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In recent months, China has come under fire from the European Commission, among others, for promoting disinformation about the origins and spread of the coronavirus. The campaign appears to mark a shift in Beijing’s tactics, as the government and its representatives have become more aggressive in pushing disinformation and conspiracy theories globally, a strategy more commonly associated with the Russian government. Indeed, new reports appear to demonstrate that the Chinese and Russian governments at times join forces to amplify and support each other’s disinformation campaigns. A recent New York Times report by Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger about Russian disinformation efforts around COVID noted that such efforts included “amplifying false Chinese arguments that the virus was created by the United States military.” In the midst of this, the Chinese and Russian governments have announced a joint effort to “combat” disinformation globally, noting that they will “strengthen communication, jointly combat disinformation, offer an accurate account of facts and truth, champion justice and legal principles, and uphold morality and conscience.”
ProPublica recently published a lengthy investigation into a video produced by Larry King, which turned out to be part of a disinformation campaign by the Chinese government with possible assistance from Moscow. Renee Dudley and Jeff Kao report on how King was “duped” into producing a video interview, in which he recorded the questions but was not present when the answers were recorded, about exiled billionaire Guo Wengui, who has long been the target of government propaganda and censorship:
[…] In the twilight of a remarkable radio and television career spanning more than six decades, battling health problems but determined to stay in the public eye, King was ensnared in an international disinformation scheme. Based on social media analysis and the retracing of a trail that wound through two Israeli entrepreneurs to Ora’s California studio, it appears that the Chinese government, possibly in concert with Russia, manipulated an American broadcasting icon.
“It’s unfortunate that Larry found himself unwittingly being exploited,” said Ora’s CEO, John Dickey. “I’ve seen it over the years. He’ll talk to anybody. He’ll give access to anybody, to a fault. He loves to mentor. He loves to be available. With a star that shines as bright as his, you’re going to have some people come into your orbit who are not positive. … This was obviously not right, and in hindsight, I wish it never would have happened. Larry didn’t know, and Jason [Rovou, King’s executive producer] could only protest so much.”
Posted on YouTube under the title “Larry King US China Special Conference 2019,” and quickly spread by social media accounts linked to Chinese government influence operations, the fake interview went viral across Chinese-language social media, likely reaching hundreds of thousands of users on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube.
As diplomatic tensions escalate between the U.S. and China, the video demonstrates how foreign disinformation campaigns are growing increasingly aggressive even as they conceal their origins to boost credibility. Social media is only one element of China’s far-ranging propaganda efforts. China also disseminates its message on university campuses, where its Confucius Institutes convey a whitewashed view of Chinese history and politics, and its Thousand Talents program aggressively woos top scientists.
The video has other implications as well. By conveying Chinese disinformation through a journalist for Russian media, it may exemplify the increasing media cooperation between the two countries. In addition, it raises questions about whether Niv — and King himself — should have registered as foreign agents on behalf of China. [Source]
In February, the State Department required five Chinese state-run media outlets to register as “foreign missions,” imposing restrictions on their actions in the U.S., which was followed by the Chinese government expelling several American journalists from China.
The U.S. government has also recently accused China, along with Russia and Iran, of using influence and propaganda campaigns to interfere with the upcoming U.S. election. From a New York Times report by David E. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes:
The warning came from William R. Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in a statement 100 days before Americans go to the polls. “We’re primarily concerned with China, Russia and Iran — although other nation-states and nonstate actors could also do harm to our electoral process,” the statement said.
The warning about China came at a moment of extraordinary tension between Beijing and Washington, only days after the United States indicted two Chinese hackers on charges of stealing intellectual property, including for the country’s main intelligence service, and evicted Chinese diplomats from their consulate in Houston.
