source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2023/05/photo-lift-maintenance-by-hbnorth/
Tuesday 23 May 2023
Photo: Lift Maintenance, by hbnorth
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2023/05/photo-lift-maintenance-by-hbnorth/
China and G7 Nations Trade Accusations of Economic Coercion, Deepen Geopolitical Fault Lines
Tensions rose in the wake of the G7 summit last weekend, as China weathered accusations of being an economic and security threat, while countering with its own similar accusations against the West. The meeting of the multilateral group—composed of the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan, and punctuated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s surprise visit—underscored the extent to which China has become entrenched as a geopolitical antagonist in the eyes of many Western leaders. David Pierson and Chris Buckley from The New York Times described the parallels between the growing convergence of Ukraine and the G7 countries on one hand, and that of Russia and China on the other:
The contrast between President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine receiving more arms guarantees from President Biden at the G7 and [Russian Prime Minister] Mr. Mishustin seeking more economic support for Russia from China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, underscores how the deepening geopolitical divisions have been exacerbated by the war.
“China is ready to double down on its relationship with Russia following the G7 summit because the central theme of that summit comprised not only Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but also China and how the West should deal with it,” said Alexander Korolev, a senior lecturer at the University of New South Wales in Australia, who studies Chinese-Russian relations.
“The summit and Zelensky’s presence at it have marked a more apparent and deeper geopolitical divide between the West on the one hand and China and Russia on the other hand,” he added. [Source]
One major outcome of the summit was the formation of a new framework, called the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion, which aims “to increase [the G7’s] collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence and response.” It is largely seen to be directed at China. Josh Lipsky, the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, said that at the G7’s summit in the U.K. two years ago, “It would have been hard to believe that European leaders would sign on to a statement that was so specifically directed at Beijing. But […] the G7 has shown it will increasingly focus on China and will try to maintain a coordinated policy approach. That’s a major development.” A U.S. White House fact sheet released after the summit contained a section outlining the G7’s “united” position on China, and the forum’s “need to respond to concerns and to stand up for our core values”:
Economic security issues. The G7 will push for a level playing field for their workers and companies and seek to address the challenges posed by China’s non-market policies and practices and foster resilience to economic coercion. They recognized the necessity of protecting certain advanced technologies that could be used to threaten our national security.
Indo-pacific. Leaders reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and called for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. They highlighted that there is no change in the basic positions of the G7 members on Taiwan. They registered their serious concern […] about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reaffirmed their strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion.
Core values. G7 Leaders voiced concerns about the human rights situation in China, and called on China not to conduct interference activities or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions. [Source]
Part of the G7’s resolutions sought to clarify that its approach “not designed to harm China” nor “to thwart China’s economic progress and development.” Instead of “decoupling,” the favored description used to forge a common strategy was “de-risking,” a term that was recently popularized by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The nuanced, less-hawkish tone reflected concerns from Europe and Japan about antagonizing Beijing. But some individual statements conveyed a harsher stance. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said China posed “the greatest challenge of our age” in regards to global security and prosperity, and that it was “increasingly authoritarian at home and abroad.”
The Chinese government reacted furiously to the G7’s newfound resolve to present a unified front. In response to Sunak’s statement, the Chinese embassy in the U.K. issued a statement of its own: “The relevant remarks by the British side are simply parroting words from others and constitute malicious slanders in disregard of the facts. China firmly opposes and strongly condemns this.” As Al Jazeera reported, China summoned the Japanese ambassador to protest the summit:
China’s Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong has summoned the Japanese ambassador to register protests over “hype around China-related issues” at the Group of Seven (G7) summit over the weekend, the foreign ministry said in a statement.
[…] Sun said Japan’s actions were detrimental to China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.
