . . we can’t use yesterday’s methods to regulate the future,” Mr Ma said at a conference in Shanghai on the weekend, referring to the international banking supervision framework.

Mr Ma said the challenges that the rules were designed to resolve were not relevant to China’s phase of development. “Many of the world’s problems” stemmed from “only talking about risk control, not talking about development, not thinking about young people’s or developing countries’ opportunities”, he said.

[…] He also urged moving away from a “pawnshop” mentality of banks taking collateral for loans and towards credit-ratings based on big data. The Basel Accords require banks internationally to keep sufficient collateral to absorb potential losses. [Source]

But while Ma sees the traditional banking system as excessively risk averse, Ant has also come under fire for enabling users to take on worrying amounts of debt via the popular lending functions of its Alipay app. The Wall Street Journal’s Stella Yifan Xie, Shan Li, and Julie Wenau reported on the worryingly large amount of personal debt being amassed by young people:

Short-term loans from online lenders such as Ant Financial Services Group are helping fuel the spending. Ant Financial charges rates up to nearly 16% on an annualized basis, depending on the credit profile of the borrower. A 2018 survey in China by Rong360, a loan recommendation website, found that around half of respondents who took out consumer loans were born after 1990.

Most had borrowed from multiple lending platforms, the survey found, and nearly a third took out short-term loans to repay other debts. Nearly half of them had missed payments.

One of the most popular ways to borrow is a Huabei account, a revolving credit line embedded in China’s Alipay mobile payments network. Huabei has extended loans in excess of 1 trillion yuan, or more than $140 billion, since its launch in April 2015, a person familiar with the matter said. Ant Financial, which owns Alipay, declined to disclose any figures related to Huabei. [Source]

The growing ubiquity of Alipay in China has also spurred privacy concerns, as the company has amassed vast amounts of data on its hundreds of millions of users. There is growing public concern in China about privacy issues, especially as reliance on e-payment apps such as Alipay and WeChat Pay has grown. Experts note that key provisions of China’s draft Data Security Law, which will for the first time regulate personal and consumer data, was likely written with e-payment apps in mind. Privacy concerns relating to e-payment apps are likely on the minds of consumers, too. In an article for Sixth Tone about China’s new digital currency system, Ye Ruolin reported on the perspective of one Chinese expert who spoke about relative trust in the government and tech companies in China:

Cui wasn’t too concerned about privacy [of the central bank digital currency]  either, given that both Alipay and WeChat Pay already require users to verify their identities by uploading a photo of their government ID.

“It’s about who you trust,” he said. “Personally, I have more faith in the government than tech companies. But it may be a different story in the U.S., where people tend to trust private companies more than the government.” [Source]

As the Financial Times’ Editorial Board wrote this week, data privacy concerns also have serious implications for Alipay’s prospects of expanding its business beyond China. Unlike Chinese Alipay users, international consumers may have greater reservations about the involvement of the Chinese government.

But by far the biggest issue is about the management of data. Ant and its rivals hold vast amounts of user information. This needs to be carefully managed and regulated. The Bank for International Settlements has previously warned about the potential of big tech companies to quickly become systemically relevant financial institutions. Regulators need to be alert to the consequences of these companies becoming major cross-border payment systems and should hold them subject to the same strict regulations that apply to banks.

Ant’s international business is still small relative to its Chinese operations, but its ambitious expansion plans have seen it take minority stakes in 10 e-wallet ventures in Asia. Ant may face the same questions as other Chinese tech groups over whether the data of foreigners is secure from the Communist party. This could limit its growth abroad. [Source]

The relationship between Ant Group and the Chinese government, and in particular, the degree to which they can cooperate, continues to be an open question. Chinese regulators have sent mixed signals about their attitude towards Alipay. Earlier this year, China’s central bank made the unusual move of urging the State Council’s antitrust committee to investigate Alipay and WeChat Pay for holding an alleged duopoly over the digital payment market. Technode’s Wei Sheng reported on the unusualness of that move, as China has been historically reluctant to go after domestic businesses with antitrust suits. CDT has written about recent developments and changing regulators’ attitudes in China on the issue of antitrust law.

But Chinese officials with the central bank have more recently struck a different tone. South China Morning Post’s Coco Feng and Masha Borak reported this week that a central bank official, when responding to questions about whether China’s emerging digital currency would compete with the e-payment giants, emphasized that they would play complementary roles:

China’s Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP) will not compete with WeChat Pay and Alipay, the head of the programme clarified for the first time on Sunday. The two digital wallets had a combined 94 per cent share of the country’s mobile payments industry in the second quarter, according to iResearch.

“They don’t belong to the same dimension. WeChat and Alipay are wallets, while the digital yuan is the money in the wallet,” said Mu Changchun, the head of the research institute for digital currency at the People’s Bank of China. [Source]



source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/10/with-ant-ipo-looming-speculation-about-companys-future/