The intelligence warning on Friday did not accuse the Chinese of trying to hack the vote; instead it said they were using their influence “to shape the policy environment in the United States” and to pressure politicians “it views as opposed to China’s interests.” [Source]
The Chinese government has also used widespread propaganda and disinformation in an effort to shape the global response to an ongoing crackdown in Xinjiang, including the internment of up to two million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims. A recent report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project looks at how these tactics in Xinjiang were scaled up following the leak of government documents about the mass detention program:
The Chinese government has deployed a multi-pronged and aggressive information control strategy to prevent access to accurate information on what is occurring in East Turkistan, to portray the success of government policies through a global propaganda campaign, and to attack individual activists, journalists and institutions reporting on the issue. Elements of the campaign include state media reports and public statements by officials that portray the camps in a positive light; reports and statements by international media outlets, foreign government officials, and international experts that highlight the “positive effects” of the camp system; and social-media posts that disseminate false stories on a variety of platforms inside and outside of China. The world beyond China’s borders is an increasingly important target of the Party’s public opinion work. [Source]
In the wake of worsening tensions between both their governments and Beijing, Australia and the U.S. have announced a joint initiative to counter disinformation from China and other countries, focusing especially of Chinese campaigns on social media by their diplomats and other government actors. From Anthony Galloway and Eryk Bagshaw of the Sydney Morning Herald:
Australia and the US will look to present a united front against disinformation by authoritarian states across the Indo-Pacific, with the two countries particularly concerned by the way in which China has used social media to undermine democracies across the region.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is already setting up a new taskforce to counter online disinformation, with Australia concerned about the effect on developing nations throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Twitter last month revealed it had removed more than 30,000 accounts after investigators found they had ties to state-run propaganda and disinformation operations in China, Russia and Turkey. [Source]
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Post tags: disinformation, external propaganda, global influence, Guo Wengui, propaganda, Russia
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As China is dealing with a new spike in coronavirus cases—reporting its highest new case count in three months on Wednesday—the vast majority of officially reported new cases are coming from the Xinjiang region. The capital city of Urumqi last week declared a “wartime state” over the initial spike, enacting additional lockdown measures in a region accustomed to tight security and high-tech surveillance.
In Xinjiang a broad and escalating crackdown on local Uyghur culture and religiosity has been underway since 2014, and arguments have recently been made that the aims of its policies fit the U.N. definition for genocide. Since at least 2017, the campaign has included a mass detention program that has held as many as two million Uyghurs. At The Guardian, Helen Davidson reports on fears that the new outbreak in Xinjiang could affect the internment camps:
Dr Anna Hayes, senior lecturer in politics and international relations at James Cook University in Australia, said the level of secrecy coupled with the potential for officials to cover up outbreaks, means any outbreak in the camps may never be made public.
“I doubt we would ever know,” she said. “But the fact there is community transmission, it’s only a matter of time, if it hasn’t happened already,” she said.
[…] Dr Michael Clarke, associate professor at the Australian National University’s national security college said the outbreak in two distant cities and high rates of community transmission suggested there were “multiple places throughout the region with potential hotspots”.
[…] “Another source of vector for the wider Uighur community is the Becoming Family program where you’re allocated a Han Chinese person … and you have to have the person in your house,” Hayes said, referring to a program of compulsory homestays where Communist party members spend about a week every two months in the home of Xinjiang residents. [Source]
Despite evidence of forced labor, political indoctrination, abuse, and death inside the camps, Chinese authorities continually deny allegations as a chorus of censure from foreign lawmakers, rights groups, academics, editorial boards, and celebrities continues to grow. Earlier this month, the U.S. announced Magnitsky sanctions on top CCP officials, and the International Criminal Court began considering a case against Beijing for crimes against humanity. Days later, China’s ambassador to the U.K. issued a lengthy and spirited denial of the situation in Xinjiang while being shown footage of blindfolded and bound prisoners being led to trains.