“Japan should correct its understanding of China, grasp strategic autonomy, adhere to the principles of the four political documents between China and Japan, and truly promote the stable development of bilateral relations with a constructive attitude,” he added. [Source]
Throwing an early punch before the G7 summit began, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released “America’s Coercive Diplomacy,” a blistering 5,000-word report that was amplified by Chinese state media and diplomats online. The release of the report coincided with the opening of the China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an, during which Xi Jinping unveiled an ambitious “plan for Central Asia’s development, […] taking on a new leadership role in a region that has traditionally been a Russian sphere of influence.” As the end of the G7 summit approached, the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged the G7 nations to “stop ganging up to form exclusive blocs, stop containing and bludgeoning other countries, stop creating and stoking bloc confrontation and get back to the right path of dialogue and cooperation.” Simone McCarthy at CNN described how the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s criticism specifically labeled the U.S. as the main culprit:
Beijing’s retort later Saturday urged the G7 “not to become an accomplice” in American “economic coercion.”
“The massive unilateral sanctions and acts of ‘decoupling’ and disrupting industrial and supply chains make the US the real coercer that politicizes and weaponizes economic and trade relations,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
“The international community does not and will not accept the G7-dominated Western rules that seek to divide the world based on ideologies and values,” it continued. [Source]
“China’s reaction this time is quite intense,” said Wang Jiangyu, a professor at City University of Hong Kong. Moritz Rudolf, a research scholar and fellow at Yale University’s Paul Tsai China Center, said that “Beijing’s reaction (especially the early timing of its release) underlines that tensions in the region are already quite high and likely to increase further.” That said, commenting on the freeze in Sino-American relations, U.S. President Joe Biden predicted at the end of the summit: “I think you’re going to see that begin to thaw very shortly.” He also revealed that the U.S. was considering easing sanctions on China’s defense minister, General Li Shangfu, who was sanctioned in 2018 in response to Chinese purchases of Russian weapons. The move could help restart bilateral military communications. Commenting on this potential thaw, Brookings senior fellow Ryan Haas outlined several adjustments available to the U.S. to push its relationship with China in a more constructive direction:
First, Washington can reprioritize direct, private diplomacy with China. Public spectacles, such as the March 2021 meeting between U.S. and Chinese diplomats in Anchorage or the more recent dust-up between Blinken and Politburo member Wang Yi on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, are counterproductive. They limit America’s ability to influence how China pursues its interests, shake the confidence of America’s allies in the soundness of American strategy, and poison personal relations between participants. Pushing Xi publicly will generate the opposite of the intended effect. Private letters, phone calls, quiet conversations among national security advisors, drama-free visits, and work through embassies will hold greater prospects of making progress on American priorities with China.
Second, the United States should pause efforts with Beijing to negotiate crisis management mechanisms and principles for the conduct of the relationship. At a tactical level, there is no scope for progress on these issues in the current climate of relations. Pushing these topics now will be more aggravating than risk-reducing.
[..] Third, Washington needs to get back into the business of channeling Xi’s ambitions to constructive ends. Xi wants to enjoy dignity and respect on the world stage. He wants to be viewed as a global leader and a peacemaker. Washington should look for ways to harness these ambitions to support its own priorities. For example, rather than pouring cold water on Beijing’s inability to mediate Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the United States and its global partners should look for discrete areas to urge China to take on greater responsibility for lowering tensions and relieving suffering. Washington could push Beijing, for example, to take the lead in pressuring Russia to keep grain routes open through the Black Sea for the sake of global food security. Washington and its partners could encourage Beijing to take the lead in setting expectations in Moscow and Kyiv that attacks against nuclear power plants such as Zaporizhzhia would constitute nuclear terrorism and provoke a harsh international response. Beijing also could be urged to organize international efforts to pool funding for Ukraine’s $411 billion reconstruction bill after the war concludes. [Source]
China, meanwhile, has not signaled a strong desire to thaw relations with the U.S. As Lingling Wei reported for The Wall Street Journal, on the same day that Biden was hinting at the resumption of high-level exchanges, the Chinese government announced that U.S. tech firm Micron had failed a security review, and warned Chinese companies against using Micron’s products:
The Cyberspace Administration of China said Sunday its review of Micron products found “significant security risks” that would affect national security and warned operators of key Chinese information infrastructure—such as telecommunications firms and state-owned banks—against purchasing the company’s goods.
[…] The Chinese ban came less than two months after Beijing announced an investigation on imports from Micron, the largest memory-chip maker in the U.S., in what seemed a political gesture aimed at hitting back at a sweeping ban Washington put in place late last year on selling advanced chip-making technology to China.