Last week, France renewed its criticism of Beijing over the treatment of Uyghurs and called for rights observers to be allowed into Xinjiang, and the Trump administration announced sanctions on 11 companies alleged to have utilized the forced labor of Uyghur detainees. At Reuters, Amber Milne reports on a coalition of over 180 civil society organizations’ petition for popular brands to stop sourcing cotton products from Xinjiang over the “grave risk” that forced labor was involved:
More than 180 organisations urged brands from Adidas to Amazon.com Inc. to end sourcing of cotton and clothing from the region and cut ties with any suppliers in China that benefit from the forced labour of the ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslim groups.
[…] While most fashion brands do not source from factories in Xinjiang, many of their supply chains are likely to be tainted by cotton picked by Uyghurs that is exported across China and used by other suppliers, the rights groups said in a letter.
More than 80% of China’s cotton comes from northwestern Xinjiang, which is home to about 11 million Uyghurs.
“Brands and retailers recognize there is a massive problem in the region, and that their supply chains are exposed to a grave risk of forced labour,” said Scott Nova, head of the U.S.-based Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), which signed the letter.
[…] A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in the United States earlier this month said the accusation of forced labour in Xinjiang was “both false and malicious”. [Source]
At CNN Business, Michelle Toh reports on comments from some of the companies urged against using cotton products from Xinjiang:
Some companies, such as PVH (PVH), the US owner of Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger, told CNN Business that it was working on “reducing our supply chain footprint in China, which will result in us ending all business relationships with any factories and mills that produce garments or fabric, or use cotton grown, in Xinjiang within the next 12 months.” The move was in line with a broader long-term strategy that had already been in the works for several years, a spokesperson said.
And Big W, a discount department store chain operated by Australia’s Woolworths (WOLWF) Group, said that while the company does not have any factories in Xinjiang, it acknowledged that “currently, we do not have visibility of the full supply chain of cotton.”
“We are aware … that some of the cotton sourced via our suppliers is likely to be from this region and we are conducting further due diligence,” a spokesperson said.
But several companies — including Nike (NKE), Puma and Adidas (ADDDF)— denied that they sourced products from the region, and stressed that they had worked to eliminate problematic practices from their supply chains. [Source]
The NBA recently announced the severing of ties to a Xinjiang-based basketball training academy after a U.S. senator wrote league executives a letter expressing concern in June. An ESPN investigation also found abuse and mismanagement at the NBA facility in Xinjiang. Late last year, the NBA became embroiled in a political firestorm after a team general manager expressed support for the Hong Kong protests, and cited massive revenue loss after China reciprocated by cancelling planned Chinese airings of games.
Asked if human rights abuses in #Xinjiang led @NBA to close academy, deputy commissioner Mark Tatum avoided the question: "Our job is not to take a position on every single human rights violation.” https://t.co/pvpur0RIGt @SteveFainaru
— Mark Fainaru-Wada (@markfwespn) July 29, 2020
As diplomatic and commercial pressure on Beijing continues to mount, Benedict Rogers notes that the silence of Pope Francis—a figure who has stressed the importance of “placing human rights at the center of all policies […] even if that means going against the tide”—can be explained by a controversial 2018 deal between the Vatican and Beijing:
In China today, we see one of the 21st century’s worst crimes—perhaps a genocide—being perpetrated against the Uighurs. But in addition, we see the most flagrant violation of an international agreement in China’s imposition of the new national security law on Hong Kong—a law that destroys Hong Kong’s freedoms and autonomy. We also see the worst crackdown on Christians since the Cultural Revolution, while the repression in Tibet continues.
Yet in the face of all of these crimes, Francis remains silent. He has not uttered a public prayer (I hope he has at least said a private one) for the Uighurs, Hong Kongers, Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and others who are increasingly feeling the pressure of the Chinese Communist Party’s boot—at all.
Why?
Two years ago, the Vatican made a deal with Beijing that bought the pope’s silence.