[…] “Other domestic customers may also consider this to be a political signal to stop buying, and even replace, their products,” said Lester Ross, a Beijing-based lawyer at WilmerHale, who advises American companies in China. [Source]
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2023/05/china-and-g7-nations-trade-accusations-of-economic-coercion-deepen-geopolitical-fault-lines/
Monday 22 May 2023
Friday 19 May 2023
Museum Dedicated to Migrant Workers to Shut Its Doors
On May 18, a social media post (archived here) announced the impending closure and demolition of a well-known museum dedicated to documenting the lives and improving the welfare of China’s migrant workers. The Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art (打工文化艺术博物馆, Dǎgōng Wénhuà Yìshù Bówùguǎn) was established in 2008 in Pi Village, a working-class neighborhood in the far northeastern corner of Beijing, near the airport. Its exhibitions often involved displays of the artifacts of workers’ lives—their personal photos, letters, temporary residence permits, employment certificates, pay slips, IOUs, labor contracts, work injury certificates, clothing, tools, and other possessions. The museum was also affiliated with a non-profit that offered various services such as a reading room, a cinema, a secondhand store, and even a school for the children of migrant workers.
The Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art, lauded even by Chinese state media, helped to transform many workers’ lives, create a sense of shared community, and elevate the contributions of all workers. It will be deeply missed. CDT has translated the full text of the museum’s moving farewell letter, penned by Yuan Changwu:
In the process of China’s industrialization and urbanization, hundreds of millions of migrant workers from rural areas have made indelible contributions, yet the cultural history of this group rarely enters the public eye. At the Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art, we aim to record the vicissitudes and cultural history of contemporary workers, and to advocate respect for and recognition of the value of their labor.
The Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art is the only non-profit museum in China founded by grassroots migrant workers. Since its official public opening on May 1, 2008, it has been open daily to the public free of charge, and has received more than 50,000 visitors.
The Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art is scheduled to be demolished. There will be a farewell ceremony on Saturday [May 20, 2023]. All interested friends are welcome to come and participate!
A Farewell to the Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art!
I humbly bid you farewell,
Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art.
The country’s first museum dedicated to migrant workers
will be closed indefinitely,
forming the last stroke of the character for “demolition” (拆, chāi).
This event, too, will be written into the history of the migrant workers’ museum.
Allow me to also bid farewell to—
Sun Zhigang, who lacked a temporary residence permit
Zhang Haichao, who had his chest cut open to biopsy his lungs
Cui Yingjie, who set up a street stall
and the 31 migrant workers in the “black brick kiln incident.”
Let me also say goodbye to—
Migrant workers who demand their back wages
All those who defend the rights of workers
My brother-workers pedaling three-wheeled carts in the rain
My sister-workers toiling on the assembly line.
Let me also bid farewell to—
Those children known as “migrant kids”
Xiao Cui, host of the “Migrant Workers’ Spring Festival Gala“
The aunties making scallion pancakes from their streetside carts
The construction workers in their hard hats.
Given this passage in the annals of time,
why would we leave it blank?
Given that history is written by the People,
why overlook our existence?
The history of migrant workers
coincides with the history of an era.
The Museum of Working People’s Culture and Art
makes it clear—
Without our culture there is no history.
Without our history there is no future.–Written in Picun (Pi Village), Beijing, on May 13, 2023 [Chinese]
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2023/05/museum-dedicated-to-migrant-workers-to-shut-its-doors/
New Reports on China’s International Media Strategy
Chinese state media’s external-facing content has become increasingly known for its aggressive stance towards Western geopolitical rivals and its ideological consistency under centralized leadership. Recent reports about Chinese state media, as well as reports from Chinese state media, emphasize this trend and demonstrate how it plays into Beijing’s efforts to exert international discourse power.
On Thursday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a report titled “America’s Coercive Diplomacy and Its Harm.” The report states that it “aims to expose the evil deeds of US coercive diplomacy in the world and make the international community better understand the hegemonic and bullying nature of US diplomacy, and the serious damages caused by US actions to the development of all countries, regional stability and world peace.” Manoj Kewalramani from Tracking People’s Daily provided a summary of the main sections and points of the report:
First, the hegemony of the dollar “is an important foundation for US economic coercion.” In this bit, the report talks about sanctions, “cutting off other countries’ dollar supply and trading channels,” “long-arm jurisdiction” and trade control measures like “restrictions on imports and exports, imposition of tariffs, elimination of subsidies and quotas” and use of “lists to fit different purposes and targets, including lists of specially designated nationals, lists of entities, unverified lists, lists of military end users, and lists of industry sanctions.”
Second, democracy promotion and use of human rights “to carry out political coercion and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.”
Third, use of the US military.
Fourth, the use of “soft powers of culture and science and technology” as “covert means for the US to engage in ideological infiltration and coercive diplomacy.” This includes the use of the media, Hollywood, non-profits, etc. For instance, “US intelligence agencies have established a large number of ‘infiltration organizations’ around the world. Various foundations and non-governmental organizations have become ‘middlemen’ in exporting American values and ‘pioneers’ in cultural infiltration. The National Endowment for Democracy, the Congress for Cultural Freedom and other American ‘infiltration organizations’ and institutions have promoted American cultural and political views to other countries through financial support, training, publication and conference, to export American values and ideology to the world, and to pursue cultural hegemony.” [Source]
The report was amplified to foreign audiences by Chinese state media outlets. Xinhua, CGTN, China Daily, Global Times, and People’s Daily all ran stories on the report. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin gave a lengthy endorsement of the report in his Friday press conference. On Twitter, the report was shared by not only state–media accounts but also by Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hua Chunying and Chinese diplomatic accounts in Pakistan, Iran, South Africa, Canada, Sweden, Latvia, France, the U.K., and the U.N.
This coordinated surge in combative coverage is a change under Xi Jinping’s tenure. In a blog post for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, researcher and former long-serving BBC international news journalist Vivien Marsh reflected on how China’s English-language state-media news has evolved over time to become more centralized and aggressive in its messaging:
The relaunch of CCTV-News as CGTN (China Global Television Network) on the last day of 2016 brought about a deliberate change of tone. If CCTV-News was the product of Hu Jintao’s ‘soft power’ China, CGTN reflected the more assertive, uncompromising era of Xi Jinping in which the media’s role was to ‘have the Party as its family name’. CGTN did not abandon soft power but added sharp power to its mix, including the deliberate sowing of doubt in Western news reports and a muscular use of the West’s open social media platforms to proclaim Beijing’s views. Instead of ignoring Western accounts of the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, as was normal for Chinese media, CGTN tackled them head-on. It used news features, documentaries and YouTube videos to praise Beijing’s uncompromising anti-terrorism measures and its ‘re-education’ of disadvantaged minorities. The channel highlighted Western narratives in order to deride them.
[…] In the push-pull between CGTN’s news staff and a new shoal of managers, ‘small acts of journalism’ in the channel’s China news appear to have been snuffed out. Nowadays the stars of the network are, increasingly, those who proclaim the Party line. This is a tragedy for talented Chinese journalists, and for many foreigners who joined the channel to do a professional job on an alternative agenda. There is still evidence of robust and credible reporting by CGTN on matters that do not directly involve Beijing, but news about China itself is the channel’s Achilles heel.
[…] The Chinese state does not need to be loved, it now appears – just to be heard and seen. [Source]
CCTV is a textbook example of projecting narratives without necessarily seeking to win over audiences. As Phil Cunningham documents in his CCTV Follies substack, CCTV’s news broadcast “Xinwen Lianbo” typically ends each segment by portraying havoc in the U.S. and other Western countries, while showing daily, glorifying footage of Russian military attacks in Ukraine. China’s “fight” reaction to the narrative battle over the war has only intensified since the invasion, and Chinese state media have led the charge.
Personnel changes also point to a future tightening of state media’s external communication strategy. This week, China announced that Cao Shumin will lead the country’s National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA). Cao was previously deputy director of the powerful Cyberspace Administration of China, tasked with censoring and managing content on the Chinese internet. She will now concurrently serve as a deputy minister of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. China Media Project described the global focus of the NRTA’s mission, and Cao’s ideological credentials:
A ministry-level agency directly under the CPD charged with overseeing state-run enterprises in film and broadcasting, the NRTA now also plays a much wider role in external communication activities through these media groups as well as through various subsidiaries and exchanges.