When I say “bought,” I am not suggesting impropriety. I love this pope and his focus on mercy and forgiveness. […]
[…] One of the most troubling aspects of the Vatican-Beijing deal is that the text remains secret. If it is such a good arrangement in the eyes of the Holy See, why can’t ordinary Catholics—and the world at large—know what it says? What we do know is that it gives the Chinese Communist Party—an avowedly atheist regime—a direct role in the appointment of Catholic bishops and that it has already led to the forced retirement of several underground bishops loyal to the Vatican in favor of state-approved bishops until recently out of communion with the church. [Source]
At Nikkei Asian Review, Andrew Sharp quotes Taiwan’s Digital Minister Audrey Tang’s warning that the policies and technology being used in Xinjiang represent “a prototype of a truly totalitarian surveillance regime,” and recalls earlier warnings from Tang about incorporating Chinese equipment into global 5G networks.
“We have seen that previous attempts at totalitarian government were at most sub-totalitarian because there were no sufficient technologies to ensure the total tracking of people,” Audrey Tang told reporters in Tokyo in an online news conference. “Now in places like Xinjiang we are seeing a prototype of a truly totalitarian surveillance regime is being worked on.”
A February report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute estimated that more than 80,000 Uighurs were moved out of Xinjiang to work in factories across China between 2017 and 2019, with some being sent directly from detention camps. According to the report, the workers are subjected to intimidation and threats, and are constantly monitored by security personnel and digital surveillance tools.
Speaking via video link from Taipei, Tang said such reports serve as a reminder for people in Taiwan of the value of liberal democracy.
“We see things through a human rights and democracy lens,” the 39-year-old said. “These attempts, for example in Xinjiang that I just alluded to, are basically prompting all sectors in Taiwan — not just the social sector people, the ‘hacktivists,’ but also people in the private sector — to look at these applications and technologies. It serves a really strong reminder that we should not go there.” [Source]
For an in-depth roundup of the policy background and political context of the Xinjiang region; and an explanation what led to, and what evidence supports the existence of the internment program, see a recent comprehensive post from Vox. See also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver’s summary of the situation. For more on Xinjiang, Uyghurs, or the internment program, see prior CDT coverage.
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Five Senses Series – Smell 1/2, by Gauthier DELECROIX – 郭天 (CC BY 2.0)
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In 2016, citizen journalist Lu Yuyu and his girlfriend at the time Li Tingyu were formally arrested after having been detained for over a month. The two had been chronicling “mass incidents” across China on the “Not News” (非新聞) blog and @wickedonnaa Twitter account since 2013. Reporters Without Borders awarded the detained Lu and Li a Press Freedom Prize in 2016. While Li was reportedly tried in secret and released in April 2017, Lu was sentenced to four years in prison that August for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” a catch-all charge frequently used to prosecute activists.
Lu was released from prison last month, and on July 17 began sharing his account of his detention and treatment on Twitter. CDT has translated the fourth part below. See also CDT’s translation of Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3.
不正确的记忆（4） pic.twitter.com/t9uzZ7nMCf
— darkmamu (@darkmamu6) July 21, 2020
I continued my hunger strike, I was committed. On the third day, an opportunity came up. The cop from the Northeast came in to do count. I confronted him at the door. You want to beat me? Why don’t you do it now? He couldn’t come in and complete his count, and he left.
Then the warden came. She said, “Li Tingyu cares a lot about you. After you said the police beat you, she called her lawyer. She wanted me to tell you that she wishes you well. Do you have anything to say to her? Any requests?” I said that I wish her well too. And that I wanted to buy an English dictionary.
I could buy books, and I heard about Jane [Li Tingyu’s English name]. So I started eating again.
I didn’t pay attention when I was in school. I skipped classes, got into fights, and basically learned nothing. I didn’t know much English. In 2015, Jane signed me up for online classes in Hujiang. I would babble along when I was done with my work. Jane obviously found my pronunciation intolerable. She asked me to just study the phonetic alphabet first.
A few days later, the warden got me a dictionary. It had a red cover, and reminded me of those classic moments in the 1970s. She said it’s a gift, that no payment was required, and that if I wanted more books I should just go to the library. I went and found an American-style pronunciation guide. I also found a novel written by a British author. Every day, I exercised, read, and studied English.
The bathroom was located in the outdoor space. The shower was directly above the toilet, and the hot water was from solar power. We were allowed to shower twice a week. The surveillance camera was pointed towards the bathroom with no blocking. When using the toilet we would use a basin for cover, and we’d turn our backs against the camera while showering. Xiao Yang didn’t do that. When he showered, he faced the camera on purpose. There was no toilet in our cell. When they locked the door at night, we had to use a big black plastic bucket as a toilet. To prevent odor, we had to throw in a mushy soap and keep stirring it until the suds were about to overflow. We took turns doing that.
Xiao Yang was about 30 years old. He was a traffic cop, an urban guy. He looked down on Xiao Zhao, who was from the countryside. Although they were both charged with theft, he often said nasty things to Xiao Zhao. One time they almost got into a fight over some petty business. I stopped them.
In October, they finally thought to come see me. I was so bored! As I was thinking over the slim chance they’d be letting us out, two people came, a bald supervisor and a young person in an FC Barcelona jersey. I’m a Barca fan. The bald supervisor had some paperwork in hand. He said: “Lu Yuyu, let’s talk.”
“What do you want to talk about?”
“Let’s talk about Jin Feng. What’s your relationship with him?”
“Friends on the internet. We haven’t even met in person. What’s there to talk about?”
“How about the Guangbao Party?”
“I’m sorry. I have no idea what you are talking about.”
“Alright. Let’s talk about you. Do you want to get out early?”
“Of course.”
“We want you out soon as well. But you have to explain your situation first.”
“What situation? I told you a long time ago, even under your laws I’m innocent.”
“That means you want to go through trial procedures?”
“I can’t control whatever procedures you have. I’m innocent.”
The conversation led nowhere, and they left.
Days went on like this. Occasionally, people got excited when some female inmates would come through to clean the floor. Xiao Yang received his verdict at the end of October. He got a year and a half. In early November, he was sent to prison. We didn’t get a new cellmate.
On November 11, they made an announcement over speakers, telling everyone to pack up. Any chance they were letting me out?
I took all my personal stuff and walked out of the gate. A van was waiting there. I was put on ankle shackles and got into the car. Then two armed police joined me.
As the prison van drove into the city, Xiao Zhao said that we were going to the city jail. The prison van drove across the city, and moments later we arrived at Dali City Jail.
We walked through a series of gates. Outside a security room, police officers used their feet to inspect our stuff. Xiao Zhao and Lao Zhang were escorted to their cells. Before we parted ways, Lao Zhang said: “Lu Yuyu, take care.”
Lao Zhang was 45 years old, but he looked 50. His beard and hair were grey.
I was left there alone, uneasy. I thought about whether I should fight back if my new cellmates messed with me. A police officer came, asked a few questions, and then left again. A few officers were smoking and chatting in the security room. There were about 30 cells next to the security room. This was the center of the jail, like a giant, flat Beijing courtyard.
Later, a chubby police officer brought me to the furthest cell. There were five cellmates in there, cleaning things up. I guess they were assigned there to do merits.
The outdoor space was just like what we had in the prefecture jail. They put metal wire above it like a cage. There were some cigarette butts left there by police officers. The ground was about 20 cm lower than the cell floor. I thought to myself: That would make my running exercise a little inconvenient. [Chinese]
Translation by Yakexi. See also CDT’s translation of Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3.
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In 2016, citizen journalist Lu Yuyu and his girlfriend at the time Li Tingyu were formally arrested after having been detained for over a month. The two had been chronicling “mass incidents” across China on the “Not News” (非新聞) blog and @wickedonnaa Twitter account since 2013. Reporters Without Borders awarded the detained Lu and Li a Press Freedom Prize in 2016. While Li was reportedly tried in secret and released in April 2017, Lu was sentenced to four years in prison that August for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” a catch-all charge frequently used to prosecute activists.