The NRTA was created in 2018 amid the same wave of mergers that resulted in the China Media Group. It has funded and promoted numerous film and documentary projects intended for external propaganda, many of these distributed through partnerships with global media companies. The Chinese Association for Radio, Film and TV Exchanges (中华广播影视交流协会), or CARFTE, is a unit under the NRTA often pursuing co-productions on documentaries overseas.
[…] In a November 2021 article on page 9 of the CCP’s official People’s Daily, Cao wrote about the importance of “ideological and political education” (思想政治工作). In the piece, essentially an act of loyalty signaling to Xi Jinping, Cao described political indoctrination as a primary task in higher education that should be implemented “throughout the whole process of education and teaching.” [Source]
Last week, Björn Alpermann and Michael Malzer published an article in the journal Modern China, titled “‘In Other News’: China’s International Media Strategy on Xinjiang—CGTN and New China TV on YouTube.” They describe it as the first comprehensive, systematic analysis of Chinese state media’s handling of the Xinjiang human rights crisis. The article assesses the types of discourse used to defend and shape China’s international image, and highlights the growing sophistication of state media messages over time:
[A]s our quantitative analysis demonstrates, Chinese state media use YouTube to methodically disseminate mostly positive depictions of Xinjiang, while directly countering criticism has been the primary mode only during heightened episodes of contention. Since July 2020 in particular, they scaled back the terror narrative and the showing of atrocities committed in China and tremendously expanded the development narrative as well as culture and nature broadcasts. Thus Chinese state media are more productive in spinning their own yarns than refuting accusations directly.
[…Our analysis] finds that the media messages and forms of delivery have become more variegated and sophisticated over time. Within the development narrative we highlight the recently introduced genre of personal development stories as a major tactical innovation to increase persuasive power. This has even spilled over into the usually staid and statistics-laden white papers themselves. We also stress how different tropes, such as women’s liberation, expected to hold sway among international audiences, are woven into the fabric of the development narrative. The culture- and history-related narratives clearly serve political ends too, with their emphasis on long-term territorial integrity, multiethnicity, multireligiosity, and multiculturalism in Xinjiang. In addition, they present a glimpse of what the Chinese state envisions as goal of its current Xinjiang policies: a reformed, secular, modern lifestyle and a Uyghur identity centered on the Chinese nation-state in which ethnic difference is only expressed in nonthreatening (or nonprofane) ways, such as different food preferences. This is indeed “social re-engineering of Uyghur identity” (Smith Finley, 2019: 10), as critics allege, however benign may be the outcome presented in official propaganda videos. [Source]
Africa is one target region where CGTN and other Chinese state media have increased the dissemination of assertive, anti-Western content. CGTN Africa’s homepage currently displays an article summarizing a report titled “The Record on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2022,” the latest edition of its traditional retort to the U.S. State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. It contains graphics highlighting gun violence, hate crimes, souring attitudes towards democracy, and other issues with American society and politics, largely drawn from American media, civil society, and official material. Discussing the influence of Chinese state media in Africa, Bob Wekesa and Paul Nantulya held a conversation last week at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, during which Wekesa highlighted the CCP’s model of total state control of information in the export of Chinese state-media content to Africa:
Chinese disinformation practices in Africa are not new and until recently have been explicitly described by the Chinese government as propaganda campaigns, according to leading media scholar Dr. Bob Wekesa with the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa. Speaking from his experiences working in Kenyan media houses and researching Chinese media, Dr. Wekesa defines China’s approach to the media sector as the “total state control of information.” This conceptualization views information as capital to be exploited by the state rather than a public good grounded in journalistic standards.
[…] Dr. Wekesa relates how many African media professionals seek to preserve their independence and journalistic standards as watchdogs of state officials, leading them to push back on Chinese influence in African media. He recommends that African media professionals continue to seek out educational opportunities to understand changing digital media ecosystems and form partnerships with journalistic enterprises of similar standards. [Source]
source https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2023/05/new-reports-on-chinas-international-media-strategy/
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