Lu was released from prison last month, and on July 17 began sharing his account of his detention and treatment on Twitter. CDT has translated the third part below. See also CDT’s translation of Part 1 and Part 2.
不正确的记忆（3） pic.twitter.com/nEBDyOnW4a
— darkmamu (@darkmamu6) July 20, 2020
My jail cell had a surveillance camera, and so did the outdoor space. At first, there weren’t any audio recording devices, but a few days later they installed them. I talked nonsense underneath it on purpose, and so did Xiao Yang. He said some bureau chief was working for drug dealers. Xiao Yang said he used to be a traffic cop. One day he was high on meth, and he circled around and around Xiaguan on someone else’s motorcycle. Then, well, then he wound up in here, charged with theft.
One day, Xiao Zhao was bored. He wrote some words on the wall of the outdoor space with his nails. I did so too. We were caught and everyone was told to write a self-criticism. I said that I was the one who wrote those things, don’t trouble the others, and that I wouldn’t write the self-criticism. They said, if you don’t write it, we’ll stop selling things to you!
My three cellmates wrote self-criticisms. I refused, so they stopped selling to us–not even toilet paper. I was hungry and didn’t have enough to eat. I refused to answer questions during interrogations.
“Why won’t you answer our questions?” The jail won’t sell me anything. I’m hungry!
Later that afternoon, they sent us some toiletries and food. They said they didn’t have much left and we just had to make do with these, and that they’ll sell to us next time. That evening, Xiao Zhao said if it were at the city jail, you’d be beaten up badly. He said that two days before, the city jail warden told them that they’d be transferred to the prefectural jail, and that they should try to perform some deeds of merit. On the afternoon of my arrest, they were transferred from city jail to this prefectural jail. This jail didn’t normally take in male inmates.
A few days later, I was moved to a different cell. Maybe the original cell didn’t give them a good enough audio recording? I tried to poke around and see which cell Jane [Li Tingyu’s English name] might be in. Xiao Zhao told me that even if I could find out, I wouldn’t be able to see it. Xiao Zhao was charged with theft. He drove around in a minivan, pretending to be a moving company. He broke into people’s homes when a chance came up and took their stuff. He had been locked up for six months now. I once saw his indictment—he even took potted plants.
We had a library but not many books to read. We were allowed to go once a month. One day, Xiao Zhao and others went there and took back a lot of books. I picked two, one by Gu Long, the other was an American soldier’s memoir of the Vietnam War. We were allowed to watch TV in the evening. Everyday there was some soap opera on Hunan TV. As they watched TV, I read books or simply did nothing. People must be looking for us, I thought. We had been updating our Twitter on a daily basis with no interruptions. But now we stopped for so many days, friends must be looking for us.
Around Day 10, someone deposited 1,000 yuan in my account. They wouldn’t let me see the deposit slip. I took a sneak peak and saw it was deposited by Xu Hui (@yangpigui). It must have put in a lot of effort to find me in this prefectural jail.
Around Day 20, someone came and asked me what my older brother’s name was. The next day, Attorney Xiao and Attorney Wang came and brought with them good wishes from the outside. They mentioned a series of familiar names. With so many people who care about me, I thought, it’s all worth it. I signed a pile of powers or attorney.
The interrogations went on. I once said that if we have to go through tens of thousands of cases one by one, it will take a year. They said they have orders, and that there’s no way around them. Around Day 20, interrogations suddenly stopped. In the months that followed, I was completely forgotten, except once in a while I’d get a notice to switch cells.
I received some clothes and shoes. My big sisters were quite thoughtful.
They didn’t allow smoking in the prefecture jail. It didn’t take me much effort to get used to this, but Xiao Zhao and the others were having a hard time. Every day, they talked about smoking. They rolled scratch paper into fantasy cigarettes. He said he regretted coming to the prefectural jail— no opportunities for merits, and no cigarettes to smoke. He’d rather have stayed at the city jail, where he could smoke. Once in a while, we’d smell cigarette smoke from the lobby, and they would lament about it.
From time to time, the jail would summon the three of them for a talk. I was never included. I assumed they were asking them about me. Xiao Zhao and Xiao Yang used to tell me to forget about it, that I can’t beat them. Xiao Wang was young. He was charged with defrauding someone of something like 100 thousand yuan, and he was stupid enough to take that person to his home. He never tried to persuade me to do anything. About two months later, he was suddenly transferred back to the city jail. I guess it was because he never did any persuasion. Then came Lao Zhang, a man from the northeast.
Lao Zhang used to sell grilled squid in Shuanglang. He stabbed someone with a beer bottle over territorial disputes and was jailed for 10 days. A year later, he was suddenly in jail again. He said they had connections and wanted more money out of me.
The second day after he came, he asked me to play poker with him. We used marinated eggs as chips. We played all morning to kill time. Lao Zhang lost everything. We called it a day. I gave those marinated eggs back to him, I couldn’t have eaten all of them anyway.
Lao Zhang jogged every morning, from the cell to the outdoor space and back. I followed him, and so did Xiao Zhao, 30 minutes every day.
The female inmates lived next door. We could hear them talking from the outdoor space during the day. Xiao Zhao often knocked on their walls but never got a response. One day he was reported by them. The cops came in and scolded him, and he didn’t dare to knock again.
The lights in the cell were always on. I had trouble falling asleep, so I covered my face with a t-shirt. A female officer said that was not allowed and told me to take it off. She sounded tough. I said I couldn’t sleep, that I’d had enough. Then she called up two male officers to threaten me. One of them had a Sichuan accent, the other had a Northeastern accent. They said I must immediately take it off. I refused. 30 minutes later, they left. Male officers were not allowed in jail cells at night. At our morning count, the two of them came in. The Northeastern officer said viciously: “Lu Yuyu, stand straight!” I said I couldn’t stand straight. He came over and tried to push me to the ground. My head hit the wall during struggle. The Sichuan officer joined him and grabbed my arms, pushing me to the ground. I was in pain and couldn’t fight back, so I shouted that the officers were beating me up. Apparently that worked, they let me go.
I went on the first hunger strike of my life. I wrote on a piece of paper that the police had beaten me up, and put it towards the surveillance camera. The cops didn’t come in. They summoned Xiao Zhao for a talk. When he came back, Xiao Zhao asked me to eat. I didn’t go out. I didn’t stand up for the count. I just lay in bed and drank water whenever hunger set in. The next day, Attorney Wang came. The Sichuan officer took me to see him. I told Attorney Wang that I was beaten up by the police. And just like that, he walked away, dejected. Attorney Wang told me to watch my health. I took the opportunity to make a statement: “I am in good health. I don’t have any illnesses. If I die or become sick in jail, the CCP did it.” [Chinese]
Translation by Yakexi. CDT will continue to translate selected excerpts from Lu’s Twitter diary account of his detention as they are published. See also CDT’s translation of Part 1 and Part 2.
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On Wednesday, the Trump administration issued a surprise order for the Chinese consulate in Houston to “cease all operations and events” by Friday afternoon. The move added to festering diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing over issues including rights abuses in Xinjiang, tit-for-tat policies aimed at restricting press access, and Beijing’s imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong. While the U.S. government didn’t initially provide clarity on the immediate reasons for the order beyond vague espionage allegations, news reports cited a relevant FBI investigation and noted allegations of a wanted Chinese researcher being harbored at the San Francisco consulate.
On Friday, the FBI arrested a Chinese scientist who was hiding from allegations of visa fraud at Beijing’s mission in San Francisco. CNBC’s Amanda Macias reports, noting that if convicted the suspect faces 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine if convicted:
According to court documents unsealed earlier this week in the Eastern District of California, Juan Tang, a researcher at the University of California at Davis, applied for a non-immigrant J1 visa in October 2019. The visa was issued in November 2019 and Tang entered the United States a month later.
Tang allegedly made fraudulent statements on her visa application by concealing that she served in the Chinese military. The FBI concluded that Tang was a uniformed officer of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force after photographs of her were uncovered on electronic media seized pursuant to a search warrant.
“I won’t discuss the circumstances of the arrest,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, adding that the individual did not have diplomatic immunity. The person said that the details of the arrest could be released when the defendant appears before the Eastern District of California court on Friday. [Source]
The AP reports that three other researchers have been formally arrested for visa fraud in connection with the probe. At CNN, Kylie Atwood, Nicole Gaouette, and Jennifer Hansler report that U.S. officials also commented further on the reasons behind the Houston consulate’s closure:
The activities in Houston “are a microcosm, we believe, of a broader network of individuals in more than 25 cities. That network is supported through the consulates here,” the Justice Department official said. “Consulates have been giving individuals in that network guidance on how to evade [and] obstruct our investigation. And you can infer from that the ability to task that (a) network of associates nationwide.”
[…] The idea to close the Houston consulate emerged this spring after China interfered when US officials returned to the consulate in Wuhan, closed due to the coronavirus pandemic, to retrieve diplomatic materials, a senior State Department official told CNN.
[…] The senior Justice Department official acknowledged that the US move against China’s espionage won’t yield many arrests. “By their very nature, consulates are a base of operations for foreign governments in the United States, including the intelligence services,” the official said, but “the sum total of the Houston consulates activities went well over the line of what we’re willing to accept.”
[…] “Our focus is on disrupting this activity out of Houston as well as deterring similar activity by Chinese officials and other consulates,” they said in the call with reporters. “Closing the Houston consulate and presenting relocation of those officials accomplishes both of those goals.” [Source]
Meanwhile, Beijing on Friday retaliated by ordering the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu to shut down. At The New York Times, Keith Bradsher and Steven Lee Myers report, noting official rebukes to a sharply worded speech this week from U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo:
Beijing blamed the Trump administration for the deterioration in relations, calling its own action justified after Washington told China this week to shutter its consulate in Houston and accused its diplomats of acting illegally. A Chinese official, in turn, denounced American diplomats in Chengdu, a southwestern city, for interfering in China’s affairs.
In the Chinese telling, Beijing is under assault, as the Trump administration goes after it with increasing intensity on trade, technology and human rights. All in a matter of weeks, the United States has sanctioned Chinese officials over the ruling Communist Party’s policies in Hong Kong and the western region of Xinjiang, cut off Chinese companies’ access to American technology and challenged Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea.
The party’s propaganda outlets struck a nationalistic note on Friday, vowing that Beijing would hold firm in the face of mounting pressure from the United States.
[…] To the Trump administration, China has been the aggressor. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Thursday accused Beijing of exploiting the West’s willingness to engage with the Communist Party. He called on “freedom-loving nations of the world” to band together and “induce China to change.” [Source]
At Whats on Weibo, Manya Koetse cites Chinese social media to report on the situation outside of the Chengdu consulate, and explains a meme that Chinese netizens created of the situation:
On Weibo, over two million people ‘liked’ one of the news posts reporting on the closure of the consulate in Chengdu. The most popular comment of the comment thread, receiving over 231,000 ‘thumbs up’ suggested to “directly turn [the consulate] into a hotpot restaurant.”
Chengdu is one of China’s authentic hotpot hot spots, and is famous for its Sichuan hotpot, with many hotpot restaurants scattered around the city.
“I’ve already got a hotpot restaurant name ready, when can we move in?”, one commenter suggested, with others responding that the only suitable name for the imaginary hotpot place would be “Trump Hotpot.”
A photoshopped design of the future hotpot place was shared on Weibo and Douyin. [Source]
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Post tags: diplomacy, espionage, U.S. relations
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